Market Asymmetric Information Research Articles

Research of Tax Governance on Urban Village Rent: A Case Study of X Village in Dongguan City

Tax governance is an important part of the national governance system and also a significant reflection of the national governance capacity. Using X Village in Dongguan City as a case study, this paper summarizes the tax governance issues in the urban rental market through field investigations and online data collection, as well as identifies the deficiencies in current laws, regulations, and policies. The research reveals that there are practical problems such as regulatory gaps and implementation difficulties, asymmetric market information, inadequate participation in social governance, and difficulty in coordinating conflicting interests in X Village. In response to these issues, the study explores corresponding paths for governance and proposes methods such as establishing comprehensive regulations and strengthening law enforcement, creating an information-sharing platform, enhancing participation in social governance, and balancing economic interests to address the tax irregularities in urban village rentals. This will help provide a solid foundation for the sustainable development of urban villages.

How SMEs Develop International Markets

With the acceleration of the globalization process and the intensification of market competition, SMEs are gradually realizing that the development of international markets is crucial to their future development. However, due to their relatively limited capabilities, SMEs face many challenges in the process of international market development, including financial and resource constraints, asymmetric market information, legal and policy barriers, cultural differences and language barriers. In response to these challenges, SMEs' internationalization requires identifying suitable international markets, customizing product and marketing strategies, ensuring product quality and compliance, cross-border cooperation and resource integration, and establishing reliable logistics and supply chain systems.

Market chain analysis of goat in south omo zone of SNNPR, Ethiopia

This study was initiated to identify market chain actors and their function in the market, investigate the structure conduct and performance of goat marketing in south omo zones of SNNPR, Ethiopia during the year 2018. Primary data were collected from sampled pastoralists and agro pastoralists, traders and brokers. Before the household survey, key informant interview and focus group discussions were conducted with producers, traders and brokers. Descriptive Statistics and qualitative data analysis techniques were employed to analyze the goat market structure, conduct and performance. The results show that producers, brokers, traders and consumers were the major goat market actors. Regarding the market structure, cattle market is known to be dominated by few traders. Although the degree of competition varies, goat market structure in the study area has an oligopolistic nature. This shows that only few traders have the majority of market share and earn abnormal profit. Besides, goat market is characterized by entry barriers, distant market point, high trucking cost, seasonality of marketing, information asymmetries and unfriendly relation between actors. As the pastoralists and agro pastoralists mainly depend on goat for their livelihoods and other cultural values, traders take advantage of the asymmetric market information towards them. The larger share of the market gains remains with end traders thereby limiting the pastoralists and agro pastoralists chance to realize the economic gains in goat production. Thus, linking producers to market and its benefits, establishing cooperatives and development of infrastructure could play a significant role for optimization of the sector. Int. J. Agril. Res. Innov. Tech. 11(2): 52-60, Dec 2021

TRANSPORTATION CORRIDORS «CHINA-EUROPE EXPRESS» IN THE CONDITIONS OF DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

In the article the author examines the current state, including the problems of the development of international transport corridors running from China to the countries of the European region. The proposal and development of the Belt and Road Cooperation Initiative by the Sino-European Railway Express has played a pivotal role in promoting trade of China and Europe and the countries along the route. The author shows the features of the development of economic relations after the new coronavirus epidemic in 2020. To stimulate the rapid economic recovery of the countries along the route, the PRC came up with a new concept of dual domestic and international cycles, and the China-Europe Express became an important transport link connecting China, Central Asia, Central and North Asia and Europe. The author of the article notes that the initiative from the Chinese side has become an important engine of global economic growth, taking advantage of the " One Belt - One Road " policy. However, excessive operating costs, asymmetric market information, underdeveloped infrastructure along the route, and heavy reliance on government subsidies limit the sustainable development of China-Europe railway transit routes. In the context of international economic relations, this article analyzes the many challenges facing China-Europe Railway Express, and the author proposes appropriate solutions and proposals to prove the prospects for the development of the above-named project. Key words: International trade; China-Europe Express; world economy; dual circulation strategy; Chang’an train; One Belt – One Road project; countermeasures; infrastructure, government subsidies.

On complex dynamics of Cournot-Bertrand game with asymmetric market information

A Cournot-Bertrand duopoly game that is characterized as bounded rational firms is introduced by a discrete dynamical map. The second firm in the game is characterized by knowing some information about the next time production of its opponent. The game’s equilibrium points are calculated and their conditions which ensuring stability are obtained for the boundary points. Due to the complex form of Nash point its stability loss is analyzed under varying some of the game’s parameters. The numerical simulation of Nash equilibrium point gives rise to periodic and chaotic attractors. Using some parameters’ values the structure of basins of attraction for some attracting set that changes that structure from simple to complex is determined. We also calculate the critical curves of the map’s game and show that it is noninvertible.

The Influences of Asymmetric Market Information on the Dynamics of Duopoly Game

We investigate the complex dynamic characteristics of a duopoly game whose players adopt a gradient-based mechanism to update their outputs and one of them possesses in some way certain information about his/her opponent. We show that knowing such asymmetric information does not give any advantages but affects the stability of the game’s equilibrium points. Theoretically, we prove that the equilibrium points can be destabilized through Neimark-Sacker followed by flip bifurcation. Numerically, we prove that the map describing the game is noninvertible and gives rise to several stable attractors (multistability). Furthermore, the dynamics of the map give different shapes of quite complicated attraction basins of periodic cycles.

Information asymmetry, input markets, adoption of innovations and agricultural land use in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan

This paper presents empirical evidence on the effects of information asymmetry in input markets on the adoption of innovations and agricultural land use in rainfed districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. Farmers’ input market integration may contribute to innovation and adoption among farmers, which may in turn positively influence the sustainable use of agricultural land. To examine this hypothesis, we conducted a study of farmers and input providers to assess the potential constraints on quality inputs, prices, and extension information. We used a multistage random sampling technique to collect data from 395 respondents. We then compared differences among adopters and non-adopters using the Mann-Whitney U test and Mood’s median test. Our results indicate that there is a significant difference between the adopters and non-adopters when considering their perceptions of asymmetric market information. Non-adopters are suspicious of exaggerated prices, the non-availability of price lists, adulteration of agricultural inputs, unbalanced input weight and the supply of low-quality alternate commodities (e.g., fertilizers and pesticides) in place of the recommended commodities in the markets. Our results call for the reformulation and implementation of appropriate policies to ensure transparent and equal information sharing among farmers engaged in input markets and for the provision of timely and quality inputs assured by regulatory checks and price checks. Free availability of information on innovations and appropriate oversight over markets appear not only to motivate farmers to adopt agricultural technologies but also to influence more sustainable land use practices.

Antitrust in History

The antitrust world before 1890 looks barren when compared with today’s global antitrust industry. The most common antitrust laws in pre-modern societies condemned practices that had the perceived tendency to raise prices: forestalling, hoarding and price fixing. Enforcement was focused on retail markets and trade in essential foodstuffs, like grain. Laws intended to ensure fair prices are common throughout history. Rules prohibiting unfair or excessive prices raise the more general question of price controls in pre-industrial societies. The historical evidence is ambiguous. Laws prohibiting monopolistic or abusive conduct are less clearly evident than anti-cartel laws in pre-industrial societies, although a few references exist. Before the 20th century, courts and authorities lacked the tools of modern economic analysis, like mathematics-based theories of harm. This absence of modern economics meant that there was no clear distinction among “economic,” “social,” “moral” and “political” policy objectives. Laws concerning product quality, consumer fraud and misrepresentations are commonly found in pre-modern societies. Although consumer protection rules were based on notions of fair dealing and justice, the rules were consistent with modern economic notions of transaction cost efficiencies, asymmetric market information and imperfect market information.

On the Formation of Producers’ Information‐Sharing Coalitions

In this study, we propose a stylized Cournot competition model under asymmetric market information and study the formation of producers’ informational coalitions. We offer guidance towards how the information service operations can improve the producers’ welfare. Our results shed interesting light on farmer producer organizations (FPOs) in their efforts to link farmers in developing economies by integrating market information. To be specific, by focusing on Nash equilibria wherein producers make coalition‐joining decisions, we find that no information‐sharing coalition will be formed when the public information provision is either too low or too high, or when the private information provision is high. When the private information provisions are endogenous, a coalition can be formed between two producers when the public information provision is high, while a fair allocation of payoff can be achieved by the dominant group architecture, but not efficiency in terms of aggregate payoff. The main theme is that the government or NGO should provide right amount of market information to the right target, and too much informational intervention leads to more inefficient production and unstable organization.

Trade credit model with customer balking and asymmetric market information

Customer balking exists in many industries, and would significantly impact the supply chain management. We consider trade credit, customer balking behavior and market information asymmetry and information sharing in a two-level supply chain. Stackelberg equilibriums are derived in each scenario, respectively. The wholesale price and order quantity at equilibrium decrease (increase) in balking threshold (balking probability) when the production cost is not relatively low. The retailer benefits from the manufacturer’s pessimism with information asymmetry, while the optimism with information sharing. However, information asymmetry always harms the manufacturer. We design an information-dependent-credit-limited contract to enforce the retailer to share information.

РОЛЬ ТА МІСЦЕ СПОЖИВАННЯ В ФІНАНСОВО-ЕКОНОМІЧНІЙ СИСТЕМІ

У статті здійснено аналіз історичної еволюції теоретико-економічних поглядів на роль споживання та його місце в фінансово-економічній системі. Проаналізовано гіпотезу абсолютного доходу Дж. Кейнса; гіпотезу відносного доходу С. Кузнеця; модель міжчасового вибору І. Фішера; модель життєвого циклу Ф. Модільяні; модель перманентного доходу М. Фрідмена, модель дискретного вибору споживачів Д.-Л. Мак-Феддена та ін.

Supply Chain Commitment Contract Model Based on Uncertainty Theory under Uncertain Market Information

Based on the uncertainty theory, market demand information updating as the background, we study the coordination and optimization problem of three-stage supply chain in this paper. In half a asymmetric market information, participants are risk neutral; under the situation of the manufacturers and wholesalers having twice pre-season decision-making opportunity, wholesalers can be replenished in the season; manufacturers join the lowest supply contract of commitment: manufacturers for exchanging the information that they cannot get directly from the market will promise wholesalers to have a season lowest supply in pre-season. According to this contract, we establish optimization models of manufacturers and wholesalers respectively, and get the optimal strategy of supply chain members by analyzing the supply chain system. Finally, by giving a numerical example and comparing the results with that under random circumstances, the result is reasonable.

Research on the E-Commerce Model of Small and Medium Enterprises

In this paper, the SME e-business financing for the study, analysis of business operation mode based e-commerce platform, focusing on big data platform based in the cloud as a means of e-business financing model, to a certain extent to solve the financing market asymmetric information problems in order to achieve the factory operation SME financing; while its limitations, namely the closed nature of the platform, the limited nature of the subject's participation as a breakthrough, build e-commerce platform as the core to the line a variety of financial non-financial large financial institutions to participate in party mode, to solve financing problems of SMEs. The end of the analysis of the profitability of the parties involved, as well as problems and deficiencies that may be encountered, verify its economic viability and future development of the platform to do a certain degree of outlook.

A Computational Analysis of Bundle Trading Markets Design for Distributed Resource Allocation

Online auction markets play increasingly important roles for resource allocations in distributed systems. This paper builds upon a market-based framework presented by Guo et al. (Guo, Z., G. J. Koehler, A. B. Whinston. 2007. A market-based optimization algorithm for distributed systems. Management Sci. 53(8) 1345–1458), where a distributed system optimization problem is solved by self-interested agents iteratively trading bundled resources in a double auction market run by a dealer. We extend this approach to a dynamic, asynchronous Internet market environment and investigate how various market design factors including dealer inventory policies, market communication patterns, and agent learning strategies affect the computational market efficiency, market liquidity, and implementation. We prove finite convergence to an optimal solution under these various schemes, where individual rational and budget-balanced trading leads to an efficient auction outcome. Empirical investigations further show that the algorithmic implementation is robust to a number of dealer and agent manipulations and scalable to larger sizes and more complicated bundle trading markets. Interestingly, we find that, though both asynchronous communication and asymmetric market information negatively affect the speed of market convergence and lead to more agent welfare loss, agents' ability to predict market prices has a positive effect on both. Contrary to conventional wisdom that a dealer's intertemporal liquidity provisions improve market performance, we find that the dealer's active market intervention may not be desirable in a simple market trading environment where an inherent market liquidity effect dominates, especially when the dealer owns a significant amount of resources. Different from the traditional market insight, our trading data suggest that high trading volume does not correlate to low price volatility and quicker price discovery.

Spatial Price Integration in Nepal

There is a large volume of literature documenting the analysis of spatial market integration based on individual commodity prices. This paper, instead, contributes to the literature by delineating the existence of spatial market integration using intra-regional price indices. In this context, we use monthly price indices for Kathmandu valley, Hill and the Terai region, which are the only available spatial indices in Nepal. Employing Johansens' bi-variate cointegrating approach for the period from August 1995 to December 2010, we found a strong proposition of Law of One Price (LOP) across the region indicating the fact that spatial markets are highly integrated albeit speed of adjustment is rather slow. This may be due to the existence of oligopolistic pricing behaviour, carteling, asymmetric market information, and syndicate in the transportation system as discussed in various literatures.

Equity or Cash? The Signal Sent by the Way You Pay

The article reports on a study of asymmetric market information and corporate transactions such as the purchase of assets. The researchers found that buyers want to pay with equity instead of cash when they believe that their shares are overvalued and sellers want to receive equity when they believe the asset will create value for the buyer.

A mathematical example of the two-echelon inventory model with asymmetric market information

This paper examines the extended two-echelon newsboy problem for a manufacturer and retailer in a supply chain with asymmetric market information. In this scenario, the retailer has better knowledge of the market's demand, and the manufacturer perceives the same demand. This applied model presents how the manufacturer can take advantage of the retailer's market information and improve the efficiencies in the supply chain channel.

Some two-echelon style-goods inventory models with asymmetric market information

A “two-echelon” newsboy problem considers the interactive decisions between the “manufacturer” and the “retailer” – now recognized as two separate entities. Earlier papers on this problem assumed that the two parties share the same market information. We extend this problem by studying the situation in which the retailer has better market information than the manufacturer. Presented are several decision models that should be useful for guiding a manufacturer's decisions. Moreover, solutions to these models lead to various unexpected and interesting conclusions. For example, we found that improved retailer's market-knowledge always benefits the manufacturer and the system, though not necessarily the retailer himself. In contrast, improved manufacturer's knowledge benefits only the manufacturer himself at the expense of the retailer and of the system.