When can organizations assess themselves and adapt? The current literature articulates a number of answers, but lacks a clear understanding of how organizations evaluate their own personnel. This paper considers a Principal-Agent relationship and characterizes a “Self-Policing” dynamic in which Agents may inform on one another to the Principal. In the model, Principals evaluate Agents in an effort to replace incompetent Agents while retaining competent ones. The results indicate that there will be higher turnover when the probability of a competent replacement is greater or after poor outcomes provided that the cost to firing a Subordinate is sufficiently low. These characteristics also make Principals less able to identify incompetent Agents, increasing the likelihood that incompetent Agents will be retained and competent Agents will be fired. This paper highlights the need for further work on intraorganizational dynamics to further our understanding of conflict. ∗I would like to thank Cliff Carrubba, Michael Horowitz, Danielle Jung, Shawn Ramirez, Eric Reinhardt, Dan Reiter, Toby Rider, Emily Ritter, Idean Salehyan, Elizabeth Saunders, Jun Koga Sudduth, and Patricia Sullivan for detailed comments on previous drafts of this paper, which have been presented at the 2015 Peace Science Society International Annual Meeting, the 2016 International Studies Association Annual Meeting, and the 2016 Online Peace Science Colloquium. Correspondence: wawagst@emory.edu.