T HIS discussion is based in considerable part upon experience in an organization charged with the study of attitudes and morale in the United States Army: Research Branch, Information and Education Division, War Department. Our analysis is based upon observations drawn from work in this country and from operations in the European Theater. Certain conclusions arise from wider observation of several other governmental research organizations. The intention is to focus mainly upon things which seem to have been learned about: (i) research organization, and (2) the relation of research to administrative action. Presumably most members of this Society are acquainted in a general way with the work of the Research Branch. The studies carried out by this organization do notfor sociologically significant reasons-fall neatly under the rubric of any one of the sciences as usually delimited. People who in previous academic life had been labelled as social psychologists, sociologists, and so on worked together; and in many instances it is impossible to ascertain from the technique or content of a given study the academic background of the author or authors. This situation arose in the first instance out of the mandate of the organization. It was established to carry out service research directed toward (i.e., immediate' administrative) problems. In many instances these concrete problems represented the interlacing of technical, economic, political, and psychological or sociological problemsall combined in one not-too-neat package. Generals were, understandably, not particularly interested in strictly analytical research as such; rather, they wanted specific, concrete findings which seemed to have a definite, immediate bearing upon administrative policy and practice. In such a climate, interdisciplinary cooperation in some sense becomes a practical necessity. This may be regarded as one of the early lessons which came out of Research Branch operations. Now, the opportunities and limitations in such an operation can be adequately understood only when it is recognized that it took place within what is practically the empirical polar type of bureaucratic organization. All the definitive characteristics of bureaucracy reach an especially high level of development in a modern Army, and in the Department which has official jurisdiction over the Army. These characteristics include among others a rigid hierarchy, formal and impersonal procedures, appointment of officials, sharp demarcation of areas of competence and authority, a multiplicity of explicit and rigid regulations, a high degree of specialization of functions, and a complex system of interlocking subordinate organizations.' This formal structure, embodying legitimate authority and commanding important coercive sanctions, emphasizes above all a rigid disciplineincluding the requirements of punctuality,
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