Annual Registration Fees Research Articles

Will It Fly? Adoption of the road pricing framework to manage drone use of airspace

• We adopt the theoretical road pricing framework to examine user charging potential in air drone use. • Responses from 825 active drone flyers were analysed using a random parameters logit model. • WTP of $0.11 for flying a drone in a safe and orderly manner for one hour was found. • Modelling also shows much higher WTPs for various currently prohibited activities (e.g. fly at night) • A LAAM system with variable user charges is preferred and fairer than flat registration fees/taxes. Applications and demand for airborne drone operations, including urban air mobility, are growing rapidly in regional and metropolitan areas. However, the expected traffic volumes in cities will make it impossible to operate drones in uncontrolled airspace. Despite the wealth of literature on pricing transport infrastructure usage showing that variable pricing is the optimal way for charging for road use, jurisdictions are reluctant to move towards this efficient mechanism evident in the slow uptake of road pricing implementation globally. What is worse, regulations have been drafted to tax the drone growth similarly to cars proposing the adoption of annual registration fees for drones. This paper proposes that drone use should instead adopt a pricing structure modelled on road user charging, and presents evidence suggesting that a case can be made for enabling controlled and fair growth through low altitude airspace management (LAAM) systems and variable drone user charges. A stated preference experiment with 825 respondents who actively fly drones has shown user charge potential in way of willingness to pay (WTP) of A$0.11 for flying a drone for one hour. Random parameters logit models further allowed us to establish much higher WTP for various currently not permitted activities such as A$7.09 to fly beyond line of flight or A$4.29 to fly outside daylight hours. As such, if those occasional uses are variably charged, we argue that a commercially viable LAAM system could be implemented, and low altitude air traffic user charging could overtake implementation of the wider (i.e. road) transport capacity pricing on the fast lane.

All car taxes are not created equal: Evidence from Germany

Economic theory suggests that the environmental externalities created by driving cars can be corrected by imposing taxes. In this paper we focus on one possible such tax, namely an annual registration fee that grows with the CO2 emissions rate of a vehicle. Taxes of this kind have been adopted in recent years in countries with important car markets, including Germany. We ask three research questions. First, how effective is this type of tax at redirecting new cars towards models with lower emissions rates? Second, are these effects stable over time? Third, when new information is issued about the true CO2 emissions rates of cars, how does the car market process that information? We use monthly new car sales from Germany from January 2011 to March 2019, a period during which the tax was revised three times. The first two revisions tightened the threshold above which a car's emissions are penalized; with the third, the car's emissions rate changes, due to the adoption of a new testing procedure, the Worldwide Harmonised Light Vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP). We find that new car sales are affected by the tax. Our models ascribe to the tax 2–5% reductions in new car sales. Focusing on specific periods around the time of the tax revisions results in higher estimated tax elasticities (−0.12 to −0.31), and efforts to match cars with emissions rates just below the threshold with similar vehicles just above the thresholds results in even stronger elasticities (−0.122 to −0.563, depending on the period). The resulting effect on the average CO2 emissions rate is, however, small. When we separate the tax amount into the previous tax plus the shock due to the switch to the WLTP test procedure, we find that the market is insensitive to the tax shock, but processes fully the corresponding change in the fuel economy of the vehicle. Much literature has focused on whether consumers discount very heavily or neglect the future costs of owning a car, compared to the price they pay for it. We find that even within future costs, some appear to be more salient than others.

All Car Taxes are Not Created Equal: Evidence from Germany

Economic theory suggests that the environmental externalities created by driving cars can be corrected by imposing taxes. In this paper we focus on one possible such tax, namely an annual registration fee that grows with the CO2 emissions rate of a vehicle, of the kind adopted in recent years in countries with important car markets, including Germany. We ask three research questions. First, how effective is this type of tax at redirecting new cars towards models with lower emissions rates? Second, are these effects stable over time? Third, when new information is issued about the true CO2 emissions rates of cars, how does the car market process that information? We use monthly new car sales figures at a very disaggregated level from Germany from Jan 2011 to March 2019, a period during which the tax, which is relatively modest, was revised three times. With the first two revisions the threshold above which a car's emissions are penalized was tightened; with the third, it is the car's emissions rate that changes, due to the adoption of a new testing procedure, the WLTP. We find that, overall, the elasticity of new car sales with respect to the tax is low (-0.06). Focusing on specific periods around the time of the tax revisions results in higher estimated tax elasticities (-0.12 to -0.31), and efforts to match cars with emissions rates just below the threshold with similar vehicles just above the thresholds even stronger elasticities (-0.122 to-0.563, depending on the period). When we separate the tax amount into the previous tax plus the shock due to the switch to the WLTP test procedure, we find that the market is insensitive to the tax shock, but processes fully the corresponding change in the fuel economy of the vehicle. Much literature has focused on whether consumers discount very heavily or neglect the future costs of owning a car, compared to the price they pay for it. We find that even within future costs, some appear to be more salient than others.

Impact of Electric and Hybrid Vehicles on Highway Trust Fund in Alabama

The objective of this paper is to help state agencies better understand the impact of electric and hybrid vehicles on the Highway Trust Fund and to develop a method for estimating proper annual registration fees for electric vehicles (EVs). In this study, a comprehensive literature review was conducted to summarize the background on electric and hybrid vehicles, current national and state policies and incentives, the trend of EV market in the U.S., and registration fees on electric and hybrid vehicles. As electric and hybrid vehicles do not contribute to fuel excise tax revenue, to compensate the lost tax revenues, some states charge additional annual registration fees to EV owners. To help the legislators determine the proper annual fees, a method was developed to assess the additional registration fees for EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) in Alabama. The collected data include number of registered electric and hybrid vehicles, fuel tax per gallon, and annual average mileage traveled by electric and hybrid vehicles in Alabama. The results of this study served as a key reference in the Rebuild Alabama Act that proposed an annual registration fee of $200 and $100 for EVs and PHEVs, respectively, which is effective since January 2020. The method in this study can be applied to other states for developing policies on registration fees for EVs and PHEVs to offset the fuel excise tax revenue loss.

The impact of emissions-based taxes on the retirement of used and inefficient vehicles: The case of Switzerland

Previous evaluations of emissions-based car taxes have estimated their impact on the shares or sales of new vehicles. In contrast, we ask whether taxes that penalize high emitters induce changes in the retirement of existing and inefficient vehicles. We exploit natural experiment conditions in Switzerland to analyze the impact of three different “bonus”/“malus” annual registration fee schemes implemented at the cantonal level. In the three schemes, the bonus rewards new, fuel-efficient vehicles. The malus is retroactive in canton Obwalden, i.e. it is charged on both new and existing high-emitting cars, but prospective in Geneva and Ticino. We use a difference-in-difference design within a survival analysis framework to assess direct treatment effects and spillover effects. While the bonus/malus in Obwalden hastens the retirement of existing high-emitting vehicles (by around 5%), the scheme in Geneva postpones retirement (by some 3%). We find no statistically significant effects in Ticino. These findings have important implications about the desirability of bonus/malus schemes and on their design, as well as on old car scrappage programs.

The money doesn't go round.

I've never felt the need to respond to an article before, but I had to comment on the story about the NMC not increasing the £120 annual registration fee for nurses (news, 5 April).

NMC registration fee held at £120.

The Nursing and Midwifery Council's (NMC) annual registration fee will remain at £120 for the coming financial year, the regulator has confirmed.

The effect of registration taxes on new car sales and emissions: Evidence from Switzerland

In Switzerland, the annual circulation taxes on road vehicles are set by and paid to the cantons (not to the federal government). We exploit the 26 different circulation tax rules and their variation over time, which we interpret as a natural experiment, to see if linking them to a vehicle’s CO2 emissions rate has helped shift new car sales towards lower-emitting vehicles. We find that even when the penalty associated with a highly polluting vehicle is high, the effect is relatively small. For example, in canton Zurich, imposing a 50% “malus” on the annual registration fee for cars that emit 200 or more grams of CO2 per kilometer reduces the average CO2 emissions rate from new cars by only 0.46g per kilometer, bringing it to 158.11g per kilometer in 2011. A similar effect would be attained with a modest increase in fuel taxes. Bonus policies may trigger new car sales and engender a net increase in CO2 emissions.

The Effect of Registration Taxes on New Car Sales and Emissions: Evidence from Switzerland

In Switzerland, the annual circulation taxes on road vehicles are set by and paid to the cantons (not to the federal government). We exploit the 26 different circulation tax rules and their variation over time, which we interpret as a natural experiment, to see if linking them to a vehicle’s CO2 emissions rate has helped shift new car sales towards cleaner, lower-emitting vehicles. We find that even when the penalty associated with a highly polluting vehicle is high, the effect is relatively small. For example, in canton Zurich, imposing a 50% “malus” on the annual registration fee for cars that emit 200 or more grams of CO2 per kilometer reduces the average CO2 emissions rate from new cars by only 0.46 gram per kilometer, bringing it to 158.11 grams per kilometer in 2011. A similar effect would be attained with a modest increase in fuel taxes.

How will we fund our roads? A case of decreasing revenue from electric vehicles

Annual expenditures for transportation infrastructure have recently surpassed the funding available through tax and fee collection. One large source of revenue generation for transportation infrastructure is use fees that are charged through taxes on gasoline both on a federal and state level. A massive adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) in the United States would result in significantly lower gasoline consumption and thus reduce the revenue collected to maintain the U.S. transportation infrastructure. We investigate how different vehicles will change the annual fee collected on a marginal basis. In addition, we assess the effects of adoption of alternative vehicles on revenues using several projections of alternative vehicles adoption, both on a state-by-state basis and at the national level. We find that baseline midsize and compact vehicles such as the Toyota Camry and Honda Civic generate approximately $2500–$4000 in tax revenue over their lifetime. Under the current funding structure, battery-electric vehicles (BEVs) such as the Nissan Leaf generate substantially less at $400–$1300, while plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) such as the Chevrolet Volt generate $1500–$2700. Even in states with high lifetime fees due to fuel taxes, such as California, revenue generation can be upwards of 50% lower than in states with high registration fees such as Colorado. Total annual revenue generation decreases by about $200 million by 2025 as a result of EV adoption in our base case, but in projections with larger adoption of alternative vehicles could lead to revenue generation reductions as large as $900 million by 2025. Potential schemes that charge user fees on alternative fuel vehicles to overcome the decrease in revenue include a flat annual registration fee at 0.6% of the vehicle’s manufacturer suggested retail price (MSRP) or 2▪ per mile fee.

Give some of the health service’s £1.5 billion underspend to NMC

The Nursing and Midwifery Council wants to increase the annual registration fee for nurses to help pay for fitness to practise hearings and to build up reserves of £10 million (Letters April 2).

Reciprocity of Annual Registration Fees in National Governing Bodies of Sports

Reciprocity of Annual Registration Fees in National Governing Bodies of Sports

Huge increase in regulator’s workload was to be expected

In her Voices column (reflections May 30), NMC interim chair Judith Ellis says she wants to increase the annual registration fee from £76 to £120 to help pay for a 48 per cent increase in fitness to practise (FtP) referrals over the past two years.

Sign the e-petition opposing the increase in registration fees.

The NMC proposes to increase our annual registration fee to £120. It is not an organisation, like a union or professional association, that we would choose to join or contribute to.

Accounting for Preference and Scale Heterogeneity in Establishing Whether it Matters Who is Interviewed to Reveal Household Automobile Purchase Preferences

The choice of automobile purchases in households often involves participation of more than one household member, each of which exerts some degree of influence on the final choice outcome. The influence of more than one agent has been recognised for many years, and yet the majority of automobile choice studies develop choice models as if a single agent is involved in the preference revelation process. What is not clear is whether it makes any substantive difference in preference revelation according to who is interviewed in a household. Using a generalised mixed logit framework that accounts for preference and scale heterogeneity, we estimate a series of models to investigate whether there are significant differences between the preferences of each individual in a household when assessed in isolation from other household members, as well as their joint preferences when expressing their preferences through a group choice task. The context is choosing amongst petrol, diesel and hybrid fuelled vehicles (associated with specific levels of fuel efficiency and engine capacity) when faced with a mix of vehicle prices, fuel prices, fixed annual registration fees, annual emission surcharges and vehicle kilometre emission surcharges. Using a stated choice experiment, we find that sampling a single individual as a representative of the household’s preferences is less appropriate than utilising preference information from the relevant group of decision makers in the household.

Pay up and shut up about the annual NMC registration fee

Could health unions and nurses please stop complaining about the annual registration fee for the Nursing and Midwifery Council (news July 15).

Childcare news from around the UK...

The annual registration fee for childminders joining the Ofsted Early Years register will rise by 400 per cent in three years, according to plans outlined by the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF).

The rights and interests of doctors and patients: does the new Victorian Health Professions Registration Act 2005 strike a fair balance?

From July 2007, the Health Professions Registration Act 2005 (Vic) will significantly alter the medical disciplinary process in Victoria. For practitioners: Formal hearings for allegations of serious unprofessional conduct will be heard by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT); There will be no right of appeal from a VCAT decision other than on a point of law; The maximum fine for serious unprofessional conduct will increase from $2000 to $50 000; Performance standards panels (PSPs) will be established to conduct informal hearings, with a power to impose conditions on registration; and Costs of the new system will cause an increase in annual registration fees. For complainants: There are new avenues for conciliation; There is a right to seek a review of certain Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria decisions; and Reasons for a PSP decision will be provided. Despite government argument that these changes will make the health complaints handling system fairer, the new Act has the potential to diminish the rights and interests of doctors.

Annual Registration Fees

Annual Registration Fees

Annual Registration Fees

Annual Registration Fees