Arctic Conflict Research Articles

Arctic conflict and co-operation

ABSTRACT: The Arctic region is often presented as a space either of future conflict or of exceptional co- operation. While Arctic experts have long argued for more nuanced understandings of the region, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 once more brought these questions to the fore. This article challenges the assumption that the Arctic is either one or the other. Instead, it highlights how a diverse Arctic region is one of equally diverse relations, peoples, places and events – and of multiple imaginaries all at once. It argues that appreciating the complexities of socio-political relations is now more important than ever – and that Arctic conflict or co-operation, neither or both, is not pre- determined.

War of the Whales: Climate Change, Weather and Arctic Conflict in the Early Seventeenth Century

Abstract Beginning in 1580, average annual temperatures across the Arctic cooled amid the regional onset of the 'Grindelwald Fluctuation', a particularly cold but volatile period in the Little Ice Age. By contributing to socioeconomic trends that raised the cost of vegetable oils, climatic cooling encouraged European merchants to establish rival whaling operations around the frigid archipelago of Svalbard, roughly halfway between Norway and the North Pole. From 1611 until 1619, European whalers depended on temporary encampments set up along the shores of bays in the islands of Svalbard, and eventually the nearby island of Jan Mayen. When regional sea ice registered the climatic trends of the Grindelwald Fluctuation by besetting these bays, whalers from different European nations and companies coped by cooperating with one another. Yet when the volatility of the Grindelwald Fluctuation in the already variable climate of Svalbard and Jan Mayen drew ice away from the bays, violence often broke out between rival whalers and their escorting warships. Shifting environmental circumstances therefore played a previously ignored role in inciting and mitigating violence in the first decade of the Spitsbergen whaling industry. These relationships can offer new perspectives on the future of geopolitical competition in a warming Arctic.

Борьба за господство в Арктике: исторический взгляд и экономическая оценка соглашения между СССР и США 1990 г.

The question of the delimitation of powers in the sea open spaces adjacent to Alaska between two states (Russia and the USA) remains open and problematic to this day. This work is devoted to the study of more than a century and a half of the history of the Arctic conflict between the two powers in the Bering and Chukchi Seas. The prerequisites and stages of the conclusion of the 1990 agreement on the line of delineation of sea spaces, the legal consequences of the lack of Russian ratification of this treaty, as well as the economic losses incurred by the Russian Federation in connection with the reduction of the economic zone, are examined.

Problems of Russia's Cyber-Security in the Arctic

The importance of Arctic natural resources and communications is increasing in the modern global society. At the same time, the Arctic conflict space is not only unprotected from cyberattacks, but their consequences here can be the most terrible in the hybrid war conditions of the XXI century. Cyberattacks on the critical information infrastructure of credit and financial institutions, the economy, authorities and other facilities are becoming especially dangerous. Cybercrimes of hackers for the purpose of obtaining illegal income, threats of money and property loss by the population become more active. The main source of cyberattacks onRussiaare the US Cyber Command, the aggravation risks of cyber warfare between theUSandRussiaare increasing. One of the leaders in protecting against cyberthreats in the Russian Arctic is PJSC MMC Norilsk Nickel.

Memory politics in transition: Nostalgia tours and gilded memories of Petsamo

The paper examines politics of memory related to the Arctic Finnish-Russian-Norwegian borderland, Petsamo-Pechenga. How it has been remembered, shared and interpreted after the Second World War by refugees from Finnish Petsamo and their offspring, on the one hand, and Finnish public writing, on the other hand? Which means have been used to revitalize their collective and personal narratives and construct the geohistorical space of Petsamo? During the Second World War, Petsamo was the focus of the Arctic conflict, and at the end of the war, Finland lost the region to the Soviet Union. Our source material comprises 521 articles, which we analyzed using qualitative and text mining methods. We conclude that compared with the other war refugee communities in Finland, Petsamo is peripheral to Finnish public post-war memory politics and nostalgia tourism. This is for several reasons: the fact that people from Petsamo constituted a minority among the Finnish evacuees (5200 of 420,000) and were subdivided into two groups (Finns and Skolt Sami people), the devastated and polluted environment, militarization and closeness of Russian Pechenga until the 1990s. The politics of memory about Petsamo – such as nostalgia tourism, written memories, monuments, intergenerational experiences of landscape and history books – can be seen as a manifestation of collective sorrow for a lost homeland, both as individual therapeutic surrender and creating a special emotional community of ex-Petsamo people.

Managing Conflict at Sea: The Case of Norway and Russia in the Svalbard Zone

In 1977, Norway established a maritime Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) around Svalbard, yet avoided claiming an outright Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A dispute with Russia over the status of the Zone arose. In the late 1990s, Norwegian enforcement of fisheries regulations became stricter, as fish stocks were in decline. This led the Norwegian Coast Guard to attempt to arrest Russian fishing vessels on several occasions, resulting in reactions from Russian fishermen, as well as officials in Murmansk and Moscow. In 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2011 specifically, incidents had the potential to escalate beyond a fisheries issue. Today, an event in the maritime zone is of concern to both Norwegian and Russian authorities. Given the potential volatility of events in the FPZ, how do Norway and Russia manage to avoid escalation in the case of a crisis? Whereas previous scholarly work has explicitly focused on the legal status of Svalbard and its maritime zones, or looked at how Norway manages fisheries in cooperation with Russia, this article brings forth new knowledge by examining the specific incidents in the Zone and placing these in the wider context of conflict theory. Limited to the Norwegian perceptions of the dispute only, this article adds to our understanding of this specific issue of Arctic conflict management and governance. Based on several years of data collection through interviews, the argument put forth is that Norwegian and Russian cooperation is based on both mutual interests and the socializing effects of cooperative mechanisms, which in turn are key to avoid escalation in crisis-scenarios. In sum, we need to recognise how a combination of economic interests and the effects of socialisation have enabled Norway and Russia to keep conflict levels low, when incidents at sea have occurred.

The Ukraine crisis moves north. Is Arctic conflict spill-over driven by material interests?

ABSTRACTThe Ukraine crisis has led to tensions between Russia and the western states and the Arctic is one of the affected regions. Regional cooperation, institutions, and international law are essential for Arctic governance, and the crisis may thus have wide-ranging consequences for high north politics. The present article develops an interest-based model of Arctic conflict spill-over and examines its strength, based on a case-study of the first 18 months of the Ukraine crisis. Three hypotheses for Arctic conflict spill-over are developed: Arctic conflict spill-over will be less severe than spill-over in other regions, the western states will be more assertive than Russia, and the smaller Arctic states will be less assertive than the larger states. A review of the crisis confirms the bulk of these hypotheses with some exceptions, thus demonstrating that an interests-based model holds some merit, while also showing that a complete understanding of Arctic conflict spill-over necessitates a broader approach. The article concludes that conflict spillover is unlikely, but not impossible, in the Arctic.

Cold peace: Arctic conflict in an era of climate change

Cold peace: Arctic conflict in an era of climate change

INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND TRENDS OF INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF ARCTIC TERRITORIES

In this article and summarized the regularities of formation of foreign experience and trends of development of Arctic territories. Set out the important points predetermine orientation and specificity of manifestations of national interests – potential participants of the subsoil in the Arctic zone. On the basis of the illuminated materials were obtained the following conclusions: Signifi cant interest in the Arctic show today, not only the fi ve countries (Russia, USA, Canada, Norway, Denmark), who own Arctic territories, but also polar state (Iceland, Sweden, Finland), the European Union and Asia. As a consequence of that, it is expected that in the XXI century the Arctic region will be the focus of attention as an official Arctic 45, and a number of states whose territory is quite removed from it; For Russia, given the current, acute political conditions (sanctions, confrontation with the West, Ukrainian crisis and war in the Middle East) development of Arctic territories, some moved away, moved on tomorrow and the day after tomorrow on the agenda. This approach is fundamentally fl awed and fraught with a number of threats, because other countries do not decrease, but only increase their interest in this issue; Territorial opposition to all those involved in the topic of causing instability in the Arctic region, but does not represent a real threat for the emergence of large-scale conflict. Therefore, making the choice between the hard pressure of national interests and the interests of harmonization of the Arctic states, Russia must be based on international cooperation and mutual consideration of interests in the development of its Arctic strategy; Considering the cooperation of the countries of the Arctic Council and their cooperation in the framework of a global economic forum G8, there are prerequisites for the decision of the Arctic confl ict through negotiation and compromise. In this context it is very important to develop the legal and regulatory institutional frameworks on Arctic issues. The scientific novelty of this study lies in the fact that, based on best international practices and trends in the fi eld of exploration and development of Arctic territories, recommend measures regarding the development and implementation of the Russian Arctic policy, namely: Increase the efficiency of technological equipment and exploration and production of natural resources in the Arctic; The achievement of a reliable logistical infrastructure to secure future energy supplies; Transformation of the operational risks of development and extraction of natural resources in the Arctic financial risks through the mechanisms of public-private partnerships and venture fi nancing; Harmonization of domestic legislation in the sphere of development of Arctic territories with international; Liberalization of the production and sale of energy resources, lobbying national Arctic interests at the global level through the various national structures and institutions.

A New Kind of Arctic Power? Russia's Policy Discourses and Diplomatic Practices in the Circumpolar North

The aim of this article is to examine what the geopolitics of the Arctic look like as seen from the largest Arctic state. How are narratives about the development of the region received, reworked and produced in a Russian context? We find that Russian policy actors distance themselves from discourses of Arctic conflict and geopolitical competition, and examine how this approach may serve some of Russia's key interests in the region. We further argue that the key tension in the Arctic region is not along the conflict/cooperation axis, but rather lies in the tricky process of delineating between international cooperation and national sovereignty in tackling Arctic problems. In attempting to illustrate the various voices, ideas and interests that shape Russia's policy understanding of the Arctic and its challenges and opportunities, we draw upon a media analysis and a set of qualitative interviews with representatives of the five Arctic states.

A dangerous space? Unpacking state and media discourses on the Arctic

“Race for the Arctic” and the “New Cold War” are common newspaper headlines when it comes to coverage of Arctic affairs. In popular media, the Arctic is often portrayed as a zone of potential conflict – with unresolved boundary issues, rapidly changing sea ice cover and tempting natural resources forming a potentially explosive political cocktail. On the other hand, the region possesses a strong track record of post-Cold War peace and cooperation and political leaders and civil servants representing Arctic states have, in recent years, become a coordinated chorus extolling the peacefulness of the region. This article illustrates how the Arctic is represented as a zone of potential conflict in the media through a sampling of international media and an in-depth case study of how the potential for Arctic conflict is discussed in a mainstream Russian newspaper. I argue that these different ‘framings’ or representations of Arctic politics have significance for the kind of politics that can be pursued in the region and discuss how a certain kind of geopolitical reasoning contributes to seeing the Arctic as a latent space of danger and conflict.

Why Do They Need the Arctic? The First Partition of the Sea

The political situation of the Arctic still remains unstable. In the past decade, a combination of the specific regulations of the Convention on the Law of the Sea and the phenomenon of Arctic ice-cover shrinkage have produced a significant increase in the political activity of some of the countries interested in the region. It is commonly thought that the roots of the Arctic conflict lie in the abundant mineral resources, particularly petroleum and natural gas, that lie under the Arctic seabed. By analyzing geological data on the location of oil deposits and by taking into account the technological and macroeconomic conditions that must be fulfilled in order to exploit them, it is possible to conclude that the exploitation of these deposits will most likely not be attempted in the areas under dispute in the coming decades. This conclusion suggests that the motives behind the Arctic conflict are political, and not economic.

Cooperation or Conflict in a Changing Arctic?

The possibility of conflict among nations has dominated discussions of the future of the Arctic. Are there no opportunities for cooperation? This article explores the avenues and incentives for Arctic cooperation through the common issues outlined in the strategy statements of the five coastal Arctic states. Incentives to cooperate can be found in all the thematic areas examined: sovereignty, scientific research, resource development, shipping, and environmental concerns. Cooperation is already occurring on some salient issues. Additional cooperation may occur as issues become increasingly pressing. From this perspective, Arctic conflict is by no means inevitable. Numerous avenues for cooperation exist.