Anti-atheist Prejudice Research Articles

The Limits of Antiatheist Prejudice

Abstract: People tend to perceive atheists as being immoral. We tested whether this perception also applies to moral transgressions against animals. Study 1 ( N = 288) and Study 2 ( N = 306, pre-registered) utilized a conjunction fallacy paradigm to show that people attributed harming animals most frequently to criminals, then to God-believers, and least often to nonbelievers. Study 3 ( N = 248, pre-registered) used a job-choice paradigm and found that people choose a God-believer over an atheist for a job involving animal harm because the God-believer was supposed to hold a more hierarchical view of the relationship between humans and animals than the atheist. Consequently, we discuss the limits of antiatheist prejudice in the domain of human–animal interactions.

Distrusted disclosures: Deception drives anti-transgender but not anti-atheist prejudice.

Transgender individuals face high levels of prejudice in interpersonal relationships. However, limited experimental research has examined the role of identity disclosure on anti-transgender prejudice. Drawing upon research on distrust and identity disclosure, two between-participants experiments (total n = 802) examined the role of intentional and unintentional identity disclosure on negative attitudes (Studies 1 & 2), perceived deception (Studies 1 & 2) and distrust (Study 2) toward two potentially concealable and historically distrusted identities (transgender and atheist). Specifically, the current studies examine the impact of a target's stigmatized identity (transgender or atheist) and method of disclosure (intentional or unintentional) on perceptions of the target, perceived deceptiveness, and distrust toward the target. Our findings demonstrated that compared to atheists, transgender targets elicited greater levels of prejudice and were viewed as more deceptive, and that this effect was amplified if the target did not intentionally reveal their identity. Study 2 demonstrated that perceived deception mediated the relationship between reveal type (i.e., intentional vs. unintentional) and prejudice toward participants who read about a transgender (but not atheist) target. We discuss the implications of these findings for reducing prejudice toward binary transgender individuals, particularly those who do not voluntarily disclose their identity.

Preliminary evidence for an aversion to atheists in long-term mating domains in the Southern United States

The centrality of religiosity in selecting long-term mates suggests atheism could be undesirable for that context. Given recent findings suggesting several positive stereotypes about atheists, a largely distrusted group, individuals could prefer atheists in mating domains not emphasizing long-term commitment (i.e., short-term mating). Two studies tasked U.S. participants with evaluating long-term and short-term mating desirability of theists and atheists while assessing perceptions of their personalities. Study 1 indicated atheists were more desirable in short-term mating than long-term mating, though this preference did not translate to being preferred over theists. The pre-registered Study 2 demonstrated this effect is specific to physically attractive targets. Atheists were further perceived as more prone to infidelity, especially when attractive. Results are framed from an evolutionary perspective while discussing anti-atheist prejudice.

Love thy Neighbour… or not: Christians, but not Atheists, Show High In-Group Favoritism

Atheists are among the most disliked groups in America, which has been explained in a variety of ways, one of which is that atheists are hostile towards religion and that anti-atheist prejudice is therefore reactive. We tested this hypothesis by using the 2018 American General Social Survey by investigating attitudes towards atheists, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, and Muslims. We initially used a general sample of Americans, but then identified and isolated individuals who were atheists, theists, nonreligious atheists, religious theists, and/or theistic Christians. Logically, if atheists were inordinately hostile towards religion, we would expect to see a greater degree of in-group favouritism in the atheist group and a greater degree of out-group dislike. Results indicated several notable findings: 1). Atheists were significantly more disliked than any other religious group. 2). Atheists rated Christians, Buddhists, Jews, and Hindus as favourably as they rated their own atheist in-group, but rated Muslims less positively (although this effect was small). 3). Christian theists showed pronounced in-group favouritism and a strong dislike towards atheists. No evidence could be found to support the contention that atheists are hostile towards religious groups in general, and towards Christians specifically, although this may have been a Type II error. If atheist groups do dislike religious groups, then this hypothetical dislike would be significantly smaller in magnitude than the dislike directed toward atheists by Christians.

Is There Anything Good About Atheists? Exploring Positive and Negative Stereotypes of the Religious and Nonreligious

Negative stereotypes about atheists are widespread, robust, rooted in distrust, and linked to discrimination. Here, we examine whether social perceivers in the United States might additionally hold any positive stereotypes about atheists (and corresponding negative stereotypes of the religious). Experiments 1 (N = 401) and 2 (N = 398, preregistered) used methods of intuitive stereotypes (the conjunction fallacy). People tended to stereotype atheists as fun, open-minded, and scientific—even as they harbor extreme intuitive anti-atheist prejudice in Experiment 2. Experiment 3 (N = 382) used a quasi-behavioral partner-choice paradigm, finding that most people choose atheist (vs. religious) partners in stereotype-relevant domains. Overall, results suggest that people simultaneously possess negative and also positive stereotypes about atheists, but that corresponding negative stereotypes of the religious may be even stronger. These effects are robust among the nonreligious and somewhat religious, but evidence is mixed about whether the highly religious harbor these positive stereotypes.

Attributions for Atheism: Perceptions that Atheism is a Choice are Associated with Prejudice against Atheists among Christians, but Not Jews or Nonbelievers

ABSTRACT Is believing that atheism is a choice related to prejudice against atheists? The present research draws on attributional models of prejudice to examine the relationship between perceptions that atheism is a choice and anti-atheist prejudice among Christians, Jews, and nonbelievers. We hypothesized that Christians would be more likely than Jews (Sample 1 and 3) and nonbelievers (Samples 1, 2, and 3) to believe atheism is a choice. Further, we hypothesized that the relationship between perceptions of choice and anti-atheist prejudice would be stronger among Christians than Jews and nonbelievers. In three samples of college students and U.S. adults (N = 859), Christians were more likely than others to believe atheism is a choice and perceptions of choice uniquely predicted Christians’ prejudice toward atheists. By examining perceptions of choice, our research reveals a novel source of anti-atheist prejudice, but a source with deep roots in the psychology of prejudice.

Opposition to short-term mating predicts anti-atheist prejudice

Which people are most likely to harbor prejudice toward atheists? Recent research suggests that perceptions of (non)religious individuals tend to track lifestyle (i.e., family and sexual) choices. We draw on this work, proposing that anti-atheist prejudice stems, in part, from the conflict that arises among competing mating strategies. Across four studies (N = 1855), we confirmed that anti-atheist prejudice is related to stereotypes about atheists' mating strategies (Pilot Study); we further found that people who favor committed mating strategies express greater levels of anti-atheist prejudice, even controlling for their beliefs about cooperation (Study 1a) and religiosity (Study 1b). Finally, this effect holds even when using a semi-implicit measure of prejudice, again controlling for religiosity (Study 2). These results suggest that mating strategies provide one source of individual differences in prejudice toward atheists, consistent with the notion that this prejudice may reflect perceived differences in lifestyle rather than just abstract theological disagreements or ingroup bias.

Distrust persists after subverting atheist stereotypes

Antiatheist prejudice appears to be common. This prejudice may stem from distrust. However, the factors influencing distrust are not fully understood. The current research identified common stereotypes about atheists, tested the intuitiveness of those stereotypes, and determined whether distrust toward atheists depends more on the label “atheist” or the attributes atheists are thought to possess. Study 1 ( N = 100) and Study 2 ( N = 149) identified several attributes thought to be most characteristic of atheists and least characteristic of Christians (or vice versa). Study 3 ( N = 219) demonstrated that atheists and Christians are intuitively associated with the respective traits identified in Studies 1 and 2. Study 4 ( N = 274) and Study 5 ( N = 259) used fake social media profiles to manipulate target religious identification (atheist, Christian, or unspecified) and attributes (stereotypically atheist or stereotypically Christian) to determine the effect on trust ratings. Overall, the results of these studies indicate that atheists and Christians are explicitly and implicitly associated with different attributes and that, even when atheists possess stereotypically Christian attributes, Christians trust atheists significantly less than other Christians. These findings suggest that antiatheist prejudice is relatively insensitive to individual differences of the target.

Perceived Morality and Antiatheist Prejudice: A Replication and Extension

ABSTRACTRecent evidence suggests that, although moral distrust drives antiatheist prejudice, certain types of morality are central: Perceived atheist moral capacity for caring and compassion appears to be central, whereas perceived atheist moral capacity for fairness, in-group loyalty, deferential respect, or purity/decency is not (Simpson & Rios, 2017). Here, we extend this research. First, we conceptually replicated experimental effects: Manipulating the perception that atheists strongly versus weakly value morality affects antiatheist prejudice much more strongly if the type of morality relates to caring/compassion rather than purity/sanctity (N = 162; U.S. Christian theists recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk). This finding was particularly strong among White participants. Second, we provide evidence for cross-national replication of correlational findings among Australian undergraduate theists (N = 85; recruited from the University of Melbourne) as well as evidence to suggest that the type of perceived morality that predicts prejudice differs according to the social group in question. Specifically, only perceived atheist concern for caring/compassion reliably predicted antiatheist prejudice, whereas perceived Jewish concern caring/compassion and in-group loyalty predicted anti-Jewish prejudice. Results reinforce existing evidence that increasing perceptions of atheist benevolence will help reduce antiatheist prejudice and provide novel support for social-functionalist theories of prejudice.

Godless in essence? Psychological essentialism, theistic meta-beliefs, and anti-atheist prejudice

Atheists are widely distrusted, but research has only recently begun to explore why. As atheists and theists differ primarily regarding belief, we investigated U.S. theists' basic beliefs about (a)theism (i.e., theistic meta-beliefs) and how such beliefs are associated with anti-atheist prejudice. We operationalized theistic meta-beliefs with measures of psychological essentialism. In Study 1, items tapping essentialist beliefs about (a)theists loaded onto five distinct factors: Beliefs about the (i) categorical discreteness/uniformity of atheists, (ii) naturalness/universality of atheism, (iii) changeability of (a)theist belief, (iv) degree to which (a)theism becomes fixed during childhood, and (v) heritability of (a)theism. Beliefs about atheist naturalness and (especially) discreteness/uniformity predicted (negatively and positively, respectively) numerous measures of anti-atheist prejudice independent of several prejudice-relevant factors. Within the discreteness/uniformity factor, item-specific analyses revealed that beliefs about atheist category discreteness predicted anti-atheist prejudice more strongly than beliefs about atheist category uniformity, thus implicating perceived atheist-theist boundaries as central to anti-atheist prejudice. In Study 2, similar results emerged regardless of how non-theists were labeled (“atheist” or “non-believer”); moreover, belief that atheism poses a threat to religious cultural authority mediated the naturalness-prejudice and discreteness-prejudice associations. This research demonstrates the central role of essentialist beliefs in understanding theists' attitudes toward atheists.

Improving the Electability of Atheists in the United States: A Preliminary Examination

AbstractDecades of polling data and recent research have demonstrated the magnitude of anti-atheist prejudice in the United States and its relationship to perceptions of atheists as immoral and untrustworthy. Across three studies, I examine the malleability of bias against atheists in the context of election politics. Informational manipulations of an atheist candidate's stated values (Study 1) and popularity (Study 2) improve participants’ perceptions of the morality and trustworthiness of and likelihood of voting for that atheist candidate, but religiously affiliated participants still prefer a similarly situated Christian candidate. Study 3 shows that participants are more likely to vote for an atheist when the opposing candidate was described as a theocrat. Implications of this research for ameliorating the under-representation of non-religious individuals in government are discussed.

Analytic Thinking Reduces Anti-Atheist Bias in Voting Intentions

ABSTRACTResearch has demonstrated that priming analytic thinking reduces adherence to religious ideas. The current studies examined whether analytic thinking primes can also increase acceptance of secular ideas and ameliorate anti-atheist prejudice. In Study 1, participants who were primed to think analytically demonstrated less anti-atheist prejudice (operationalized as willingness to vote for an atheist) and increased levels of agreement with secular ideas. Mediation analyses indicated that the ability of an analytic prime to reduce anti-atheist prejudice and facilitate agreement with secular ideas was related to increases in analytic thinking (operationalized as performance on the Cognitive Reflections Test). Study 2 extended the findings of the first study and demonstrated that, among a sample of young adults, higher levels of analytic thinking predicted decreased anti-atheist prejudice in the context of voting intentions in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Basic and applied implications of these findings are discussed.

Belief in divine moral authority: Validation of a shortened scale with implications for social attitudes and moral cognition

Religion and morality have been deeply interwoven throughout human history. Although much research has investigated the role of religiosity (e.g., belief in God, prayer, religious attendance) in shaping moral concerns, only recently has research in psychology begun to delve deeper into the meta-ethical beliefs theists hold about the spiritual foundations of morality. The present research builds on moral–philosophical discourse on Divine Command Theory and recent work by Piazza and Landy (2013), who developed the 20-item Morality Founded on Divine Authority (MFDA) scale to measure Divine Command beliefs. We sought primarily to reduce the MFDA scale to increase its pragmatic utility; Confirmatory Factor Analysis revealed an optimal 5-item scale. Across four studies, this scale yielded levels of construct, convergent, and incremental validity equivalent to those of the 20-item scale. Compared with several other measures of religiosity and conservative thinking, the short MFDA was the strongest predictor of anti-atheist prejudice among U.S. religious believers and Indian Hindus (Studies 1a–1b) and largely explained religiosity's relationship with attitudes toward science (Study 1a) and moral cognitive outcomes including deontological reasoning (Study 2a) and prohibitive morality (Study 2b). We conclude with discussion about the practical utility of this scale in ongoing research into religion and moral cognition.

The Roots of Right and Wrong: Do Concepts of Innate Morality Reduce Intuitive Associations of Immorality With Atheism?

Atheists are frequent targets of prejudice and discrimination. Previous research suggests that anti-atheist prejudice may stem in part from perceptions of religion as an ultimate basis for morality: without God, why do good (or not do bad)? We conducted two studies to test whether presenting recent scientific findings regarding the nonreligious bases of morality (e.g., morality in nonhuman primates and preverbal infants) might lead people to view morality as innate, thus reducing intuitive associations of immorality and atheism. Consistent with previous research, participants viewed moral transgressions as more representative of atheists than of Christians. However, learning about the putatively innate nature of morality did not lead participants to view immorality as less representative of atheists. Intuitive moral distrust of atheists appears quite resilient, persisting even in the face of evidence for the nonreligious origins of morality.

Tolerating the "doubting Thomas": how centrality of religious beliefs vs. practices influences prejudice against atheists.

Past research has found a robust effect of prejudice against atheists in largely Christian-dominated (belief-oriented) samples. We propose that religious centrality of beliefs vs. practices influences attitudes toward atheists, such that religious groups emphasizing beliefs perceive non-believers more negatively than believers, while groups emphasizing practices perceive non-practicing individuals more negatively than practicing individuals. Studies 1–2, in surveys of 41 countries, found that Muslims and Protestants (belief-oriented) had more negative attitudes toward atheists than did Jews and Hindus (practice-oriented). Study 3 experimentally manipulated a target individual's beliefs and practices. Protestants had more negative attitudes toward a non-believer (vs. a believer), whereas Jews had more negative attitudes toward a non-practicing individual (vs. a practicing individual, particularly when they had a Jewish background). This research has implications for the psychology of religion, anti-atheist prejudice, and cross-cultural attitudes regarding where dissent in beliefs or practices may be tolerated or censured within religious groups.

No good without God: Antiatheist prejudice as a function of threats to morals and values.

No good without God: Antiatheist prejudice as a function of threats to morals and values.

What If They’re Right About the Afterlife? Evidence of the Role of Existential Threat on Anti-Atheist Prejudice

Terror management theory posits that the uniquely human awareness of death gives rise to potentially paralyzing terror that is assuaged by embracing cultural worldviews that provide a sense that one is a valuable participant in a meaningful universe. We propose that pervasive and pronounced anti-atheist prejudices stem, in part, from the existential threat posed by conflicting worldview beliefs. Two studies were conducted to establish that existential concerns contribute to anti-atheist sentiments. Experiment 1 found that a subtle reminder of death increased disparagement, social distancing, and distrust of atheists. Experiment 2 found that asking people to think about atheism increased the accessibility of implicit death thoughts. These studies provide the first empirical link between existential concerns and anti-atheist prejudices.

The Robustness of Anti-Atheist Prejudice as Measured by Way of Cognitive Errors

ABSTRACTOver the past decade, distrust of atheists has been documented in psychological literature yet remains relatively understudied. The current research sought to test the robustness of anti-atheist prejudice. Specifically, it examined the extent to which an individual’s anti-atheist prejudice remained unchanged in light of new information. One hundred participants from the United Kingdom completed an online experiment. The experiment involved reading a vignette describing the actions of an untrustworthy individual. Participants were asked to make a judgment with regards to the untrustworthy individual’s identity. The occurrence of a cognitive bias, namely, the conjunction fallacy, was used to measure the frequency of anti-atheist prejudice. An examination of judgment errors (i.e., conjunction fallacies) under different conditions was used to test the robustness of anti-atheism prejudice. The results show that anti-atheist prejudice is not confined either to dominantly religious countries or to religious individuals but rather appears to be a robust judgment about atheists.

Supplemental Material for No Good Without God: Antiatheist Prejudice as a Function of Threats to Morals and Values

Supplemental Material for No Good Without God: Antiatheist Prejudice as a Function of Threats to Morals and Values

In Godlessness We Distrust: Using Social Psychology to Solve the Puzzle of Anti‐atheist Prejudice

AbstractMost people believe in a god of some sort. Nonetheless, there are hundreds of millions of atheists in the world, and they face considerable discrimination and prejudice. This is a puzzling form of prejudice: Atheists do not form a coherent group, they are individually inconspicuous, and they are not, in general, oppositional or threatening. Recent research in social, evolutionary, and cultural psychology, however, offers suggestions for solving the puzzle of anti‐atheist prejudice, in terms of both uncovering its psychological causes and also suggesting interventions for reducing it. Antipathy towards atheists derives specifically from moral distrust – to many people, belief in a watchful, moralizing god is seen as a uniquely powerful and perhaps necessary component of morality. Without religious belief, atheists are viewed as moral wildcards who cannot be trusted. This unique basis in turn implies specific ways in which distrust of atheists might be ameliorated.