Auction Contract Research Articles

Enhancing Auction Systems with Blockchain Technology

This research paper examines the use of blockchain technology in auction systems. Traditional auction systems face issues related to trust, transparency, and security. Blockchain offers a decentralized and immutable solution that can enhance the efficiency, security, and transparency of auctions. The paper provides an overview of blockchain technology and identifies the challenges in traditional auctions that blockchain can address. It explores existing blockchain-based auction systems and evaluates their effectiveness in mitigating issues such as bid manipulation and fraud. The impact of blockchain on auction participants is also discussed, including benefits like increased trust and reduced transaction costs, as well as challenges related to adoption and scalability. The paper considers both theoretical and practical aspects, analyzing case studies and implementation challenges. It concludes by summarizing the key findings and suggesting future research directions to advance the application of blockchain in auction systems. The auction contract allows users to place bids and determine the highest bidder within a specified time period. The contract also provides functionality for canceling the auction and finalizing it by transferring the funds to the appropriate recipients.

Akad Tidak Bernama Dalam Hukum Kontrak Bisnis Syariah

Studying unnamed contracts is an important requirement for economic business actors, especially sharia economic actors. The rapid development of the economy and business requires business actors to study unnamed contract forms in sharia business practices in order to respond to the challenges of the times. This research will examine unnamed contracts in sharia business contract law. This type of research is library research, which is a study by examining data from various literature. The results of the study show that unnamed contracts are contracts that are not specifically regulated in fiqh books and do not have special provisions. This contract is made and determined by the parties according to their needs. The provisions that apply in this contract refer to the provisions of the general theory of the contract (naẓriyyat al-'aqd) and are guided by the principle of freedom of contract (mabda' ḥurriyat at-ta'āqud). An example of an unnamed contract is istishnā', bai al -wafa, istijrār, tahkīr, book publishing contracts, advertising contracts, auction contracts, fiduciary contracts, leasing contracts, franchising contracts, consignment contracts, lease purchase agreements and others.

Complexities with Auction Contracts: The Need for Continual Regulation

Complexities with Auction Contracts: The Need for Continual Regulation

Misdescription and Misrepresentation Liability Arising Out of Art Auctions in New Zealand

Assumptions that successful bidders carry the risk in terms of artwork that is either mis-described or misrepresented by art auctioneers is challenged, for New Zealand at least. This is because descriptions of works to be auctioned are invariably proffered in sale catalogs as unqualified assertions of fact (or opinion based on fact), inviting reliance. Further, consumer protection legislation in New Zealand overrides privity of contract, enabling courts to give relief where the auction contract terms are found to be unfairly weighted against the successful bidder, as a consumer. For New Zealand, these arguments may be more persuasively made, given a significant number of bidders are members of the general public.

CReam: A Smart Contract Enabled Collusion-Resistant e-Auction

Auction is an effective way to allocate goods or services to bidders who value them the most. The rapid growth of e-auctions facilitates online transactions but poses new and distinctive challenges. It is difficult to establish trust among sellers, buyers, and auctioneers without centralized auction websites or platforms (the auctioneer) which collect bids and derive the auction results. However, these third parties may be untrustworthy, and malicious sellers or buyers may refuse to deliver the goods or payment according to the protocol. Moreover, the open and anonymous online environment may stimulate auction participants to form collusion coalitions to rig the auction and reap unfair profit. Many auction designs have been proposed to address these concerns, but they fall short of simultaneously achieving decentralization (i.e., held without a trusted third utility), strong consensus (i.e., the establishment of trust), collusion resistance, and practical implementation. We present CReam , the first decentralized collusion-resistant e-auction system that is implemented with smart contract on the blockchain. With the carefully designed smart auction contract, mutually distrustful and rational sellers and buyers are stimulated to operate properly, hence transact safely without trusted third parties. The auction mechanism in the smart contract can effectively prevent bidder collusion and realize economic robustness, i.e., truthfulness. We implement a fully functional CReam on the Ethereum network. Extensive experimental results confirm that CReam can greatly reduce the probability of collusion and achieve an approximate optimal revenue at a low cost of contract execution.

Combining Buy-In Penalties with Commissions at Auction Houses

Most auction sellers consign property to auction houses rather than holding the auction themselves. In addition to charging sellers a commission on property that sells in the auction, many auction houses also specify buy-in penalties in auction contracts. This is an amount the seller must pay the auction house if the property fails to sell at auction. An important managerial question for auction houses is whether and when buy-in penalties can increase revenues of the auction house, seller, or both, and what combinations of commission and buy-in penalty to use. We show that auctions which combine buy-in penalties with lower commissions Pareto-dominate auctions that use only commissions. This strategy motivates the seller to set a lower reserve, which creates a surplus in auction revenues that can go to one or both parties. This strategy is Pareto-dominant even if the auction house and the seller are uncertain about the number of bidders at the auction, or the auction house is uncertain about the seller's own valuation for the property, at the time the buy-in penalty, commission, and reserve are contractually set. We also discuss the incentive issues raised by this strategy.

A Model of Auction Contracts with Liquidated Damages

This paper develops an auction model in which the winning bidder has an opportunity to cancel the transaction and pay damages to the seller. In the event of a default on the auction contract, the winning bidder pays liquidated damages or loses a posted deposit. When renegotiation is possible, increasing the deposit has no effect on the seller′s payoff unless the seller has some bargaining power and exogenously receives some information about the winning bidder. Under these conditions the seller′s payoff is decreasing in the level of the deposit. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44.