Onset Of Armed Conflict Research Articles

Climate, Women, and Conflict: Rebel Groups’ Armed Activities after Major Disasters

Abstract This study builds long-anticipated bridges between the literature on (i) climate/disaster security, (ii) women, peace, and security, and (iii) rebel group behavior. Specifically, I analyze how rebel groups react to disasters (like droughts, earthquakes, floods, or storms) by intensifying or reducing their armed activities. This addresses a crucial knowledge gap: While a large literature is dealing with the impacts of climate change and disasters on armed conflict onset or incidence, knowledge on how environmental factors shape the behavior of particular conflict actors remains scarce. I argue that rebel groups escalate fighting when disaster-related opportunities occur (e.g., easier recruitment) but scale back their armed activities if adversely affected by the disasters (e.g., loss of resources). However, this relationship is contingent of the rebels’ inclusion of female combatants. Empirically, this study draws on a unique sample of thirty-six cases of disasters striking armed conflict zones and integrates quantitative and qualitative data via a qualitative comparative analysis. The results suggest that rebel groups intensify their armed activities to exploit disaster-related opportunities but can only do so when female combatants provide them with sufficient capabilities. Conversely, rebels have to reduce fighting when adversely affected by disasters unless they can draw on female members to cope with disaster impacts.

Rebel group formation in Africa: Evidence from a new dataset

Theories of internal armed conflict onset often conceptualize an eruption emerging from pre-existing, non-violent opposition movements or organizations. This paper argues that this is not the most common pathway to armed conflict in Africa. It introduces new data on rebel group formation in 47 African states (1997–2015) that offers a more complete picture than existing conflict datasets; about two-thirds of the groups in the new dataset are not named in standard conflict datasets. The strong majority of these rebel groups formed in rural areas; did not emerge from nearby protest movements or civil society organizations; and initially did not benefit from substantial material resources nor commit large-scale violence. Analyses suggest that rebel groups forming in rural parts of African states draw less often on pre-war, public, non-violent contestation than those of urban areas. The paper highlights the need for more theory on the varied pathways to internal armed conflict, and the importance of – and challenges of collecting – systematic evidence on armed group formation.

What’s going on next door? Irregular leader change in neighboring countries, uncertainty, and civil war

Uncertainty about capabilities or resolve is a prominent explanation for war between states. However, we know comparatively little about uncertainty as a cause of armed conflict between domestic actors. This article proposes that irregular leader change in a neighboring country generates uncertainty about third-party resolve and thus increases the likelihood of intrastate armed conflict. I argue that domestic actors take potential third parties’ capabilities and resolve into account when bargaining, that neighboring countries are important potential third parties, and that irregular leader change among these potential third parties results in uncertainty because there is an increased risk of foreign policy change combined with limited access to information. With uncertain estimates of third-party resolve, the risk of bargaining failure and armed conflict increases. Global spatial analyses spanning 1946–2014 corroborate the argument. As expected, I find that irregular leader change in one or more neighboring countries increases the probability of intrastate armed conflict onset. The results are robust across three different distance thresholds for neighboring countries, using time and country fixed effects and several alternative model specifications. Overall, this article advances our knowledge about uncertainty as a cause of civil war and sheds new light on the adverse consequences of irregular leader change.

Multi-method evidence for when and how climate-related disasters contribute to armed conflict risk

Climate-related disasters are among the most societally disruptive impacts of anthropogenic climate change. Their potential impact on the risk of armed conflict is heavily debated in the context of the security implications of climate change. Yet, evidence for such climate-conflict-disaster links remains limited and contested. One reason for this is that existing studies do not triangulate insights from different methods and pay little attention to relevant context factors and especially causal pathways. By combining statistical approaches with systematic evidence from QCA and qualitative case studies in an innovative multi-method research design, we show that climate-related disasters increase the risk of armed conflict onset. This link is highly context-dependent and we find that countries with large populations, political exclusion of ethnic groups, and a low level of human development are particularly vulnerable. For such countries, almost one third of all conflict onsets over the 1980-2016 period have been preceded by a disaster within 7 days. The robustness of the effect is reduced for longer time spans. Case study evidence points to improved opportunity structures for armed groups rather than aggravated grievances as the main mechanism connecting disasters and conflict onset.

The Future is a Moving Target: Predicting Political Instability

AbstractPrevious research by Goldstone et al. (2010) generated a highly accurate predictive model of state-level political instability. Notably, this model identifies political institutions – and partial democracy with factionalism, specifically – as the most compelling factors explaining when and where instability events are likely to occur. This article reassesses the model’s explanatory power and makes three related points: (1) the model’s predictive power varies substantially over time; (2) its predictive power peaked in the period used for out-of-sample validation (1995–2004) in the original study and (3) the model performs relatively poorly in the more recent period. The authors find that this decline is not simply due to the Arab Uprisings, instability events that occurred in autocracies. Similar issues are found with attempts to predict nonviolent uprisings (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017) and armed conflict onset and continuation (Hegre et al. 2013). These results inform two conclusions: (1) the drivers of instability are not constant over time and (2) care must be exercised in interpreting prediction exercises as evidence in favor or dispositive of theoretical mechanisms.

How (wo)men rebel

Previous studies find a strong relationship between armed conflict and gender equality, but only compare armed conflict to no armed conflict onset. However, opposition movements use different means to challenge governments, such as nonviolent or armed strategies. This study explores this variation and poses the question: How does the level of gender equality affect the onset of nonviolent campaigns and armed conflicts? It makes two contributions. First, I quantitatively test the impact of gender equality on different forms of conflict onset, and second, I propose a comprehensive gendered mobilization argument based on strategic choice theory. Nonviolent campaigns rely on mass participation, and the nonviolent conflict literature claims that they are open to a wider array of participants, including women, compared to armed conflicts. I argue that gender norms affect movements’ expectations of mobilization (mass or limited) as well as conflict norms (nonviolent or violent) in society, and subsequently, the choice of conflict strategy. I hypothesize that higher levels of gender equality, measured by fertility rate and female-to-male primary school enrolment ratio, increase the likelihood of nonviolent campaign onset, compared to both armed and no campaign onset. This study analyses country-year data from the UCDP and NAVCO datasets between 1961 and 2006 and finds that increases in gender equality are, on average, associated with an increased likelihood of nonviolent conflict onset.

Killing in the name of …? Types of ethnic groups and armed conflict

This paper asks whether certain types of ethnic groups are particularly likely to take part in armed conflict. Several theoretical arguments indicate that this should be the case, often highlighting religious and racial boundaries as being more conflict-prone than, for instance, linguistic boundaries. However, the potential effects of groups being mobilized around these different boundary markers remain largely untested. The paper helps to fill this gap by analyzing conflict propensity across types of ethnic groups in a global sample for the period 1946–2009. At odds with common perceptions, the results show that the probability of armed conflict onset is not affected by whether ethnic groups are mobilized around religious, linguistic, racial, or regional markers. The effect of political discrimination on armed conflict is also not conditioned by these different boundary markers. The paper thus lends support to an inclusive conception of ethnicity and suggests that we need to focus on the social and political context rather than the specific cultural content of ethnic boundaries if we want to identify the conflicts that are most likely to escalate and turn violent.

Comprehensive peace agreement implementation and reduction in neonatal, infant and under-5 mortality rates in post-armed conflict states, 1989-2012.

BackgroundPrevious studies suggest that countries with a higher child mortality rate are more susceptible to armed conflict onset as well as recurrence. Studies do not explain conditions under which child mortality declines among post-armed conflict states. This article argues that where armed conflict is terminated through negotiation and implementation of comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs), the child mortality rate declines. This is due to the implementation of provisions in CPAs, which addresses underlying grievances of the poor, underserved and marginalized segments of the population, as well as the successful reconstruction of the health sector. CPA implementation resolves hostilities between armed rivals and facilitates the return process for internally displaced persons and refugees. The CPA implementation may also encourage the return of aid workers and health professionals to conflict-affected zones.MethodThis study utilizes new data on CPA implementation and examines neonatal, infant and under-5 mortality rates among 73 post-armed conflict countries between 1989 and 2012. Multivariate cross-sectional time series correlation (fixed effect) methods are used to analyze the data.ResultsWithin post-armed conflict states, a decline in neonatal, infant and under-5 mortality rates is associated with higher CPA implementation rates. Additionally, this study shows that higher GDP per capita, higher levels of democracy, and more primary school enrollment are also associated with lower child mortality rates. On the other hand, child mortality rates increase following a rebel victory in armed conflict.ConclusionOngoing armed conflicts are responsible for massive displacements and the destruction of economic, healthcare and human infrastructure, thus hindering improvements in child survival. For better health outcomes in post-armed conflict countries, ongoing armed conflict must cease through the signing and implementation of a CPA. Short-term and long-term public health issues are discussed in concluding comments.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12914-015-0066-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Bad Religion? Religion, Collective Action, and the Onset of Armed Conflict in Developing Countries

Anecdotal evidence from many armed conflicts suggests that religion incites violence. Theoretically speaking, several facets of religion can create motives and opportunities to overcome the collective action problems associated with organized violence. However, empirical research has hitherto found no conclusive answer on the extent to which religion is connected to armed conflict onset. Contributing to the filling of this gap, we use a new database that incorporates important religious factors that previous studies left largely untested. The data set covers 130 developing countries for the period 1990 to 2010. Results from logistic regressions confirm our expectation that certain religious factors fuel armed conflict—in particular, the overlap of religious and other identities, religious groups’ grievances, and religious leaders’ calls for violence. We also find that religious determinants vary in their impact according to whether conflicts are religious or not in origin.

Ethnic fractionalization, natural resources and armed conflict

Thus far, researchers working on ethnicity and resources as determinants of civil conflict have operated largely independently of each other. While there is plenty of evidence that natural resources may spur armed conflict, empirical evidence for the nexus between ethnic fractionalization and conflict remains inconclusive. Some authors conclude that ethnically fractionalized societies are actually spared from intrastate violence. Others find either a positive relationship or none at all between ethnic fragmentation and internal conflict. In this context, this paper serves two purposes: first, it shows that salience-based fractionalization indices are associated with a higher risk of ethnic conflict onset; second, it finds evidence that oil further increases the conflict potential within fractionalized countries. The combination of oil and a shared identity seems to help overcome the collective action problems associated with rebellion, by providing recruitment pools, strong motives and the necessary financial means for insurgency. Employing logit models for pooled time-series cross-sectional data, our quantitative analysis shows that various ethnic fractionalization indicators are robustly linked to a substantially increased risk of ethnic armed conflict onset in a subset of oil-abundant countries.

Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict

In this study we resolve part of the confusion over how foreign aid affects armed conflict. We argue that aid shocks – severe decreases in aid revenues – inadvertently shift the domestic balance of power and potentially induce violence. During aid shocks, potential rebels gain bargaining strength vis-a-vis the government. To appease the rebels, the government must promise future resource transfers, but the government has no incentive to continue its promised transfers if the aid shock proves to be temporary. With the government unable to credibly commit to future resource transfers, violence breaks out. Using AidData’s comprehensive dataset of bilateral and multilateral aid from 1981-2005, we evaluate the effects of foreign aid on violent armed conflict. In addition to rare-event logit analysis, we employ matching methods to account for the possibility that aid donors anticipate conflict. The results show that negative aid shocks significantly increase the probability of armed conflict onset.

Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict

In this study we resolve part of the confusion over how foreign aid affects armed conflict. We argue that aid shocks—severe decreases in aid revenues—inadvertently shift the domestic balance of power and potentially induce violence. During aid shocks, potential rebels gain bargaining strength vis-à-vis the government. To appease the rebels, the government must promise future resource transfers, but the government has no incentive to continue its promised transfers if the aid shock proves to be temporary. With the government unable to credibly commit to future resource transfers, violence breaks out. Using AidData's comprehensive dataset of bilateral and multilateral aid from 1981 to 2005, we evaluate the effects of foreign aid on violent armed conflict. In addition to rare-event logit analysis, we employ matching methods to account for the possibility that aid donors anticipate conflict. The results show that negative aid shocks significantly increase the probability of armed conflict onset.

Do poverty and poor health and nutrition increase the risk of armed conflict onset?

We analyze the effects of improving the economic, food security and health status on the risk of armed cotntectflict onset, focusing on the factors related to the millennium development goals. We employ the discrete-time hazard model that allows us to examine the time-varying effects of socioeconomic factors controlling for the reverse effect of conflict. Our results show that income poverty and poor health and nutritional status are more significantly associated with armed conflict onset than GDP per capita, annual GDP growth, and the ratio of primary commodity exports over GDP. In particular, poor health and nutritional status seems to play a key role in inducing armed conflicts in poor countries. These results indicate that, when a majority of the poor and the malnourished resides in rural areas and depends on agriculture directly or indirectly, investments in public goods for agriculture and rural areas can be effective tools to achieve the multiple goals of reduced poverty, food security and armed conflict, including riots in early 2008 triggered by high food prices. Food policy can be an effective element of efforts to maintain stability.

The Economic Effects of the Sri Lankan Civil War

A number of studies have used multicountry data sets to analyze the effect of higher military spending on growth in developing countries. E. Benoit's controversial 1973 study used a multicountry data set to provide evidence that military spending was positively associated with growth in LDCs.1 Later studies using multicountry data sets, such as those by D. Lim, S. Deger, S. Chan, and R. Faini, P. Annez, and L. Taylor found evidence that military spending depresses growth in LDCs.2 While multicountry data sets are useful, the effect that higher military spending has on growth does vary substantially among countries, depending on specific policy choices made regarding resource allocation. For this reason, it is also beneficial to use a case study approach in analyzing the relationship between defense spending and economic growth in LDCs. This article provides such a case study. It focuses on the small nation of Sri Lanka, which has recently seen a dramatic increase in its defense spending due to a violent civil war that began in 1983. This study analyzes the economic effects of the Sri Lankan civil war, and the potential future costs that could be associated with a continuation of this conflict.