Aristotle's Observation Research Articles

Domestication and the comparative embryology of birds.

Studies of domesticated animals have greatly contributed to our understanding of avian embryology. Foundational questions in developmental biology were motivated by Aristotle's observations of chicken embryos. By the 19th century, the chicken embryo was at the center stage of developmental biology, but how closely does this model species mirror the ample taxonomic diversity that characterizes the avian tree of life? Here, we provide a brief overview of the taxonomic breadth of comparative embryological studies in birds. We particularly focused on staging tables and papers that attempted to document the timing of developmental transformations. We show that most of the current knowledge of avian embryology is based on Galliformes (chicken and quail) and Anseriformes (duck and goose). Nonetheless, data are available for some ecologically diverse avian subclades, including Struthioniformes (e.g., ostrich, emu) and Sphenisciformes (penguins). Thus far, there has only been a handful of descriptive embryological studies in the most speciose subclade of Aves, that is, the songbirds (Passeriniformes). Furthermore, we found that temporal variances for developmental events are generally uniform across a consensus chronological sequence for birds. Based on the available data, developmental trajectories for chicken and other model species appear to be highly similar. We discuss future avenues of research in comparative avian embryology in light of the currently available wealth of data on domesticated species and beyond.

Aristotle on the Category of Relation (review)

Reviewed by: Aristotle on the Category of Relation Roderick T. Long Pamela M. Hood . Aristotle on the Category of Relation. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2004. Pp. xi + 154. Paper, $28.00. It is often assumed that Aristotle cannot have an adequate understanding of relations, and in particular that "his substance-accident ontology and his reduction of propositions to the logical structure of subject-predicate form" (3) compel him to treat relations as monadic properties of the relata. But as Hood shows in this book, Aristotle's theory does indeed make room for dyadic (and generally polyadic) predicates—meaning not just that he employs such predicates in practice (that by itself would be no surprise), but that he does so in self-conscious connection with his theory of relatives. Moreover, Hood argues persuasively that Aristotle's characterization of relatives as holding "somehow" toward their correlatives suggests that he recognizes not only relational properties but relations as well. Along the way, she usefully distinguishes her interpretation from those of other commentators; especially helpful is Hood's diagnosis and critique of Morales's interpretation that relatives cease to be relatives when their correlatives are specified. At first Hood seems to want to show that Aristotle's account of relations is not only adequate, but also consistent with his placing individual substances at the center of his ontology. Given the importance of this ontological orientation to Aristotle's overall philosophic project, it would indeed be valuable to be able to show that Aristotle can acknowledge dyadic relations without sacrificing his ontological commitments. But Hood's remark that Aristotle's relational theory transcends "the limitations of his other philosophical positions" (142) suggests instead that she doubts Aristotle's consistency, and perhaps dismisses his substance-based ontology as well-lost. [End Page 149] Similarly, while Aristotle's claim that the actualization of an agent affecting a patient is something located in the patient has sometimes been taken as symptomatic of Aristotle's confused assumption that predicates must have unitary subjects, Hood convincingly refutes this interpretation, showing that Aristotle explicitly describes the actualization as having both the agent and the patient as subjects (62). So far, so good. But one would then expect the moral to be that, when Aristotle speaks of the actualization's being located in the patient, he must mean something other than the actualization's having one subject rather than two. Hood concludes instead that Aristotle's "relational theory . . . may outstrip his causal theory" (63), as though the causal claim were embarrassingly indicative of a monadic approach to relatives after all. Left unconsidered is the possibility that Aristotle might have good reasons—unconnected with any confusion about relatives—for locating the actualization in the patient. Hood's oddest omission is the lack of a clear explanation of what she takes items in the category of relative to be: relations? relata? relational properties? Hood glosses Aristotle's observation that "a man is not called 'someone's man' [but rather] 'someone's property'" (Cat. 8a22–24) as a distinction "between a specimen from the species and the species itself" (38); but I do not think that that can be right. For if Aristotle's reason for rejecting the expression 'someone's man' were that it would imply that someone owns the human species, then Aristotle's approval of the expression 'someone's property' would correspondingly imply that someone owns the species property. Surely what Aristotle actually means is that it is not qua man, but rather qua property, that a man belongs to someone; the distinction is not between specimen and species, but rather between a subject qua specimen of one species and the same subject qua specimen of a different species. Now Hood does see that it is not Peggy's slavehood, but Peggy qua slave, that is supposed to be the relative. But it is unclear whether Hood thinks Peggy qua slave is just Peggy, or instead some complex (a "kooky object"?) constituted by Peggy together with her slavehood. She calls relatives "Complex Predicative Entities," for example, and writes that, while "Peggy's fundamental existence is as a primary substance, not as a relative," because Peggy is "the underlying...

Aristotle's Fish: the case of the kobios and phucis

Aristotle was a remarkable observer of the living world. He made detailed observations on the anatomy and life history characteristics of many organisms as part of a larger study into the differentiae (diaphora) of groups of animals. This reexamination of Aristotle's observations of two small fishes is a study into the work or the way of being of particular organic wholes. As such, it is directed by three main objectives: to evaluate the accuracy of those observations Aristotle makes with regard to the kobios and phucis in the History of Animals, as well as to understand how he might have conducted his research; to determine whether aspects of those observations would ground more philosophical arguments; and to contribute to the understanding of the basic biology of these fishes. In so doing, this article also may introduce a new generation of biologists to the richness of Aristotle's biological observations and the questions that motivated them.

Meconium Aspiration Syndrome — More Than Intrapartum Meconium

Meconium, the fecal material that accumulates in the fetal colon throughout gestation, is a term derived from the Greek mekoni, meaning poppy juice or opium. Beginning with Aristotle's observation of the association between meconium staining of the amniotic fluid and a sleepy fetal state1 or neonatal depression, obstetricians have been concerned about fetal well-being in the presence of meconium-stained amniotic fluid.The passage of meconium normally occurs within the first 24 to 48 hours after birth. However, the passage of fetal meconium, resulting in meconium-stained amniotic fluid, occurs in approximately 12 percent of all deliveries. The meconium aspiration syndrome, associated . . .

THE CHRISTIAN VIRTUE OF MERCY: AQUINAS' TRANSFORMATION OF ARISTOTELIAN PITY

In his discussion of the virtue of mercy (ST, II‐II.30), Thomas Aquinas draws upon two seemingly opposed sources. On the one hand, Thomas takes Aristotle as an authority on the subject of compassion. Aristotle maintains in his discussion of pity in the Rhetoric that pity is felt for those who suffer undeservedly since we do not pity but rather blame those who suffer as a result of their own wicked actions. On the other hand, Jesus in Matthew's gospel feels pity for the crowds. ‘At the sight of the crowds, his heart was moved with pity for them for they were troubled and abandoned, like sheep without a shepherd’ (Matt.9:36). In his commentary on this text from Matthew, Thomas identifies two possible interpretations for the troubled and abandoned condition of the crowd. The crowd is said to be troubled in so far as it is vexed by demons and abandoned in so far as it lies prostrate because of infirmities. The crowd can also be said to be troubled in so far as it is vexed by errors and to be abandoned in so far as it is fallen because of sin.1 Jesus, then, according to Thomas and contrary to Aristotle's claim, feels pity for the crowds as a result of the crowd's misery brought on by their own sinful deeds.In this paper, I examine how Thomas harmonizes these conflicting sources. More specifically, I hope to show both how Thomas uses Aristotle's observations on pity and at the same time transforms those observations in light of Christ's mercy on sinners. Thomas' use and transformation of Aristotle's account of pity provides an enlightening perspective from which to interpret Thomas' initially troubling claim that God feels no pity over the suffering of creatures, which we will consider briefly by way of a conclusion to this paper.

Infrapubic implantation of the three-piece inflatable penile prosthesis

Penile prosthetic surgery has a fascinating history. Presumably inspired by Aristotle's observation in animals of the bony os penis or baculum, prosthetic implantation of costal cartilage homograft was reported initially in 1936 and more extensively in 1943 as a reconstructive technique for wartime penile trauma. Because this biologic material rapidly succumbed to bending and reabsorption, acrylic and later polyethylene and silicone were used as intracavernosal implants in the 1950s. By the late 1960s, these rigid penile prosthetic implants generally were accepted as treatment for impotence. The technology of penile implantation was refined greatly in the 1970s with the development of semirigid rod-type implants, intraoperative sizing, and inflatable prostheses.

Aura glasbene umetnosti - Aristotelova filozofska estetika glasbe

Po kratkem pregledu Aristotelovih omemb glasbe v Poetiki se razprava osredotoči na Aristotelovo filozofijo oz. estetiko glasbe v Politiki. Aristotelova teorija države vkijučuje liberalno izobrazbo, ki je zasnovana na glasbi. Ob navezavi na Damona, Platona in druge glasbene teoretike Aristoteles razvije pojme glasbe kot posnemanja, razumljenega kot sorodnost med umetnostjo in življenjem. Prav ta afiniteta omogoča razumevanje različnih glasbenih učinkov: sprostitve, vzgoje in katarze. Skrb za vzgojo državljanov je pri Aristotelu zgrajena kot skrb za umetnost (glasbo), ki tako postane prava skrb za dušo, cultura animi. Razprava je razčlenjena na naslednje paragrafe: 1. Pesništvo, glasba, vzgoja, 2. Ethos in glasbena mimesis, 3. Glasba in vzgoja, 4. Blagor glasbe in muzikalična katharsis, 5. Glasbena katarza, estetsko ugodje in umetnostno izkustvo, 6. Sklepne opombe o glasbi in katarzi.

Promiscuity: An Evolutionary History of Sperm Competition

Males are promiscuous and ferociously competitive. Females--both human and of other species--are naturally monogamous. That at least is what the study of sexual behavior after Darwin assumed, perhaps because it was written by men. Only in recent years has this version of events been challenged. Females, it has become clear, are remarkably promiscuous and have evolved an astonishing array of strategies, employed both before and after copulation, to determine exactly who will father their offspring. Tim Birkhead reveals a wonderful world in which males and females vie with each other as they strive to maximize their reproductive success. Both sexes have evolved staggeringly sophisticated ways to get what they want--often at the expense of the other. He introduces us to fish whose first encounter locks them together for life in a perpetual sexual embrace; hermaphrodites who joust with their reproductive organs, each trying to inseminate the other without being inseminated; and tiny flies whose seminal fluid is so toxic that it not only destroys the sperm of rival males but eventually kills the female. He explores the long and tortuous road leading to our current state of knowledge, from Aristotle's observations on chickens, to the first successful artificial insemination in the seventeenth century, to today's ingenious molecular markers for assigning paternity. And he shows how much human behavior--from the wife-sharing habits of Inuit hunters to Charlie Chaplin's paternity case--is influenced by sperm competition. Lucidly written and lavishly illustrated, with a wealth of fascinating detail and vivid examples, Promiscuity is the ultimate guide to the battle of the sexes.

Rhetorical Argumentation in Philo of Alexandria

Rhetorical Argumentation in Philo of Alexandria, by Manuel Alexandre, Jr. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999. Pp. xx + 302. $34.95. Alexandre declares that his purpose in this book to show that ancient rhetorical theories of argumentation can help us understand the and basic literary motivation (p. xiii) of Philo's discourse. He believes this the case not only with the speech-- like discourses but also with Philo's exegetical comments on scripture. The book commences with a commendatory preface by Burton L. Mack, after which Alexandre offers a general introduction to the current status of Philonic studies. Part 1 of the book, comprising 80 pages, situates Philo in the context of rhetorical argumentation. In part 2 (150 pages) Alexandre sets out his analysis of the formal structure of De Vita Mosis and Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit and of five discourses embedded in treatises, for example, De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini 21-44. In ch. 4 of part 2, he tracks the structure of complete arguments in such documents as Legum Allegoriae II and De Joespho, as well as the elaborate development of a theme in, e.g., De Migratione Abrahami. In ch. 5 he scrutinizes rhythmic and periodic structures in such discourses as Legatio ad Gaium 53-56. The work ends with observations on the philosophical character of Philo's rhetorical argumentation as a technique of argumentation and exposition. The book contains a thirty-three-page bibliography as well as indices on passages from Philo, ancient and modern authors, and Greek, Latin, and English rhetorical terms. In the general introduction Alexandre does an excellent job in short order of depicting the present state of Philonic studies. Though he published a book in Portuguese, Argurnentaco Retorica em Flon de Alexandria, in 1990, he has brought this 1999 English version up-to-date in comment and bibliography. He mentions the work of the major Philo scholars and the Philonic centers in Chicago, Claremont, Berkeley, Lyon, Italy, and Trondheim. Alexandre himself was involved in the first two centers. He declares that this book is the fullest investigation ever attempted of Philo's knowledge and use of (p. 18). I concur and affirm that any future scrutiny of Philonic rhetoric must commence with this book. In part I Alexandre situates Philo in the context of ancient rhetorical argument. This an insightful, thorough, and judicious presentation. Alexandre cites not only the appropriate ancient rhetorical works but abreast of current discussions in Europe and America. He takes up the rhetoricians historically beginning with the Greeks. He notes that the Greeks focused on the differences between philosophical and rhetorical arguments locating the differences, especially after Aristotle, in formal logic and enthymemes. Alexandre, however, more interested in the formal structures of the manner in which arguments unfold than in those views of the audience that determine the beginning points for arguments, which was the focus of Aristotle's observations. Alexandre writes that the success of the arguments depends upon -the listener's cooperative interaction (p. 43). I suggest that Aristotle gave the audience a more significant role. For him persuasion was based upon the speaker identifying the premises of the audience and employing them as beginning points for arguments. The premises located in the auditors were, for Aristotle, the grist of enthymemes. The later rhetoricians refocused the enthymeme, centering rather upon the form. Alexandre traces developments from Aristotle through the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, Rhetorica ad Herennium, Cicero, Quintilian, Aelius Theon, and Hermogenes, ending with a synoptic chart. While such a chart of help in locating the varying observations, no ancient prepared a discourse employing such a synopsis. At first I was skeptical of Alexandre's efforts to establish that Philo was educated in and deeply immersed in ancient rhetoric. …

Aristotle: Form, function, and comparative anatomy

Aristotle: Form, function, and comparative anatomy

Interaction of efferent and afferent signals in visual perception A history of ideas and experimental paradigms

A historical review of the development of interaction theories in visual perception is presented. The concept that efferent signals generated in the eye or central nervous system interact with afferent visual signal flow dates back to the circles of pre-Socratic philosophers. They believed, however, that the interaction between observer-generated ‘pneuma’ and visual objects takes place at the site of the object or in the extrapersonal space between objects and eye. This idea was elaborated by Plato, the Stoic philosophers, Galen and some church fathers, but rejected by Aristotle and his school. The interaction theory was modified by Arabian medieval scientists (e.g., Alhazen, Avicenna), who believed the interaction of afferent and efferent signal flow to occur within the eye at the site of the pupil. The interaction theory finally disappeared during the first half of the 18th century when Alkmaion's age-old idea of ‘efferent light’ generated in the eye was experimentally refuted. With the rediscovery of Aristotle's observation of eye-movement-related afterimage movement, however, interaction theory reappeared towards the beginning of the 19th century, and sensory physiologists were asking why the world is perceived as stable despite the fact that its image shifts continuously across the retina (Erasmus Darwin, Stembuch, Purkyneě, Bell). The idea of ‘cancellation’ between afferent visual movement signals and corollary signals evoked by the motor compounds of gaze movement (now called efference copy signals) was first proposed by Purkyně. It was further developed during the 19th century by leading sensory physiologists such as Hering, Helmholtz, Mach and their pupils. The first block diagrams of this idea were presented by Mach (1906) and Von Uexküll (1920/1928). These concepts led to the ‘reafference principles’ of Von Holst and Mittelstaedt (1950) and Sperry (1950).

Aristotle's Anomaly

<h3>To the Editor.—</h3> Intrigued by the description of Aristotle's anomaly inThe Journal(1982;248:89), I set out to confirm his observation. My initial assumption was that the index and middle fingers should be crossed. I did this both ways and inserted the pencil between the shafts of the fingers and between the tips of the fingers (except that I could not get a pencil between the tip of my index and middle finger when the index finger was on top). I did not feel two pencils. I then crossed my thumb and index finger in both directions and inserted a pencil in various positions and again felt only one pencil. The following three possibilities come to mind: 1. Aristotle's observation may not have been accurate. In fact, one might question whether a pencil was available to him, since the Encyclopaedia Britanica reports they were first invented in 1565. 2. I

Aristotle the metic

‘Le fondateur du Lycée était à Athènes un métèque; cette position marginale est pour quelque chose dans son détachement et sa lucidité.’ Thus a recent and stimulating commentary upon the economic and social structure of Greek society, in a formulation of the obvious difference between Plato's participation in and Aristotle's observation of contemporary political phenomena. In one area, however, it was Aristotle rather than Plato whose experience was the more direct – that of life, over a prolonged period, as a resident alien. In this brief παίγνιον I shall pursue the Aristotelian side of this contrast along three paths: (a) Aristotle's exact juristic status in Athens; (b) the feelings aroused by his presence there; and (c) what he himself has to say on the subject of metics and foreigners. I advise the reader to derive what satisfaction he may from the journeys themselves, for no startling revelations await him ἐν τριπλαἴς ἁμαξιτοῖς.