Appointment Of Cadres Research Articles

Swot Analysis of Village Food Safety Cadres in The Safe Food Village Program in Gorontalo, Indonesia

Village Food Safety Cadres must possess a high level of proficiency in the field of food safety. The purpose of this study was to assess the efficacy of Village Food Safety Cadres in the Safe Food Village Program in Gorontalo, with the aim of promoting the engagement of these cadres. This was done to facilitate the formulation of recommendations aimed at optimizing the performance of cadres in future endeavors. This study uses qualitative descriptive methods. The study findings indicate that there are multiple barriers to establishing active village food safety cadres in Gorontalo. These obstacles include a lack of experience, skills, and knowledge among local food safety cadres, as well as their own self-concept. Additionally, the appointment of cadres is not voluntary but rather done by the Village Head, which hinders the formation of a strong self-concept as a cadre. Furthermore, socio-cultural characteristics, particularly language issues, pose challenges as some cadres are highly proficient in local languages, making it difficult to comprehend materials in Indonesian. The communities that needed to be supported were composed of individuals with varied educational backgrounds, thus requiring the adaptation of counselling methods to cater to their specific needs. To effectively train and meet the necessary qualifications of active cadres, it is essential to create media platforms for spreading food safety information that incorporate local knowledge. This can be achieved by utilizing local languages that cater to the different demographic characteristics of the communities being nurtured. Furthermore, it is imperative to make dedicated endeavors to enhance the knowledge of cadres on food safety, thereby fostering a positive self-perception.

Inisiasi Program Janji Temu Kader Dengan Ibu Hamil Sebagai Upaya Peningkatan Pemeriksaan Sesuai Jadwal Di Puskesmas Sungai Turak

The health problem of pregnant women is a public health problem that needs major attention because it has an impact on the quality of life and future generations. The risk of pregnancy is very likely to be experienced by a mother and must receive preventive, monitoring and treatment efforts as early as possible so as to contribute to reducing the causes of maternal morbidity and mortality. ANC or antenatal care is care for the mother and fetus during pregnancy. Through ANC, various information and education related to pregnancy and childbirth preparation can be provided to mothers as early as possible. Pregnant women in the Sungai Turak Community Health Center work area have various obstacles in relation to routine ANC checks, for example due to work, time opportunities, and family support in taking them to the Community Health Center. The proposed solution is the initiation of a cadre appointment program with pregnant women, where pregnant women who do not have the opportunity to have their pregnancy checked at the Puskesmas/Posyandu are contacted and make an appointment with cadres, then continue with the implementation of activities. The activities and results of the program implemented are leaflets which are used as outreach materials.

Regional differences of COVID-19 pandemic prevention in China: Especially from the perspective of political leaders.

Since emergency management capabilities with respect to COVID-19 differ across different regions of China, it is necessary to adopt a more comprehensive perspective to study the reasons for these differences and propose corresponding policies. By investigating 287 prefectural-level administrative regions, this study explores the reasons for different levels of COVID-19 prevention performance. The results lead to the following conclusions. The factors influencing pandemic prevention include both structural factors, such as economic and social factors, and the experiences and characteristics of prefectural-level government leaders (party secretaries and mayors), such as grassroots work experience and level of education, which are significantly positively correlated with the progress of pandemic prevention. Based on these findings, we propose suggestions to improve governance capacity in terms of three aspects: the improvement of emergency management capacity, the appointment of cadres in the context of new challenges and missions, and the establishment collocation of prefectural-level leader teams.

Picking Places and People: Centralizing Provincial Governance in China

AbstractChina's political system has been characterized by two institutions since the 1980s: an explicit “layer-by-layer administrative hierarchy” and the “appointment of cadres one level down.” There have, however, been two departures from these administrative practices. First, some provinces have “empowered prosperous counties” by placing them in a dual-reporting relationship with both prefecture-level cities and provinces. Second, some provinces have restored personnel control going “two levels down” by appointing key officials at the county and urban district levels of government. These deviations evolved as responses to China's GDP-centric policy environment during the early reform era. Based on field interviews and nationwide analysis of city-level personnel data, this article argues that such adaptations have generated unintended conflicts between provinces and prefecture-level cities. While prior studies of evolutionary change in China highlight the relationship between state and non-state actors, this study demonstrates how interactions among state actors themselves may fundamentally transform the dynamics of administrative governance.

Dynamics of Local Cadre Appointment in China

The paper investigates the dynamics of local cadre appointment in China by focusing on the relationship between the appointment of prefectural level leading cadres and the tenure of their superior provincial secretaries of the Communist Party of China. We propose a model featuring trade-off between information gain and brain drain as a key mechanism that shapes the dynamics of the appointment. Using unique nation-wide prefectural level Cadre Statistical Data (1983–1998), we find there exists “appointment political cycle” in inverted-U shape over the tenure of the provincial secretary and it peaks in the third year. The inverted-U pattern is mainly driven by the prefectural cadre who had overlapping previous work experience with the incumbent provincial secretary. Both the officially released GDP growth rate and the investment-GDP ratio are greater in prefectures after the appointment of the prefectural secretary or the mayor by the incumbent provincial secretary than those in other prefectures where both the prefectural secretary and the mayor were appointed by previous provincial secretaries. The findings confirm from a perspective of province-prefecture nexus that the personnel control is a fundamental institutional element in China. Although the appointment is subject to personal connections, it appears that the newly appointed cadres are able to generate better economic performance.

A Study on the Reform of Grass-Root Trade Unions and the Promotion of Collective Bargaining in China

In China, the actual union cadre appointment system formed during the planned economy period and the content of the work of the trade unions centered on welfare and entertainment must be changed, and the trade union cadres who have become lazy and silly under the planned economy system must be retrained or adjusted. And there shall be an incentive and restraint mechanism to make them work hard. At present, the most important measure to safeguard workers' rights and interests in China is to activate grass-root trade unions through reform; activating grass-root trade unions is also a prerequisite for promoting collective bargaining. The reform of grass-root trade unions is not only inevitable and necessary, but also feasible; the main measures for grass-root trade union reform are direct election of grass-root trade unions and representative litigation of trade unions on behalf of individual workers. The promotion of collective bargaining cannot be separated from the grass-root trade union reform, and the way of collective bargaining itself is also very important. Resulted from local conditions, Guangdong Model and Zhejiang Model are good examples in collective bargaining. Guangdong Model is a strike-leading model, where industrial disputes begin with a strike, and the employer advocated collective bargaining follows as a result of the strike; Zhejiang Model is a group job-hopping leading model, where the industrial disputes begin with group job-hopping or group sabotage, and the sectoral trade union advocated collective bargaining follows as a result of joint-pricing of employers. All localities ought to choose the right way according to local conditions.

A Comprehensive Model of Evaluating Management Cadres in Universities and Colleges Based on Principal Component Analysis and Fuzzy Mathematics

Applying fuzzy comprehensive evaluation theory, a comprehensive evaluation model can be established by determining its relevant factors and their weight. The comprehensive evaluation for the management cadres can be achieved by adopting the methods of Cluster Analysis and Principal Component Analysis. This model provides a comprehensive and scientific tool for the assessment, selection and appointment of cadres for the personnel department and organization department in colleges and universities.

Profiles in Exhaustion and Pomposity: the Everyday Life of Komsomol cadres in the 1920s

The article examines the daily lives of Young Communist League (Komsomol) cadres in the 1920s argue that their ability to establish local authority through consent was often undermined by their everyday conditions. The article treats the emergence of the Komsomol’s nomenklatura and cadre appointment system after the Russian civil war, cadre workload, working conditions, health, attitudes, and the Komsomol leadership’s efforts to subordinate cadre malfeasance and corruption through public scandal. The article demonstrates that without a sturdy material base upon which to generate consent, local Komsomol cadres often relied on domination to exert their authority over their rank and file members and to some extent the local population. This reliance ultimately perpetuated itself. The more cadres employed coercion, the more the means of consent atrophied, which led them to turn time and again to domination. The use of domination over consent had grave implications on the nature of Bolshevik rule. Often Komsomol cadres were the only representative of the Soviet state in rural localities, and their methods of garnering authority were representative of prevailing trends of Bolshevik governance throughout the 1920s.

“Sprinting with Small Steps” Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System

AbstractWithin the operational procedures of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadre appointment system, age restrictions hinder cadre promotion. As a result, three different methods have emerged to bypass these restrictions, allowing officials to attain faster promotion. These three methods are the Communist Youth League route, temporary transferred duty and non-regulation promotion. This article will explain the age restriction system, and then outline the three methods and discuss their impact on the appointment system as a whole. The examples of Zhou Qiang and Lu Hao, rising political stars, demonstrate how these methods are used to gain substantial age advantages for successful career progression.

FACTIONS AND SPOILS: EXAMINING POLITICAL BEHAVIOR WITHIN THE LOCAL STATE IN CHINA

The emergence of local factions in County X and their relationship to the formal institutions of Party and government and the resilience of local state factionalism and its implications for central government control and one-Party rule are examined. It is argued that local politics is driven largely by a competition over spoils and that competition over spoils is organized around a relatively stable system of factionalism.

Political Machinations in a Rural County

The article discusses corruption and selective policy implementation as general phenomena, related to the configurations of political power and the behavior of key actors in a specific rural county, Benghai County of Anhui Province. The County government only takes up initiatives in which three conditions are met, which are highlighted.

Administrative Monitoring in China

During the reform era, there have been two important developments in China's administrative system. First, there has been a moderate degree of administrative decentralization in the area of cadre appointment. Prior to 1983, the central Party authorities – formally the central Organization Department (OD) – were responsible for appointing cadres down to the bureau level; the 1983–84 reforms delegated bureau-level appointments to ministries and provinces. As a result, the Centre is responsible for appointing fewer cadres than before; as of 1983, it had 7,000 cadres on its management list, a reduction of some 6,000 from the 1980 list. The second development is that the Centre has sought to regulate the appointment decisions that it no longer controls directly and to monitor officials’ performance and conduct. To this end, new and increasingly detailed procedures have been laid out to guide appointment decisions and there have been efforts to strengthen the specialized monitoring agencies.

Chinese Informal Politics

In the study of modern Chinese politics, the informal dimension has always played an extremely important part.1 This is due in part to the unsettled nature of the Chinese political scene throughout the twentieth century, making it difficult for any political arrangement to become securely institutionalized, and in part to the traditional aversion to law and a cultural preference for more moralistic and personalized authority relations. Though usually not part of the explicit analytical framework, the informal dimension has been implicitly taken into account in the biographical analysis of the lives of prominent leaders or thinkers, and in the study of leadership coalitions and cleavages ('factionalism'). Informal politics per se did not, however, become the basis of social science theory on China until the 1970s ? specifically, with the publication of Andrew Nathan's pioneering article and Tang Tsou's rebuttal.2