Applied Cognitive Psychology Research Articles

Similar rates of denial in NICHD and control interviews with alleged child abuse victims in the Netherlands

AbstractPurposeIn the current study, we investigated whether denial and avoidance rates differed statistically significantly based on the interview protocol used.MethodWe examined 38 National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) interview transcripts, and 30 control transcripts from interviews from an earlier study (Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2022, 36, 7) conducted with alleged child victims of abuse at Dutch child protection services.ResultsWe detected 57 denial and 282 avoidance statements across the 68 interviews. No statistically significant differences emerged between (1) the proportion of denials using NICHD (42%, n = 16/38) and control interviews (30%, n = 9/30), and (2) the average number of denial statements between NICHD (M = 0.84) and control interviews (M = 0.83). Furthermore, denials (and avoidances) were not more or less likely to occur in response to certain types of questions, even though the majority of denials in our sample occurred in response to option‐posing questions (60%, n = 34/57). Denials did occur statistically significantly less often within the first half of the individual interviews in NICHD than in control interviews.ConclusionsOur findings call attention to the difficulties child protection services face in investigative interviews with alleged child victims.

Police officers have no advantage over civilians when making identifications

AbstractSome courts have ruled that identification evidence provided by a police officer is more likely to be accurate than comparable evidence provided by a civilian. Identifications made by a police officer are therefore given greater weight and, for these identifications, otherwise‐required procedures and safeguards might be deemed superfluous. We describe the available evidence that examines these notions and argue that police officers actually have no advantage at all over civilians when making identifications. In a recent publication, however, Tupper et al. (2023, Applied Cognitive Psychology, 37, 845–860) offer data that they suggest challenge this claim. We argue that their data, when appropriately analyzed, once again show no police advantage. Their findings therefore converge with the results of 12 prior studies, comparing the identification accuracy for police officers and civilians. We conclude that the best summary of the available data is that the suggestion of a police officer identification advantage is a myth.

Special issue of applied cognitive psychology: Rethinking cognition in a digital environment

AbstractThe digital environment has become increasingly pervasive in our lives, and as a result, may be profoundly impacting our cognitive processes. This special issue of Applied Cognitive Psychology brings together a collection of articles adopting a variety of methodological approaches and applied settings to examine how human cognition transforms in the context of digital environments. Some articles take a functional approach, examining how people use digital media as memory technology in relatively naturalistic contexts. Others adopt experimental methods to examine how basic cognitive processes such as memory and metacognition transform when embedded in digital activities such as Internet search or digital storage. Still others examine how design features of online media platforms shape how content from those different platforms are recalled. In all cases, the studies in this issue indicate how the integration of “onboard” cognitive resources with digital technologies transforms the nature and capacity of human cognition.

Effect of expectations and retention interval on prospective person memory and vigilance

ABSTRACT The present research examined the role of expectations, delay and ongoing task on prospective person memory. Participants (N = 561) studied six mock missing person posters and were told that they had either a low chance or a high chance of encountering the missing persons. Participants were told to press the ‘h’ key if one of the persons was encountered. Participants engaged in a grocery store task immediately after studying the posters or after a five-minute delay. The grocery store task included photographs of 44 individuals, including one of the ‘missing persons’. During the grocery store task, participants either engaged in an attention demanding ongoing activity (i.e. looking for four items from a shopping list) or were able to devote themselves solely to looking for the missing persons. Expectations of encounter increased both correct and incorrect sightings, effects that were more pronounced after the five-minute delay. The presence of the ongoing task had no significant effect on sighting rates. Results are discussed in terms of the multiprocess model [McDaniel, M. A., & Einstein, G. O. (2000). Strategic and automatic processes in prospective memory retrieval: A multiprocess framework. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 14(7), S127–S144 .] and the preparatory attention and memory process model [Smith, R. E. (2003). The cost of remembering to remember in event-based prospective memory: Investigating the capacity demands of delayed intention performance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29(3), 347–361.] of prospective memory. We also discuss applications of these findings to missing person investigations.

Are open‐book tests still as effective as closed‐book tests even after a delay of 2 weeks?

AbstractThe present work was conducted to re‐examine the findings of Agarwal et al. (Applied Cognitive Psychology, 22(7), 861–876, 2008), which showed that both closed‐book tests (with feedback) and open‐book tests increased learning outcomes after 1 week compared to simple re‐study of the same materials. However, contrary to often found benefits of retrieval practice—which should be more pronounced in closed‐book tests—both test conditions proved to be similarly effective. As retrieval practice benefits increase with retention interval, this pattern may change with a longer delay. Hence, we conducted a laboratory study and applied three within‐participant learning conditions (re‐study, open‐book test, closed‐book test with feedback) with a 2 weeks instead of 1 week delay between studying and the final test. Notably, our results mirrored the findings of Agarwal et al. (Applied Cognitive Psychology, 22(7), 861–876, 2008) showing that open‐book and closed‐book tests outperform re‐study but are similarly effective—even using a slightly changed procedure, new materials, a different sample, and a longer delay.

The devil is not in the detail: Reply to Belli (2022)

AbstractWe welcome Belli's (Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2022, 36, 477) comments on our double misinformation research and the opportunity to discuss the involved processes. We agree that our studies do not rule out (some of) the interference mechanisms specified by Belli (Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2022, 36, 477)—because they were never designed for this purpose. Instead, the logic of our studies is at a molar level, potentially involving different molecular‐level interference or non‐interference mechanisms. We concede that specific interference mechanisms may operate in specific circumstances but maintain that our new research approach—adding further contradictory misinformation on top of existing misinformation to reduce the misinformation effect—does pose a challenge for interference accounts in general.

Identifying criminals: No biasing effect of criminal context on recalled threat

To date, it is still unclear whether there is a systematic pattern in the errors made in eyewitness recall and whether certain features of a person are more likely to lead to false identification. Moreover, we also do not know the extent of systematic errors impacting identification of a person from their body rather than solely their face. To address this, based on the contextual model of eyewitness identification (CMEI; Osborne & Davies, 2014, Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28[3], 392–402), we hypothesized that having framed a target as a perpetrator of a violent crime, participants would recall that target person as appearing more like a stereotypical criminal (i.e., more threatening). In three separate experiments, participants were first presented with either no frame, a neutral frame, or a criminal frame (perpetrators of a violent crime) accompanying a target (either a face or body). Participants were then asked to identify the original target from a selection of people that varied in facial threat or body musculature. Contrary to our hypotheses, we found no evidence of bias. However, identification accuracy was highest for the most threatening target bodies high in musculature, as well as bodies paired with detailed neutral contextual information. Overall, these findings suggest that while no systematic bias exists in the recall of criminal bodies, the nature of the body itself and the context in which it is presented can significantly impact identification accuracy.

Call for papers for a Special Issue of ACP entitled: The Truth is Out There: the Psychology of Conspiracy Theories and How to Counter Them

All papers will be fully peer reviewed with publication of the full issue scheduled for later in the same year. Belief in conspiracy theories has become widespread, from COVID-19 and vaccinations to climate change and QAnon. [Extracted from the article] Copyright of Applied Cognitive Psychology is the property of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)

Advertisement for Editor of Applied Cognitive Psychology

Applied Cognitive PsychologyVolume 35, Issue 3 p. 578-578 ANNOUNCEMENT Advertisement for Editor of Applied Cognitive Psychology First published: 18 April 2021 https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3826Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume35, Issue3May/June 2021Pages 578-578 RelatedInformation

Withdrawal

Withdrawal: Martin Bordewieck and Malte Elson, the impact of inducing troubleshooting strategies via visual aids on performance in a computerized digital network task, Applied Cognitive Psychology 2020, (https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3731)The above article from Applied Cognitive Psychology, published online on 11 August 2020 in Wiley Online Library (http://wileyonlinelibrary.com) has been withdrawn by agreement among the authors, the Journal Editor‐in‐Chief Graham Davies and John Wiley & Sons Inc. The article was published in error. The authors are updating the proposed methods in this Stage 1 Registered Report, partly due to the impact of the Covid‐19 pandemic on conducting research. The revised Stage 1 Registered Report can be found here: https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3809.

Framing the past (and future): Effects of generic photos on autobiographical judgments.

Do the images we see every day influence how we remember our lives? Research on this matter often concerns how entire memories of events can be created or shaped through the use of doctored photographs of personal (Wade et al., Psychonomic bulletin & review, 9 (3), 597-603, 2002) and public events (Sacchi et al., Applied Cognitive Psychology, 21 (8), 1005-1022, 2007). Although this paradigm has yielded insights into false memory production, it may underestimate the extent to which photographs can bias or distort memory in a subtler manner (i.e., without the use of doctored photographs or suggestion). In Experiments 1 (N = 95) and 2 (N = 186) of the present study, we examined whether the mere presence of generic images, typical of stock photography, could influence aspects of our memories. Given the parallel between autobiographical remembering and forecasting (Berntsen & Bohn, Memory & Cognition, 38(3), 265-278, 2010), we also examined (Experiment 3: N=204) how such images would influence future autobiographical judgments. Specifically, three experiments investigated whether photographs would bias autobiographical judgments for either quantitative (e.g., How many movies have you seen in the past year?) or affective (e.g., How enjoyable do you think your next date will be?) aspects of events in everyday life. We found that photographs reliably influenced judgments related to quantitative aspects of autobiographical events. Moreover, though less robustly, there was an indication that these photos could bias our affective construal of such events as well. Overall, we conclude that the mere presence of generic photographs may exert an influence on the way we think about our lives to an extent previously under-recognized.

CORRIGENDUM

Applied Cognitive PsychologyVolume 35, Issue 1 p. 317-317 CORRIGENDUM Free Access CORRIGENDUM This article corrects the following: Commentary for special issue of Applied Cognitive Psychology in honor of Alan Scoboria D. Stephen Lindsay Volume 34Issue 6Applied Cognitive Psychology pages: 1345-1349 First Published online: November 3, 2020 First published: 17 January 2021 https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3780 AboutSectionsPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat D. Stephen Lindsay: ‘Commentary for special issue of Applied Cognitive Psychology in honor of Alan Scoboria.’ Applied Cognitive Psychology, 34,1345-1349. On page 1348 it was stated: “Brewin and Andrews (2017) reviewed the literature on false memories and argued that the rate of false memories in the real world is no higher than 15% of individuals exposed to suggestive influences. But any “upper limit” on the percentage of adults who can be led to experience false memories will depend on interactions among numerous variables.” In fact, the figure of 15% mentioned by Brewin and Andrews referred to the rate of false memories among experimental participants, and they did not claim anywhere in their article that it applied to the real world. The correct statement should be: Brewin and Andrews (2017) reviewed the literature on false memories and argued that the rate of full false autobiographical memories in that literature is no higher than 15% of individuals exposed to suggestive influences. In the real world, the percentage of adults who can be led to experience false memories will depend on interactions among numerous variables. This has been corrected within the article. The author apologies for this error. REFERENCE Lindsay, D. S. (2020). Commentary for special issue of Applied Cognitive Psychology in honor of Alan Scoboria. Appl Cognit Psychol, 34, 1345– 1349 https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3758. Wiley Online Library Web of Science®Google Scholar Volume35, Issue1January/February 2021Pages 317-317 ReferencesRelatedInformation

The verifiability approach to deception detection: A preregistered direct replication of the information protocol condition of Nahari, Vrij, and Fisher (2014b)

SummaryNahari, Vrij, and Fischer [(2014b), Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28, 122–128] found that, when participants were forewarned that their statements would be checked for verifiable details, truth tellers gave much more verifiable details than liars. In this direct replication (n = 72), participants wrote a statement claiming they had carried out their regular campus activities, whereas liars had actually stolen an exam. Statements were coded for verifiable details. Our primary prediction was confirmed: Truth tellers provided significantly more verifiable details than liars. Of note, the replication effect size (d = 0.49) was less than half that of the original (d = 1.14), and – like in the original study – was smaller than the lie‐truth effect size for total details (verifiable and unverifiable details combined; d = 0.80). We hope this will stimulate other independent investigations of VA to tell whether or not coding for verifiability will pass Ockham's razor test.

When a different perspective and contextual knowledge change the conclusions: Commentary on Baugerud et al. (2020)

SummaryIn this commentary, we raise concerns about potential methodological shortcomings in a recent paper by Baugerud et al. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2020, 34, 654–663, which threaten the validity and the interpretative power of the original authors' conclusions. Our concerns relate to (a) the use of a scoring system that fails to account for how children's legal rights have been implemented in the Norwegian legal system; (b) the failure to acknowledge the legal and ethical rationales behind the use of specific procedures in the Norwegian child interviewing model; (c) the lack of justification based on developmental theory or empirical distributions when creating age groups for statistical comparisons; and (d) the seemingly arbitrary and selective use of outcome variables to support a negative interpretation of the Norwegian interviewing model. Finally, because applied research may directly inform policy decisions, we argue that authors need to be particularly transparent with any potential conflicts of interest and have a low threshold for reporting such.

Commentary for special issue of Applied Cognitive Psychology in honor of Alan Scoboria

SummaryThe world would be a better place if there were more people like Alan. What an extraordinary convergence of kindness, reflectiveness, persistence, ethics, breadth of knowledge, and raw smarts! He positively and substantially contributed to cognitive, clinical, and social psychology, and to the lives of his students and collaborators. This collection carries that legacy forward. Alan would have relished reading every one of these articles. I am honored by the opportunity to comment. I hope to do so in a way that Alan would approve. I begin with a brief reflection on one of the “big picture” ideas in Alan's work. Then I discuss several issues that I know were near and dear to Alan and that have also occupied my own thinking for years. In addition to scientific accounts of true and false beliefs and memories, my comments are informed by the methodological reform movement. As an oldster, I also take this opportunity to mention a few earlier issues/findings that relate to current controversies.

Why Humans Are Vulnerable to Conspiracy Theories.

Humans seem drawn to dark conspiracy theories, often in favor of the simple truth In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, misinformation and conspiracy theorizing have surged President Trump, for example, praised the antimalarial drug hydroxychloroquine as a "game changer" despite scant empirical evidence of its efficacy and safety for the treatment of SARS-CoV-2 Others in the administration have promoted the unsubstantiated theory that SARS-CoV-2 originated in a Chinese lab, despite scientific consensus that the virus likely originated in an animal source before zoonotic transfer and that no evidence indicates that the virus emerged through deliberate lab manipulation of a related virus Here, Friedman discusses why humans are vulnerable to conspiracy theories

Embracing complexity in research on learning from examples and from problem solving

SummaryThis contribution is a commentary to a special issue titled “Example‐based learning: New theoretical perspectives and advances to a contemporary instructional approach” published in Applied Cognitive Psychology (2020). In the commentary, the presented research is discussed with respect to three extensions compared with previous research, namely, theoretical frameworks, learning scenarios and domains. It concludes with some suggestions for methodological advancements.

An individual differences investigation of the relations among life event stress, working memory capacity, and mind wandering: A preregistered replication-extension study.

Klein and Boals (2001a, Applied Cognitive Psychology, 15[5], 565-579, Experiments 1 and 2) found that working memory capacity correlated negatively with perceived negative life event stress and speculated the relation may be driven by thoughts produced from these experiences. Here, we sought to replicate the association between working memory capacity and perceived negative life experience and to assess potential mediators of this association such as mind wandering propensity, rumination propensity, and the sum of negatively valenced mind wandering reports. In this preregistered replication and extension study, with data collected from 356 subjects (ns differ among analyses), we found no evidence suggesting that perceived negative life stress is associated with working memory capacity. Additionally, we found evidence consistent with the claim that negatively valenced mind wandering is uniquely detrimental to cognitive task performance, but we highlight a potential confound that may account for this association that should be addressed in future work.

Thirty years of ACP

Applied Cognitive PsychologyVolume 33, Issue 2 p. 151-151 EDITORIAL Thirty years of ACP Graham Davies, Corresponding Author Graham Davies gmd@leicester.ac.uk Search for more papers by this authorPär-Anders Granhag, Pär-Anders Granhag Editors of Applied Cognitive PsychologySearch for more papers by this author Graham Davies, Corresponding Author Graham Davies gmd@leicester.ac.uk Search for more papers by this authorPär-Anders Granhag, Pär-Anders Granhag Editors of Applied Cognitive PsychologySearch for more papers by this author First published: 12 March 2019 https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3529Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume33, Issue2March/April 2019Pages 151-151 This article also appears in:Thirty Years of Applied Cognitive Psychology RelatedInformation

Picture (im)perfect: Illusions of recognition memory produced by photographs at test.

Photographs have been found to affect a variety of psychological judgments. For example, nonprobative but semantically related photographs may increase beliefs in the truth of general knowledge statements (Newman, Garry, Bernstein, Kantner, & Lindsay, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19(5), 969-974, 2012; Newman et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41(5), 1337-1348, 2015). Photographs can also create illusions of memory (Cardwell, Henkel, Garry, Newman, & Foster, Memory & Cognition, 44(6), 883-896, 2016; Henkel, Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25(1), 78-86, 2011; Henkel & Carbuto, 2008). A candidate mechanism for these effects is that a photograph increases the fluency with which a statement or an event is processed. The present study was conducted to determine whether photos at test can induce illusions of recognition memory and to test the viability of a conceptual fluency explanation of these effects. The results of the present study suggest that photographs enhance the fluency of related words (Experiment 1), that false memories can be produced by the mere presence of a related photo on a recognition memory test for words (Experiments 2 & 3), and that these effects appear to be limited to conceptually based recognition tests (Experiments 4 & 5). The results support the notion that photograph-based illusions of memory stem from the ability of related photographs to increase the speed and ease of conceptual processing.