Appearance-reality Distinction Research Articles

Un/natural Disasters II

In this paper, the author continues developing a philosophy of multiple simultaneous un/natural disasters (MSD) in terms of further development of epistemology of know-how, and the ontology of appearance/reality of such disasters, mostly in the light of globally relevant disasters during 2021, namely floods in central China and in Germany and Belgium, wildfires in Siberia, etc. The paper is a continuation of the research from the initial paper “Un/natural disasters, Philosophy of multiple simultaneous un/natural disasters” (Krkač, 2022) which concerns philosophy of MSDs during 2020, mostly in Croatia within the global context. The main issues in this text are epistemology and ontology of and in multiple simultaneous un/natural disasters, in terms of know-how and appearance-reality distinction. These are being analyzed in conceptual-morphological terms, the goal of which is reaching clear concepts of know-how and reality of and in MSDs which seem to have importance for our understanding of MSDs, deciding, and acting before, in, and after them. The critical finding is concerned with the fact that beyond global MSD hotspots, and beyond special services equipped and trained to act before, during and after MSDs, there is little understanding of and preparedness for MSDs, globally speaking and on average. This overall lack seems to be obvious, and the clearest proofs of it are MSDs in the period between 2020 and 2022.

An Appearance–Reality Distinction in an Unreal World

When it comes to the structure of reality, foundationalist intuitions have predominated throughout the history of philosophy, and this remains largely the case in contemporary metaphysics, despite the fact that in contemporary epistemology, infinitism and coherentism are treated as serious theoretical contenders. Recently, however, a growing number of voices have challenged foundationalist presuppositions about the structure of reality, particularly construed as a structure of metaphysical grounding relations, with the possibility of coherentist and infinitist structures finding new defenders.1 Jan Westerhoff’s The Non-existence of the Real World is an important contribution to this conversation for his extended and systematic defense of the viability not only of a kind of first-order ontological non-foundationalism but also of a second-order non-foundationalism about truth. In this compelling and engaging book, Westerhoff makes a case for a comprehensive non-foundationalism much like that defended by Nāgārjuna’s (c. second century) Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy without ever mentioning Madhyamaka...

Japanese and British Children's Understanding of the Social Function of Pretend Crying

AbstractThe purpose of this study was to investigate cross‐cultural differences in children's understanding of pretend crying. Five‐ and 6‐year‐olds from Japan and the United Kingdom (N = 71) heard two hypothetical stories in which the protagonist of each story pretended to cry in front of another person. Children were asked about the appearance–reality distinction of pretend crying, the other character's thoughts and behavior, and the children's own moral judgment of pretend crying. Cultural differences were found in their understanding of the social function of pretend crying. Japanese children judged that pretend crying elicited another's concern and prosocial behavior more than British children. There were no significant differences in appearance–reality distinction or moral judgments between Japanese and British children. All participants successfully discriminated between pretend crying and real crying, and most participants judged pretend crying as “not good” behavior. These results suggested that Japanese children might be more expected to be sensitive to others’ feelings, and that such cultural differences in communication and socialization lead to different patterns in expectations of the social consequences of pretend crying.

The Tension Between Divine Command Theory and Utilitarianism in Mozi and George Berkeley: A Comparison

Both George Berkeley and Mozi display a tension in their moral philosophies between divine command theory and consequentialism. This essay argues that comparing the two philosophers can shed light on the relationship between certain philosophical positions and their resulting moral philosophies. In particular, the focus here is on the lack of interest in an appearance-reality distinction and in "essence" in both, which, it is argued, gives rise to the tension between consequentialism and divine command theory.

Appearances Are Deceiving: Observing the World as It Looks and How It Really Is—Theory of Mind Performances Investigated in 3-, 4-, and 5-Year-Old Children

Appearance-reality (AR) distinction understanding in preschoolers is worth of further consideration. This also goes for its relationship with false-belief (FB) understanding. This study helped fill these gaps by assessing 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children’s performances on an appearance-reality distinction task and by investigating relationships with unexpected location, deceptive content, and deception comprehension task performances. 91 preschoolers participated in this study divided into 3 groups: (1) 37 children, M-age 3.4 years; (2) 23 children, M-age 4.5 years; (3) 31 children, M-age 5.4 years. A developmental trend was found where appearance-reality distinction understanding was significantly influenced by age. If wrong answers were particularly high by 3-year-old children, they greatly decreased by 4- and 5-year-old children. 3-year-old children also tended to fail in FB tasks; instead 4- and 5-year-old children performed AR tasks better than FB tasks. Theoretical and practical implications were discussed.

Getting Rid of the Appearance-Reality Distinction

Common sense distinguishes between the apparent color of a thing and its real color, between the apparent motions of heavenly bodies and their real motions, between nondairy creamer and real cream, and between imitation Rolexes and real ones. But only those with a taste for philosophy ask whether real Rolexes are really real. Only philosophers take seriously Plato’s distinction between Reality with a capital R and Appearance with a capital A. That distinction has outlived whatever usefulness it may have had. We should do our best to get rid of it.

More than meets the eye: Young children’s trust in claims that defy their perceptions.

Children and adults often encounter counterintuitive claims that defy their perceptions. We examined factors that influence children's acceptance of such claims. Children ages 3-6 years were shown familiar objects (e.g., a rock), were asked to identify the objects, and were then told that each object was something else (e.g., that the rock was soap). For some children, informants explicitly stated that the objects were different from what they appeared to be, whereas other children received testimony about the objects' identities without any reference to the discrepancy between appearance and reality. Children also completed standard tasks measuring appearance-reality understanding. When later asked about the objects' identities and properties, children who had a firm understanding of the appearance-reality distinction and those who heard informants mention that distinction were more accepting of the informants' counterintuitive claims. Thus, receptivity to counterintuitive claims can reflect conceptual growth rather than simple deference or conformity.

Are You Really Happy? Children’s Understanding of Real vs. Pretend Emotions

AbstractThis paper studies children’s capacity to understand that the emotions displayed in pretend play contexts do not necessarily correspond to internal emotions, and that pretend emotions may create false beliefs in an observer. A new approach is taken by asking children about pretend emotions in terms of pretence-reality instead of appearance-reality. A total of 37 four-year-olds and 33 six-year-olds were asked to participate in tasks where they had to pretend an emotion or where they were told stories in which the protagonists pretended an emotion. In each task children were asked: a) if the pretend emotion was real or just pretended and b) if an observer would think that the emotional expression was real or just pretended. Results showed that four-year-olds are capable of understanding that pretend emotions are not necessarily real. Overall, six-year-olds performed better than younger children. Furthermore, both age groups showed difficulty in understanding that pretend emotions might unintentionally mislead an observer. Results are discussed in relation to previous research on children’s ability to understand pretend play and the emotional appearance-reality distinction.

Girls in detail, boys in shape: Gender differences when drawing cubes in depth

The current study tested gender differences in the developmental transition from drawing cubes in two- versus three dimensions (3D), and investigated the underlying spatial abilities. Six- to nine-year-old children (N = 97) drew two occluding model cubes and solved several other spatial tasks. Girls more often unfolded the various sides of the cubes into a layout, also called diagrammatic cube drawing (object design detail). In girls, the best predictor for drawing the cubes was Mental Rotation Test (MRT) accuracy. In contrast, boys were more likely to preserve the optical appearance of the cube array. Their drawing in 3D was best predicted by MRT reaction time and the Embedded Figures Test (EFT). This confirmed boys' stronger focus on the contours of an object silhouette (object shape). It is discussed whether the two gender-specific approaches to drawing in three dimensions reflect two sides of the appearance-reality distinction in drawing, that is graphic syntax of object design features versus visual perception of projective space.

Is Imagination Introspective?

The literature suggests that in sensory imagination we focus on the imagined objects, not on the imaginative states themselves, and that therefore imagination is not introspective. It is claimed that the introspection of imaginative states is an additional cognitive ability. However, there seem to be counterexamples to this claim. In many cases in which we sensorily imagine a certain object in front of us, we are aware that this object is not really where we imagine it to be. So it looks as if in these cases of imagination, we are aware of the mere appearance of the imagined object, and hence introspection is a constitutive part of imagination. In this article, I address this contradictory state of affairs and argue that we should classify at least some forms of sensory imagination as introspective. For this purpose I use the appearance-reality distinction as a central notion for introspection. I also defend the thesis of introspective imagination against the objection that young children imagine without yet understanding the concept of experience.

An experimental test of the effects of gender constancy on sex typing

This study provides an experimental test of the hypothesis that level of gender constancy understanding affects children’s sex typing. Preschool-age children ( N = 62, mean age = 47 months) were randomly assigned to experimental lessons that taught that biological traits (including gender) are either fixed (pro-constancy condition) or mutable (anti-constancy condition). Posttests revealed that the lessons were effective; children in the pro-constancy condition showed higher gender constancy and appearance–reality distinction scores than did children in the anti-constancy condition. Sex typing did not, however, differ between treatment conditions at immediate and 3-month posttesting.

Social cognitive predictors of peer acceptance at age 5 and the moderating effects of gender

In this study we examined the effects of social intelligence, empathy, verbal ability and appearance-reality distinction on the level of peer acceptance, as well as the moderating role of gender. Participants were 98 five-year-old children (43 boys and 55 girls; mean age 5 years 3 months for boys and girls). Our results showed a main effect of social intelligence on peer acceptance, as well as several other effects that were moderated by gender: a significant and positive effect of verbal ability on social acceptance was found for boys; appearance-reality distinction was found to have a positive effect on social acceptance in the case of girls; and although empathy had a significant positive effect on social acceptance for both boys and girls, this effect was more pronounced among boys. Our results suggest that abilities promoting peer acceptance are different for boys and girls.

Can chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes) discriminate appearance from reality?

A milestone in human development is coming to recognize that how something looks is not necessarily how it is. We tested appearance-reality understanding in chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes) with a task requiring them to choose between a small grape and a big grape. The apparent relative size of the grapes was reversed using magnifying and minimizing lenses so that the truly bigger grape appeared to be the smaller one. Our Lens test involved a basic component adapted from standard procedures for children, as well as several components designed to rule out alternative explanations. There were large individual differences in performance, with some chimpanzees’ responses suggesting they appreciated the appearance-reality distinction. In contrast, all chimpanzees failed a Reverse Contingency control test, indicating that those who passed the Lens test did not do so by learning a simple reverse contingency rule. Four-year-old children given an adapted version of the Lens test failed it while 4.5-year-olds passed. Our study constitutes the first direct investigation of appearance-reality understanding in chimpanzees and the first cross-species comparison of this capacity.

Preschoolers’ understanding of multiple orientations to reality: The adjectives task

Preschoolers’ understanding that an object can be accurately described using two different non-synonymous words was investigated using a task in which children ( N = 36) had to judge which of two animals had provided correct adjectival labels for a series of pictures. For some pictures, only one animal provided a correct adjective, for some both animals were correct, and for some neither was correct. For all types of judgement, 4-year-olds outperformed 3-year-olds. Children in both age groups performed worst on trials where both animals were correct. Children's performance on the adjectives task related to concurrent understanding of the appearance–reality distinction, but not to false-belief task performance. Implications for children's mentalizing development are discussed.

YOUNG CHILDREN'S DISPLAY RULE KNOWLEDGE: UNDERSTANDING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN APPARENT AND REAL EMOTIONS AND THE MOTIVES UNDERLYING THE USE OF DISPLAY RULES

Aspects of 72 preschoolers' display rule knowledge – the ability to distinguish apparent from real emotions and understand the motives underlying display rule use – were examined. Children listened to stories describing situations designed to elicit an emotion in the protagonist and a prosocial or self-protective reason for concealing her/his real emotion from other story characters. Children were asked to predict what facial expressions the protagonists would display in response to the emotionally laden situations and to justify their predictions. Findings revealed that children's ability to distinguish between apparent and real emotions increased in the 4–6 years age span. Moreover, children justified prosocial and self-protective display rules with similar accuracy. The findings are discussed in terms of children's ability to make the appearance-reality distinction across domains (emotional, physical) and in the context of the socialization of emotional displays.

Cognitive abilities, androgen levels, and body mass index in 5-year-old children

This study explores the potential relationship between a series of cognitive abilities and testosterone, dehydroepiandrosterone (DHEA), androstenedione, and body mass index (BMI) measurements in 5-year-old children. 60 boys and 69 girls were administered a test (K-BIT) which provided measurements of fluid intelligence (Matrices subtest), crystallized intelligence (Vocabulary subtest), and IQ composite (the combination of the two subtests); a sub-sample of 48 boys and 61 girls was also subjected to diverse tests related to theory of mind (affective labeling, appearance–reality distinction, display rules, and false belief). Testosterone, DHEA, and androstenedione levels were measured using an enzyme immunoassay technique in saliva samples. An analysis of variance failed to reveal any significant differences between boys and girls in any of the cognitive abilities assessed. The correlation analysis revealed a positive relationship between fluid intelligence and testosterone levels in boys, a negative relationship between crystallized intelligence and androstenedione levels in girls, and between affective labeling and androstenedione levels in boys. A multiple regression analysis indicated that androstenedione and BMI were the best predictors for some of the cognitive abilities assessed.

Appearance questions can be misleading: A discourse-based account of the appearance–reality problem

Preschoolers’ success on the appearance–reality task is a milestone in theory-of-mind development. On the standard task children see a deceptive object, such as a sponge that looks like a rock, and are asked, “What is this really?” and “What does this look like?” Children below 4 1 2 years of age fail saying that the object not only is a sponge but also looks like a sponge. We propose that young children’s difficulty stems from ambiguity in the meaning of “looks like.” This locution can refer to outward appearance (“Peter looks like Paul”) but in fact often refers to likely reality (“That looks like Jim”). We propose that “looks like” is taken to refer to likely reality unless the reality is already part of the common ground of the conversation. Because this joint knowledge is unclear to young children on the appearance–reality task, they mistakenly think the appearance question is about likely reality. Study 1 analyzed everyday conversations from the CHILDES database and documented that 2 and 3-year-olds are familiar with these two different uses of the locution. To disambiguate the meaning of “looks like,” Study 2 clarified that reality was shared knowledge as part of the appearance question, e.g., “What does the sponge look like?” Study 3 used a non-linguistic measure to emphasize the shared knowledge of the reality in the appearance question. Study 4 asked children on their own to articulate the contrast between appearance and reality. At 91%, 85%, and 81% correct responses, children were at near ceiling levels in each of our manipulations while they failed the standard versions of the tasks. Moreover, we show how this discourse-based explanation accounts for findings in the literature. Thus children master the appearance–reality distinction by the age of 3 but the standard task masks this understanding because of the discourse structure involved in talking about appearances.

Engaging Nietzsche's Women: Ofelia Schutte and the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo

Ofelia Schutte's relationship to Nietzsche is contentious. Sometimes she identifies him as an ally. Sometimes she calls him an enemy. Appealing to Nietzsche's abolition of the appearance reality distinction and to his discussions of women as skeptics, I turn to Ofelia's discussions of the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo to suggest that their protests can be understood as a Nietzschean politics of transvaluation where the myth of the mother and the materialities of women's bodies become the ground of the demand for justice.

Appearance–reality distinction and development of gender constancy understanding in children

In two independent studies, the relationship between children’s ability to distinguish appearance from reality (AR) and their understanding of gender constancy1 (GC) was examined. In Study 1, German children ( N = 130) aged 3;8 to 9;5 years were tested (1) in four standard AR tasks, and (2) by 21 items related to the three stages of gender constancy understanding. In Study 2, Hungarian children ( N = 75) aged 3;0 to 6;0 years responded to (1) appearance and reality questions while they or an experimenter were wearing a facial mask, and (2) a gender constancy interview using Bem’s(1989) photographs and scripts. In Study 2, the role of genital knowledge was also examined. For gender consistency questions, children were asked about appearance (“ looks like”) and reality (“ really is”) in both studies. Applying pass–fail criteria to AR and GC responses, children in both studies were grouped as “ realists” vs. “ nonrealists” and as “ gender-constant” vs. “ non-gender-constant”. The two studies converged in finding a strong association between the ability to distinguish appearance from reality and gender constancy understanding. The observed association between AR and GC was independent of age and children’s genital knowledge. However, while the results of Study 1 suggested that the AR distinction precedes sex-category constancy, in Study 2 the two abilities appeared to develop concurrently. Further, children in Study 1 achieved both AR and GC at a later age than children in Study 2.

Theory of mind: is training contagious?

AbstractIn this study, preschool children were successfully trained in theory of mind tasks, namely false belief inference and appearance–reality distinction. Results show that both types of training had a direct effect, as measured by the improvement of performance on the FB and AR delayed post‐tests. Both types of training also had an indirect effect, as measured by transfer of the benefits of the training to the task that was not in the training. Finally, both types of training were effective even when the children were trained in a task they had already mastered.