Attitude Extremity Research Articles

American partisans vastly under-estimate the diversity of other partisans’ policy attitudes

Abstract A popular explanation for America's democratic ills is that Republicans and Democrats misperceive one another to hold extreme attitudes. However, Americans may also misperceive the diversity of partisans’ attitudes to ill effect. This paper uses surveys and pre-registered experiments with representative and convenience samples (n = 9405) to validate a measure of perceived attitude extremity and diversity and compare it to canonical measures of perceived polarization. We find that American partisans vastly under-estimate the diversity of each party's attitudes. Yet, contrary to existing research, we see little evidence that partisans over-estimate how extreme the “average” Republican or Democrat is. Finally, perceptions of both the “average” partisan and within-party attitude diversity predict partisan animosity and perceptions of out-party threat.

Attitude extremity and perceived argument diversity exposure in the COVID-19 debate

This study investigates the relationship between attitude extremity and perceived exposure to diverse political arguments in the debate about COVID-19 health policy measures. Based on a comparative, cross-sectional survey in Germany and Switzerland, we show that extreme attitudes towards wearing face masks inhibit citizens’ perceived diversity of arguments regarding the issue in both countries. This tendency is slightly more pronounced for supporters of mask-wearing than opponents. However, contrary to existing concerns about issue-specific echo chambers, even respondents showing strong attitude extremity still experience exposure to a relatively diverse range of arguments for and against wearing face masks.

Effect of asking questions and providing knowledge on attitudes toward organic foods among Japanese consumers.

Some people overestimate the benefits of certain kinds of foods, such as organic foods, while others underestimate it. Previous studies have found that reducing people's self-assessed knowledge successfully moderated these extreme attitudes. In this study, we investigated interventions to reduce people's self-assessed knowledge and to moderate attitude extremity. We examined extreme attitudes toward organic foods and investigated the effects of implementing two intervention methods to moderate their attitude: (1) providing knowledge on organic food after asking them some questions and (2) simply providing them with knowledge. We conducted a two-factor mixed-design experiment with 653 college-educated Japanese women. In the first condition, before knowledge provision, participants were asked to answer questions about organic foods and were then informed of the correct answer and whether their answer was correct (Q&A Intervention). This step was based on an intervention conducted in a previous study to reduce their self-assessed factual knowledge. In the second condition, participants were simply provided with knowledge without being asked to answer any questions (Simple Intervention). The results showed that both intervention methods, on average, decreased the participants' self-assessed knowledge and attitude extremity. Therefore, simply providing knowledge may be effective in reducing their self-assessed factual knowledge and moderating their extreme attitudes toward organic foods.

Effects of biased extrapolation on attitude extremity

AbstractPrevious research has shown that merely thinking about an attitude object can make both positive and negative attitudes more extreme. The present research explored whether a specific type of thought—extrapolating from known to unknown attributes—might make attitudes and behavioural intentions more extreme than reviewing known attributes. In three experiments, extrapolating from a social group's ‘known’ personality traits made positive and negative attitudes and behavioural intentions more extreme than reviewing those traits. This pattern of results occurred whether participants self‐generated extrapolations (Experiment 1) or rated the likelihood of frequently extrapolated traits (Experiment 2). Attitudes were also more extreme after extrapolating traits high versus low in cognitive relevance to known traits, regardless of trait positivity/negativity (Experiment 3). In all three experiments, the effect of biased trait extrapolation on attitude extremity was mediated by more extreme associations with the extrapolated group. The current findings are consistent with attitude theories that emphasize cognitive processes.

Moralization and extremism robustly amplify myside sharing.

We explored whether moralization and attitude extremity may amplify a preference to share politically congruent ("myside") partisan news and what types of targeted interventions may reduce this tendency. Across 12 online experiments (N = 6,989), we examined decisions to share news touching on the divisive issues of gun control, abortion, gender and racial equality, and immigration. Myside sharing was systematically observed and was consistently amplified when participants (i) moralized and (ii) were attitudinally extreme on the issue. The amplification of myside sharing by moralization also frequently occurred above and beyond that of attitude extremity. These effects generalized to both true and fake partisan news. We then examined a number of interventions meant to curb myside sharing by manipulating (i) the audience to which people imagined sharing partisan news (political friends vs. foes), (ii) the anonymity of the account used (anonymous vs. personal), (iii) a message warning against the myside bias, and (iv) a message warning against the reputational costs of sharing "mysided" fake news coupled with an interactive rating task. While some of those manipulations slightly decreased sharing in general and/or the size of myside sharing, the amplification of myside sharing by moral attitudes was consistently robust to these interventions. Our findings regarding the robust exaggeration of selective communication by morality and extremism offer important insights into belief polarization and the spread of partisan and false information online.

Surfing to the political extremes: Digital media, social media, and policy attitude polarization

AbstractBackgroundCable news makes it possible for consumers to avoid information that challenges their predispositions, and the Internet makes it even easier. Cable news consumption is related to attitude extremity, but the extant literature is absent empirical examination of how the two may work together.ObjectivesThis study aims to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between media consumption and policy attitude extremity. In particular,, it asks how digital media consumption may combine with cable or traditional mass media to drive higher levels of polarization and attitude extremity.MethodsWe use American National Election Studies and data reduction methods to model and measure the gathering of political information to compare the relationship between different forms of media consumption and policy attitude extremity.ResultsOur results indicate that, independently, the consumption of both “partisan” cable news and “non‐partisan” political digital information have the same positive relationship to attitude extremity across four major issue domains (economy, federal spending, social issues, and foreign affairs) and that when combined into a single index, the relationship is stronger than their independent relationships. Finally, the results suggest that the combined effect is strongest among those who consume more liberal cable news.ConclusionOur high choice media environment contributes to the polarized climate in the United States today.

Hearing and speaking the other side: The roles of expression and opinion climate perception in political polarization

The role of cross-cutting exposure in political polarization has long been discussed. Building on this literature, we proposed a moderated mediation model in which cross-cutting exposure is linked to political polarization, especially affective polarization, differently through different types of political expression, and furthermore these indirect effects of cross-cutting exposure are moderated by opinion climate perception. To test this model, we used data collected by a multi-method approach in the context of a South Korean presidential election: (a) digital trace data of online discussion behavior (i.e., exposure and expression) in the online discussion forum custom built for this study, combined with (b) traditional three-wave panel surveys. Results indicate that cross-cutting exposure increased cross-cutting expression while having no effect on like-minded expression. Cross-cutting expression was then found to reduce affective polarization and attitude extremity. Furthermore, the mediation by cross-cutting expression between cross-cutting exposure and attitude extremity was amplified when participants perceived their opinion to be on the majority side, but such moderation effect was not significant on affective polarization. Implications were discussed regarding ‘hearing the other side’ and ‘speaking the other side.’

The role of affective and cognitive attitude extremity in perceived viewpoint diversity exposure

The current study examines the role of affective and cognitive attitude extremity on perceived exposure to diverse political viewpoints and investigates the possibility of a “primacy of affect.” Based on a multi-level analysis of panel survey data, we show that people with extreme attitudes toward immigrants experience less viewpoint diversity and that this tendency is especially pronounced for affective attitude extremity. However, even those holding extreme attitudes do not find themselves in issue-specific echo chambers, that is, they still encounter relatively diverse sets of viewpoints.

Is political extremism supported by an illusion of understanding?

Polarization is rising in most countries in the West. How can we reduce it? One potential strategy is to ask people to explain how a political policy works—how it leads to consequences— because that has been shown to induce a kind of intellectual humility: Explanation causes people to reduce their judgments of understanding of the issues (their “illusion of explanatory depth”). It also reduces confidence in attitudes about the policies; people become less extreme. Some attempts to replicate this reduction of polarization have been unsuccessful. Is the original effect real or is it just a fluke? In this paper, we explore the effect using more timely political issues and compare judgments of issues whose attitudes are grounded in consequentialist reasoning versus protected values. We also investigate the role of social proof. We find that understanding and attitude extremity are reduced after explanation but only for consequentialist issues, not those based on protected values. There was no effect of social proof.

“Easy” and “hard” issues: Attitude extremity and a role of the need to evaluate

AbstractBackgroundThis article addresses the topic of issue polarization among the mass public, focusing on the classic typology of “easy” and “hard” issues (Carmines and Stimson, 1980) and the influence of the individual‐level motivational variable, which is the need to evaluate.ObjectiveCarmines and Stimson (1980) suggest that issues are characterized by their “hardness,” the degree of how much issues are easy to understand and make political evaluations. This article contends that the NTE would positively relate to attitude extremity of “hard” issues, which require extensive motivations for political judgment but would not necessarily be associated with attitude extremity of “easy” issues, which do not require such motivations.MethodsIn the analyses, four “easy” issues (abortion, same‐sex marriage, affirmative action, and gun control) and four “hard” issues (immigration, tax, health care, and climate change) were selected to compare the effects of the NTE on attitude extremity, based on previous literature. The data of 2016 American National Election Survey was used to test the hypotheses.ResultsThe analyses using the data of the 2016 American National Election Survey supported the hypotheses by showing that the need to evaluate was related to increased attitude extremity on all “hard” issues, whereas need to evaluate was not associated with extremity on “easy” issues except the issue of affirmative action.ConclusionNeed to evaluate is related to attitude extremity on “easy” and “hard” issues.

The Self-Validating Role of Political Ideology on Political Attitudes

Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in the influence of ideology on the formation and maintenance of political attitudes. Much of this work has examined ideology as an individual difference that influences evaluations of political issues; these studies instead examined how one's ideology explicitly serves to polarize political opinions. Using the self-validation perspective as a theoretical backdrop, two studies examine the role of political ideology in validating thoughts about a political issue. In Study 1, considering one's political ideology after writing about one's attitude toward abortion increased thought confidence and attitude extremity related to abortion. Study 2 utilized a more subtle manipulation of ideology salience and found that political ideology validated thoughts about abortion, but not the issue of changing the legal drinking age (an issue less related to political ideology). These studies suggest that political ideology plays a role in attitude extremity and certainty toward ideology-relevant issues.

Examining the relationship between knowledge and attitude extremity on genetic engineering technology: A conceptual replication study from China

Fernbach et al. (2019) found that extreme opposition to genetically modified (GM) food was associated with low levels of objective knowledge and high levels of self-assessed knowledge in the US. They also found that the pattern that extreme opponents knew the least but felt they knew the most applied to opponents of a medical application of genetic engineering technology (gene therapy). In the past few years, genetic engineering technology become one of the most polarized scientific and social issues in China. Following Fernbach et al. (2019), we conducted a conceptual replication study using a nationally representative sample of Chinese internet users. In addition to studying extreme opponents of GM food and other applications of genetic engineering technology, we examined the extreme supporters in terms of their knowledge as well. Our findings show that Chinese people in general hold negative attitudes toward GM food and positive attitudes toward other applications of genetic engineering technology. Consistent with the original study, we found a similar pattern for extreme opponents of GM food in China. In addition, our data show the same pattern for extreme proponents of other applications of genetic engineering technology.

Loopholes in the Echo Chambers: How the Echo Chamber Metaphor Oversimplifies the Effects of Information Gateways on Opinion Expression

ABSTRACT Social media (SM) are often regarded drivers of personalized echo chambers in which only ideas resonante that individuals already hold, leading to more extreme opinions and intensified opinion expression. However, recent theorizing and evidence has cast doubts on the universal applicability of the echo chamber metaphor, pointing out that communication effects on opinion expression are much more complex than the metaphor suggests. Using the refugee crisis in Germany as a background, the current study challenges four implicit premises of the echo chamber metaphor empirically. The findings show a more complex picture than the metaphor implies: (1) Ignoring other information sources beyond SM may lead to severe misinterpretations; seeming evidence for echo chambers disappears after controlling for news media use. (2) SM reliance does not generally stimulate opinion expression. (3) Attitude extremity moderates the effect of SM reliance, suggesting that people with more extreme views are susceptible to echo chamber effects. (4) Attitude position on the issue-at-hand moderates the effect of SM reliance, which suggests that echo chambers do not completely shield their users from the public discourse. We propose the Echo Chamber Continuum (ECCo) Model to stimulate developing the echo chamber metaphor into a theory suitable for studying opinion formation.

Hot Politics? Affective Responses to Political Rhetoric

Canonical theories of opinion formation attribute an important role to affect. But how and for whom affect matters is theoretically underdeveloped. We establish the circumplex model in political science as a theory of core affect. In this theory unconscious emotional processes vary in level (arousal, measured with skin conductance) and direction (valence, measured with facial electromyography). We theorize that knowledge, attitude extremity, and (in)congruence with political rhetoric explain variation in affective responses. In a large lab study (N = 397), participants watched video clips with left-wing or right-wing rhetoric on prominent issues. We find that people with extreme attitudes experience more arousal in response to political rhetoric and that political rhetoric incongruent with prior attitudes evokes negative affect. Moreover, we show that affective responses lead to opinion change, independent of self-reported emotions. We conclude by setting a research agenda for the alignment between affective and cognitive components of emotions and their consequences.

Value extremity contributes to affective polarization in the US

AbstractA wealth of research documents the rise of affective polarization, or the increasing disdain for the out-party in American politics. In this paper, we analyze ANES data from 1988 to 2016 to investigate the contribution of core value polarization to the phenomenon of out-party enmity. We find that greater differences in fundamental principles relate significantly to emotionally intense evaluations of the opposing party and its candidates, as well as the ideological out-group, independent of issue attitude extremity and the strength of one's partisan and ideological identities. Moreover, ANES panel data from 1992 to 1996 reveal that past value extremity promotes future affective polarization. These results are important for our understanding of the nature and extent of value-based polarization in American politics.

Feeling prepared increases confidence in any accessible thoughts affecting evaluation unrelated to the original domain of preparation

The present research shows that preparedness increases reliance on thoughts irrelevant to the domain of preparation. In Study 1, participants wrote positive or negative thoughts about a tuition increase proposal. Next, participants were primed with words related to preparedness or positive control words and reported their evaluations of the initial proposal. Consistent with self-validation theory, results showed that the effect of the direction of thoughts (positive/negative) on attitudes toward tuition was significantly greater when participants were primed with preparedness than control words. A second study replicated and generalized these findings to the domain of social interaction, using a different topic (genetically modified food), and a more natural yet indirect induction of preparedness (expectation to prepare for negative feedback). Study 3 extended these findings by comparing the validating effects of an indirect (expectation) versus a direct (implementation intention) induction of preparedness. Consistent with self-validation theory, moreover, both studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that preparedness and thought confidence mediated the effects of the preparedness manipulations on attitude extremity even though the domain of preparation was unrelated to the domain of evaluation.

Who Speaks and Why? An Examination of Outspokenness on Social Networking Sites and a Reflection on Assessing Public Opinion Online

Abstract Incorporating the spiral of silence theory and the model of corrective behavior, this study utilized a national survey (N = 373) to investigate the questions of who chooses to speak out on social networking sites (SNSs) and for what reasons in the context of same-sex marriage in Taiwan. Strong partisans were found the most outspoken; they spoke out to prevent media influence that might sway public opinion to the disagreeable side. Only respondents of low attitude extremity would refrain themselves from speaking out on SNSs when perceiving opinion incongruence. Nonpartisans who held a neutral stand could be motivated to speak out when perceiving majority’s support for same-sex marriage. The roles that opinion stances or attitude extremity each play in public opinion process online are discussed.

I'm so touched! Self-touch increases attitude extremity via self-focused attention

In everyday life, people often engage in behaviors like chin touching, hand clasping, and arm crossing. Such self-touching behaviors have been found to emerge under emotional stress and while performing tasks requiring concentration and focus. In contrast to work examining antecedents of self-touch, the current research experimentally investigates the causal outcomes of self-touch, specifically its influence on evaluative cognitions such as attitudes toward external objects and events. Four studies support the prediction that both instructed and spontaneous self-touch enhance focus on the self, resulting in greater attitude extremity toward evaluated targets. A last study demonstrates that people do not have a fully accurate understanding of the influence of self-touch on consequential outcomes such as self-focus and attitude extremity. Thus, this common behavior may incidentally influence a wide variety of judgments.

Fired Up by Morality: The Unique Physiological Response Tied to Moral Conviction in Politics

Studies provide mounting evidence that morally convicted attitudes elicit passionate and unyielding political responses. Questions remain, however, whether these effects occur because moral conviction is another strong, versus a distinctly moral dimension of attitude strength. Building on work in moral psychology and neuroscience, I argue that moral conviction stems from a distinctive mode of mental processing that is tied to automatic affective reactions. Testing this idea using a lab experiment designed to capture self‐reported moral conviction and physiological arousal, I find that conviction about political objects positively predicts arousal evoked by the objects, while attitude extremity and importance do not. These findings suggest that moral conviction items do tap into moral processing, helping to validate the conviction measure. They also illustrate the value of using physiological indicators to study politics, help explain why morally convicted attitudes trigger such fervent responses, and raise normative questions about political conflict and compromise.

Interpersonal accuracy in a political context is moderated by the extremity of one's political attitudes

The political orientation of others can be perceived above chance level from looks alone. However, the effect is usually small and there is considerable interpersonal variance. We propose that the ability to accurately perceive others' political orientation is highest for those who hold more extreme political views themselves, as compared to people with more moderate views. This is because more extreme persons have a higher need to establish clear group boundaries and distinguish between political allies and adversaries. In six studies we investigate the proposed relationship, using participants from three different countries and two different sets of politicians as targets. In line with our hypothesis, attitude extremity was associated with higher accuracy. The robustness of our findings is supported by a small-scale meta-analysis over our studies. An alternative account that attitude strength in general – of which attitude extremity is a sub-facet – would lead to higher accuracy was not supported. Implications and suggestions for future research on interpersonal accuracy are discussed.