Anonymous Auction Research Articles

Semi‐Quantum Secure Multiparty Summation and its Applications to Anonymous Auction and Ranking

AbstractSemi‐quantum secure summation allows multiple parties with limited quantum capabilities to perform collective calculations under the premise of protecting privacy. However, current approaches are confined to low‐dimensional quantum states as information carriers and are restricted to scenarios involving two or three parties. This limitation hinders their universality and ability to fulfill the requirements of practical secure multiparty computations. To address these challenges, a novel semi‐quantum secure multiparty summation (SQSMS) protocol is proposed based on high‐dimensional entangled states and single‐particle states. The protocol leverages the entanglement correlation to guarantee the security of the transmission, enabling resistance against various potential attacks. Then, by utilizing the IBM Qiskit platform, corresponding quantum circuits and simulation results are presented to validate the feasibility and correctness of the protocol. Furthermore, building upon the foundation of the SQSMS protocol, semi‐quantum anonymous auction and anonymous ranking protocols are further constructed. Compared with previous approaches, the designed protocols cater to the requirements of their respective counterparts. Consequently, the approach may have broad applications in semi‐quantum secure multiparty computation scenarios.

The cost of privacy on blockchain: A study on sealed-bid auctions

In order to preserve privacy in a blockchain ecosystem, the main objective is to keep a transaction's data private, such as the sender, the receiver, and the amount transferred. The current work studies the cryptographic tools commonly used to achieve this type of privacy, primarily focusing on the Ethereum blockchain. Such tools usually require many computational and storage resources, leading to additional fees. An anonymous auction protocol was developed as a case study to explore these costs, where hiding the identity and the amount of the bids utilizes a variety of cryptographic primitives. The proposed implementation was compared against three sealed-bid auction protocols, which utilize similar cryptographic tools for preserving privacy throughout the auction process. The results show that providing an additional level of anonymity, such as hiding someone's identity, can increase the gas cost significantly, up to 2.5 times, depending on the choice of the cryptographic tools, which determine the usage of the blockchain's storage and computational resources. By adjusting the level of decentralization on the application level by moving some operations off-chain and maintaining the role of the auctioneer, we show that we can maintain anonymity while reducing the gas cost by 40%.

BA2P : Bidirectional and Anonymous Auction Protocol with Dispute-Freeness

Electronic auction is a popular platform to sell goods, task assignment, and resources’ allocation due to reductions of transaction costs and has attracted a huge number of potential buyers. However, it is challenging to address the disputes between the buyer and the auctioneer. The main reason is, on the one hand, solving such problem leverages to the broad domain of research aspects, such as economic theory, engineering, and cryptography, and, on the other hand, it is difficult to arbitrate in a decentralized and anonymous setting. In this work, we consider a more general framework to solve the potential disputes by enforcing bidirectional confirmation and public verification. Hence, the bidding procedure is clear to inspect and potential disputes can be erased. To achieve this goal, we propose policy-driven chameleon hash and revised linkable-and-redactable ring signature as building blocks. We used these two tools to build a bidirectional and anonymous auction protocol called BA 2 P. In our BA 2 P protocol, the bidders can competitively and anonymously place their bids to outbid others. At the end of the auction protocol, everyone can verify the validity of the bidding proof and decide the winner. Thus, dispute-freeness feature is achieved. The analysis suggests that our proposal is provably secure and practically efficient, and it trades some efficiencies with dispute-freeness feature.

Anonymous Auction Protocol Based on Timed-Release Encryption Atop Consortium Blockchain

Anonymous Auction Protocol Based on Timed-Release Encryption Atop Consortium Blockchain

The effect of competition on discrimination in online markets-Anonymity and selection.

Empirical studies show that discrimination by identity found in offline markets also prevails online. This paper reveal that in a competitive market, buyers that intend to discriminate exist but they are prevented from influencing the market outcome. To this end, we construct a field experiment on eBay, where half of the sellers disclose their names in their usernames while the other half do not. eBay, however, automatically discloses the seller’s names to the buyer after the auction. In the anonymous auctions, winning bidders thus learn the identity of the seller after the auction ends, and here we find buyers to discriminate against sellers with foreign-sounding names by leaving them feedback less often. However, there is no such discrimination in feedback provision when the seller name was known to the buyer before the auction. When bidders know the names of the sellers, the bidders with animus towards individuals with specific names can select out of auctions from these sellers, leaving winners that do not discriminate. One would expect that the auctions of for example sellers with foreign-sounding names would receive fewer bidders and thus lower auction prices. However, we observe no such differences: there are no statistically significant differences in the number of bids or auction prices received by sellers with foreign or domestic sounding names.

Anonymous Auction Protocol Based on Time-Released Encryption Atop Consortium BlockChain

The Ethereum blockchain as a decentralized platform is so successful that many applications deployed on it. However, for the inherent transparency properties and the lack of privacy, deploying a financial application on top of it is always a challenge. In this paper, we tackle this challenge and propose an anonymous sealed-bid auction protocol based on time-released encryption atop Consortium Blockchain. We adopt a strict digital certificate-based identity mechanism of the consortium blockchain to permit legitimate participants, and utilize the blind signature based on elliptic curve technology to allowing anonymous participation. Moreover, a timed release public key encryption algorithm is adopted to encrypt bids and prevent auctioneer from colluding with bidders. This is completely different from the method (zero-knowledge proof) used in other papers to prevent collusion between auctioneer and bidder. We provide a specific analysis of our protocol, which shows that our protocol meets anonymity and applicability.

Security of Symmetric Primitives under Incorrect Usage of Keys

We study the security of symmetric primitives under the incorrect usage of keys. Roughly speaking, a key-robust scheme does not output ciphertexts/tags that are valid with respect to distinct keys. Key-robustness is a notion that is often tacitly expected/assumed in protocol design — as is the case with anonymous auction, oblivious transfer, or public-key encryption. We formalize simple, yet strong definitions of key robustness for authenticated-encryption, message-authentication codes and PRFs. We show standard notions (such as AE or PRF security) guarantee a basic level of key-robustness under honestly generated keys, but fail to imply keyrobustness under adversarially generated (or known) keys. We show robust encryption and MACs compose well through generic composition, and identify robust PRFs as the main primitive used in building robust schemes. Standard hash functions are expected to satisfy key-robustness and PRF security, and hence suffice for practical instantiations. We however provide further theoretical justifications (in the standardmodel) by constructing robust PRFs from (left-and-right) collision-resistant PRGs.

Security of Symmetric Primitives under Incorrect Usage of Keys

We study the security of symmetric primitives under the incorrect usage of keys. Roughly speaking, a key-robust scheme does not output ciphertexts/tags that are valid with respect to distinct keys. Key-robustness is a notion that is often tacitly expected/assumed in protocol design — as is the case with anonymous auction, oblivious transfer, or public-key encryption. We formalize simple, yet strong definitions of key robustness for authenticated-encryption, message-authentication codes and PRFs. We show standard notions (such as AE or PRF security) guarantee a basic level of key-robustness under honestly generated keys, but fail to imply keyrobustness under adversarially generated (or known) keys. We show robust encryption and MACs compose well through generic composition, and identify robust PRFs as the main primitive used in building robust schemes. Standard hash functions are expected to satisfy key-robustness and PRF security, and hence suffice for practical instantiations. We however provide further theoretical justifications (in the standardmodel) by constructing robust PRFs from (left-and-right) collision-resistant PRGs.

Undeniable and Unpretendable Signatures

Undeniable signature, and unpretendable signature schemes have been studied independently. In this paper, efficient schemes which serve as both at the same time are presented. The schemes find their typical application in anonymous auction where the winner cannot deny her bid; nobody can pretend to be the winner; and the anonymity of all losers is preserved. The security of the schemes is proved in the common reference string model under discrete logarithm type assumptions.

Practical electronic auction scheme with strong anonymity and bidding privacy

In 2003, Chang and Chang proposed an efficient and anonymous auction protocol with freewheeling bids. They claimed that their scheme could ensure the bidders’ anonymity and secure confidentiality. Later, Jiang et al. pointed out that their scheme could not withstand the man-in-the-middle attacks; during this time, Jiang et al. proposed an improved scheme based on the scheme by Chang and Chang. In 2006, Chang and Chang proposed an anonymous auction scheme that was much more efficient than the abovementioned schemes. However, all of these three schemes were unable to achieve strong anonymity, bidding privacy, and secret bidding prices for sealed-bids. This article proposes a new scheme to resolve the above problems in which two managers and zero knowledge proof are used. The proposed scheme can be widely applied in any sensitive auction (e.g., auctions of cosmetics, medical services, etc.). Moreover, the proposed scheme also satisfies the following requirements: (1) bidding privacy, (2) strong anonymity, (3) secret bidding prices, (4) unforgeability, (5) verifiability, (6) non-repudiation, (7) traceability, (8) one-time registration and (9) easy revocation.

Een schrijfstertje van Vermeer. Jacob Oortman en de Dissiusveiling van 1696

The writer traces the history of Vermeer's Mistress and servant, which was one of the 21 paintings by the artist that were sold at the famous Dissius auction in Amsterdam on May 16, 1696. The painting was sold at an anonymous auction in 1738 to Jacob Oortman, who kept it in his house on Singel, Amsterdam. An inventory of Oortman's belongings made up after his death indicates that the painting was hung in a side room on the main floor that was probably meant for receptions of a more or less intimate character.

Efficient anonymous secure auction schema (ASAS) without fully trustworthy auctioneer

PurposeIn traditional commerce, an auction is known as a mechanism of determining the value of a commodity that does not have a fixed price. Auctions are exciting and an increasing number of transactions are performed through e‐auctions. But most current auctions cannot address all the important security requirements. Usually, auction systems force bidders and sellers to trust the auctioneer and, on the other hand, do not provide anonymity for bidders and sellers. This paper aims to solve these problems by presenting an efficient anonymous secure auction schema (ASAS) without a fully trustworthy auctioneer.Design/methodology/approachThe paper analyzes security properties and the complexity of previous works in auction security and then proposes a new ASAS that is more secure and efficient than previous works. Finally, security properties and the complexity of the new schema and previous works are compared with one another.FindingsThe proposed auction protocol does not force bidders and sellers to trust the auctioneer. In addition, it provides anonymity for both of them. Owing to these newly added features and high degree of security of ASAS, it is suggested that its use in high‐value auctions should require tighter security.Originality/valueThe paper proposes a new schema for electronic auctions that is secure and efficient and, in addition, does not force bidders and sellers to trust the auctioneer.

An efficient multi-round anonymous auction protocol

In this paper, we shall propose an efficient multi-round anonymous auction protocol. In the many literatures concerned, when more than one party bidding the same highest price for merchandise, all the bidders must re-participate in the auction again. It is inefficient. In this paper, the proposed protocol can make the auction easier. In our system, we first pick out the bidders offering the same highest price as the winners of the first round. Then, all the bidders need not re-participate in the auction again; only the winners of the first round have to come back for the second round.

An improvement on efficient anonymous auction protocols

In this paper, we propose an improvement on Chang et al.'s efficient anonymous auction protocols to overcome the security weakness in initiation phase of Chang et al.'s scheme. At first, we formally analyze the initiation phase of Chang et al.'s scheme on the basis of authentication tests to disclose the insecurity of the initiation phase. Then we give our attack to the initiation phase, which can make the following auction phase fail to run. Later, we propose our improvement on the initiation phase. Finally, we formally analyze our improved scheme with authentication tests, and prove the security of our improved scheme. Our improved scheme can preserve the merits of Chang et al.'s scheme and overcome the security weakness in initiation phase of Chang et al.'s scheme.

Efficient anonymous auction protocols with freewheeling bids

The need for electronic auction services has been increasing in recent years. Taking security into account, anonymity of online bidders becomes more important than it used to be. However, bidders cannot bid of his/her free will in existing anonymous auction protocols. For real-time applications, time delays are the significant factor taken into account. As a result, the proposed paper presents a simple and efficient method to ensure that the bidders can bid arbitrarily and anonymously.

Dynamic price formation in a futures market via double auctions

We report an exploratory study of the process of price formation in a speculative market in the absence of liquidity traders. Traders exchange a futures contract because they interpret information differently. We formulate trading as a sequence of anonymous double auctions and introduce a notion of bounded rationality in which traders use approximate models of market response in forming their bids. We prove existence of a perfect equilibrium in the sequential anonymous auctions game, and show that the equilibrium has a “no-regret” property. After learning the market price, a trader regrets neither the bid that he made nor the position that he holds. We show that trading volume is related to changes in the distribution of information in the economy. We also show that volume and expected change in price are related to two different attributes of the pattern of private information flow. Fundamentally, no particular relationship between the time series of these variables is always valid for all futures contracts. This point is emphasized by an example.