Aum Shinrikyo Cult Research Articles

The role of heroic doubling in ideologically motivated state and terrorist violence

The psychiatrist Robert Lifton developed his model of ‘doubling’ to account for the capacity of some human beings to commit atrocities in one compartment of their lives, while continuing to maintain normal social relations in their domestic sphere, a phenomenon which he encountered both in interviews with former Nazi doctors working in concentration camps, and with terrorists belonging to the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult. By supplementing this model with a theory of heroization based on existential anthropology and Jung’s concept of the Shadow, a composite heuristic explanatory paradigm is formed, ‘heroic doubling’, which may contribute to the empathetic understanding of acts of extreme violence being carried out by individuals who do not present symptoms of psychiatric disorder and maintain normal existences, yet are prepared to kill and be killed for a cause that confers on their lives a sense of transcendent purpose and sacrality.

Writing Guilt: Haruki Murakami and the Archives of National Mourning

In the work of mourning it is not grief that works: grief keeps watch. Blanchot, Writing of the Disaster Every work of art is an uncommitted crime. Adorno, Minima Moralia Who can swear that our unconscious is not expecting this? Derrida, No Apocalypse, Not Now I. In 1995, traumatic events occurred in Japan. On 17 January, an earthquake struck Kobe, killing five thousand people. On 20 March, the Aum Shinrikyo cult released sarin gas into the Tokyo subway system killing twelve and injuring four thousand, some permanently. These events powerfully traumatized Japanese society, exposing as it did hidden--one might say, subterranean--uncertainties and anxieties. As Haruki Muramaki puts it in Underground: [events] were nightmarish eruptions beneath our feet--from underground--that threw all the latent contradictions and weak points of our society into frighteningly high relief. Japanese society proved all too defenseless against these sudden onslaughts. We were unable to see them coming and failed to prepare (237). These events, two of the greatest tragedies in Japanese postwar history (237), present serious challenges to Murakami, both as novelist and citizen of Japan. On the one hand, the events demand memorialization, demand, that is, a mourning response; yet on the other, these historical events, so cataclysmic, so beyond imagining, resist representation, resist language itself. It is here, in the crucible of history's impossible claims, that an aporetic guilt arises for Murakami and perhaps for Japan: the guilt of failing to imagine the possibility of trauma (We were unable to see them coming) and the traumatic guilt of being unable to imagine the means to represent the traumatic event in order properly to mourn. And for Murakami the problem of representation is a problem of guilt, a guilty problem: he is faced with the difficulty of attempting to represent trauma and the problem of representing guilt. Both of Murakami's narrative responses to these traumas (after the quake and Underground) represent Murakami's (guilty) attempt to speak of guilt, to speak through guilt (and thus to mourn), and to speak of the fundamental impossibility of representing guilt within language itself a priori incapable of accommodating trauma. (1) Blanchot's words from Writing of the Disaster are thus crucial in what follows: The disaster, unexperienced. It is what escapes the very possibility of experience--it is the limit of writing [limite de l'ecriture] (7). disaster defies representation, and in some profound way this defiance--the disaster's resistance to representation--becomes the disaster. What Murakami's texts implicitly argue is that authentic trauma--and the guilt arising from that trauma--is not the initial event but the failure to represent that event: the disaster is both the limitation of writing and that which, as border or boundary, encloses writing's impossibility. What then can be said about guilt, for guilt, within this limit-space where writing becomes its own effacement, its own impossibility, its own disastrous immolation? after the quake and Underground stand as testimony, as witness, to Murakami's attempt to find the appropriate narrative means to express the disaster. after the quake is a series of six short stories (I will analyze here); Undergound, in its English version, is a series of interviews with victims of the sarin attack (Part One) and with members, past and current, of the Aum Shinrikyo cult (Part Two). In Underground, Murakami makes clear that the workings of memory displace historical events, transforming trauma into another narrative: Simply put, our memories of experience are rendered into something like a narrative form. To a greater or lesser extent, this is a natural function of memory--a process that novelists consciously utilize as a profession. truth of is told will differ, however slightly, from whatever actually happened. …

A review of recent unexpected animal disease events in Japan and Korea and the follow-up action taken

In Japan, the need to improve countermeasures against biological weapons was recognised after the Aum Shinrikyo cult attempted to use biological weapons in 1995. This paper describes how the two relevant ministries in Japan worked together to cope with recent disease outbreaks, including cases of classical swine fever (CSF) and avian influenza, which evidence suggests might have been the result of the deliberate misuse of unauthorised vaccines that had been illegally imported. By implementing successful control measures the two ministries were able to eradicate all the diseases within very short periods. In the past few years, the Republic of Korea has also experienced outbreaks of foot and mouth disease, highly pathogenic avian influenza, and CSF, all of which had previously been absent (or had been eradicated) in Korea. A review of the historical background, major events of the outbreaks and the control measures which were implemented are presented here.

The problem of biological weapons

The problem of biological weapons

An innovative approach to training hospital-based clinicians for bioterrorist attacks

The recent attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent dissemination event of anthrax in the United States demonstrated the necessity for hospitals to initiate bioterrorism education for clinicians. Events such as the release of sarin gas into the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinrikyo cult provided some insight into how quickly emergency medical personnel may be overwhelmed by causalities of unconventional weapons. Educational interventions to prepare hospital-based practitioners for such disasters must fit among the demands of patient care, administrative duties, and continuing education within specialties. In addition, the priority placed on the topic, confusion about reputable resources to consult, and concerns of funding for preparedness training mandate the need for an authoritative, comprehensive, and easily accessible approach. A pilot project supported in part by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality was developed to facilitate streamlining of preparedness efforts through the implementation of interactive screen savers as an alternative to traditional educational modalities. This report presents the successful application of this model, which was quantified with pretests and posttests given to users of the system.

The history of biological warfare: Human experimentation, modern nightmares and lone madmen in the twentieth century

The history of biological warfare: Human experimentation, modern nightmares and lone madmen in the twentieth century

Aum Shinrikyo and Spiritual Emergency

This article investigates the phenomenon of the dark night of the soul and how it has developed into a serious spiritual emergency in Japan. Japanese society is highly interdependent, which prevents people from developing a strong sense of individuality. For Japanese people, social harmony has the highest priority, and they are pressured to sacrifice their individuality to maintain that harmony. In psychodynamic terms, they develop a strong group ego to compensate for their vulnerable individual ego structure. When a Japanese person recognizes that group ego is an unsatisfactory construct, he or she faces an existential isolation of his or her vulnerable ego. Some cannot put up with the fear of the dark night of the soul and look for an alternative group ego on which to depend. They tend to embrace this new group ego as a way to resist fear from deep unconscious realms. If this alternative group ego is not accepted by mainstream society, it may become radicalized and even hostile to society. The Aum Shinrikyo cult, which in 1994 and 1995 killed many people in poison gas attacks, provides an extreme example of an alternative group ego. In this article, the author explains the mechanism of how individuals came to embrace a radical group ego by applying Washburn’s developmental model to this particular cult.

A Review Article on Nerve Agents

The incidence of Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in 1995 had raised the concern of the use of nerve agent as a weapon in terrorist attack. The recent event in World Trade Centre in New York city had further brought our attention to the possibility of terrorist attacks using these agents. In view of the high possibility of nerve agents being used as chemical weapon, medical personnel should have a clear knowledge of these agents. This article aim to provide a detailed discussion of these agents.

Molecular investigation of the Aum Shinrikyo anthrax release in Kameido, Japan.

In 1993, the Aum Shinrikyo cult aerosolized Bacillus anthracis spores over Kameido, Japan. Spore samples were obtained from the release site, cultured, and characterized by molecular genetic typing. The isolates were consistent with strain Sterne 34F2, which is used in Japan for animal prophylaxis against anthrax.

When Terror Strikes, Who Should Respond?

During the past decade, concerns about possible terrorist acts involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) led Congress and the President to adopt a comprehensive counterterrorism plan focused on preventing a chemical, biological, or nuclear attack and enhancing domestic preparedness. The agency of choice for domestic consequence management has been the Department of Defense. Of the $1.4 billion appropriated in the FY 2000 budget specifically for WMD response, over half went to DOD. [1] Overreliance on the military for domestic WMD protection, however, may diminish the military's warfighting capability and holds the potential for infringement of individual rights. Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), signed in 1995, and the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 are the cornerstones of the United States' WMD terrorism strategy. This strategy is divided into four elements: intelligence and warning; prevention and deterrence; crisis and consequence management; and acquisition of equipment and technology. While crisis management involves the criminal aspect of dealing with a WMD attack, consequence management (CM) involves treating victims of the attack, searching for survivors, ensuring the containment of victims who are infected or exposed, and cleaning up the attack area. A number of agencies are involved in domestic preparedness. The National Security Council is the interagency consequence management coordinator; the Justice Department, through the FBI, handles crisis management and is responsible for preventing an attack; the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for consequence management after an attack; and first-responders include local municipalities and state governments. But DOD has been assigned a disproportionate amount of domestic consequence management responsibilities. This is due to the national security threat of WMD terrorism and the historical reliance on the military to solve complex domestic issues. The assumptions that led to PDD-39 and the Federal Response Plan may no longer be applicable, however, as new information and analysis draw differing conclusions on the threat of WMD terrorism. This article will discuss the Defense Department's role in domestic consequence management following a catastrophic terrorist attack. Catastrophic terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and all refer to the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological agents to bring about a major disaster with death tolls of ten thousand or higher. [2] The scope of this article will be limited to the discussion of superterrorism and not include other types of terrorism, such as conventional terrorism or small-scale chemical or biological weapons (CBW) terrorism. Pan Am 103, Khobar Towers, and the East African embassy bombings were incidents of conventional terrorism, for example, and the Aum Shinrikyo's sarin attack in Tokyo was an example of small-scale CBW terrorism. While the threat is no less serious, the low probability and unique political circumstances of an incident of nuclear terrorism exclude such weapons from this discussion. [3] Bringing the Issue into Focus Four events of the 1990s significantly sharpened the nation's perception of chemical-biological warfare and catastrophic terrorism. First, Saddam Hussein used his intermediate-range Scud missiles to demonstrate the paralyzing possibility of operating in a contaminated environment during the Persian Gulf War. Second, the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 demonstrated that foreign terrorists could not only operate on American soil, but could launch a chemical attack. [4] Third, the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 proved that domestic terrorists could harm the nation. And fourth, the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinrikyo cult made chemical warfare a reality. The United States responded to the threat of terrorism, particularly superterrorism, when President Clinton signed PDD-39 in June 1995, PDD-62 in May 1998, and the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act. …

Aum Shinrikyo's Biological Weapons Program: Why Did it Fail?

During the six years since the Aum Shinrikyo cult's nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system, the United States has undertaken a major effort to prevent and respond to terrorist acts involving nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical weapons. Given this high level of official activity, it is remarkable that Aum's protracted and costly, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempts to acquire and use mass-casualty biological agents has received scant analytical attention. Specifically, there has been relatively little focus on one critical question: Why did this apparently sophisticated and lavishly funded program ultimately fail? Aum's failure suggests that it may, in fact, be far more difficult to carry out a deadly bioterrorism attack than has sometimes been portrayed by government officials and the press. Despite its significant financial resources, dedicated personnel, motivation, and freedom from the scrutiny of the Japanese authorities, Aum was unable to achieve its objectives. The Aum case illustrates how acquiring virulent strains of biological agents can be a major hurdle for prospective bioterrorists. Cult-like terrorist organizations, the ones that appear to have the greatest interest in mass-casualty biological weapons, may be least suited to meet the complex demands associated with a bioweapon program. As the Aum example illustrates, a paranoid, fantasy-prone and sometimes violent atmosphere is not conducive to the sound scientific judgement needed to produce mass-casualty biological weapons.

Aum Shinrikyo's Biological Weapons Program: Why Did it Fail?

During the six years since the Aum Shinrikyo cult's nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system, the United States has undertaken a major effort to prevent and respond to terrorist acts involving nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical weapons. Given this high level of official activity, it is remarkable that Aum's protracted and costly, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempts to acquire and use mass-casualty biological agents has received scant analytical attention. Specifically, there has been relatively little focus on one critical question: Why did this apparently sophisticated and lavishly funded program ultimately fail? Aum's failure suggests that it may, in fact, be far more difficult to carry out a deadly bioterrorism attack than has sometimes been portrayed by government officials and the press. Despite its significant financial resources, dedicated personnel, motivation, and freedom from the scrutiny of the Japanese authorities, Aum was unable to achieve its objectives. The Aum case illustrates how acquiring virulent strains of biological agents can be a major hurdle for prospective bioterrorists. Cult-like terrorist organizations, the ones that appear to have the greatest interest in mass-casualty biological weapons, may be least suited to meet the complex demands associated with a bioweapon program. As the Aum example illustrates, a paranoid, fantasy-prone and sometimes violent atmosphere is not conducive to the sound scientific judgement needed to produce mass-casualty biological weapons.

Bioterrorism preparedness: planning for the future.

The release of nerve gas in a Tokyo subway and attempted releases of biological agents by the Aum Shinrikyo cult have demonstrated the willingness and ability of modern-day terrorists to use unconventional weapons. Unlike explosive weapons, the use of biologic weapons may only become apparent once people become ill. The detection and response to these man-made outbreaks will occur initially at the medical and public health levels. Therefore, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and its partners are strengthening their response, disease detection, diagnostic, and communication capabilities to better protect the nation's citizens against biological or chemical terrorism.

Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat

foreword by William S. Cohen, U.S. Secretary of Defense Biological weapons pose a horrifying and growing threat to the United States and to the world in general. Revelations about Iraq's weapons research and the plans of the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan serve as frightening reminders of the potential for military or terrorist use of biological agents.The essays in this book, many of which were originally published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, examine the medical, scientific, and political dimensions of limiting the threat posed by biological weapons. The contributors consider the current threat posed by biological weapons, the history of attempts to control them, episodes in which biological agents have been used, Iraq's biological warfare program, and policies that the United States might pursue to reduce the threat.Contributors : Suzanne Barth, Pamela Berkowsky, Kristin A. Birkness, Stephen Black, W. Russell Byrne, W. Seth Carus, Marie Chevrier, George W. Christopher, Theodore J. Cieslak, Richard Danzig, Edward M. Eitzen, Jr., Charles C. Engel, James R. Ferguson, Laurence R. Foster, David R. Franz, Arthur M. Friedlander, Carol S. Fullerton, Jeanne Guillemin, Charles E. Haley, Harry C. Holloway, David L. Hoover, John M. Horan, Martin Hugh-Jones, Peter B. Jahrling, Robert P. Kadlec, Akiko Kimura, Shellie A. Kolavic, Alexander Langmuir, John R. Livengood, Karl Lowe, Steven Mauvais, David J. McClain, Matthew Meselson, Ann E. Norwood, Julie A. Pavlin, Graham S. Pearson, Ilona Popova, Alexis Shelokov, Jeffrey D. Simon, Shauna L. Simons, Michael R. Skeels, Laurence Slutsker, Robert Sokolow, Robert V. Tauxe, Thomas J. Torok, Jonathan B. Tucker, Robert J. Ursano, Victor Utgoff, Ann M. Vrtis, Robert P. Wise, Olga Yampolskaya, Allan P. Zellicoff, Raymond A. Zilinskas