Association Of Southeast Asia Research Articles

The impact of the rise of emerging economies on global industrial CO2 emissions: Evidence from emerging economies in Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

The rise of emerging economies has changed the production structure of the global industrial chain, which in turn has had a significant impact on global industrial CO2 emissions. As the most representative countries among the emerging economies, the developing countries in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) have become the leading supplier for global industrial chain over the past decade. To study the impact of the rise of emerging countries in RCEP on global industrial CO2 emissions, we proposed a new structural decomposition analysis method using the global environmentally extended multi-regional input–output table. A quantitative analysis using a multi-regional input–output table shows that if the emission intensities remain unchanged in 2010, the increase in these countries’ proportion of supply of final demand and supply of intermediate input resulted in an increase of 2,068 and 87 million tons (Mt) in global CO2 emissions, respectively. The counterfactual analysis shows that China and the Association of Southeast Asia's (ASEAN) participation in the global value chains would increase global CO2 emissions in 2010–2015, but the emissions from Chinese energy and raw material production has gradually slowed or reversed. Simultaneously, the emissions embodied in global industrial chains from ASEAN have increased. Emerging economies should pursue a low-carbon way in consumption patterns and production technologies, and global mitigation efforts should prioritize support to the emerging emitters with green technology.

Fifty-Plus Years of Watching Asia: An American Perspective

Fifty-Plus Years of Watching Asia: An American Perspective Sheldon W. Simon (bio) As a prelude to this personal rumination on the issues in Asian international politics that have occupied my professional life, I wish to express appreciation to See Seng Tan for asking so many well-qualified colleagues to contribute their own assessments to this compendium. My fascination with Asian politics began as an undergraduate in the 1950s at the University of Minnesota, where on a cold, snowy morning in January, Professor Werner Levi—a German-Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany who held three doctorates, including one in politics—stated that the world’s future would lie in Asia. A combination of ancient civilizations, historical grandeur, and a strong work ethic among its populations, he argued, would transform Asia in due course into the world’s most dynamic region. He went on to say that those of us who planned for a career in public affairs should consider becoming students of Asia. I was convinced. Upon completing my PhD in political science, I took a position with the U.S. government for three years analyzing Soviet and Chinese commentary on Asia. During this time, I honed the research interests that characterized my subsequent academic life—the interface between the great powers and Asian states as well as the dynamics of the developing Asian actors in dealing with great-power pressures and blandishments. Of course, the Asia-Pacific was home to three of those great powers—the United States in the aftermath of World War II, China under the aegis of its Communist Party, and the Soviet Union. This essay addresses these dynamics in two sections—one on the security arrangements in North and Southeast Asia and one on recent U.S. relations with states in both subregions—before concluding with some final thoughts. Northeast and Southeast Asian Security Arrangements From an American perspective, it is useful to divide the analysis of East Asia into its northern and southern components. The United States’ Cold War and post–Cold War attention to the region may be assessed through its security arrangements. For Northeast Asia, this would be the ongoing presence of U.S. forces in the aftermath of World War II. Japan and the [End Page 74] Republic of Korea (ROK) became junior partners in Washington’s East Asia strategy opposing the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea. Thus, the U.S. hub-and-spoke security arrangement came into existence. Unlike NATO, a multilateral European military alliance requiring each member to come to the others’ defense in the event of an attack, Washington was unable to effect a similar arrangement between Japan, the ROK, and the United States. Korean bitterness over Japan’s colonial legacy meant that Seoul was unwilling to engage in any security agreement with Tokyo. The alternative was separate U.S. bilateral defense treaties between the United States and each country. The United States was the “hub” and its bilateral partners were the separate “spokes.” These spokes for the most part did not interact militarily with each other. For example, until recently, the Japanese and ROK navies only directly interacted with each other through U.S. intersession in multilateral maritime exercises such as the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). By contrast, the Southeast Asian states assayed a number of times to create multilateral institutions beginning in the 1950s—for example, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the Association of Southeast Asia, and Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia (MAPHILINDO). None were successful, but all demonstrated a realization among non-Communist elites in the region that some form of political collaboration was necessary to deal with both extraregional and intraregional challenges from China, the Soviet Union, and North Vietnam. Southeast Asian leaders were also concerned that Western states might leave the region as the Indochina wars of the 1950s and 1960s ended with Communist victories. Southeast Asian leaders conceived a new regional organization in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), composed of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. In the mid-1960s, Indonesia’s president and founding father Sukarno had attempted to destroy Malaysia, which he saw as a neocolonialist country...

Таиланд как региональный актор в Юго-Восточной Азии: опыт «мягкого» регионализма

The foreign policy of Thailand and its role in regional integration processes in Southeast Asia are considered. Materials are the texts of the official websites of the government of Thailand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Association of South-East Asia, its research centres, Embassy of Thailand in South-East Asia in foreign policy of Thailand relative to other countries (e.g., Singapore, Australia, Japan, Russia, etc.). It is shown that Thailand focuses foreign policy primarily on neighbouring countries, such as Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia and Malaysia. It is noted that since 2001, each Thailand government has pursued a foreign policy aimed at developing relations and cooperation with neighbouring countries. It is indicated that Thailand implements its national interests through integration processes. It is emphasized that it is trying to take a leadership position in the South-East Asia region through the creation of new agreements and regional projects that are implemented in a “soft” form, especially in its subregion. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the role of Thailand in Southeast Asia and the peculiarities of soft regionalism in the region.

Perubahan Ekonomi Global dan Tantangan bagi Indonesia [Global Economic Change and Challenges for Indonesia

The shifting of global political-economy since early 1990s has been followed by the expansion of regional economy cooperation forum establishment, such as: NAFTA (North America Free Trade Area), EFTA (European Free Trade Area) and APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). Indonesia, together with the other South East Asia countries who join ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia), is also actively involved in engaging regional economy cooperation forums, such as: ASEAN-China FTA, ASEAN-India FTA, ASEAN-Jepang Economic Partnership, ASEAN Regional Economi Partnership (ARCEP). The establishment of those economic regionalism is apparently a strategy in responding economical globalization. Indonesia’s involvement in those regional economy cooperations has increased its national commitment, both in going through economical liberization as well as in building its national economy competitiveness. This research describes Indonesian political challanges in responding the dynamic changes of that global economy.

THE DREAM OF MALAYAN UNITY: PRESIDENT DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL AND THE MAPHILINDO

In July 1962, a proposal to form a greater Malayan Confederation was proposed by President DiosdadoMacapagal. This proposal was to include the Philippines, the Federation of Malaya and the British territories of Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo. The proposal would have been a realization of a Malaya Irredenta which was dreamed of by visionaries like WenceslaoVinzons who once made an oration advocating for the unity of Malayan people working toward a common destiny. The opportunity came near as colonial powers were liquidating their possessions in post-World War II Asia, Already an earlier association, the Association of Southeast Asia was formed in 1961 and this association included non-Malay countries. The Malayan confederation which would be called MAPHILINDO was to be different. On August 5, President Macapagal issued his declaration calling for the creation of MAPHILINDO. The formation of the MAPHILINDO was met with jubilation as it was the realization of a centuries-old vision and the culmination of the anti-colonial struggle. The organization however floundered because of significant problems among the three countries. It led into a diplomatic crisis that had the possibility of widespread armed conflict. MAPHILINDO floundered and was later superseded by the present Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Despite its stillbirth the formation of the MAPHILINDO demonstrated fraternal relations in dealing with problems and issues among the three states of Malay origin.

Co-Prosperity Sphere Again? United States Foreign Policy and Japan's “First” Regionalism in the 1950s

in the Asia-Pacific attracts considerable attention. Since the end of the 1980s, we have witnessed many proposals for creating regional institutions such as APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), EAEC (the East Asia Economic Caucus) and ASEAN+3 (a so-called East Asian Community). This movement is often called New Regionalism or Second Regionalism together with the expanding and deepening links within the EU (the European Union) and the creation of NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) ? Adjectives such as new and second indicate that contemporary Asia Pacific regionalism is not unprecedented. Competition in creating regional blocs was one of the contributing factors leading to World War II. In the war's aftermath, attempts to build regional arrangements in Asia continued, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, leading to the so-called First Regionalism phase, which saw the creation of SEATO (the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization) in 1954, ASA (the Association of Southeast Asia) in 1961, and ASPAC (the Asia-Pacific Council) in 1966. However, many of these arrangements never came to full fruition or, once created, soon ceased to exist. Only one state-led regional arrangement has survived to the present: ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations). But it is far less formal and institutionalized than its Western counterparts. Why are there no institutions in the Asia-Pacific that are equivalent to those found in Western regions, such as the EU, NATO and NAFTA? Since

The ASEAN Regional Forum: Maintaining the Regional Idea in Southeast Asia

Despite the uncertain contribution of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to Asian-Pacific security, its creation is significant in light of the region's lack of multilateral arrangements and especially the long reluctance of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to address questions of security formally as a collective body. By focussing on ASEAN perspectives, this article identifies both external and internal challenges to ASEAN and the notion of 'Southeast Asia' and examines how ARF -- a multilateral security dialogue involving ASEAN and 14 other interested powers, including the United States -- relates to them. It concludes that while the origins of ARF are to be found in basic concerns about Southeast Asia's growing strategic uncertainty, ARF is also an attempt by ASEAN to maintain not only its relevance as a regional organization but also the relevance of Southeast Asia, both conceptually and practically, in a changing world context.ASEAN AND THE, REGIONAL IDEAThis article begins with the premise that 'Southeast Asia' is an idea advanced by ASEAN states to increase certainty in their domestic, regional, and global environments. Though generally accepted today as comprising Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, Southeast Asia is difficult to define in objective terms -- geographically or by its peoples. More water than land, Southeast Asia lacks any single dominant land mass that might identify it and includes both mainland and island countries. As for its peoples, Southeast Asia is far more heterogeneous than homogeneous and boasts a host of different religions, cultures, ethnicities, and languages.Nor can Southeast Asia's political cohesion be assumed. Modern Southeast Asia is plagued by intraregional rivalries, cold war divisions, and territorial disputes. Before the Association of Southeast Asia (ASEAN's predecessor) was created in 1961, there was no indigenous tradition of thinking of Southeast Asia as a political, economic, or cultural entity, and, even then, Southeast Asia's divisions were more apparent than its unity, as illustrated by the Philippines' disruptive claim to Sabah and, especially, by Indonesia's confrontational politics (Konfrontasi).(f.1) As one historian put it: 'Southeast Asia ... is so culturally diverse and politically subdivided as to raise doubts in some minds as to whether it constitutes a meaningful entity in any positive sense.'(f.2)In 1967 Southeast Asia gained political substance with the creation of ASEAN. The founding states -- Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philipines, Thailand -- congregated not around primordial ties but rather around common and immediate concerns about domestic instability, regional tensions, and the West's commitment to the security of Southeast Asia. Even then, intraregional tensions continued to loom over the grouping: Konfrontasi was a fresh memory, the Philippines' claim to Sabah was unresolved, and four of the five members were engaged in at least one dispute with another member. The issue of security was considered so contentious that it was not identified as an area of intended intra-ASEAN co-operation in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration that established ASEAN, even though ASEAN was founded because of security concerns. These tensions further illustrate the extent to which 'Southeast Asia' as a region is artificial, a socially created political space that has provided member-states with a measure of insulation against the machinations of larger powers and a minimum of assurance about their intentions towards one another. This has allowed them to focus on the important tasks of economic and political development.Since 1967, ASEAN's cohesiveness has largely been sustained by conflict avoidance and by avoiding discussions of such divisive issues as security within the ASEAN framework. Though tensions and conflicts periodically threaten to rise above the surface, intra-ASEAN relations have nevertheless greatly improved over time, gaining both depth and breadth. …

ASEAN and SAARC Revisited: More Lessons

A recent article compared the origins and development of the South Asian Asso ciation for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), seeking to analyse SAARC's prospects by drawing some lessons from new experiences of ASEAN.1 This complementary essay will attempt to amplify and give different shades of emphasis to the conclusions drawn in that ground-breaking study. Some comparison between South Asia and Southeast Asia as case-studies on regional co-operation will also be made. The primary lessons drawn from the ASEAN experience were presented as: pursue goals that are simple and workable rather than grandiose show-case items; work through an indigenized system for planning. A second set of observations relates to decision-making style. The ASEAN experience argues for informality, frequent discussions, patience ? progress will take time ? and the use of public exposure to draw in non-governmental groups to promote co-operation. All of the above can well serve as guidelines for SAARC interaction. Underlying such mechanics, however, a more important factor was discussed: There was not only the political will to submerge some of the differences for the sake of peace and stability within the sub-region but the members also saw clearly their unity as beneficial in relation to third countries.2 Common political will is explained by a convergence of interests which must precede and be the foundation for the diplomatic mechanics in a political process. To illustrate this, remember that ASEAN's predecessor, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), incorporated many of the rules, procedures, and guidelines that supported ASEAN interaction in the first ten years; but it lasted barely three years before conflicting individual national and regime interests rendered it moribund. Consequently, the questions of importance to SAARC members ? how and why ASEAN members came to possess the political will to co-operate ? are best explained by a discussion of the interests common to the ASEAN governments. A first observation is that the motivating interests of the states have varied at different times during the history of their association. As different internal and situations have prevailed, different ASEAN case-studies and different lessons can be drawn. A first case is the post-formation era which well illustrates that one important commonality uniting the ASEAN members was an external threat, which at a general level meant communism.3 To emphasize and lend strength to this factor, it should be noted that in the early years, unlike today, there was a shared focus on one threatening factor, Maoist China, which was equated 221

ASEAN´s Prospective Security Role: Moving Beyond the Indochina Fixation

its earliest days, and to discern the various dimensions of this endeavour, but also to attempt to broaden the debate concerning the Association's future security role. ASEAN was not the first attempt at international co-operation within Southeast Asia, but it has certainly been the most successful. In the early 1960s, the ASA (Association of Southeast Asia, linking the Malayan Federation, the Philippines and Thailand) failed to become an effective organization because of its limited membership and prestige, especially in terms of Indonesia's absence. MAPHILINDO, announced in mid-1963, included Indonesia together with Malaysia and the Philippines, but was quickly thwarted as a device for regional co-operation by the almost simultaneous onset of Sukarno's policy of Konfrontasi (Confronta tion) against Malaysia. The emergence of Suharto's New Order in Indonesia in 1966 enabled a detente between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur: this situation of reduced intra-regional tension was a vital permissive factor facilitating the formation of a new regional grouping. A more positive impetus for the inception of ASEAN sprang from the prevailing turbulence elsewhere in the region: the conflict in Indochina was turning Southeast Asia into a cockpit of great power rivalry. At the same time, the end of the regional British military presence could be seen not far ahead, with impor tant implications for the security of Malaysia and the now sovereign city-state of Singapore. There were strong incentives for a fresh attempt at formalized regional co-operation. Although economic, social and cultural co-operation were stressed as the central objectives of ASEAN, from the beginning the Association also represented a political entente between non- (indeed, anti-) communist states in a region clearly threatened by communist-led revolutionary pressures, from both within and without. The specific political motives of the five ASEAN states in joining the organization nevertheless varied widely. Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman hoped that ASEAN would become an organ for the collective political defence of the region, so that for Bangkok a policy of regional co-operation could sup plement, and eventually replace, its alliance with the United States. Indonesia

Thai Foreign Policy since October 1973

While the change from a military dictatorship to a civilian government in October 1973 has affected the law and order situation of the country internally, no new direction in foreign policy seems to have surfaced. The exception, perhaps, is the adoption of a low posture in contrast to the enthusiasm displayed in the fifties to attain, if possible, a leading role in the region, since Thailand has never been colonized and ranks only after China and Japan as an independent country in Asia. The quiet retirement of the veteran diplomat Prince Wan Waithayakorn and the absence of the dynamic personality of Dr Thanat Khoman since November 1971, left a hiatus in initiative in Thai foreign policy. Now, a year after the October demonstrations, the Civil Service maxim carry on as usual may be said to sum marize Saranrom Palace's record of the past twelve months. In short, the thaw with the socialist governments including Peking, Hanoi and Pyongyang, begun during Thanom's r?gime, continues. An added new dimension consists of fending off any criticisms, justified or not, flung at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the highly vocal student bodies and press exercising their so-called democratic rights. Relations with the three superpowers may be described as follows: with the United States ? Thailand's own takes priority over the well-worn and often abused term of mutual interest ; with China ? renewing the interrupted dialogue begun by the Thanom Government, more frequent visits, and missions now led by Cabinet rank officials ; and, finally, with the Soviet Union ? cool and correct. In the mid-sixties, Thanat Khoman had already found American arrogance hard to bear. He initiated the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and, together with the Philippines, called for an Asian solution to Asian problems. He also claimed that Asians must be masters of their own affairs. ASA folded up in 1967 when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was born. ASA had to sail in very rough seas because of the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation. That and the Association's modest budget ? it refused to accept outside contributions ? were major factors in its limited achievements. Thanat Khoman's stand, in hindsight, might be called the forerunner of the Nixon Guam Doctrine. He advocated a reduction of the number of American troops in Thailand as far back as August 1969; formal talks took place a year later and the withdrawal of the first 6,000 Americans was agreed upon. The presence of foreign troops on Thai soil, especially in times of peace, never found favour with the Thai people. However, the subject was silenced in public by the simple method of equating it to anti-Americanism. Thus, anti-SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organization) or anti-American meant pro-communist, which was, and still is, an offence punishable by a jail sentence.

The Advocacy of Malaysia—before 1961

A Formidable consensus of academic opinion exists on the question of the formation of Malaysia. In its most commonly stated form, this consensus is manifested in an explanation which specifies a date—27 May 1961—and sees Malaysia as the outcome of the attempt to solve the ‘Singapore Problem’. The movement towards Malaysia is, with dull regularity, dated from the Tunku's almost casual, certainly very vague, reference to the need for a ‘closer understanding’ between Singapore, British North Borneo (Sabah), Brunei, and Sarawak, and for ‘a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in a political and economic association’ which he made in the course of a speech to the Foreign Correspondents’ Association of South-east Asia on 27 May 1961. The Tunku's initiative arose, it is almost invariably argued, from the fear of future events in Singapore. Since the Republicwould in all probability be granted a separate independence by 1963,the British would no longer be in a position to control the island's internal security, defence and foreign relations. The Federation would be deprived of the Internal Security Council through which it had had (in conjunction with the British) direct control over Singapore's internal Malaya viewpoint if an amenable Singapore government could be guaranteed. By May 1961, however, the opposite appeared imminent. There were indications that the PAP was rapidly losing ground. In the Hong Lim by-election held in late April, its candidate was severely trounced. This, combined with the knowledge that no government had in the past managed to win more than one term of office, and full aware-ness of the seemingly perpetual leftward movement of Singapore politics, ness of the seemingly perpetual leftward movement of Singapore politics, created the impression in Kuala Lumpur that unless something was done, the Republic would become a second Cuba threatening the security of the Federation. The Tunku was convinced, so the argument goes, that the Federation had to ensure control over Singapore's internal security. A reversal of his previous stand on merger was, therefore, necessary. This explanation may be referred to as the security theory on the formation of Malaysia. It has a corollary: having decided that the incorporation of Singapore was necessary, the Tunku had to find a racial counter-balance to the island's Chinese population; the Borneo territories had to be included because it was essential that Singapore be territories had to be included because it was essential that Singapore be brought into the Federation of Malaya. Malaysia was thus the logicalsolution to the Singapore Problem. Among those who have propounded the security theory are Willard Hanna, Arnold Brackman, Gordon Means, George Me. T. Kahin, James Gould, Milton Osborne, Tan Koh Chiang, J. M. Gullick, Emily Sadka, Sir Richard Allen and Justus Van der Kroef.

The Advocacy of Malaysia—before 1961

A FORMIDABLE consensus of academic opinion exists on the question of the formation of Malaysia. In its most commonly stated form, this consensus is manifested in an explanation which specifies a date—27 May 1961—and sees Malaysia as the outcome of the attempt to solve the ‘Singapore Problem’. The movement towards Malaysia is, with dull regularity, dated from the Tunku's almost casual, certainly very vague, reference to the need for a ‘closer understanding’ between Singapore, British North Borneo (Sabah), Brunei, and Sarawak, and for ‘a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in a political and economic association’ which he made in the course of a speech to the Foreign Correspondents’ Association of South-east Asia on 27 May 1961.

Thailand after Sarit

The death of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat in December 1963 occurred at a particularly unfortunate time for Thailand and its Western allies because of the increasingly dangerous political situation prevailing in Southeast Asia. The Diem regime had been overthrown in Vietnam and the Viet-Cong were taking full advantage of the resulting confusion to press an offensive in the Mekong Delta. Neighboring Cambodia, which had broken relations with Thailand in 1961, appeared to be moving toward an accommodation with Peking; and in Laos, the civil war threatened to erupt again at any time. Burma was encountering increasing difficulties in preventing dissident elements and the students from plunging the country into chaos, and Thailand's partners in the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), Malaysia and the Philippines, were quarreling with each other and with Indonesia over rights to the North Borneo territories. Thus, the leader who had given the country both political and economic stability for over five years died after a short illness at a time when Thailand found itself surrounded by trouble and in great need of internal stability. For the West, the death of Marshal Sarit meant that the one country in Southeast Asia which seemed capable and determined to withstand the southward push of Chinese influence would enter a period of political uncertainty whose outcome was difficult to predict. Sarit was different in a number of important respects from other prime ministers that have ruled Thailand since the overthrow of absolute monarchy in 1932 and the inauguration of constitutional government for the first time. The three best known political figures-Pibun Songkhram, Pridi Panomyong and Khuang Apaiwong-were educated in France during the 1920s and were part of the small group of conspirators who planned the 1932 coup d'e'tat against the monarchy. Thereafter, each of these men became the leader of a political group or faction and played a prominent role in the politics of Thailand.' In contrast, Sarit received all his education in Thailand, was not a conspirator in the 1932 revolution, and was not the leader of any political group until after he ousted Pibun from the premiership in September 1957. Sarit's entire career had been spent in the Army, and there is little evidence that he aspired to the premiership until political events in 195758 forced him into a decision. Another, and perhaps the most important, difference between Sarit and his predecessors was that he made no pre-

Problems of Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia

Is regional cooperation feasible within Southeast Asia? The idea continues to have vitality, although most of the attempts to make use of the concept in this area have so far met with little apparent success. The Colombo Plan, SEATO, and the Bandung Conference are reminders only of the most prominent efforts to apply "regionalism" to the area. As early as 1947, the Burmese nationalist, Aung San, urged greater cooperation among Southeast Asian states, but his ideas had no lasting effect. And despite the many more formal proposals made since 1947, the area continues to be Balkanized. Yet today regional proposals seem to be proliferating and, for this reason, it is important that the obstacles to regional cooperation in Southeast Asia should be well understood. In 1961, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was established, and the Malaysia plan, incorporating Malaya, Singapore, and the British Borneo territories, was put into effect in September 1963. In addition, and largely as a result of problems connected with the Malaysia proposals, "Maphilindo" was formed during June and July 1963. This is a loose consultative grouping of Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia. On a wider scale, there have been some proposals to organize an Asian Common Market; and the United Nations, through its Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), seems to be urging certain forms of regional economic cooperation in Southeast Asia.1