Army Casualties Research Articles

Belaya Smert: The White Death

In the late autumn of 1939, shortly after Second World War had commenced, the Soviet Union invaded Finland. This act of military aggression, henceforth known to history as the Winter War, was ostensibly carried out to secure a buffer state and better protect major urban areas such as St. Petersburg (then known as Leningrad). The Red Army's attack through the forests of northern Finland was a poorly calculated operation-in the little more than 3 months that the conflict lasted, the Soviets suffered extensive losses. The hit-and-run tactics of the small, winter-savvy Finnish Army resulted in a not significant number of Red Army casualties. But from the Soviet perspective, the Finnish soldiers were merely an annoyance compared with the real enemy--the environment. Cold injury reached epidemic proportions in the Red Army during this short conflict, apparently caused in large part by ignorance of environmental realities by the Soviet high command. Paradoxically, the Soviets arguably possessed the most extensive and sophisticated body of knowledge about cold injury prevention and treatment on earth by the late 1930s. There were significant lessons learned by the Soviets during the Winter War, however. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the Red Army very successfully applied these lessons during 4 years of vicious winter battles on the Eastern Front.

Lessons Learned From Casualty Statistics in Health Care System Development: Afghanistan 2008–2009

A retrospective study of Afghanistan National Army casualty rates for a 1-year period was completed to assist in health care system assessment and further development during a period of rapid force expansion. Battle and disease nonbattle injuries by Corps area were determined from data on soldier visits from all military health care facilities. The number of fielded forces in each Corps was used to calculate the populations at risk. Total manpower losses from all casualties were tabulated. The 15,336 casualties (175 per thousand fielded soldiers) resulted in the loss of 146,986 duty days (average 9.5 days per casualty). Battle casualties were 739 (8.4 per 1,000) and nonbattle casualties were 14,597(166 per 1,000) with 72% secondary to infectious diseases. Casualty rates from both battle and disease nonbattle injuries were high, but casualty rates were particularly high from infectious diseases. Rapid force expansion in developing countries requires early consideration for resourcing and implementation of preventive medicine programs.

A study of warfare injuries draining to teaching hospital, Anuradhapura, Sri Lanka

BackgroundArmed conflict has been a major cause of ill health and death throughout history and not received the same attention from public health practitioners and researchers as other causes of...

The Evaluation of Casualties from Operation Iraqi Freedom on Return to the Continental United States from March to June 2003

Most seriously wounded US Army casualties from the Iraqi theater of operations come through Walter Reed Army Medical Center on their return to the United States. General surgery and orthopaedic surgery services have developed a multidisciplinary team approach to triage and treatment of incoming casualties. Prospective database of returning casualties to Walter Reed Army Medical Center from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from March 1 to July 1, 2003. Of 294 casualties seen, 119 were triaged to inpatient status and treated within 1 hour of arrival; mean age 26.6 +/- 6.2 years (range 23 to 37). Time from original battlefield injury was a mean of 8 days (range 3 to 28 days). Forty-six (39%) sustained gunshot wounds, 37 (31%) sustained blast and shrapnel injuries, and 41 (34%) had blunt/motor vehicle collision mechanisms. There were a total of 184 wounded locations in these 119 casualties; of these, there were 29 head and neck, 25 chest, 20 abdomen, 74 lower extremity, and 36 upper extremity. Twenty-eight casualties (23%) required emergent surgical procedures on the night of arrival. Another 30 (25%) required an urgent surgical procedure within 48 hours of arrival. Followup surgical procedures were urgently or emergently required in 43% of admitted battlefield casualties from OIF on transfer to Level V care in the continental United States. The injury pattern of wounds from this engagement is described. The Walter Reed Army Medical Center system of incoming battlefield casualty evaluation using multidisciplinary teams is successful in expediting care and ensuring evaluation of the full range of potential injuries.

Sidney Carter, MD (1912–2005)

![][1] Figure. Sidney Carter, MD Dr. Sidney Carter, one of the most eminent and beloved of neurologists and a founder of child neurology, died on Sunday, January 16th, on Cape Cod. He was 92 years old. Dr. Carter was born in Boston and attended Dartmouth College. He received his medical degree from Boston University in 1938. He interned at St. Mary’s Hospital in Waterbury, CT and then trained in psychiatry in 1939 to 1940 at the Westboro State Hospital in Westboro, MA. In 1941, he started his residency in neurology on the Harvard Unit at Boston City Hospital, where Houston Merritt had recently been appointed Acting Director, following the departure of Tracy Putnam to the Neurologic Institute of New York. In addition to Merritt, Carter worked closely with Raymond Adams, then also at the Boston City Hospital. In 1943, Derek Denny-Brown was named Director of the Neurology Service and, 2 years later, Merritt left to direct Columbia’s neurology program at Montefiore Hospital in the Bronx. Carter had the distinction of being Merritt’s last chief resident at Boston City, and Denny-Brown’s first. During World War II, Carter joined other physicians from the Boston City Hospital at the Seventh General Army Hospital in England, where he was assistant chief of the neuropsychiatric section and the principal neurologic consultant for army casualties. His military career had … [1]: /embed/graphic-1.gif

Israeli Army Casualties in the Second Palestinian Uprising

This study analyzes the pattern of injuries and evacuation in this unique low-intensity conflict with many casualties and high availability of medical services and evacuation means. Injury data regarding Israel Defense Forces casualties during the first 19 weeks of the events were collected and analyzed. Ninety-six of the 356 Israel Defense Forces casualties during the first 4 months of the events were admitted or killed. Bullets (63.5%) were the most common cause of injury. Fragments and explosives accounted for 14.6% of injuries, stones and sling-thrown marbles accounted for 9.4% of injuries, and 12.5% of injuries were from miscellaneous causes. The most commonly injured body regions were the head, face, and neck (54.2%) and the limbs (50.0%). The trunk was injured in 25.0% of cases, and 4.2% of injuries were classified as external. Injury severity distribution was bimodal. The largest group represented patients with Injury Severity Scores (ISSs) between 1 and 14. The other large group was the 23 dead soldiers. The group of soldiers with ISSs between 16 and 75 included five patients only. Sixteen of the 23 dead soldiers were killed in action. Seven soldiers died of their wounds in the hospital, four of them within the first hour after admittance. A total of 83.8% of the casualties were evacuated by ambulances and the rest were evacuated by air. All casualties except one reached the hospital within 1.5 hour after the injury. Seventy-five percent of the injured were evacuated to trauma centers, and the rest were evacuated to other hospitals. The group of soldiers evacuated to trauma centers had a significantly (p = 0.021) higher mean ISS. The nature of this conflict resulted in a bimodal distribution of injuries. Most of the soldiers were either mildly injured or killed, whereas relatively few suffered severe injuries. The prehospital medical forces should be able to identify such patients and provide prompt treatment and evacuation. The abundance of head, face, neck, and limb injuries suggests that the current armor systems should be further investigated and improved.

United States Army, a historical dictionary

Part 1 List of Illustrations Part 2 Editor's Foreword (Jon Woronoff) Part 3 Preface Part 4 Abbreviations and Acronyms Part 5 Chronology Part 6 Introduction Part 7 THE DICTIONARY Part 8 Appendixes Chapter 9 1. Resolution of the Continental Congress Adopting of the Continental Army Chapter 10 2. Resolution of the Continental Congress Appointing George Washington as Commander in Chief of the Continental Army Chapter 11 3. Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff of the Army Chapter 12 4. Secretaries of War and Secretaries of the Army Chapter 13 5. Sergeants Major of the Army Chapter 14 6. Campaigns of the United States Army Chapter 15 7. United States Army Casualties by War Chapter 16 8. United States Army Rank Insignia Part 17 Bibliography Part 18 About the Author

Simulation Analysis of Army Casualty Evacuations

Since war games and field exercises are very expensive, mathematical models are often developed to analyze military systems. In this study, the authors investigate a brigade casualty evacuation system (BCES) via simulation. Specifically, they model the existing BCES of the Turkish Army and analyze the system to improve the patient flow processes in main facilities. The proposed model aims to provide the necessary information to the commanders in a maneuver, logistics, and medical unit about casualties such as time in medical facilities, waiting times in doctor queues, utilization of doctors, and percentages of casualties who return to duty or are sent to higher level medical facilities. The simulation model is also used to compare several alternative system designs and evaluate their impacts on system performance. The result of this study highlights the major problem areas of the system and the possible ways to deal with them.

Ellis Kerley's Service to the Military

The purpose of this paper is to present the contributions Ellis Kerley has made to the United States Department of Defense in the area of forensic anthropology. His service began at the end of the Korean War in the identification laboratory established in Kokura, Japan, under the direction of T.D. Stewart. Ellis developed his research on the quantification of cortical bone microstructure as a means of age estimation while at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. In December 1985, Ellis was asked by the Army to form a commission to evaluate the Central Identification Laboratory, HI (CILHI). This lab is tasked with the mission of search and recovery and identification of American personnel killed or listed as missing from past military conflicts. Ellis's team reviewed the identification process and documentation, the qualifications of lab personnel, the adequacy of facilities and equipment, and some questionable cases. Their written report was supplemented with testimony in front of congressional committees. Ellis served as scientific director of CILHI from 1987 until 1991. In addition to overseeing the daily case work, he led several missions to Vietnam to examine human remains and served as spokesman for the lab. His input helped the lab gain needed scientific credibility. Despite the frustrations of trying to identify human remains within the Army's casualty and memorial affairs system, Ellis always maintained the utmost dignity, compassion, and respect for the victims and their families.

Role conformity and creativity: Soldiers as administrators and caregivers after loss

Previous studies of loss in a military social context have focused on organizational and military unit responses to death and serious injury and bereavement among family members. Integrating structuralist and symbolic interactionist approaches, this study describes the demanding occupational role of army casualty assistance officers (CAOs). This unique military position has the concomitant obligations of administrator and caregiver to surviving family members following death, missing, or captured status of U.S. soldiers in both peace and wartime. The research design involved a qualitative content analysis of the role requirements described in CA 0 handbooks and responses to an open-ended questionnaire (N = 188) by CAOs who served the families of U.S. Army soldiers killed in three unrelated air disasters in Gander, Newfoundland; Lockerbie; Scotland, and Arizona, U.SA., between 1985 and 1990. CAOs are generally preoccupied with instrumental demands associated with their role. The role transcends the institutional boundaries of the military organization and the family and substantively bridges and integrates the concepts of role taking and role making. Implications and interventions for CAOs and other bereavement workers are discussed.

Working with the bereaved: U.S. Army experiences with nontraditional families.

This paper uses a postmodern family perspective to examine the interaction between Army Casualty Assistance Officers (CAOs) and the families of deceased soldiers. The data we examine are open-ended survey responses of CAOs (N = 188) who assisted bereaved families of soldiers killed in three unrelated air disasters. Five themes emerged from our analysis of the qualitative responses: postmodern family structures, contested definitions of "significant other," language, diversity, and emotion. These themes appear to be related to the difficult demands associated with bereavement work. We argue that the experiences of the CAO are comparable to the experiences of others who may work with the bereaved (e.g., police officers, medical workers, and disaster workers) when working in similar familial contexts.

Organizational responses to death in the military

Abstract When a friend or loved one dies, the challenge for survivors is to somehow cope effectively with the loss and go on living and functioning. This is true not only for family members, but also for friends and coworkers of the deceased. How organizations respond to a death can influence coping in either a positive or negative direction. Military organizations have long experience with death, and have developed poprams and policies aimed at assisting survivors to adjust positively to loss. This report reviews how casualty policies have developed in the U.S. Army, and draws on the Army's casualty experience to suggest some ways in which organizational responses to death might facilitate healthy adjustment for survivors.

The pivot: the First Australian Casualty Clearing Hospital at the Gallipoli beachhead — the first seven days

In October 1914, a new type of medical unit was added to the order of battle of the Australian Army's casualty evacuation chain. Designated the casualty clearing hospital, it was called a Casualty Clearing Station on the beach at Anzac Cove in the Gallipoli campaign. This unit was established as the most forward unit to provide emergency surgery, freeing the forward field ambulances from the necessity of holding wounded soldiers, a task which compromised their mobility and prevented them from moving with the brigades they supported. The Casualty Clearing Station was to be the most forward unit where specialist surgeons, anaesthetists, nurses, radiologists and a dentist were to be found. The 1st Australian Casualty Clearing Station (1ACCS) was raised in Hobart and consisted of 93 men including 7 doctors. After some seven weeks of training in camp, the new unit embarked for Egypt and the Gallipoli offensive. They landed on the beach at Anzac Cove at 11 a.m. on 25th April 1915, and remained on a 20 metre stretch of beach through eight months of the Gallipoli campaign. This paper reviews the first seven days of the Station's role at Anzac Cove, during which time this essentially inexperienced medical unit treated and evacuated an estimated 2700 wounded Australian and New Zealand soldiers. This paper also reviews the Commanding Officer's hitherto unpublished war diary and other archival and family records which add to the medical story of Anzac. This frightful baptism of mass casualty evacuation, undergone by the Australian Army Medical Corps, brings a perspective to the problems of mass disasters today.

EVACUATION OF ARMY CASUALTIES

EVACUATION OF ARMY CASUALTIES

Army casualties

Army casualties