Arms Reduction Treaty Research Articles

Strategic Competition and US–China Relations: A Conceptual Analysis

Abstract Despite much attention on “strategic competition” between the USA and China following the declaration of China as America’s “strategic competitor,” the concept’s meanings, origins, as well as different analytical and political functions remain poorly understood. The present article fills this lacuna by conducting a conceptual study of “strategic competition” that traces the concept and its evolution over time. The article finds that there was never a singular or universally applicable meaning of “strategic competition”. When the concept first appeared during the détente era, politicians and scholars referred to the reality of needing to curtail “strategic competition” between the USA and the Soviet Union, and seek cooperative relations, such as through arms reduction treaties. In the late 1990s, the label “strategic competitor” became central to political efforts by the Bush administration to justify their pursuit of military power, deterrence, and American hegemony. Since the Trump administration in the late 2010s, “strategic competition” became a goal to pursue in US-China relations rather than something to be managed. Not recognizing the historical evolution of the term and its many different variations is analytically poor and politically dangerous, and impedes the development of a modus vivendi between the two great powers.

Gas dynamics features of physico-chemical processes in the SRM large-sized charges at open firing

The problem of utilization of solid rocket motors (SRM) with large-sized charges is a relevant objective. This is due to the decommissioning of SRM that failed or were rejected during production and operation, as well as with the implementation of strategic arms reduction treaties. Comparative analysis of SRM with large-sized charge utilization methods showed that the simplest, most productive, and relatively safe technique is open firing. At the same time, the information on the dynamics of harmful substances emission into the environment is needed to conduct quantitative assessment of the concentrations of environmentally hazardous combustion products formed during open firing. The calculation of intraballistic parameters in SRM makes it possible to estimate the consumption parameters of harmful gaseous and condensed combustion products entering the atmosphere. Also, it allows analyze the spatial and temporal course of the concentrations of these substances and optimize ways to reduce environmental hazards. The mathematical model and results of gas dynamics parameters calculation at the open firing of large-sized SRM with the demounted nozzle unit and forward bottom are submitted. The key features of realized flow modes are marked: significant pressure differentials along the length of the SRM in the initial stage of its activity; transonic velocities of intrachannel flow; erosion effects on the initial stages of burning rate.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS REMAIN THE MAIN DETERRENCE AGAINST POSSIBLE AGGRESSION

The renewal of superpower status competition has led, among other things, to enhancing the emphasis on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, all of which relate to China and/or Russia. The challenge of deterrence – discouraging states from taking unwanted actions, especially military aggression – has again become a main issue in defence policy. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which was signed by the United States and Russia, could be seen as “just one step in a longer journey”. Russia’s reassertion of its status as a major world power has mostly included recurring references by Russian officials to Russia’s nuclear weapons capabilities and its status as a major nuclear power. China’s nuclear-weapon capabilities are much more modest than Russia’s, but China is modernising its nuclear forces as part of its overall military modernisation effort. Across the globe and in many different domains, the United States is now dealing with a more immediate requirement for effective deterrence than in any other time since the end of the Cold War. Because many potential adversaries are significantly more capable than they were a decade or more ago and the risks of actually fighting a major war are more significant than ever, deterring such a conflict becomes even more imperative.

Compliance issues and the future of arms control

ABSTRACT Arms control has increasingly become threatened by compliance issues. Viewed individually, these issues might be expected and should not be cause for alarm. However, the list of agreements with unresolved issues has grown too long to ignore. The US State Department’s 2021 arms-control-compliance report calls attention to this problem. Recent casualties include the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, and the 1992 Open Skies Treaty. Although the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty has been renewed, even the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is under stress because of the view, shared by many states, that there has been a failure to implement its key nuclear-disarmament obligation. Many are advocating a move to less formal arms-control arrangements that are politically but not legally binding. However, these bring their own set of compliance problems—in particular, lack of effective verification regimes and dispute-resolution mechanisms. The current approach to compliance issues is failing. These issues need more urgent, high-level attention if the world is to avoid this threat to international peace and security.

Biden Administration Reengages with International Institutions and Agreements

The newly inaugurated administration of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. took immediate steps to reengage with a variety of international institutions and agreements from which the Trump administration had withdrawn. On January 20, 2021, the administration deposited with the United Nations a new instrument of acceptance of the Paris Agreement on climate change, and it halted U.S. withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO). On January 21, the United States announced that it would participate in the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility, an international vaccine distribution scheme. The Biden administration also announced that it would reengage with and seek election to the UN Human Rights Council, and it quickly reached agreement with Russia for a five-year extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining arms control agreement between the two countries. These early moves are consistent with the foreign policy strategy President Biden previewed during the campaign when he promised to “renew American leadership” and “[e]levate [d]iplomacy.” In his first speech on foreign policy as president, delivered at the U.S. State Department on February 4, Biden asserted that “America is back” and that “[d]iplomacy is back at the center of our foreign policy.” To implement these objectives, Biden has appointed a slate of experienced foreign affairs officials, many of whom worked in the Obama administration.

ARMELE NUCLEARE RĂMÂN PRINCIPALA DESCURAJARE ÎMPOTRIVA UNEI EVENTUALE AGRESIUNI

The renewal of superpower status competition has led, among other things, to enhancing the emphasis on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, all of which relate to China and/or Russia. The challenge of deterrence – discouraging states from taking unwanted actions, especially military aggression – has again become a main issue in defence policy. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which was signed by the United States and Russia, could be seen as “just one step in a longer journey”. Russia’s reassertion of its status as a major world power has mostly included recurring references by Russian officials to Russia’s nuclear weapons capabilities and its status as a major nuclear power. China’s nuclear-weapon capabilities are much more modest than Russia’s, but China is modernising its nuclear forces as part of its overall military modernisation effort. Across the globe and in many different domains, the United States is now dealing with a more immediate requirement for effective deterrence than in any other time since the end of the Cold War. Because many potential adversaries are significantly more capable than they were a decade or more ago and the risks of actually fighting a major war are more significant than ever, deterring such a conflict becomes even more imperative.

Eroding Arms Control Regime and US-Russia Relations

Two weeks after Joseph Biden took office as President, the U.S. and Russia extended the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty for five years. This landmark arms control treaty limits the number of strategic offensive weapons each country can have. A ‘window of opportunity’ for a new stage of strategic stability discussions on arms control has opened. Strategic competition between the world’s most powerful countries, escalating global and regional threats, accelerating technological advances in the military sphere, which hold the potential to have a transformative impact on arms forces and military conflicts, have given added urgency to the bilateral dialogue on arms control between the two nuclear superpowers. Political barriers to a new agreement are significant. The perilous state of U.S.-Russia relations, lack of trust and mutual suspicion make it more difficult for the two powers to have sustainable negotiations toward a new treaty. However, if political will is in place coupled with a realistic approach and the United States’ readiness to address Russia’s concerns, a follow-on agreement could be reached.

Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND): a good faith, effective measure pursuant to Article VI NPT or empty gesturing?

It has been 50 years since the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which established the obligation upon all States Parties to work towards nuclear disarmament under Article VI. Yet, despite extensive reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles since the Cold War peaks, nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts are currently in disarray. After the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was terminated in 2019, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty remains as the only bilateral limitation on United States (US) and Russian nuclear forces in operation and is due to expire in February 2021. The US has justified its limited nuclear disarmament progress on the premise that the current international security environment is not conducive to further nuclear disarmament. Instead, the US has recently promoted a new initiative called Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND). The initiative aims to provide a platform for all States to engage in constructive dialogue to identify ways to improve the international security environment, which make nuclear deterrence necessary while addressing the hurdles that currently impede progress towards nuclear disarmament. Significantly, the US regards CEND as an ‘effective measure’ and an illustration of its commitment towards disarmament under Article VI. This article seeks to address the US claim that CEND represents a good faith, effective measure towards nuclear disarmament pursuant to Article VI. This will revisit existing doctrinal interpretative debates concerning the obligation under Article VI, particularly the requirements that negotiations and measures be adopted in good faith, and what constitutes an effective measure towards nuclear disarmament. The discussion will then determine whether the CEND initiative itself can be considered a good faith, effective measure towards nuclear disarmament, by considering its purpose, origins and implementation, and actions of the US.

Russia’s Grom-2019 strategic nuclear exercise

Russia's recent nuclear forces exercise was probably its largest since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Uncertainty remains over the exact number and type of weapons tested. The exercise suggests that nuclear systems remain fundamental to Moscow's approach to deterrence, and can be understood, at least in part, as an attempt to convey to Washington the benefits of extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

Opposing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in the U.S. Congress: Ideological analysis of Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee Hearings

The United States Senate voted to ratify the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia in 2010 by 74-26, all 26 voting against being Republicans. The change in the voting outcome compared to the 95-0 result in the 2003 SORT vote was dramatic. Using inductive frame analysis, this article analyzes committee hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations and the Armed Services committees in order to identify competing narratives defining individual senators’ positions on the ratification of the New START. Building on conceptual framework introduced by Walter Russel Mead (2002), it distinguishes four schools of thought: Jacksonian, Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, and Wilsonian. The argumentation used in the hearings is deconstructed in order to understand the increase in opposition to the traditionally bipartisan nuclear arms control regime. The results reveal a factionalism in the Republican Party. The argumentationin opposition to ratification traces back to the Jacksonian school, whereas argumentation supporting the ratification traces back to Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian and Wilsonian traditions. According to opposition, the Obama administration was pursuing its idealistic goal of a world-without-nuclear-weapons and its misguided Russia reset policy by any means necessary – most importantly by compromising with Russia on U.S. European-based missile defense.

The Deep Crisis of Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament: The State of Play and the Challenges

ABSTRACTAfter the golden age of arms control, Russia and the United States are no longer engaged in arms control negotiations. The landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was officially terminated on 2 August 2019, and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expires in February 2021. The continued political alienation between Russia and the West, combined with new military-technological developments, will undermine strategic stability. A new arms race is looming with severe implications for global nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and regional stability. Neither superpower seems to have a strategy for developing arms control and disarmament. On the contrary, both sides are pursuing costly programs to replace and modernize their Cold War strategic arsenals. A more ambitious approach is necessary for further reductions in nuclear arsenals and the extension of long-standing arms control commitments. The collapse of the INF Treaty could have been prevented by reciprocal inspections to verify treaty compliance. The United States and Russia can agree to extend New START to 2026 and to undertake a wider and structured discussion about what they could do to enhance strategic stability. Such a model must take into account third-country actors, missile defense, precision-guided conventional strike systems, and future actions in outer space and cyberspace. NATO and Russia need to launch a substantive dialogue on how to reduce the risk of hazardous military activities and to prevent military escalation caused by accidents and miscalculations. Other nuclear-armed states and their different types of delivery systems must be part of the disarmament process.

Russia's Strategic Partnerships with China and South Korea: The Impact of THAAD

Russia's Strategic Partnerships with China and South Korea:The Impact of THAAD Anthony V. Rinna (bio) keywords Russia, South Korea, China, Strategic Partnerships, Thaad [End Page 79] executive summary This article analyzes the effects of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system on Russia's strategic partnerships with China and South Korea. main argument Russia opposes THAAD's placement in South Korea and has begun to cooperate with China on missile defense. But despite this cooperation, THAAD's effects on Russia's relations with South Korea have been limited compared with China's. Whereas Beijing retaliated economically, Moscow remains keen to develop closer trade ties with Seoul. The pursuit of strategic partnerships with China and South Korea has encouraged Moscow to maintain balanced relations with both countries even while facing a mutually contentious issue. policy implications • Because the Sino-Russian relationship is a strategic partnership as opposed to a full-fledged alliance, Moscow is able to cooperate with Beijing on issues of mutual interest without being in complete lockstep. • South Korea's policies toward Russia, more so than Japan's policies, have diverged from those of the United States in crucial respects. As a result, Russia tends to view its relationship with Japan through the lens of the U.S.-Japan alliance, whereas it has a more independent relationship with South Korea. • Given that South Korea is a particularly important player in Russia's bid to develop its Far Eastern region, Moscow is unlikely to allow THAAD to derail its growing economic relationship with Seoul. [End Page 80] Escalating tensions between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States prompted Washington and Seoul in 2013 to discuss deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in the Republic of Korea (ROK). In spring 2017, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that THAAD was fully operational in the ROK. The decision to deploy THAAD there met with opposition from Russia, with Moscow expressing skepticism regarding the effects that the system could have on Northeast Asia's regional security environment. In September 2016, Mikhail Ulyanov, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, lamented that THAAD's deployment in South Korea would simply provoke the DPRK to take further measures against the United States.1 Russia's deputy defense minister Alexander Fomin has stated that, short of an outbreak of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, THAAD could ignite or perpetuate a regional arms race.2 Not only have senior Russian officials expressed fears of the potential negative consequences for regional security, they have also decried the potential impact that THAAD could have on arms control agreements between Russia and the United States. Russian lawmaker Viktor Ozerov, then chairman of the Security and Defense Committee of the Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian parliament), has asserted that THAAD's deployment could serve as an impetus for Russia's withdrawal from the 2011 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).3 The People's Republic of China (PRC), an increasingly salient partner of Russia, has echoed Russian apprehensions about THAAD's deployment. In particular, Chinese and Russian officials have repeatedly condemned the impact that THAAD will have on regional stability, as well as the potential of its radar capabilities to challenge Chinese and Russian missile systems. This specifically includes the ability to peer into the air, land, and sea beyond the Korean Peninsula and detect activities such as missile tests as well as [End Page 81] distinguish between real nuclear warheads and decoys.4 The PRC and Russia vowed to implement a coordinated response to THAAD's installation in relative proximity to their borders. This professed intention to cooperate on security comes at a time when they have already grown closer on a broad range of issues. As part of this cooperative relationship, Russia's policy positions on Korean security have largely coincided with China's—namely on the absolute need to avoid military conflict to resolve the North Korean security crisis. Their agreement on policies regarding Korean security has concurrently placed Moscow and Beijing in disagreement with Washington. At the same time, Russia...

US–Russia relations and the future of arms control: how the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty could restore engagement on nuclear issues

ABSTRACTRelations between the United States and Russia are in a prolonged downward spiral. Under these circumstances, cooperation on nuclear issues—once a reliable area of engagement even in difficult political environments—has all but completely halted. There are urgent reasons to find a way out of this situation, particularly the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 2021. However, seemingly intractable disagreements about noncompliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty and US ballistic-missile defense, compounded by the Ukraine crisis, the conflict in Syria, and the accusations of Russian interference in the US election of 2016, threaten the future of arms control. Against this backdrop, policy makers and practitioners should identify ways to re-engage on nuclear issues now so they can be ready to implement them as soon as feasible. This article considers how the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) could serve as a platform for US–Russia cooperation on nuclear issues when circumstances permit. Taking into account the challenges posed by ongoing US non-ratification, it identifies a menu of CTBT-related activities short of ratification that the two countries could undertake together. It explores how joint work on this issue would advance shared US and Russian interests while helping to create the circumstances necessary for further arms-control work.

Experimental demonstration of an isotope-sensitive warhead verification technique using nuclear resonance fluorescence

Future nuclear arms reduction efforts will require technologies to verify that warheads slated for dismantlement are authentic without revealing any sensitive weapons design information to international inspectors. Despite several decades of research, no technology has met these requirements simultaneously. Recent work by Kemp et al. [Kemp RS, Danagoulian A, Macdonald RR, Vavrek JR (2016) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 113:8618-8623] has produced a novel physical cryptographic verification protocol that approaches this treaty verification problem by exploiting the isotope-specific nature of nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) measurements to verify the authenticity of a warhead. To protect sensitive information, the NRF signal from the warhead is convolved with that of an encryption foil that contains key warhead isotopes in amounts unknown to the inspector. The convolved spectrum from a candidate warhead is statistically compared against that from an authenticated template warhead to determine whether the candidate itself is authentic. Here we report on recent proof-of-concept warhead verification experiments conducted at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Using high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors, we measured NRF spectra from the interrogation of proxy "genuine" and "hoax" objects by a 2.52 MeV endpoint bremsstrahlung beam. The observed differences in NRF intensities near 2.2 MeV indicate that the physical cryptographic protocol can distinguish between proxy genuine and hoax objects with high confidence in realistic measurement times.

Sidney David Drell

Sidney David Drell

The political and military vulnerability of America’s land-based nuclear missiles

ABSTRACTThe current plan for US nuclear modernization would replace the nation’s aging Minuteman III missiles with next-generation missiles known as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, at a cost of $100 billion or more. As part of the agreement that resulted in the Senate’s approval of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty nuclear agreement with the Russian Federation, the Obama administration agreed to a nuclear modernization plan that includes retaining and upgrading the nation’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). But from a military standpoint, these missiles are the most vulnerable and least essential components of the US nuclear arsenal. As part of its comprehensive nuclear posture review, the Trump administration should take the time to determine whether ICBMs fit into America’s nuclear deterrent strategy, and to consider options such as reducing or even eliminating them – which could be done with little risk to the overall security of the United States or its allies.

Rising tensions, nuclear modernizations: How Washington can turn down the heat

ABSTRACTStatesmen such as William Perry and Mikhail Gorbachev are growing increasingly concerned about global nuclear tensions. Their concern springs in large measure from the nuclear modernizations being conducted by all major nuclear powers. The United States has embarked on a trillion-dollar modernization program – motivated partly by Russia’s increasing aggressiveness abroad and by indications that Vladimir Putin might be willing to use nuclear weapons. Donald Trump, meanwhile, makes erratic, inconsistent, and impulsive statements about nuclear weapons, causing many to argue that his sole authority to launch these weapons should be taken away. Nuclear tensions will be dampened somewhat by fiscal pressures in both Washington and Moscow and by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Nonetheless, the United States should reduce nuclear dangers by paring down some aspects of its modernization program; agreeing to extend New START; adopting a no-first-use policy and ending hair-trigger alert for nuclear weapons; better educating Donald Trump about arms control agreements and nuclear risks; and stopping or slowing plans for ballistic missile defense installations in Poland and Romania.

Pursuing an early extension of New Start: Evaluating the decision space for the Obama administration and its successor

ABSTRACTWith rumblings that the Obama administration is considering an early extension to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, it is important to review the advantages and disadvantages to extending the treaty at this time. Moreover, in light of Russia's strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapon investments, as well as its broader, destabilizing foreign policy, there are plenty of reasons to delay. Conversely, the transparency the treaty provides and the strategic ceilings it institutes have a special value unto their own. Pursuing an extension now is not in the best interests of the United States, while examining other policy options is prudent.

Контроль над ядерным оружием: конец истории?

The article is addressed to an unprecedented crisis of the system and process of nuclear arms control – including nuclear arms reduction and non-proliferation. During a half century history of the practical nuclear disarmament (counting from the 1963 partial nuclear tests ban treaty – PTB) this process has had many ups and downs, but never has it been so deeply deadlocked. Although the two main nuclear treaties are still implemented: the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 2010 and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) of 1987, their future is increasingly uncertain and their validity is eroding, just as that of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 and other agreements in this crucial sphere. For the first time in the last fifty years the world is facing a real threat of totally loosing control over the most destructive weapons created in the history of mankind. What is the most amazing – this is happening half a century after the end of the Cold War, when the hopes emerged that nuclear disarmament would finally become a realistic proposition. Dramatic events in and around Ukraine are badly exacerbating the crisis of nuclear arms control, but they are not its original cause. The article is analyzing the principal reasons of the present crisis: the transforming post-post Cold War world order; Russia’s position and role in the new international environment; the military-strategic, economic and technological developments, which are leading to disintegration of former conceptual premises and mechanisms of nuclear arms control and which are not adapted to the changing objective realities. In conclusion some general proposals are provided with the aim of saving, adopting and enhancing nuclear arms limitation and non-proliferation.

Rusya-NATO i sredata na sigurnost sled Studenata voina: Chast 1—1989–1999

<i>Rusya-NATO i sredata na sigurnost sled Studenata voina: Chast 1—1989–1999</i>