Asset Management Division Research Articles

Implementasi Strategi Penanganan Pembiayaan Bermasalah di Bank Panin Dubai Syariah Surabaya

This study examines how the strategy for handling non-performing financing at Bank Panin Dubai Syariah KCU Surabaya. The analysis method used is qualitative descriptive using a case study approach. Data collection techniques include observation and interviews. The results of the study show that in handling problematic financing, there are two divisions involved in rescue and settlement efforts for customers who experience payment problems. The Business Division (front end) is responsible for rescuing customers who are experiencing payment problems with a delay of less than 90 days by offering strategies such as installment repayment, rescheduling, reconditioning, and restructuring. Meanwhile, if the customer is late in paying more than 90 days from the due date, the handling of the customer will be taken over by the Special Asset Management Division (back end) by taking actions such as total repayment, voluntary surrender, and auction.

GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEM (GIS) BASED HIGHWAY ASSET MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR MOTORWAYS: CASE STUDY OF MAJOR PAKISTAN’S MOTORWAYS

:Result of pavement condition survey, conducted by NHA in 2005, showed that 43%of existing NHA network has remaining service life (RSL) of0 to1 year. Asset replacement value ofNational Highway was estimated more than 600 Billion in 2005 by Road Way Asset ManagementDivision. This largest investment is deteriorating at fast pace, main cause being increased axle loadingand lack of maintenance.The study was carried out to develop GIS based Highway Asset ManagementSystem(GHAMS) for M-1 and M-3Motorways.Digitized database was established to develop QueryBasedinterface on ArcGIS. The developed system, GHAMS, produced different outputs like thematicmaps, graphs and charts that would assist authorities and decision makers to carry outmaintenance/rehabilitation works of NationalMotorways timely and efficiently. Moreover, this querybased system would lead to save intense pavement damages and subsequent high maintenance /construction cost.

Outside ownership in the hedge fund industry

I examine an action hedge fund managers take to increase their assets under management: selling ownership stakes in their firms to outside owners. Fund companies that sell stakes to outside owners open more new funds and attract higher fund flows. The flow impact is greater for funds who sell stakes to more reputable outside owners and outsiders with asset management divisions. Funds with outside owners do not subsequently outperform their peers. Despite the lack of subsequent outperformance, fund investors do benefit from a reduction in returns management and lower incidence of fraud. Taken together, my results indicate that these transactions result in synergies for all parties involved.

The Impact of Competence and Work Environment on Employee Motivation and Performance in The Financial and Asset Management Division

The Impact of Competence and Work Environment on Employee Motivation and Performance in The Financial and Asset Management Division

Life-cycle cost comparison of chip seal and striping: in-house workers versus private contractors

Purpose To maintain road systems in the USA, state departments of transportation (DOTs) generally use in-house workers or private contractors. Limited studies have calculated the cost savings of hiring private contractors; however, most of them have not calculated cost savings based on life-cycle costs (LCCs). The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the LCC of chip seal and stripping maintenance activities performed by in-house workers are cheaper than those performed by private contractors. Design/methodology/approach The paper collected the hard cost data of chip seal and stripping maintenance activities performed by state DOT in-house workers, as well as private contractors, from 2003 to 2016 from the Nevada DOT Maintenance and Asset Management division. Statistical tests were conducted to test the research hypothesis that the LCC of chip seal and stripping activities performed by in-house workers are significantly less than those performed by private contractors. Findings The study results showed that the cost per unit and LCC of chip seal and striping work performed by in-house workers were significantly less than those performed by private contractors in Nevada. Research limitations/implications The study only collected data from Nevada DOT, so readers should use caution in generalizing the findings of this study. Additionally, factors affecting the cost of these maintenance activities for private contractors are significantly different compared to in-house contractors. Therefore, these differences may be some of the potential reasons for cost difference between these two methods. Practical implications The practical implications of this study are that state DOT engineers need to plan for outsourcing chip seal and stripping maintenance activities only to private contractors that are cost effective, based on life-cycle cost. Originality/value The LCC analysis framework developed in this study will help state DOT engineers to determine cost savings by using in-house workers for road maintenance works.

Informed Trading by Advisor Banks: Evidence from Options Holdings

Strong conflicts of interest exist within investment banks: the investment banking division possesses substantial private information, and the asset management division seeks such information. This raises the question of whether the asset management division benefits from an information advantage on client firms. While prior examinations of advisor bank trading in client firms have focused on stocks and found mixed results, we argue that the options market represents a more attractive venue for such trading. We find significant evidence of advisor banks trading in client firm options ahead of merger announcements, but no evidence of similar trading in client firm stock. Received October 22, 2015; editorial decision June 5, 2018 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Asset Management within Commercial Banking Groups: International Evidence

ABSTRACTWe study the performance of equity mutual funds run by asset management divisions of commercial banking groups using a worldwide sample. We show that bank‐affiliated funds underperform unaffiliated funds by 92 basis points per year. Consistent with conflicts of interest, the underperformance is more pronounced among those affiliated funds that overweight the stock of the bank's lending clients to a great extent. Divestitures of asset management divisions by banking groups support a causal interpretation of the results. Our findings suggest that affiliated fund managers support their lending divisions’ operations to reduce career concerns at the expense of fund investors.

Informed Trading by Adviser Banks: Evidence from Options Holdings

Within an investment bank, there is a tension between the investment banking and asset management divisions: the former possesses substantial private information while the latter seeks information. Information is arguably impossible to completely safeguard, raising the possibility of leaks, either deliberate or inadvertent. To the extent that there is information leakage, we conjecture that it will be observed in the options market, as options represent a relatively cheap means to leverage private information. Empirical evidence is consistent with trading departments of the advisor banks having an information advantage, and leveraging this advantage through options rather than stock.

Citigroup Asset Management

This story offers students the opportunity to practice systems thinking, including the analysis of behavior over time graphs, the application of systems archetypes, and the design of system interventions. Excerpt UVA-OM-1218 The Story Prior to attending Darden, I worked in the Equity Research department of Citigroup Asset Management for a year-and-a-half. This department had been in existence for just over a year when I joined, and because it was a cost center, senior managers had very high expectations regarding the impact of the department on Citigroup's various portfolio management teams. The department's managing director had promised the head of the entire asset management division that the group would initiate coverage on 1,500 global companies within three years. Consequently, the performance goal of each analyst was to initiate coverage on 10 companies per year, but a limiting factor made this goal very difficult to achieve. After analysts initiated coverage on companies, they continuously analyzed and reported all new developments relating to these companies. This maintenance function became so time consuming that most analysts found it difficult to initiate on new companies once they were already formally covering 8 to 12 other companies. The Strategic Decision In the mid-1990s, Citigroup Asset Management (then known as Citibank Global Asset Management) was a division of Citigroup (at that point in time, Citibank). Despite having access to the resources of a Fortune 25, financial services firm, the division was a midtier performer (or worse) in the competitive asset-management business. Managers within the company knew that profitability lay in attracting institutional and private banking business (institutional clients were pension funds and other corporate clients and the private bank catered to high net-worth individuals). Still, managers wondered how could they both build the Citigroup brand name in the asset-management business and attract new clients. Historic performance of the mutual funds and private portfolios was not spectacular and would therefore not generate the business required. . . .

Asset Management and Financial Conglomerates: Attention Through Stellar Funds

This paper provides evidence that stock returns of a financial conglomerate are affected by how successful certain funds of its asset-management division are. The results indicate a spillover effect between management companies with top-performing funds and the stocks of the parent firm. I find that the presence of star funds affects stock returns in ways consistent with investor attention, suggesting that the boost in returns is due not only to an increase in fee revenues accruing to the funds but also to an increase in firm visibility. Additional analyses suggest that managers tend to opportunistically adjust the odds of having star funds to exploit the return effect. These findings suggest that financial institutions can benefit from operating an asset-management unit as they create a brand reputation and benefit from spillover effects. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance.

Outside Ownership in the Hedge Fund Industry

I examine the impact of hedge fund managers selling ownership stakes in their firms to outside owners. Fund companies that sell stakes to outside owners open more new funds and attract higher fund flows, suggesting that managers sell stakes to obtain strategic growth partners. The flow impact is greater for funds i) with lower prior flows, ii) with lower assets under management, iii) purchased by more experienced outside owners, and iv) funds purchased by firms with asset management divisions. Although funds with outside owners do not subsequently outperform their peers, fund investors benefit from a reduction in returns management.

Ask For It!

“Our industry lags most others in terms of attracting, retaining, and advancing women, and that’s a problem for all of us,” says the president and CEO of Charles Schwab’s asset management division

FAKTOR-FAKTOR YANG MEMPENGARUHI PENGELOLAAN ASET PASCA PEMEKARAN WILAYAH DAN PENGARUHNYA TERHADAP KUALITAS LAPORAN KEUANGAN PEMERINTAH DI KABUPATEN TAPANULI SELATAN

This study aims to determine the factors that affect the asset management post-expansion area and its effecton the quality of financial reports of government in South Tapanuli.This study is a qualitative descriptive study,which aims to explore the factors that affect the asset management post-expansion area and its effect on thequality of financial reporting. Data were collected through interviews with the informants, the studydocumentation, as well as observation or triangulation or a mix of all three. Stages of data analysis used includedata reduction, display data, and drawing conclusions or verification in the preparation of a workinghypothesis.The results showed that factors affecting the asset management division of the post in theGovernment of South Tapanuli include: human resources knowledge assets management, proof of ownership ofassets, valuation of assets, leadership commitment, and attitude: lack of awareness and responsibility.Management of assets after the post-expansion area affects the quality of government financial reports. Keywords: Expansion Areas, Asset Management, Quality of Financial Statements

Asset Management within Commercial Banking Groups: International Evidence

We study the performance of equity mutual funds run by asset management divisions of commercial banking groups using a worldwide sample. We show that bank-affiliated funds underperform unaffiliated funds by 70 basis points per year. Consistent with conflicts of interest, the underperformance of affiliated funds is more pronounced among funds with larger stock holdings of the bank’s lending clients. Divestitures of asset management divisions by banking groups and placebo tests using passive and international funds support a causal interpretation of the results. Our findings suggest that affiliated funds support their lending divisions’ operations at the expense of fund investors.

From Reactive to Proactive – Implementing a Utility Asset Management Division in Baltimore, MD

From Reactive to Proactive – Implementing a Utility Asset Management Division in Baltimore, MD

Universal Banks and Corporate Control: Evidence from the Global Syndicated Loan Market

We investigate the effects of bank control over borrower firms whether by representation on boards of directors or by the holding of shares through bank asset management divisions. Using a large sample of syndicated loans, we find that banks are more likely to act as lead arrangers in loans when they exert some control over the borrower firm. Bank-firm governance links are associated with higher loan spreads during the 2003–2006 credit boom but lower spreads during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Additionally, these links mitigate credit rationing effects during the crisis. The results are robust to several methods to correct for the endogeneity of the bank-firm governance link. Our evidence, consistent with intertemporal smoothing of loan rates, suggests that there are costs and benefits from banks' involvement in firm governance.

Universal Banks and Corporate Control: Evidence from the Global Syndicated Loan Market

We investigate the effects of bank control over borrower firms whether by representation on boards of directors or by the holding of shares through bank asset management divisions. Using a large sample of syndicated loans, we find that banks are more likely to act as lead arrangers in loans when they exert some control over the borrower firm. Bank-firm governance links are associated with higher loan spreads during the 2003-2006 credit boom, but lower spreads during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Additionally, these links mitigate credit rationing effects during the crisis. The results are robust to several methods to correct for the endogeneity of the bank-firm governance link. Our evidence, consistent with intertemporal smoothing of loan rates, suggests there are costs and benefits from banks’ involvement in firm governance.

Do investment banks listen to their own analysts?

To what extent conflicts of interest affect the investment value of sell-side analyst research is an ongoing debate. We approach this issue from a new direction by investigating how asset-management divisions of investment banks use stock recommendations issued by their own analysts. Based on holdings changes around initiations, upgrades, and downgrades from 1993 to 2003, we find that these bank-affiliated investors follow recommendations from sell-side analysts in general, increasing (decreasing) their relative holdings following positive (negative) recommendations. More importantly, these investors respond more strongly to recommendations issued by their own analysts than to those issued by analysts affiliated with other banks, especially for recommendations on small and low-analyst-coverage firms. Thus, we find that investment banks “eat their own cooking,” showing that these presumably sophisticated institutional investors view sell-side recommendations as having investment value, particularly when the recommendations come from their own analysts.

Do Investment Banks Listen to Their Own Analysts?

To what extent conflicts of interest affect the investment value of sell-side analyst research is an ongoing debate. We approach this issue from a new direction by investigating how asset-management divisions of investment banks use stock recommendations issued by their own analysts. Based on holdings changes around initiations, upgrades, and downgrades from 1993 to 2003, we find that these bank-affiliated investors follow recommendations from sell-side analysts in general, increasing (decreasing) their relative holdings following positive (negative) recommendations. More importantly, these investors respond more strongly to recommendations issued by their own analysts than to those issued by analysts affiliated with other banks, especially for recommendations on small and low-analyst-coverage firms. Thus, we find that investment banks 'eat their own cooking,' showing that these presumably sophisticated and well-informed institutional investors view sell-side recommendations as having significant investment value, particularly when the recommendations come from their own analysts.

Universal Banking, Asset Management, and Stock Underwriting

Abstract This paper examines institutions that underwrite IPOs and have asset management divisions from 1993 through 1998. We provide evidence that these firms use asset management funds as vehicles to help them earn more equity underwriting business. We also show that asset managers affiliated with IPO underwriters use their superior information about their own institution's IPOs to earn annualised market adjusted returns 7.6% above asset managers of firms who did not underwrite the IPO. Superior future returns by asset managers who trade affiliated IPOs are dependent on the information environment for the IPO and the underwriter reputation rank.