Association For Evolutionary Economics Research Articles

Symposium on the Monetary Macroeconomics of John R. Commons

:This essay introduces a five-article symposium on the monetary macroeconomics of John R. Commons. The articles, first delivered as papers at the annual meeting of the Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics in early 2019, demonstrate the vibrance of contemporary institutionalist research on Commons and highlight his contributions to money and business cycles.

Allan Gruchy’s view of institutionalism and the foundation and early years of the Association for Evolutionary Economics

Studies on the history of economic thought of American institutionalism usually focus on the founding fathers, or pre-1930s institutionalism. The decline in importance of this school of thought during the 1930s resulted in few post-World War II studies on the history of institutionalism. However, institutionalists played a prominent role in the emergence of dissenting associations. In the late 1950s, institutionalists’ dissatisfaction with the American Economic Association culminated in the Association for Evolutionary Economics (AFEE) in 1965. Allan Gruchy was a founder of the AFEE, and this paper highlights his perspective of institutionalism and how it changed over the course of his career because of his involvement in AFEE’s internal affairs.

A History of the Founding and Early Years of AFEE

:During the late 1950s, institutionalists started organizing themselves amid the decline of institutional economics, leading to the 1965 founding of the Association for Evolutionary Economics (AFEE). We analyze the history of the movement to found AFEE and its early years. We use archival evidence, much of it previously unpublished, to provide a detailed history of these early years. We also present an account of AFEE that highlights the role of different interpretations of institutional economics in building the association. In addition, we provide a brief history of the early years of the Journal of Economic Issues (JEI).

Inside the Organizational Institutions of Institutional Economics: Why Are There Two Institutionalist Associations?

:The institutionalist-inspired Association for Evolutionary Economics (AFEE), officially founded in 1965, was the first heterodox association to break with the American Economic Association (AEA). In 1979, another institutionalist association, the Association for Institutional Thought (AFIT), was founded. Using mainly archival evidence, this paper provides historical reasons for the presence of two institutionalist associations.

Institutionalists as Dissenters: Why Were Institutionalists So Dissatisfied with Economics During the Post-War Period

:In the 1940s and 1950s, institutionalist economists rapidly lost their influence over American economics. In parallel, a new mainstream emerged, and the institutionalists were extremely dissatisfied with the path taken by the economic science. We analyze the opinions and feelings about this context to shed light on the institutionalists’ understanding of the new mainstream economics. We construct a historical account of the institutionalists’ dissatisfaction with post-war economics based on archival material from the personal papers of Allan Gruchy, John Gambs, John Blair, and Clarence Ayres. In the period analyzed, the economists, who would later found the Association for Evolutionary Economics, acted as dissenters rather than institutionalists. In part, this explains the pluralistic path that the association has followed ever since its foundation.

From Contagion to Incoherence towards a Model of the Unfolding Eurozone Crisis

Based on an account of the macroeconomic foundations and political economy underpinning European Monetary Union, this paper presents a simple dynamic model of the mutual reinforcement feedback between (a) the Eurozone's contagion dynamic and (b) the policy responses of the European Union, including the creation of new institutions (e.g. the EFSF and ESM), the signing of new treaties (e.g. the Fiscal Past) and, of course, the novel' policies of existing institutions (e.g. the ECB). Acknowledgments: I wish to thank James K. Galbraith as well as participants at the 2013 Ayres Scholar Lecture, organised by the Association for Evolutionary Economics in the context of the 2013 ASSA Conference, San Diego, where an earlier version of this paper was presented.

Preferences, Power, and the Determination of Working Hours

Document is made available from the Journal of Economic Issues by special permission of the copyright holder, the Association for Evolutionary Economics.

Veblen and Sweezy on Monopoly Capital, Crises, Conflict, and the State

In the 1960s and 1970s there was a revival of non-neoclassical political economy, or heterodox economics, in many nations which has continued to this day. Original institutionalists started their own organization, the Association for Evolutionary Economics (AFEE) in 1965, followed by the Journal of Economic Issues in 1967. Other radicals and Marxists organized the Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE) in 1968 and the Review of Radical Political Economics the following year. In many nations similar organizations and journals were instituted in the 1970s. Post Keynesians started to publish the Cambridge Journal of Economics in England and the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, inaugurated by Sidney Weintraub and Paul Davidson from the USA. The Association for Social Economics started to become more inclusive and participatory by including many heterodox themes in its Review of Social Economy. It wasn't until the late 1980s that the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy was formed and the early 1990s when feminists became active in organizing their own International Association for Feminist Economics along with their journal, Feminist Economics. After thirty to forty years of growth, heterodox political economy has really come of age, since now there are more journals and publishers disseminating heterodox themes than one could have imagined in the 1960s.1 Then in the 1990s a whole series of ency-

Marxism, Institutionalism and Social Evolution

The following papers were prepared for a panel discussion of William M. Dugger's and Howard J. Sherman's new book, entitled Reclaiming Evolution: A Dialogue Between Marxism and Institutionalism on Social Change, held in April of 2001 at the annual meeting of the Association for Institutional Thought in Reno, Nevada. While the immediate purpose of the discussion was to review Dugger and Sherman's book, its broader objective was to explore the extent to which Marxian and Institutional theories of social change offer a common framework for the interpretation and critique of society. This broader objective can be seen as having emerged out of a dialogue, which has been occurring with increased frequency, between Marxists and Institutionalists seeking to find common ground. This search is reflected in the growing number of papers exploring the points of convergence between Marxism and Institutionalism, to which Dugger and Sherman have contributed (1994, 1997), the growing number of panels dedicated to this topic at meetings of the Association for Institutional Thought and the Association for Evolutionary Economics, and the emergence of a Radical Institutionalist movement within the Institutionalist camp, of which Dugger is an excellent example. This search for common ground has occurred against a background of rightist politics on the one hand, with its concomitant attack against the progressive welfare state, and, on the other hand, a fatuous scientism that has prevented

Commons and Keynes: Their Assault on Laissez Faire

(1998). Commons and Keynes: Their Assault on Laissez Faire. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 1019-1030.

The Association for Evolutionary Economics and the Union for Radical Political Economics: General Issues of Continuity and Integration

The Association for Evolutionary Economics and the Union for Radical Political Economics: General Issues of Continuity and Integration

Scholarly Belief and Attitude Formation: The Case of the Radical Economics Paradigm

Abstract Samples of three organizations: The American Economic Association, the Union of Radical Political Economics, and the Association for Evolutionary Economics, were obtained in an effort to determine the social forces which create a radical paradigm in contemporary economics. Radicalism is maintained through the operation of (1) social forces external to the discipline, namely, low levels of religiosity and modest income, as well as prior political socialization through natal family political interest and student activism, and (2) forces internal to the discipline and found within its professional socialization subsystem. A structural model incorporating these variables and emphasizing the adoption of an academic perspective consistent with prior political socialization was tested by means of LISREL VII analysis.

Three Kinds of Economists:

Abstract. The diversity of thought among American economistsis investigated using samples of the memberships of the American Economic Association, the Union for Radical Political Economists and the Association for Evolutionary Economics. Discriminant analysis reveals a complex web of theoretical and organizational integration and separatism involving theoretical orientation in economics, emulative economists, scholarly research focus, organizational membership, and political values. The modal radical economist espouses a radical political economic philosophy and pursues Marxist/radical scholarship in an academic setting. The modal neoclassical economist, radical in neither disciplinary nor personal political beliefs, is found, more often than the other types, in nonacademic administrative work. Marxist/radical and institutionalist scholarship are mutually exclusive. Other dimensions of the professional role, as well as a number of social and biographical background characteristics, do not differentiate between types of economists.

Section I: Biographies of Members of the Association for Evolutionary Economics

Section I: Biographies of Members of the Association for Evolutionary Economics

Methodological Differences between Institutional and Neoclassical Economics

Facts, empirical evidence if one prefers, do not exist independently of theories. Instead, the preconceptions of the investigator strongly influence his search for empirical evidence. Of course, preconceptions vary among investigators, and some are often quite amorphous. Nevertheless, excepting Marxists, most economists tend to group themselves around at least two significantly different sets of preconceptions. One set is generally shared by neoclassicists, the other by institutionalists. Overlapping is quite frequent, but the fact that the American Economic Association and the Association for Evolutionary Economics are separate national organizations is evidence of this grouping. The significantly different preconceptions of and types of evidence sought by the two groups are important distinctions between them, and these differences will be analyzed here in light of recent works in epistemology and methodology.'

Institutional Economics: Its Influence and Prospects

Abstract. The influence of institutional economics is determined more by the contributions of outstanding mainstream institutionalists such a Myrdal, Colm, and Galbraith than by the Association for Evolutionary Economics (AFEE) established to advance institutionalism. This association as a collective body has a clearcut theoretical image because its membership is largely made up of advocates of a vague evolutionary economics or of a proposed but not clearly defined new general theory of institutionalism regarded as a substitute for mainstream institutionalism regarded as a substitute for mainstream institutionalism. Mainstream institutionalists from Veblen to Myrdal have constructed a well‐defined theory of the evolving industrial system, a technological interpretation of this evolving system, and a logic of industrialism that points in the direction of 'indicative’ national planning. Until AFEE builds upon this theoretical work of the mainstream institutionalists it will have neither a well‐defined institutionalist image nor policy proposals appropriate to the coming post‐industrial society.