Anticompetitive Behavior Research Articles

Strategies for Dealing with Algorithmic Collusion in the Era of E-commerce

In the rapidly evolving e-commerce landscape, algorithmic collusion has emerged as a sophisticated method for businesses to engage in anti-competitive behavior without explicit agreements. This paper delves into the complexities of algorithmic collusion, examining how modern information technologies facilitate these covert practices. This study underscores the profound impact on market competition and consumer rights by categorizing the different types of algorithmic collusion and analyzing their implementation mechanisms. Furthermore, it highlights the deficiencies in current antitrust frameworks and the urgent need for legal and regulatory reforms. The paper concludes with strategic recommendations to enhance market transparency and fairness, ensuring that technological advancements do not undermine competitive equity.

Competition Law and Artificial Intelligence: Solution or Threat

This article discusses the solutions and threats posed by artificial intelligence in the context of business competition law. The findings of this article indicate that artificial intelligence presents both challenges and opportunities in this field. While artificial intelligence can enhance competition by increasing efficiency and fostering innovation, it raises concerns about market dominance and collusion. Consequently, the KPPU must adapt to these complexities to ensure fair competition and protect consumers. Balancing innovation with competitive enforcement is essential to leveraging the benefits of artificial intelligence while mitigating potential threats as artificial intelligence becomes more prevalent in the market. Based on these findings, the authors recommend that the KPPU increase its oversight of artificial intelligence-related activities to ensure compliance with business competition laws. The KPPU should look for evidence of anti-competitive behavior driven by artificial intelligence, such as price collusion through price monitoring and algorithmic matching software, by amending Law No. 5 of 1999. The KPPU enforces laws and regulations to address the impact of artificial intelligence on business competition law. For instance, the European Union’s Digital Markets Act empowers the European Commission to request algorithms, data about their testing, and explanations about their use from companies designated as competition gatekeepers.

Unaccountable Care: The Dangers of Federal Support for Anticompetitive Behavior in the Healthcare Market

Unaccountable Care: The Dangers of Federal Support for Anticompetitive Behavior in the Healthcare Market

The Path to Establishing an Antitrust Regulatory System for Self-preference of Digital Platforms

China's Anti-Monopoly Law currently fails to adequately cover the circumscribed regulation of self-preferential behavior on digital platforms. There are controversies in the academic circle about the definition of the illegality of digital platform self-preference. The purpose of this paper is to provide an institutional supply for the regulation of self-preference on digital platforms and to construct a localized system of self-preference on digital platforms through empirical research and comparative law study. Through the idea of "clear entry into the law - entry into the expansion - justified exemption", it defines, judges the illegality and regulates the self-preferential behavior of digital platforms, and explores the concise analysis path of anti-competitive behavior of digital platforms. It also explores the concise analysis path of anti-competitive behavior of digital platforms.

A Study on the Performance of the Competition Commission and Competition Law in Bangladesh: Qualitative Content Analysis of the ‘Other Opinion’

The researchers conducted a series of Key Informant Interviews among expert respondents having good experience in competition law and the Competition Commission of Bangladesh. After conducting a qualitative content analysis, the data of the first-of-its-kind study were later presented for research publications. While the questionnaire comprised of fixed questions was subject to publication in different journals, the data analysis results of ‘other opinion’ were chosen for this article. The respondents brought forward various issues our fixed questions did not address. Findings and recommendations were heavily drawn from the outcome of the qualitative data analysis of the ‘other opinion’. The authors also provided a legal background to co-relate the issues of ‘competition’ with the legitimate or illicit practice of ‘anticompetitive market behavior’. Dhaka University Law Journal, 2023, 34 (2), 25-41

Anti-competitive adsorption of gaseous benzene on hydrophilic microporous carbon in humid conditions

The adsorption capture of ambient volatile organic compounds (VOCs) is of practical importance for air quality management. Herein, unique anti-competitive adsorption behavior of benzene on a hydrophilic activated carbon (Procarb-900 (P900)) is evidenced in the presence of competing components (e.g., formaldehyde (FA) and/or moisture). Contrary to general expectations, the adsorption capacity of 10 Pa benzene (QB) onto P900 (30 mg) at the 99 % breakthrough level improves from 144.8 to 187 mg g−1 as the relative humidity (RH) increases from 0 to 25 %. Such pattern is maintained at 183.9 mg g−1 even at the relatively high RH of 50 %. Furthermore, QB exhibits a remarkable increase of 56.1 % (to 226.0 mg g−1) in the binary phase (100 ppm benzene plus 50 ppm FA) relative to its single phase (144.8 mg g−1). The kinetic studies confirm the occurrence of anti-competitive adsorption of benzene under humid conditions with the unusual decrease in rate constants at the elevated RHs (i.e., 25 and 50 %). The thermodynamic studies suggest the exothermic nature of benzene adsorption onto P900. The hydrophilicity of P900's outer surface promotes the preferential adsorption of polar FA and water vapor over non-polar benzene, which deforms the activated carbon texture and lowers the pore size distribution (PSD). The narrow PSD enhances benzene uptake in the complex systems due to the confinement effect. Overall, this study offers insights into the unique anti-competitive adsorption of non-polar VOCs (e.g., benzene) on hydrophilic microporous adsorbents in the presence of potential interferences such as polar water vapor and FA. These findings offer a guideline for the practical implementation of adsorption techniques for gaseous VOCs in humid conditions.

The Propriety and Inevitability of Netting in Antitrust Class Actions

How to define “antitrust injury” is an issue that has been the source of much debate among judges, lawyers, and academics alike. Specifically, a disagreement exists as to whether participation in a single transaction, which a defendant has allegedly tainted via anticompetitive behavior, is sufficient to constitute antitrust injury. Complicating this area of jurisprudential and doctrinal uncertainty are cases in which a plaintiff who has alleged injury as a result of anticompetitive conduct later reaped offsetting gains resulting from that very same conduct. The disagreements regarding the role of these net beneficiaries, and the netting process necessary to identify them, in antitrust suits implicate matters that extend far beyond legal theory. This Note outlines the multitude of ways in which the foregoing consequences manifest. It then highlights the propriety of a contextual approach in which courts are more willing to engage in nuanced and substantive class certification analyses that balance the interests of the litigants and the goals of the antitrust laws. The Note uses financial markets, and variations among the instruments therein, as a specific instantiation of these principles and a context in which a nuanced approach is especially compelling. It concludes by demonstrating that, regardless of whether a court incorporates netting into its definition of antitrust injury, it will have to contend with netting principles during the class–certification process.

Illegal interlocks among life science company boards of directors.

Competition between life science companies is critical to ensure innovative therapies are efficiently developed. Anticompetitive behavior may harm scientific progress and, ultimately, patients. One well-established category of anticompetitive behavior is the 'interlocking directorate'. It is illegal for companies' directors to 'interlock' by also serving on the boards of competitors. We evaluated overlaps in the board membership of 2,241 public life science companies since 2000. We show that a robust network of interlocking companies is present among these firms. At any given time, 10-20 percent of board members are interlocked; the number of interlocks has more than doubled in the last two decades. Over half of these interlocked firms report over $5 million in historical revenue, exceeding a legal threshold that makes an interlocking directorate a violation of antitrust law. Those interlocks are only illegal if the companies compete, even in part. Using the disease categories for which companies have sponsored clinical trials, we discover that a few markets are responsible for a large fraction of interlocks. We show that in dozens of cases, companies share directors with the very firms they identify as their biggest competitive threats. We provide a data-driven roadmap for policymakers, regulators, and companies to further investigate the contribution of anticompetitive behavior to increased healthcare costs and to enforce the law against illegal interlocks between firms.

An Analysis of Anticompetitive Behaviour on the Retail Fuel Market across Different Central and Eastern European Countries

An Analysis of Anticompetitive Behaviour on the Retail Fuel Market across Different Central and Eastern European Countries

Ensuring Fair Play: Abuse Of Dominance And Intellectual Property Rights Top Of Form Bottom Of Form

Dominance in the market gives businesses many advantages, enabling them to change business dynamics and influence customer choices. This dominance, while used improperly, can damage clients via way of means of stifling competition and innovation. The distinct rights that intellectual property rights deliver authors and inventors over their works, on the alternative hand, lead them to critical equipment for selling innovation. Abuse of dominance and Intellectual Property rights are associated while dominant corporations make the most of their intellectual property rights to stifle competition. This article attempts to examines the feasible reasons of the subject matter, which includes inflated licensing charges, unwarranted litigation, and patent hold-up tactics. The interplay among abuse of dominance with intellectual property rights (IPR) marks a pivotal factor withinside the improvement of competition law. This article captures the essence of this complicated connection and affords a window into its complicated dynamics. It further attempts to emphasise the critical factor of convergence among those fields: the sensitive stability among selling innovation and retaining marketplace opposition receives disenchanted while dominant groups use their intellectual property rights to impede competition. Such abuse of IPR might also additionally take many unique forms, from extortionate licensing charges to pointless court cases meant to save your competition from coming into the marketplace. Case studies that function an examples from across the globe provide important insights into the rational consequences of intellectual property rights violations. The difficulties in finding the appropriate stability are demonstrated by notable instances such as the legal actions related to Qualcomm's SEP and Microsoft's antitrust actions in the EU. Emerging technologies in the virtual age, like as biotechnology and artificial intelligence, raises new concerns about supremacy and intellectual property rights. One example of an increasing burden in 5G technology is Standard-essential patents (SEPs). Using well-known case studies and international regulatory reactions, this article also attempts to provide a brief discussion of the issues and headaches associated with the abuse of dominance within the framework of intellectual property rights. Strict regulatory scrutiny is necessary to prevent dominant marketplace contributors from engaging in anti-competitive behaviour. The conflict between preventing anti-competitive behaviour and promoting innovation through intellectual property rights safety is a fundamental dilemma. Finding a balance between the two needs is essential if one is to sell innovation and keep markets competitive. In this regard, the author attempts to highlight how crucial it is to handle the junction between rights to intellectual property and abuse of dominance in an appropriate manner. It draws attention to the necessity of prudent legislation that preserves innovative incentives while maintaining sincere competition. In order to fully utilize intellectual property rights for the goodness of society, it is imperative to achieve this delicate balance. In a global economic system that is rapidly changing, legislators, lawyers, corporations, and students must all comprehend and navigate the intricate relationship between abuse of power and intellectual property rights. This article lays the groundwork for additional investigation and debate in the article by offering a concise yet comprehensive synopsis of the key traits and problems in this intricate field.

Self-Preferencing

When markets at successive or complementary stages are imperfectly competitive, firms that operate at multiple stages typically have a strong incentive to purchase from, sell to, or otherwise coordinate with its own operations at adjacent stations compared with those of individual firms. But, to the extent that such self-preferencing eliminates double marginalization that would occur under vertical separation or otherwise facilitates coordination that is difficult to accomplish between firms, competition rules that discourage self-preferencing, such as restrictions on vertical mergers or integration, can harm consumers. In 2020, the United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission issue revised vertical merger guidelines that promised enforcement that more nearly resembles how they review horizontal mergers – that is, by predicting effects on static pricing incentives. But the economics of how vertical mergers on pricing incentives is more complicated than the economics of how horizontal mergers affect pricing incentives. If U.S. enforcement is based on a consumer welfare standard, the U.S. agencies will struggle to find a robust methodology for distinguishing anticompetitive from procompetitive vertical mergers. Self-preferencing has also played a key role in allegations of anticompetitive behavior in technologically advancing industries. A review of past allegations of anticompetitive product innovation against IBM, Microsoft, and Google reveals the challenges in designing rules that limit self-preferencing without acting as a drag on innovation.

Сравнительный анализ правового регулирования рекламных услуг в интернете, оказываемых цифровыми платформами в России и зарубежных странах

Digital platforms serve as an effective ground for trade in goods and services, which stimulates the development of advertising on the Internet. Platforms provide advertising spaces, connect advertising distributors and advertisers as operators of advertising networks, and collect data to provide personalized advertising and to enhance marketing efficiency. This article analyzes three aspects of the digital platformʼs responsibility in the distribution of advertising on the Internet. In the first aspect, the article compares approaches in Russia to those in foreign countries regarding the responsibility of digital platforms distributing advertisement in their capacity as advertiser or information intermediaries. In Russia (as in China), the platforms are held responsible for placing unfair advertising, because the platforms moderate such advertising. At the same time other countries (the U.S, those of the European Union (EU)) implement the principle of limited of information intermediary by publishing advertising, if the platform does not impact on the content of such advertising and does not know about the distribution of illegal advertising. In the second aspect, the article surveys the obligations of platforms for ensuring the traceability of advertising, maintaining registries with information about advertising, and ensuring compliance and organizing a risk analysis system to prevent anti-competitive and other illegal behaviour. The third aspect of the study considers the compliance of digital platforms with the regime of personal data by providing personalized advertising services. The research methods used in the work include comparative analysis of legal acts and law enforcement practice in Russia and in foreign countries, as well as analysis of recommendations of international organizations, in particular the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Skill demand and labour market concentration: evidence from Italian vacancies

PurposeThe authors provide a novel interpretation of the relationship between skill demand and labour market concentration based on the training rationale.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use a novel data set on Italian online job vacancies during 2013–2018 to analyse the relationship between labour market concentration and employers' skill demand. The authors construct measures of market concentration and skill intensity in the local labour market. The authors regress the measures of skill demand on market concentration, controlling for sector, occupations and other features of the labour market. The authors also use the Hausman–Nevo instrument for market concentration.FindingsThe authors show that employers in a highly concentrated labour market demand competencies associated with the ability of workers to learn faster (e.g. social skills) rather than actual knowledge. They also require less experience but higher education. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that employers in more concentrated labour markets are more prone to train their employees. Instead of looking for workers who already have job-specific skills, they look for workers who can acquire them faster and efficiently. The authors provide a theoretical framework within which to analyse these aspects as well as providing a test for the relevant hypotheses.Practical implicationsIn addition to cross-countries differences in labour market regulations, the authors' findings suggest that policy authorities should consider the local labour market structure when studying workforce development programmes aimed at bridging the skill gap of displaced workers. Moreover, the authors show that market concentration can have relevant implications for human resource (HR) managers by affecting their recruitment behaviour through the demand for skills. In fact, concentrated markets tend to favour firms' collusion and anti-competitive behaviour that could strongly affect HR management practices.Originality/valueThe authors' paper innovates on the literature in a number of ways. First, the authors provide evidence of local labour market concentration in Italy. Second, the authors provide evidence of skill demand at the local level using a detailed skill taxonomy that goes beyond the classical distinction between high and low skills. Third, and most importantly, the authors provide evidence of the relationship between skill demand and labour market concentration. By analysing detailed skills and competencies, the authors take one step beyond understanding the features of labour demand in monopsonistic markets.

ЕФЕКТИВНІСТЬ ІНСТИТУТУ ВІДПОВІДАЛЬНОСТІ У СФЕРІ ЗАХИСТУ ЕКОНОМІЧНОЇ КОНКУРЕНЦІЇ: АМЕРИКАНСЬКА ТА ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКА ДОКТРИНИ

The article examines the institution of responsibility in the field of economic competition protection, which is used in the American and European systems. It has been established that the issue of liability for offenses in the field of competition regulation and competition protection is a special issue on Ukraine's path to European integration. This problem is important because in the modern Ukrainian economy, its institutional support - in the form of rules, economic mechanisms and tools, as well as organizational forms - ensure the interaction of the market and the state, because neither the market nor the state, taken by themselves, with development along the line of progress, they are unable to cope. The issue of competition regulation and liability for violations in the field of competition protection is of particular importance for the European integration of Ukraine. After all, after the historical challenges faced by Ukraine, only mutually agreed and regulated relations in this sphere can become a guarantee of social and national development. It was determined that competitiveness in the modern world cannot be ensured only on a liberal basis, that is, on a purely market basis. Effective regulation of competition protection is necessary for understanding the main mechanisms of interaction of various participants in the market. Established rules that apply to different types of markets are inseparable from the economic mechanisms that underlie them. One of the violations in the field of protection of economic competition is the abuse of a monopoly position. It has been established that two doctrines are currently used as a basis for developing approaches to competition regulation: American and European. The article lists the categories of prohibitions in the anti-competitive behavior of the USA and the EU. It is proven that highly developed countries strengthen their dominant role due to the use of the latest knowledge and the introduction of innovations, which makes them more competitive. Other countries that do not possess this knowledge and skills become dependent on them. And this dependence consists in calculating the benefits of civilization with cheap labor, natural resources and other national wealth. Key words: competition, competitiveness, responsibility, enterprises, benchmarking, internationalization, protection.

RETRACTED: Anti-competitive behavior in digital markets

Abstract The regulations stated in Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) define that it is prohibited for companies to engage in agreements that are anticompetitive in nature with one another. E-commerce platforms have emerged as significant commercial channels in the virtual realm. The antitrust scrutiny has been drawn towards the limitations imposed by both suppliers and marketplaces on selling through such platforms. There exists a perception among certain individuals that there is a degree of conflict between the two approaches, wherein competition authorities are accused of endorsing marketplace platforms by prohibiting platform bans in distribution contracts, while simultaneously scrutinizing the business practices of these platforms (Colomo, 2018). Notwithstanding, it is imperative to note that this does not inherently denote an inconsistency. Although it is crucial for retailers to retain their autonomy in terms of vending their products through diverse sales channels, it is incumbent upon marketplace platforms to adhere to the regulations governing antitrust. In this sense main purpose of this manuscript is the analysis of anti-competitive behavior in digital markets.

The fallout from the forex cartels: what legacy for foreign exchange regulation?

ABSTRACT This article analyses infringement and settlement decisions issued by the European Commission in recent years in relation to cartels in the foreign exchange (‘forex’ or ‘FX’) sector, assesses what these decisions tell us about the susceptibility of the forex sector to anticompetitive behaviour and proposes how these risks might be reduced. This includes a focus on addressing the lack of transparency that characterises the sector. It is argued that preventing similar abuses occurring in future cannot be left to competition law alone, but rather requires greater ex ante regulation of the forex sector. As such, a crucial first step is the need for greater data gathering and analysis in relation to the purposes for which most forex trading is undertaken and it is proposed that there should be a stronger division between traders’ market-making activities and proprietary trading to try to minimise opportunities for collusive conduct and reduce information asymmetries.

Commercial determinants of human rights: for-profit health care and housing.

Commercial determinants of human rights: for-profit health care and housing.

Juridical Review of the Merger of Gojek and Tokopedia in the Aspect of Unfair Business Competition

Mergers in digital companies are things that have recently become a topic of discussion, concerns about indications of monopolistic practices in them are one of them. As in the merger activity of the digital companies Gojek and Tokopedia which attracted a lot of attention. KPPU is considered to have an indispensable role in supervising and assessing merger activities that have the potential to create a monopoly, especially in digital company mergers. The purpose of this paper is to find out the regulation, supervision, and evaluation by KPPU of monopoly practices in digital company mergers. This writing uses the approach of legislation. The result of this writing is that KPPU has not found any monopolistic practices in the merger of Gojek and Tokopedia companies, by prioritizing analysis of assessment aspects such as aspects of market concentration using the HHI method, barriers to market entry, and potential anti-competitive behavior. With the merger of the GoTo group, access to market share for new digital companies engaged in the same field has not experienced any obstacles at all, nor has there been any discriminatory policy imposed by the GoTo group in carrying out its business against competitors.

Modelling the Diffusion of the Deterrent Effects of Competition Policy

Abstract Through its competition policy interventions, the European Commission not only addresses infringements of EU competition law by the firms directly involved but also deters possible future anticompetitive behaviour by these firms and other market players. The present paper associates deterrence with the diffusion of information about the competition authority’s interventions to market players. In the mixed-influence diffusion model developed below, competition policy interventions act as an external signal sent to market players. Interactions between market players, in particular through legal counsels and law firms, further propagate the interventions’ deterrent effects. The focus of the model simulations is on interventions by the European Commission. The parameters of the mixed-influence diffusion model are calibrated using survey-based information on the order of magnitude of the deterrent effects of competition policy interventions and an assessment of the reputation of the European Commission as an enforcer of EU competition rules. On this basis, estimates of the deterrent effect of each individual intervention by the European Commission can be obtained. In addition, the sensitivity of the deterrent effects of competition policy interventions to the reputation of the competition authority and to the importance of interactions between market participants is analysed.

Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices in Business Trials in Indonesia: Reforming on Business Competition Supervisory Commission

Indonesia recognizes the importance of fair competition for economic growth and consumer welfare. To ensure a level playing field, the country has established legislation and regulations that prohibit monopolistic practices and promote healthy competition. Key laws include the Indonesian Anti-Monopoly Law and the Law on Business Competition Supervision and Control. Business trials play a crucial role in enforcing these laws. Courts serve as arbiters in cases involving alleged monopolistic practices, employing thorough examinations of evidence, expert testimonies, and legal arguments presented by the parties involved. The burden of proof rests on the plaintiff, who must demonstrate the existence of anti-competitive behavior and its adverse effects on the market. The Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices in Business Trials in Indonesia encompasses various types of anti-competitive conduct, such as price fixing, market division, and abuse of dominant market position. Violations of these laws can result in significant penalties, including substantial fines, dissolution of companies, and criminal charges for individuals involved. To strengthen the effectiveness of business trials, Indonesia has established regulatory bodies such as the Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU). The KPPU plays a crucial role in investigating alleged violations, providing recommendations to the courts, and monitoring compliance with rulings. Despite the robust legal framework, challenges remain in enforcement. Collaboration between government agencies, the judiciary, and the business community is essential. Additionally, monitoring and updating the legal framework to address evolving market dynamics and emerging forms of anti-competitive practices are necessary.