False Belief Attribution Research Articles

Stress affects the prediction of others' behavior.

Predicting behavior of other people is vital for successful social interactions. We tested whether a stress-induced cortisol increase affects healthy young men's prediction of another individual's behavior. Forty-two participants were randomly assigned to a stress or to a control condition. Afterwards, they participated in a modified false-belief task that not only tests false-belief understanding but also the tendency to predict another person's future behavior based on his former behavior. Subjective ratings and salivary cortisol concentrations revealed a successful stress induction. Stress did not affect participants' attribution of false beliefs but it increased the probability to predict that a protagonist would act according to his former behavior. Recognizing that stress fosters the interpretation of others' behavior following their former behavior and not their current goals extends previous research showing that stress fosters our own habitual behavior.

Superior social cognitive abilities in childhood are associated with better reward-seeking strategies in adolescence: evidence for a Social-Motivational Flexibility Model

We examined the role of a crucial component of Theory of Mind in childhood, namely the attribution of false beliefs to other agents, in the ability to adjust risk-taking strategies during decision-making in adolescence. The analytic sample was 9575 children from the UK's Millennium Cohort Study, followed at ages 5, 7, and 14 years. The ability to attribute false beliefs was measured at ages 5 and 7 years through a vignette version of the Sally-Anne Task administered by an unfamiliar assessor in a socially demanding dyadic interaction. Risk adjustment was measured at age 14 years with the Cambridge Gambling Task. Even after controlling for a range of individual and family factors, such as sex, ethnicity, verbal ability, family income, and parental education, as well as emotional and behavioural problems, we found that social cognitive abilities in childhood are positively associated with risk adjustment in decision-making during adolescence.

The influence of group membership on false-belief attribution in preschool children

The ability to infer beliefs and thoughts in interaction partners is essential in social life. However, reasoning about other people’s beliefs might depend on their characteristics or our relationship with them. Recent studies indicated that children’s false-belief attribution was influenced by a protagonist’s age and competence. In the current experiments, we investigated whether group membership influences the way children reason about another person’s beliefs. We hypothesized that 4-year-olds would be less likely to attribute false beliefs to an ingroup member than to an outgroup member. Group membership was manipulated by accent (Experiments 1–3) and gender (Experiment 4). The results indicated that group membership did not consistently influence children’s false-belief attribution. Future research should clarify whether the influence of group membership on false-belief attribution either is absent or depends on other cues that we did not systematically manipulate in our study.

A two-lab direct replication attempt of Southgate, Senju and Csibra (2007).

The study by Southgate et al. (2007 Psychol. Sci. 18, 587–592. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x)) has been widely cited as evidence for false-belief attribution in young children. Recent replication attempts of this paradigm have yielded mixed results: several studies did not replicate the original findings, raising doubts about the suitability of the paradigm to assess non-verbal action prediction and Theory of Mind. In a preregistered collaborative study including two of the original authors, we tested one hundred and sixty 24- to 26-month-olds across two locations using the original stimuli, procedure and analyses as closely as possible. We found no evidence for action anticipation: only roughly half of the infants looked to the location of an agent's impending action when action prediction did not require taking into account the agent's beliefs and a similar number when the agent held a false-belief. These results and other non-replications suggest that this paradigm does not reliably elicit action prediction and thus cannot assess false-belief understanding in 2-year-olds. While the present results do not support any claim regarding the presence or absence of Theory of Mind in infants, we conclude that an important piece of evidence that has to date supported arguments for the existence of this competence can no longer serve that function.

The Dynamic Differences between Self- and Other-Oriented Mental Inferences: An ERP Study on a False-Belief Task.

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to infer others' mental states. In our everyday lives, we need to interact constantly and appropriately with others. Not only is ToM involved in understanding others' mental states (other-oriented mental inferences), but it also helps to keep our own mental states (self-oriented mental inferences). In this study, we designed a false-belief task using event-related potential (ERP) measures to investigate the dynamic differences between the two types of mental inferences. In the false-belief task, participants were prompted with a cue to attribute a belief to either themselves (self-oriented) or another person (other-oriented). Results showed that other-oriented false-belief attribution elicited a larger late positive component (LPC; 320~440 ms post-cue onset) than the one elicited by self-oriented attribution at bilateral parieto-occipital electrodes, and also a larger late negative component (LNC; 380~500 ms post-cue onset) at frontal-central electrodes. In addition, the difference in amplitude of LPC between the two types of false-belief attribution was positively correlated with self-reported autistic traits measured by the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ). Based on prior literature, we propose that the LPC and LNC reflect the processes of self-other distinction and conflict control, respectively. Moreover, the difficulty in distinguishing other from the self is related to one's degree of autistic traits.

Infants' performance in the indirect false belief tasks: A second‐person interpretation

Research in the last 15 years has challenged the idea that false belief attribution develops at 4 years of age. Studies with indirect false belief tasks contend to provide evidence of false belief attribution in the second year of life. We review the literature on indirect false belief tasks carried out in infants using looking and active helping paradigms. Although the results are heterogeneous and not conclusive, such tasks appear to capture a real effect. However, it is misleading to call them “false belief” tasks, as it is possible to pass them without making any false belief attribution. Infants need to keep track of the object's and agent's positions, trajectories, and focus of attention, given an intentional understanding of the agent, to pass these new tasks. We, therefore, argue that the evidence can be better explained in terms of second‐person attributions, which are transparent, extensional, nonpropositional, reciprocally contingent, and implicit. Second‐person attributions can also account for primates' mentalizing abilities, as revealed by similar indirect tasks.This article is categorized under:Cognitive Biology > Cognitive DevelopmentPhilosophy > Foundations of Cognitive ScienceCognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition

Understanding emotional language through events and words in people with Williams syndrome

ABSTRACT Previous studies have mainly examined emotion recognition through face processing in individuals with Williams syndrome (WS). Contextual integration is an automatic and basic comprehension ability emerged from distinct modalities. This ability requires sensation to global configuration and local elements. However, neurodevelopmental disorders are characterized by local-focusing and global-ignoring in visuospatial perception. This causes cognitive atypicality as compared to typical development, including atypical face processing and emotion recognition. These impairments might result in deficits in theory of mind and social cognition. People with WS demonstrate impaired false-belief attribution, which was reported to be improved with emotional cues. Yet, no previous study has examined knowledge of emotional language in people with WS, which might be one of the factors affecting the development of the theory of mind in people with WS. In the present study, we examined knowledge of emotional language in people with WS by testing three emotions: positive, negative, and neutral. Participants were asked to press buttons indexing emotions in reaction to auditory targets. In the emotional event study, people with WS demonstrated responses to positive events in the normal range, delayed responses to negative events, and deviant responses to neutral events. In the emotion word study, people with WS showed the lowest accuracy and longest reaction times for neutral words. These findings indicated asymmetrical and atypical knowledge of emotional language in people with WS, confirming that knowledge of emotional expressions influences the development of the theory of mind and social cognition.

Mentalizing: What’s language got to do with it?

ABSTRACT Understanding that people’s ideas may be false is a challenging step in Theory of Mind (ToM) development, which is accomplished around the age of 4–5 years old by typically developing (TD) children. False-belief attribution remains difficult beyond this age for certain clinical populations, such as Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), where delays in this realm are significant, and Developmental Language Disorder (DLD), where delays tend to be subtler. Research has identified links between ToM success and language skills, in particular complement clauses such as John thought/said that aliens landed in his garden, in TD, as well as in ASD and DLD. It has been hypothesized that these structures serve as tools for representing subjective truths. This article reports results from our experimental work further examining the link between complementation and ToM. Study 1 investigates if complements have a more privileged influence on ToM in ASD and TD children than abilities such as Executive Functions, which arguably also play a role. Study 2 determines if complementation skills in ASD support ToM reasoning or are merely implied in ToM task performance. Study 3 extends the evaluation of complementation in ToM reasoning to DLD and explores whether clinical groups of different etiologies—ASD and DLD—perform comparably for ToM once they have similar complementation skills, as expected by a linguistic determinism approach. Study 4 addresses speculation that complementation training may not be efficient to trigger improved ToM in instances of ToM impairments by empirically testing whether training on complements via a newly created iPad application can be useful for ToM remediation in both ASD and DLD. Taken together, this body of work both enhances our theoretical understanding of the language-cognition interface as well as widens our repertoire of clinical tools addressing difficulties in this domain.

Electrophysiological investigation of infants’ understanding of understanding

Social cognition might play a critical role in language acquisition and comprehension, as mindreading may be necessary to infer the intended meaning of linguistic expressions uttered by communicative partners. In three electrophysiological experiments, we explored the interplay between belief attribution and language comprehension of 14-month-old infants. First, we replicated our earlier finding: infants produced an N400 effect to correctly labelled objects when the labels did not match a communicative partner’s beliefs about the referents. Second, we observed no N400 when we replaced the object with another category member. Third, when we named the objects incorrectly for infants, but congruently with the partner’s false belief, we observed large N400 responses, suggesting that infants retained their own perspective in addition to that of the partner. We thus interpret the observed social N400 effect as a communicational expectancy indicator because it was contingent not on the attribution of false beliefs but on semantic expectations by both the self and the communicative partner. Additional exploratory analyses revealed an early, frontal, positive-going electrophysiological response in all three experiments, which was contingent on infants’ computing the comprehension of the social partner based on attributed beliefs.

Spontaneous attribution of false beliefs in adults examined using a signal detection approach.

Understanding other people have beliefs different from ours or different from reality is critical to social interaction. Previous studies suggest that healthy adults possess an implicit mentalising system, but alternative explanations for data from reaction time false belief tasks have also been given. In this study, we combined signal detection theory (SDT) with a false belief task. As application of SDT allows us to separate perceptual sensitivity from criteria, we are able to investigate how another person's beliefs change the participant's perception of near-threshold stimuli. Participants (n = 55) watched four different videos in which an actor saw (or did not see) a Gabor cube hidden (or not hidden) behind an occluder. At the end of each video, the occluder vanished revealing a cube either with or without Gabor pattern, and participants needed to report whether they saw the Gabor pattern or not. A pre-registered analysis with classical statistics weakly suggests an effect of the actor's belief on participant's perceptions. An exploratory Bayesian analysis supports the idea that when the actor believed the cube was present, participants made slower and more liberal judgements. Although these data are not definitive, these current results indicate the value of new measures for understanding implicit false belief processing.

Theory of Robot Mind: False Belief Attribution to Social Robots in Children With and Without Autism.

This study aims to probe how children with and without autism spectrum disorders (ASD) attribute false belief to a social robot and predict its action accordingly. Twenty 5- to 7-year-old children with ASD and 20 age- and IQ-matched typically developing (TD) children participated in two false belief tasks adapted for robot settings (change-of-location task and the unexpected-contents task). The results showed that most TD children are capable of attributing false belief to the social robot, that is, they could infer higher level mental states in robots, which extends our understanding in TD children’s perception and cognition on social robots. Conversely, children with ASD still show difficulty in interpreting robots’ mental states compared to their TD peers, which would greatly interfere with their interactions and communications with social robots and might impact on efficiency of robot-based intervention and education approaches. This group difference in attributing false belief to social robots could not be explained by the different perception and categorization of the robot. Our study implies that although children with ASD appear to be highly attracted by social robots, they still have difficulty in understanding mental states when socially interacting with robots, which should be taken into consideration when designing the robot-based intervention approach targeting to improve social behaviors of ASD.

Metalinguistic negotiation and speaker error

ABSTRACT In recent work, we have argued that a number of disputes of interest to philosophers – including some disputes amongst philosophers themselves – are metalinguistic negotiations. Prima facie, many of these disputes seem to concern worldly, non-linguistic issues directly. However, on our view, they in fact concern, in the first instance, normative questions about the use of linguistic expressions. This will strike many ordinary speakers as counterintuitive. In many of the disputes that we analyze as metalinguistic negotiations, speakers might quite strongly resist the idea that their debate is in any sense about language. In this paper, we explore and provide responses to what we take to be the best versions of an objection that our view involves an unacceptable attribution of false beliefs to ordinary speakers.

A model’s competence influences false-belief attribution in preschoolers

ABSTRACTThis study investigated whether 4–5-year-olds’ attribution of false beliefs is influenced by a person’s previously demonstrated competence. The children (N = 96) were presented with two protagonists who labelled familiar objects either correctly or incorrectly. Subsequently, these protagonists labelled novel objects differently and it was tested whether children trusted the competent protagonist more than the incompetent protagonist. Finally, one of the protagonists experienced a situation in which it was reasonable to attribute a false belief to this protagonist (change-of-location task). Children were more likely to identify a false belief in the incompetent protagonist, compared to the competent protagonist. This suggests that children’s false-belief understanding is susceptible to situational influences.

Contextual influence over deriving another's false beliefs using a relational triangulation perspective taking protocol (RT-PTP-M2).

The original relational triangulation perspective taking protocol (RT-PTP-M1; Guinther, ) was extended with a second training and testing module (RT-PTP-M2) showing contextual influence over derivation of another's "false beliefs" during an analog of the Sally-Anne test for Theory of Mind (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, ; Wimmer & Perner, ) in verbally competent adults. Under the respective contextual control of experimental stimuli X2 and X3 , participants first learned through direct conditioning procedures that avatars A2 and A3 "behave the same way" towards target stimuli. Participants then made object discriminations under X2 according to the spatial perspective of A2 , who saw an initial target at a particular location but could not see that the target was later swapped with a second target; reporting the identity of the initial target was reinforced for participants. Among participants who had failed baseline testing, this directly trained "false belief attribution" repertoire was then spontaneously emitted by participants relative to the perspective of A3 under X3 during the final test for derivation. Other participants were able to derive false belief under X3 without the X2 attribution training. These results suggest the RT-PTP procedures were successful in causing X3 to acquire context-of-relating functions for exerting control over perspectival relational triangulation.

Retrospective attribution of false beliefs in 3-year-old children

A current debate in psychology and cognitive science concerns the nature of young children's ability to attribute and track others' beliefs. Beliefs can be attributed in at least two different ways: prospectively, during the observation of belief-inducing situations, and in a retrospective manner, based on episodic retrieval of the details of the events that brought about the beliefs. We developed a task in which only retrospective attribution, but not prospective belief tracking, would allow children to correctly infer that someone had a false belief. Eighteen- and 36-month-old children observed a displacement event, which was witnessed by a person wearing sunglasses (Experiment 1). Having later discovered that the sunglasses were opaque, 36-month-olds correctly inferred that the person must have formed a false belief about the location of the objects and used this inference in resolving her referential expressions. They successfully performed retrospective revision in the opposite direction as well, correcting a mistakenly attributed false belief when this was necessary (Experiment 3). Thus, children can compute beliefs retrospectively, based on episodic memories, well before they pass explicit false-belief tasks. Eighteen-month-olds failed in such a task, suggesting that they cannot retrospectively attribute beliefs or revise their initial belief attributions. However, an additional experiment provided evidence for prospective tracking of false beliefs in 18-month-olds (Experiment 2). Beyond identifying two different modes for tracking and updating others' mental states early in development, these results also provide clear evidence of episodic memory retrieval in young children.

Spontaneous false belief attribution develops earlier in less inhibited children

Inspired by the emotional reactivity hypothesis, Wellman et al. (2011) found that explicit false belief attribution is more mature in 5-year-old children who are more observant and less aggressive. Our goal was to complement this result by providing new data on the role of observationally measured behavioral inhibition in the development of early, spontaneous false belief attribution. We assumed that spontaneous false belief attribution develops through social interactions, and it is the child’s temperament that determines how they participate in these. We therefore expected to identify interrelations between temperament and spontaneous false belief attribution. We tested 217 children twice: at 18 months, when the children’s response to unfamiliar objects was measured, and at 36 months, when anticipatory looks following a non-direct prompt were used to measure spontaneous false belief attribution. We found that children who appear confident/less inhibited at the age of 18 months seem to be more skillful at recognizing false beliefs at the age of 3. Our results are consistent with the concept behind the emotional reactivity hypothesis and with the social-interactional and usage-based approach to the development of theory of mind (ToM). They are discussed with respect to the methodology of measurement of false belief attribution and the relationship between spontaneous and explicit ToM.

Growing Up Thinking of God’s Beliefs: Theory of Mind and Ontological Knowledge

The study of social cognition involves the attribution of states of mind to humans, as well as, quite recently, to nonhuman creatures, like God. Some studies support the role of social cognition in religious beliefs, whereas others ascribe religious beliefs to an ontological knowledge bias. The present study compares these distinct approaches in 37 catholic children aged 4 to 10 years, who were administered an adapted version of the unexpected content task assessing false beliefs of different agents: a human, a dog, a robot, and God. The children were also administered an intentionality understanding task, a component of mentalization abilities, and an interview on ontological knowledge assessing emotions, intentions, imagination, and epistemic knowledge. In line with previous research, the results showed that children did not attribute false beliefs to God as they did to the human and to other nonhuman agents. Importantly, while false-belief attribution to the human was associated with the children’s ability to attribute mental states (intentionality understanding), false-belief attribution to God was related to children’s ontological knowledge. We conclude that, contrary to false-belief attribution to the human and to other nonhuman agents, children’s understanding of God’s mind is largely a function of ontological knowledge about God, rather than of children’s social cognitive functions.

False belief attribution in children with Williams syndrome: the answer is in the emotion.

Individuals with Williams syndrome (WS) show difficulties in attributing false beliefs, whereas they are better at attributing emotions. This study examines whether being asked about the emotion linked to a false belief, instead of explicitly about the belief, facilitates performance on theory of mind (ToM) tasks. Thirty children with WS and 90 typically developing children, who were individually matched on mental age (50-112months), were administered six explicit (i.e. questions on belief) and six implicit (i.e. questions on emotion) trials of false belief tasks. Theory of mind competences were related to cognitive development. Children with WS performed comparably to typically developing children on the emotion questions. Correct answers to questions on emotion reveal an implicit understanding of false belief. The Representational redescription process could be impaired in the domain of ToM in this population. This finding has relevant implications for the design of supports aiming to optimise the development of ToM competences in individuals with WS.

Early conversational environment enables spontaneous belief attribution in deaf children

Previous research suggests that deaf children who grow up with hearing parents display considerable difficulties in understanding mental states of others, up to their teenage years when explicitly asked in a verbal test situation (Meristo et al., 2007). On the other hand, typically developing pre-verbal infants display evidence of spontaneous false belief attribution when tested in looking-time tasks, although verbal tests are typically not passed before the age of 4years (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). The purpose of the present study was to examine whether deaf children of hearing parents are able to demonstrate spontaneous belief attribution in a non-verbal eye-tracking task. Thirty 4- to 8-year-old, deaf and hearing children, completed a non-verbal spontaneous-response false-belief task and a verbal elicited-response false-belief task. The deaf children were either children with cochlear implants or children with hearing aids. Comparative analyses were also carried out with a previous sample of deaf and hearing 2-year-olds (reported in Meristo, Morgan, et al., 2012). We found that in the non-verbal spontaneous-response task typically hearing children, but not deaf children, were able to predict that a person with a false belief about an object’s location will search erroneously for the object. However, hearing children and deaf children with implants, but not deaf children with hearing aids, passed the verbal elicited-response task. Language development was significantly correlated with both types of false-belief tasks for the whole sample. Our findings strengthen the hypothesis that the emergence of the ability to recognize others’ beliefs needs to be supported initially by very early conversational input in dialogues with caregivers.

Learning words from speakers with false beliefs.

During communication, hearers try to infer the speaker's intentions to be able to understand what the speaker means. Nevertheless, whether (and how early) preschoolers track their interlocutors' mental states is still a matter of debate. Furthermore, there is disagreement about how children's ability to consult a speaker's belief in communicative contexts relates to their ability to track someone's belief in non-communicative contexts. Here, we study young children's ability to successfully acquire a word from a speaker with a false belief; we also assess the same children's success on a traditional false belief attribution task. We show that the ability to consult the epistemic state of a speaker during word learning develops between the ages of three and five. We also show that false belief understanding in word-learning contexts proceeds similarly to standard belief-attribution contexts when the tasks are equated. Our data offer evidence for the development of mind-reading abilities during language acquisition.