Assignment Of Property Rights Research Articles

Analysis of Assignment of Property Rights in Reality Based on the Coase Theorem

Analysis of Assignment of Property Rights in Reality Based on the Coase Theorem

A Rothbardian approach for the assignment of property rights on the Antarctica continent

A Rothbardian approach for the assignment of property rights on the Antarctica continent

A Rothbardian approach for the assignment of property rights on the Antarctica continent

A Rothbardian approach for the assignment of property rights on the Antarctica continent

Intellectual Property Rights, Holdup, and the Incentives for Innovation Disclosure

We study how the assignment of property rights between employees and their employers influences disclosures that reveal the productivity and ability of individual employees. To do so, we examine the effect of a court ruling that significantly shifted the assignment of intellectual property rights from inventors to their employers, but that was otherwise likely exogenous with respect to disclosure. Using a within-firm-year difference-in-differences design estimated across a sample of multiple firms, we find that firms accelerate their patent disclosures for innovations created by their inventors affected by the ruling, relative to their patent disclosures for innovations created by their unaffected inventors. Our results suggest that the assignment of intellectual property rights and the potential for hold up problems between employees and their employers can affect disclosure decisions.

Politics, High Technology and the Arctic Ocean as a Scenario for the Assignment of Property Rights Following the Rothbardian Approach

Politics, High Technology and the Arctic Ocean as a Scenario for the Assignment of Property Rights Following the Rothbardian Approach

Legal dispossession and civil war in Colombia

AbstractHow are institutions that regulate property rights related to the massive coercive dispossession of land that took place during the Colombian conflict? How did the workings of these institutions change during the conflict? We answer these questions through an analysis of a unique data set of rulings on land restitution issued between 2012 and 2015. The paper argues that the exclusionary nature of the institutions that regulate the access and assignment of property rights preceded the onset and escalation of the Colombian conflict, but shows how and why once the conflict began, the set of techniques used to promote coercive dispossession through those institutions could be significantly broadened and escalated. By doing so, it intends to advance the knowledge of how institutions are transformed, in this case in a deeply anti‐egalitarian and violent sense, during war.

An Evolutionary Analysis of the Assignment of Property Rights

We develop an evolutionary game model to reveal the theoretical basis for the assignment of property right, where both plaintiff and defendant argue for their rights by claiming their reliance investment. We allow for the possibility that the value of the total product depend not only on the investment conferred by the owner but also on the reliance investment provided by the trespasser. The resulting evolutionary stable set of preferences shows that the endowment effect hardwired to the owners and trespassers depends on the difference of productivities among both parties and the density of owners within the population.

Economic Effects of Recent Social and Technological Developments

This paper summarizes and connects the main findings of the habilitation project. The important social developments analyzed, result from the demographic change that many economies will face in the future. Especially on the regional level, problems arise due to increasing disparities in population. This challenges the comprehensive provision of public services such as health care or basic infrastructure. Therefore, new strategies have to be implemented and previous structures have to be adapted. In particular, as also many cities, which have always been agglomeration areas of economic activity, face demographic and/or economic problems, appropriate proactive strategies must be developed to ensure future prosperity. The most predominant recent technological development is the emergence and comprehensive availability of the Internet. This has led to new business opportunities but also new threats for economic activity. One particular online market comprises online games. In this market, due to the virtuality on the one hand and the importance of network externalities on the other hand, challenges for the assignment of property rights of virtual objects and optimal pricing strategies arise that have to considered. In the context of B2B, and also B2C, cloud computing becomes more and more important, however, this service is threatened by cybercriminals that force access into the cloud. Thus, the provider must develop strategies to prevent damage for his customers and the economy. All in all, overall analysis shows that only cooperation of all relevant (economic) stakeholders can help to overcome challenges of social and technological developments.

Addressing the Externalities from Genetically Modified Pollen Drift on a Heterogeneous Landscape

Genetically modified (GM) crops have single or multiple genes introduced to obtain crop characteristics that cannot be obtained through conventional breeding. Pollen mediated gene flow from GM to non-GM crops causes some crops planted as non-GM to become GM, and this imposes economic losses on farmers who planted a non-GM crop but then have to sell the harvest on a GM market. The economic losses that result when both crops are grown together depend on the institutional arrangements and the type of property rights in place. We analyze how the spatial heterogeneity of a farmer’s fields affects the land allocation between buffers, the GM, and the non-GM crop based on cross-pollination and initial assignment of property rights. Greater spatial heterogeneity reduces the possibility of coexistence of crops on the landscape and increases the economic losses. Buffer zones enforced to reduce cross-pollination result in less coexistence on heterogeneous landscapes.

Creation of property rights in planning by contract and edict: Beyond “Coasian bargaining” in private planning

This article advances the proposition that the creation of property rights, whether by contract-upon-negotiation or edict, is far more significant than what has been described as “ Coasian bargaining” in effecting sustainable development. By “creation” we intend the neo-institutional economist’s sense of establishing a degree of exclusive property rights for common property or devising new contractual arrangements in which private property rights are entrenched. This is sometimes mistakenly confused with the assignment of property rights. “Sustainable development” is understood as the transformation of negative into positive externalities or a state of the tragedy of the commons into a vibrant resource nourishing industry. Two real-world cases involving government planning are used to illustrate this proposition.

When is increasing consumption of common property optimal? Sorting, congestion and entry in the commons

First-best pricing or assignment of property rights for rival and non-excludable goods is often infeasible. In a setting where the social planner cannot limit total use, we show that common-property resources can be over or under-consumed. This depends on whether the external benefits of reallocating users to less congested resources outweigh the additional costs imposed by new entrants. Importantly, we show that it may be optimal to encourage consumption of some common property resources. Our results have important implications for settings ranging from fisheries and forestry to recreational demand and transportation.

Financial Mechanisms to Improve the Supply of Ecosystem Services from Privately-Owned Australian Native Forests

Much of Australia’s native forest is privately-owned and is needing investment to maintain and improve the supply of a wide range of ecosystem services. This paper reviews mechanisms presently used in Australia to improve the supply of ecosystem services, with particular emphasis on financial mechanisms. Auction, green bond and biobanking schemes are widely and, so far, successfully used in a number of States, especially in projects where the actions required and ecosystem services can be readily measured. Measurement of biodiversity and biodiversity-based services remains problematic, despite some fairly widespread application of different measurement systems. Inadequate or variable measurement systems could engender a loss of investor interest if equivalence or gains cannot be appropriately verified. A new Biodiversity Investment Scheme is proposed, based on the structure used commercially in Managed Investment Schemes. The choice of mechanism, however, will be mainly determined by landowner attitudes to assignment of property rights, and by scale, the extent of public versus private consumption goods, and the transaction costs and risks.

Coasean Bargaining in Consumer Bankruptcy

During my first weeks as a graduate student in economics, a professor described the Coase Theorem as “nearly a tautology:” Assume a world in which bargaining is costless. If there are gains from trade, the Theorem tells us, the parties will trade. The initial assignment of property rights will not affect the final allocation because the parties will bargain (costlessly) to an efficient outcome. “How can that be a theorem?,” I remember thinking at the time.

A Property Rights Analysis of Urban Planning in Spain and UK

This study compares urban planning and land management in Spain and the UK. Its purpose is to identify key differences in the legal bases for these activities in the two countries and to comment on the way in which the institutions that deliver them allocate property rights between the state and private organizations and individuals. In particular, we analyse the respective approaches to allocating rights to compensation and betterment value associated with land development, commenting on the efficiency and equity of each system and, in Coasian tradition, the influence the assignment of property rights has on municipal government behaviour.

Climate Change and Global Fisheries Management: Linking Issues to Protect Ecosystems or to Save Political Interests?

This article explores the conditions under which regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) adopt climate actions. I test a series of hypotheses to explain when RFMOs move beyond their classic management approaches—assignment of property rights, catch limits, and gear restrictions—to include climate change in their research and management plans. I introduce a new data set that compares fisheries-climate linkages since 1992 in all available RFMO annual reports and meeting minutes. The analysis reveals a series of patterns surrounding linkage politics in RFMOs. Importantly, this study finds that climate linkages in RFMOs do not simply follow scientific knowledge or regional climate vulnerability. Instead, climate action coincides with member country efforts to avoid catch regulations, and secretariat efforts to exhibit organizational relevance.

Economics of Rural Governance

This paper develops an economic rationalization of the ‘shift from government to governance’ by employing the logic of the property rights theory of the firm. Rural governance is defined as being based on the equal assignment of property rights and is hypothesized as being preferred by rural stakeholders in those cases where the stakeholders' interests are significantly common. This theoretical argument has been confirmed by an empirical analysis of rural governance in Ukraine through a survey of members of various rural cooperatives in the Kiev region.

Property Rights of Ancient DNA: The Impact of Cultural Importance on the Ownership of Genetic Information

AbstractThis article examines the way property rights can be applied to DNA from ancient sources. In particular, it examines the ways in which the legal classification of a source as a “cultural artifact” can influence the assignment of property rights over genetic information. I explore the discrepancy between the legal ability to own ancient dead bodies but not nonancient dead bodies, illustrating how dead bodies with a perceived cultural value are legally distinct from those which are not considered to have cultural value. Second, I address the way such cultural preservation laws fail to influence ownership rights over genetic information. Finally, I propose a model for the best way to deal with genetic information from ancient sources, based on the policies of the International Ancient Egyptian Mummy Tissue Bank.

A great wall of patents: What is behind China's recent patent explosion?

China's patent surge, documented in this paper, is seemingly paradoxical given the country's weak record of protecting intellectual property rights. Using a firm-level data set that spans the population of China's large and medium-size industrial enterprises, this paper explores the factors that account for China's rising patent activity. While the intensification of research and development in the Chinese economy tracks with patenting activity, it explains only a fraction of the patent explosion. The growth of foreign direct investment in China is prompting Chinese firms to file for more patent applications. Amendments to the patent law that favor patent holders and ownership reform that has clarified the assignment of property rights also emerge as significant sources of China's patent boom. These results are robust to alternative estimation strategies that account for over-dispersion in the patent counts data and firm heterogeneity.

Design and Renegotiation of Debt Covenants

We analyze the design and renegotiation of covenants in debt contracts as a particular example of the contractual assignment of property rights under asymmetric information. In particular, we consider a setting where future flrm investments are e‐cient in some states, but also involve a transfer from the lender(s) to shareholders. While there is symmetric information regarding investment e‐ciency, managers are better informed about any potential transfer than the lender. The lender can learn this information, but at a cost. In this setting, we show that the simple adverse selection problem leads to the allocation of greater ex-ante decision rights to the uninformed party than would follow under symmetric information. Consequently, ex-post renegotiation is in turn biased towards the uninformed party giving up these excessive rights. In many settings, this result yields the opposite implication from standard Property Rights results regarding contracting under incomplete contracts and ex-ante investments, whereby rights should be allocated to minimize ine‐ciencies due to distortions in ex-ante investments. Indeed, for debt contracts as well as other settings, the uninformed party, who receives strong decision rights in our setting, is likely to have few signiflcant ex-ante investments to undertake relative to the informed party.

Designing property rights for water: mediating market, government, and corporation failures

Recent decades have seen an acceleration in public concern about the allocation of increasingly scarce water supplies. There are many reasons for this concern, such as growth in urban populations. In this article, we focus on how surface water’s special qualities (the combination of spillovers, rent-seeking behavior, and common pool resources) complicate the assignment of property rights in any legal framework. These characteristics make specific market structures necessary in order to efficiently allocate rights. The state usually designs those structures. Yet, just like markets can fail, so can governments fail to effectively allocate those rights. So designers often turn to quasi-judicial conservancy boards as a second-best solution. We argue that those boards may themselves fail through a form of “corporation failure.” We address these three types of failures, and offer an analysis of two cases that suggests that the likelihood conservancy boards will suffer from corporate failure depends on the actions of the boards and outside stakeholders (like governments).