Aquino Administration Research Articles

PARTICIPATORY PLANNING AND DESIGN OF SOCIAL HOUSING FOR INFORMAL SETTLER FAMILIES

This paper reviews the outcomes of People’s Plan projects funded by the PHP 50 billion budget during the third Aquino administration, considering the macro scale of policy implementation through to the micro scale of housing designs. The discussion is informed by comparing the objectives of the fund (i.e. to move to a disaster-free place; to resettle within the National Capital Region (NCR); and relocation led by existing communities). Our review identified a diversity of approaches across projects, as well as collaboration between projects. We conclude by considering the feasibility and benefits of community-led social housing on a mass scale.

“Thinking and Working Politically”: The case of donor‐supported reform coalitions in the Philippines

AbstractMotivationReform coalitions represent a potential means for donors to support macro‐political reform in developing countries, enabling them to avoid the limitations of micro‐political or public sector reform where appropriate circumstances exist. Donor support for reform coalitions, however, is difficult to engineer and fraught with political risk, including the risk of partisan taint.PurposeThis article therefore explores the efforts of Australian Aid and the World Bank to promote reform coalitions and constituencies in the Philippines during the presidency of Benigno S. Aquino III (2010–2016) and to institutionalize the reform agenda of his administration.Approach and MethodsIt draws on a range of sources including programme design documents, mid‐term and end‐of‐term reviews, and contextual policy documents. It also draws on economic and governance data sets to explore relevant correlations.FindingsIt finds that second‐generation reform coalitions brought together stakeholders from government, the private sector and civil society and promoted economic and other reforms. These donor strategies arguably failed, however, with the election of Rodrigo Duterte in May 2016. He was critical of Aquino’s record in office and ostensibly committed to reverse engineering many of the Aquino administration’s achievements. The article critiques a governance‐centric explanatory chain of causation and proposes an expanded politics‐centric chain.Policy ImplicationsIn conceptual terms, planning of reform coalition activities must better account for dominant coalitions and the political settlements which they underpin, and must set out explicit theories of change, specifying distinct political pathways to change. In operational terms, donors must work to avoid traditional “transactional” relationships in favour of more innovative “transformative” ones and must balance “strategic opportunism” with strategic retreat and adaptation where necessary.

Abstract of crisis in Philippine-U.S. security relations: from an alliance to a security partnership?

This article explores the prospect of transforming the Philippine-U.S. alliance into a security partnership. In the past, the Philippines doubted the U.S.’s often-repeated commitment to assist its ally because the 1951 Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) merely stipulated consultation rather than an automatic armed response in case of an armed conflict. In mid-2011, the Aquino Administration asked for an unequivocal U.S. guarantee to defend the Philippines and its naval/air units deployed in the Spratlys. The Duterte Administration, however, has expressed its uncertainty over America’s willingness to back the Philippines militarily in any confrontation with China over the disputed maritime territory. Early this year, President Rodrigo Duterte commented that an armed clash in the South China Sea would crush the Philippines because the involvement of American forces would make the conflict spiral out of control. This development, along with his decision to abrogate the 1997 Philippine-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), has generated a crisis in the alliance. To avert any break-down in their overall security relations, the two allies can explore the possibility of downgrading their alliance to a security partnership. In conclusion, the article argues that should the Philippines consider this option, it must take into account the following: the consequence of losing the deterrence effect of a defence treaty with the world’s most powerful nation; the impact on Philippine defence spending; on the ongoing Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP’s) modernisation program; and whether or not the Filipino nation will support this move.

A conjunctural account of upper- and middle-class support for Rodrigo Duterte

Philippine scholars have largely interpreted Duterte’s support among the upper and middle class as a rejection of the previous administration’s incremental reformism. They also point to the growing appeal of a politics of discipline. These explanations are insufficient. They cannot tell us why the upper and middle class supported Duterte when they did in 2016. The Aquino administration was not the first to disappoint and Duterte hardly the first avatar of discipline to appear on the political scene. In this article the author argues that we need to understand support for Duterte as having crystallized over time with respect to a series of events. Specifically, we need to account for the trajectory of democracy in the Philippines and the contingency of support for him. By placing this support in conjunctural context, we are better able to understand the upper and middle classes’ predisposition to ‘strong leaders’ and their turn to Duterte in 2016.

President Duterte’s bicephalous leadership: Populist at home – pragmatic abroad

Rodrigo Duterte won the Philippines’ 2016 presidential elections thanks to a well-orchestrated campaign and his populist appeal among Filipinos. Soon after he assumed the presidency, he surprised and upset most of his domestic and western international audiences by pragmatically rejecting the pro-Western approach followed by the previous Aquino administration and adopting a China-friendly one. Adopting Critical Discourse Analysis, this research reveals President Duterte’s bicephalous leadership: populist in domestic policies, and pragmatic but unpopular in foreign relations. To qualitatively describe the dichotomy between the populist and pragmatic nature of Duterte’s leadership, this article surveys the Philippines’ mainstream media from 2016 to 2019. Furthermore, this analysis shows that Duterte is using a defensive neorealist approach in building Philippines-China relations and that Filipinos are willing to consider China as a constructive partner for their country.

АМЕРИКАНСЬКО-ФІЛІППІНСЬКІ ВІДНОСИНИ У СФЕРІ БЕЗПЕКИ У 1991–2016 РР.

This paper describes and discusses the major developments in the U.S.-Philippines security relations in 1991-2016, between signing an agreement to extend a rent of Subic Bay Naval base by the U.S. and inauguration of R. Duterte administration. The research has revealed three periods in the U.S.-Philippines security relations in 1991-2016. The first period started when the Philippines senate rejected to ratify the Subic Bay Agreement in September 1991, and the United States had to evacuate the naval base on November 1992. It lasted until the U.S. and the Philippines signed a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1998. The Philippines government’s interest in reaching a new agreement was caused by China’s 1995 military occupation of the Panganiban reef and other incidents at the disputed territories in the South China Sea. The Philippines claimed that they composed a part of their exclusive economic zone, according to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The second period lasted since ratification of the VFA by the Philippines parliament in 1999 until aggravation of the situation in the South China Sea in 2011. This period was featured by enhanced political and military cooperation between the U.S. and the Philippines, and significant U.S. assistance in modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In September 2001–2006, the security cooperation was focused on the counterterrorism activitiesin the Philippines by military means. In 2007–2011, the focus shifted to humanitarian operations and development assistance. During the third period, in March 2011 – June 2016, B. Aquino administration refocused attention from domestic security issues to the threats in the South China Sea. In 2014, the Philippines and the U.S. signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which provided American ships, aircrafts and military personnel with an access to several military bases of the AFP on a rotating basis. The Agreement essentially improved U.S. strategic position in the Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.

“Management Performance And Its Impact Analysis On The Beneficiary Community”

In a developing country such as the Philippines, where call for change is relentless, the inclusive participation of the citizens has become vital. In 2012, the Aquino Administration launched the Bottom-up Budgeting (BUB) Program to bolster inclusive growth, grassroots empowerment, and good governance at the local level. In Cagayan de Oro City (CdeO), BUB sought to increase citizens’ access to local service delivery with a demand-driven budget planning process and to strengthen government accountability in local public service provision (Openbub.gov, 2012). Using the Most Significant Change (MSC) approach, this study examined the dynamics of Civil Society Organizations’ participation in BUB-funded projects that have helped the Local Government Unit (LGU) develop a more progressive perspective in governance and its replicability in other areas. There has been formal recognition by the LGU of the valuable contributions of CSOs to the City’s growth, in the form of strengthened commitment towards poverty alleviation, productive partnerships, and the establishment of the City CSO Affairs Office. The interplay of the CSOs, government stakeholders, and private institutions in the City remains relevant. BUB has been anchored on strong community involvement, open government, and people’s multifaceted agenda for the City, even in the face of the Duterte administration’s plan to replace BUB with a relatively similar system, the Assistance to Disadvantaged Municipalities Program (ADMP). Once institutionalized in the local bureaucracy, civil society participation will continue to keep alight the torch of cooperation in building the fourth metropolis in the country, even as we are buffeted by winds of uncertainty brought about by social and political challenges.

Diffusing Signage as a Visual Communication in Applied of Pico Hydro Technology in Batu Roto, Bengkulu Province, Indonesia

In a developing country such as the Philippines, where call for change is relentless, the inclusive participation of the citizens has become vital. In 2012, the Aquino Administration launched the Bottom-up Budgeting (BUB) Program to bolster inclusive growth, grassroots empowerment, and good governance at the local level. In Cagayan de Oro City (CdeO), BUB sought to increase citizens’ access to local service delivery with a demand-driven budget planning process and to strengthen government accountability in local public service provision (Openbub.gov, 2012). Using the Most Significant Change (MSC) approach, this study examined the dynamics of Civil Society Organizations’ participation in BUB-funded projects that have helped the Local Government Unit (LGU) develop a more progressive perspective in governance and its replicability in other areas. There has been formal recognition by the LGU of the valuable contributions of CSOs to the City’s growth, in the form of strengthened commitment towards poverty alleviation, productive partnerships, and the establishment of the City CSO Affairs Office. The interplay of the CSOs, government stakeholders, and private institutions in the City remains relevant. BUB has been anchored on strong community involvement, open government, and people’s multifaceted agenda for the City, even in the face of the Duterte administration’s plan to replace BUB with a relatively similar system, the Assistance to Disadvantaged Municipalities Program (ADMP). Once institutionalized in the local bureaucracy, civil society participation will continue to keep alight the torch of cooperation in building the fourth metropolis in the country, even as we are buffeted by winds of uncertainty brought about by social and political challenges.

The South China Sea Arbitral Award amidst Shifting Philippine Foreign Policy

Abstract The South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal award was an overwhelming legal and moral victory for the Philippines. The arbitral tribunal categorically declared that China’s nine-dash line claim is incompatible with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, China’s defiance of the ruling and refusal to honor and implement the award pose a serious challenge to Manila’s victory. In addition, the astonishing shift in Philippine foreign policy direction, alongside the change in government, flouts the arbitral award and undermines previous State policies assertive of Philippine maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea. The current direction of Philippine-China relations under Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has demonstrated positive signs of improvement compared with acrimonious bilateral relations pursued by the previous Aquino administration. The arbitral award has largely been set aside in the government’s effort to restore amicable economic and diplomatic relations with China. This paper examines the South China Sea arbitral award amidst shifting Philippine foreign policy under the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte.

Developing a Credible Defense Posture for the Philippines: From the Aquino to the Duterte Administrations

Since 2011, the Aquino administration has bolstered the development of a credible external defense posture of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the face of China's territorial expansion in the South China Sea. This move entailed the upgrading of the Philippine Navy's and the Philippine Air Force's capabilities for maritime domain awareness and naval interdiction. The Aquino administration also anchored its strategic agenda on the 60‐year‐old Philippines‐U.S. alliance by signing the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The election of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte as the 16th president of the Philippines, however, generated uncertainties on whether or not he will continue building the AFP's territorial defense capabilities. Eventually, Duterte decided to continue the Aquino administration's build‐up as a hedge, in case he should find it imperative in the future to pursue his predecessor's policy of challenging China's expansive claim in the South China Sea. The article concludes that like Aquino's security policy, the Duterte administration is also committed to building up the Philippine military's credible defense posture—in light of the growing uncertainties in the region marked by China's emergence and the perceived retreat of the United States as a Pacific power.

The Duterte Administration’s appeasement policy on China and the crisis in the Philippine–US alliance

This article examines the shifts in Philippine foreign policy under the Duterte Administration, and how these changes impact 21st century Philippine–US alliance. Unlike the Aquino Administration that challenged China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, the Duterte Administration keeps silent on this maritime dispute in exchange for Chinese trade concessions, aid, and investments. President Duterte fosters closer economic and diplomatic relations with China and distances the Philippines from the US Specifically, he seeks China’s assistance for the building of drug-rehabilitation centers for Filipino drug dependents, soft loans for the construction of railways in Mindanao, and even the acquisition of Chinese-made weapons for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In consideration of this largess, President Duterte has degraded the country’s strategic security ties with the US by terminating the joint Philippine–US naval patrols in the South China Sea, and limiting the scope and number of US military interactions with the AFP. These moves, which are a dramatic departure from the Philippines’ long-standing policy of maintaining close security ties with the US, have strained the Philippine–US alliance. This article addresses this central question: How do the foreign policy changes under the Duterte Administration adversely impact the Philippine–US alliance? It also raises the following questions: (1) What are the foreign policy goals of the Duterte Administration? (2) How does the Duterte Administration pursue these goals? (3) In what ways does the pursuit of these goals affect Philippine–US alliance? (4) What is the future of Philippine–US alliance in the light of the Duterte Administration’s shifting foreign policy goals?

The Social and Cultural Dimensions of Health as a Research Agenda: Establishing the Need for a Research Interest Group (RIG)in Social Medicine

<p class="Body"><em>&quot;Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition.&quot;)</em> <p class="Body"><em>-Constitution of the World Health Organization</em> <p class="Body">The terms <em>&quot;health inequities,&quot; &quot;health disparities,&quot; </em>and<em> &quot;health inequalities&quot;</em> reflect the magnitude of differences in health outcomes existing in populations unless we address the underlying causes of disease and I&#39;ll health. In the Philippines, Kalusugang Pangkalahatan (KP) or Universal Health Care (UHC) is the health reform agenda of the Aquino administration which has been implemented by the Department of Health (DOH) since 2011.

Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy

ABSTRACTDomestic politics has played an important role in in the dramatic shifts in Philippine policy toward the United States and China, particularly as the South China Sea disputes have intensified. The Arroyo administration attempted to reduce dependency on the United States by engaging China and adopting an equibalancing policy while the subsequent Aquino administration abandoned equibalancing in favor of aligning with the United States against an increasingly assertive China. Today, President Duterte has expressed an intent to separate from the United States and move closer to China in pursuit of a more “independent” foreign policy. Duterte’s rapid consolidation of political power has strengthened his ability to chart the course of Philippine foreign policy, but domestic opposition and potential threats from China could undermine or reverse his course.

Policy coalitions and ambitious politicians: a case study of Philippine social policy reform

AbstractThe Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino administration witnessed a series of social policy reforms such as Republic Act (RA) 10533 (K-12 Law) and RA 10354 (Reproductive Health Law). The political process of this reform is full of intellectual puzzles considering the conventional knowledge on Philippine politics, which is mainly shaped by the framework of a weak state. Why was the administration able to carry out the reforms despite the strong opposition from vested interests sustaining the weak state? This paper argues that ambitious politicians, i.e. those who differ in policy positions and seek to challenge the existing power structure, can work with policy advocates in both public and private sectors and create policy coalitions which result into policy reform. By tracing the political process of forming the policy coalitions, this paper aims to reveal the dynamic aspect of Philippine politics which has been neglected because of the dominance of the weak state framework.

The Philippines in 2015: the calm before the political storm

AbstractThe year started auspiciously with the successful visit of Pope Francis in Manila. Unfortunately, the afterglow of the event was overshadowed by the tragic death of 44 members of the Special Action Forces (SAF), 18 members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and five civilians in a botched operation to capture Indonesian terrorist Marwan in Mamasapano, Mindanao. The major political fallout from the tragedy was the breakdown of the peace negotiations with the MILF. The administration was also beleaguered by accusations of incompetence in connection with the monstrous traffic crisis in Metro Manila, extortion rackets at the airport, and the mismanagement of LRT and MRT railway systems. Nonetheless, it demonstrated decisiveness in pursuing an arbitral case against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Despite overseeing a succession of impressive economic growth, the legacy of the Aquino administration and the victory of its anointed ...

Facing Up to China’s Realpolitik Approach in the South China Sea Dispute: The Case of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Stand-off and Its Aftermath

This article examines the 2012 Scarborough Shoal stand-off between the Philippines and China as a case of Beijing’s application of realpolitik in resolving the South China Sea dispute. It discusses the legal basis of the Philippines’ claim on the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal. However, since 2010, China has aggressively challenged this claim by building up its navy; undermining the other claimant states diplomatically and militarily; and engaging the Philippines in a maritime brinkmanship game. The 2012 Scarborough Shoal stand-off is the tipping point in China’s realpolitik moves against the Philippines in the disputed area. Lasting for two months, the stand-off has since strained Philippines–China bilateral relations; strained bilateral ties have further deteriorated as China intensifies its efforts to consolidate its expansive maritime claim, and the Aquino Administration applies a balancing policy towards an assertive power. In conclusion, the article argues that confronted with China’s realpolitik tactic during the Scarborough Shoal stand-off, the Philippines has applied a balancing strategy that draws the United States and Japan into the fray. Interestingly, these external maritime powers are anxious to curtail China’s growing strategic clout in East Asia. At present, China is caught in its own security dilemma as it faces increasing American and Japanese naval presence and pressure in the South China Sea.

Comment on “Philippine Infrastructure and Connectivity: Challenges and Reforms”

Comment on “Philippine Infrastructure and Connectivity: Challenges and Reforms”

The Philippines Discovers its Maritime Domain: The Aquino Administration’s Shift in Strategic Focus from Internal to Maritime Security

ABSTRACTWith China’s naval expansion in the South China Sea, the Philippine government has eased up its counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism campaign and has vigorously pursued instead the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) particularly in developing the deterrence capability of the Philippine Navy (PN). However, slow-paced and hampered by scant resources, the naval build-up will hardly deter China’s encroachment on the Philippine maritime territory. Faced with this predicament, the Philippines has resorted to forging new security partnerships with the United States and Japan, two major naval powers in East Asia. The paper concludes that maritime security will remain the Philippines’ priority concern way into the third decade of the 21st century.

The Bangsamoro Basic Law: Awareness and support among the Basilan Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Youths

The Philippine government (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, which culminates the Aquino Administration’s effort to end the deadlock in the peace process in Mindanao. It would pave the way for the creation of the new Muslim autonomous political entity (NPE) called “Bangsamoro” under law to be approved by the Philippine Congress, which was the proposed ‘Bangsamoro Basic Law’ or BBL (Bangkok Post, 2014). This study is a descriptive - correlation – regression analysis of the awareness and support of the Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Youths in Basilan, Philippines on the Bangsamoro Basic Law. The findings and conclusions were: (1) The Basilan ethnic youths (Yakan and Tausug) were moderately aware of the provisions of the BBL, while the Basilan non-ethnic youths (Chavacano and Visayan) are barely aware of the provisions of the BBL; (2) The ethnic youths moderately support the passage of the BBL while the non-ethnic youths least support its passage; (3) There is a significant relationship between the youths’ level of awareness and extent of support for the BBL; and (4) The levels of support for the BBL of the Basilan youths are dependent on their ethnic and non-ethnic affiliation.

Twenty‐First Century Philippines’ Policy Toward an Emergent China: From Equi‐Balancing to Strategic Balancing

This article examines the Philippines’ two approaches to China's emergence as a power. The first is the Philippines’ strategy of equi‐balancing the United States and China in the early years of the 21st century. During this period, the country revived and strengthened its security arrangements with the United States while at the same time, it obtained economic and politico‐diplomatic concessions from East Asia's emergent power, China. The second is the Philippines’ strategic balancing policy on China. Since 2011, the Aquino Administration has been conducting a delicate balancing act vis‐à‐vis China, which has become aggressive in asserting its sovereignty over the South China Sea. Currently, the Philippines seeks U.S. diplomatic support and security guarantees in relation to its territorial row with China. In the process, President Aquino has discarded his predecessor's policy of equi‐balancing the great powers and tilted the balance in favor of the United States. This policy shift that entails American and Japanese strategic backing doubtlessly enhances the Philippine‐U.S. alliance but strains Philippine‐China bilateral relations.