Ancient Greek Ethics Research Articles

Ethics Lessons In The History Of The Ancient World (Comparative Analysis)

The first examples of practical ethics are proverbs and proverbs written on clay tablets in cuneiform, the world's first writing, three and a half thousand years ago. Samaritan proverbs and sayings are also noteworthy; many of them have risen to the level of universal wisdom and are still used in the East in a slightly different form. In addition, various moral problems are raised in the epic "Gilgamesh". When talking about ancient Greek ethics, it is customary to mention the names of four great philosophers; Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus. But in fact, even before them, a lot of work on ethics was done in Ancient Greece

Philosophy and the good life

This paper considers the implications for education of a reworked ancient Greek ethics and politics of flourishing (particularly as found in Plato), where ‘flourishing’ comprises the objective actualisation of our intellectual, imaginative and affective potential. A brief outline of the main features of an ethics of flourishing and its potential attractions as an ethical framework is followed by a consideration of the ethical, aesthetic and political requirements of such a framework for the theory and practice of education, indicating the ways in which my approach differs from other recent work in the field. I argue that the teaching of philosophy in schools and philosophical approaches to the teaching of other subjects are ideally suited to meet the pedagogic requirements of individual and communal flourishing so understood, contributing greatly both to the understanding of what a well-lived life might be, and to the actual living of it. I further argue that these requirements are not only derived from ancient Greek philosophy but are in turn especially well-served by the teaching and deployment of Greek philosophy itself. My claim is not that Greek philosophy has all the answers, or that other philosophers and philosophical approaches should be excluded; it is simply that Greek philosophy offers rich resources for those seeking to introduce children and young people to philosophy and to foster thereby their flourishing in both childhood and as adults.

Ancient Greek and Byzantine Political Ethics

The political morality that Plato and Aristotle supported was governed by various anthropological and social determinants, which means that they focused on man understood as a citizen and interpreted through the dialectic as well as through the prospects of the city’s happiness, since for both of them man was a social animal. The political ethics of Plato and Aristotle does not endanger the political community with political bankruptcy. This political morality does not start from intransigent principles to reach a compromise that has already been surpassed by the previous negative dynamics. The Byzantine political morality oscillates between the individual and the totality. It is not governed by individualism but rather by communitarianism, which entails that it confirms the dynamics of unity within the city. The Byzantine political morals is imbued with an anticipation of the political crisis, it seeks to identify any negative developments and strives to avoid the political marginalization of the citizens who are likely to rebel against any autocratic government. The Byzantine political morality is, thus, not an idle and selfish political introversion, concerned merely with political crises, conflict scenarios and conspiracy theories, as it strives to come up with various solutions that should guarantee political balance.

Vladanje sobom: nužni uslov razvoja ličnosti, kvalitetne komunikacije i dobrih međuljudskih odnosa

Vladanje sobom: nužni uslov razvoja ličnosti, kvalitetne komunikacije i dobrih međuljudskih odnosa

Aristotle Through Lenses from Bernard Williams

AbstractThis paper looks at a theme in ancient Greek ethics from perspectives developed by Bernard Williams.1 The ancient theme is the place of theoretical activity in human life, and I shall be referring to Aristotle. Williams is relevant through one strand in his scepticism about ‘morality, the peculiar institution’.2 His discussion suggests questions not merely about Aristotle but ones it would be interesting to put to Aristotle and see how he would or should respond to them.

II-Nil Admirari? Uses and Abuses of Admiration

Both Plato and Aristotle have something to say about admiration. But in order to know where to look, and in order to appreciate the force of their remarks, we need to sketch a little of the ethical background that they presuppose. I begin, therefore, with ancient Greek ethics in the wider sense, and discuss the treatment of admiration and related attitudes by Homer, Herodotus, and other pre-Platonic sources. Then I turn to the views of Plato, Adam Smith, Aristotle and Cicero. This order of discussion allows us to see why admiration is both morally significant and, in some respects, morally unreliable.

Mourning and moral psychology.

This article investigates what it would be to complete the project of ancient Greek ethics and provide a robust moral psychology. It considers Hans Loewald’s interpretation of the psychoanalytic conception of mourning; and argues that this provides a paradigm of what an adequate moral psychology might look like.

The Rationality of Humility

In this paper I explore humility as a paradigm, with reference to recent debates over the morality and rationality of emotions, and to the relation between religion and emotion. In Ancient Greek ethics, humility did not yet play a role; with the rise of Christianity, however, it becomes one of the cardinal virtues – only to disappear again with the onset of modernity. Against a culture-pessimistic interpretation of this development, this article begins by characterising the relation between virtue and emotion, before reconstructing the inner rationality of humility and showing how it can be traced through several transformations to a modern ethics of responsibility. Against this background, possible manifestations of the humble attitude in the present are made plausible.

Recollection and knowledge

Ancient Greek ethics held in its heritage contradictory relation in understanding of virtue as a key notion on which were founded polis and politics. Sharpening and revealing of this contradiction was mostly contribution of the sophistic movement, which by rational gauge observed philosophically not enough clarified topics of the Ancient Greek worldview. To solve contradiction arisen from traditional viewpoint premised on the principle that virtue cannot be taught and stand?point that virtue is connected to knowledge, Plato introduces notion of recollection. Recollection becomes focal point in Plato?s overcoming of this contradiction. He analyses two shapes of recollection, universal, but only potential and the active one, that leads to the theory of ideas and defines what is virtue.

The Concept of Happiness in The Ancient Greek Ethics ― Centering around Plato ―

The Concept of Happiness in The Ancient Greek Ethics ― Centering around Plato ―

La voluntad, ¿una facultad superflua?

It is commonplace in the philosophical literature the translation of the Aristotelian akrasia as “weakness of will”. This raises several important difficulties, far beyond a mere problem of translation. First of all, there is a growing consensus among scholars concerning the idea, held among others by Hannah Arendt, that there’s no concept in ancient Ethics that corresponds, behind some lexical appearances, with the Augustinian voluntas construed as a power or faculty fully autonomous with respect to reason as well as to appetites, free from every determination not reducible to its own self-determination, and uniquely responsible, therefore, for the actions it commands. Secondly, the Augustinian voluntas raises a host of unsolvable paradoxes, as, for example, the supposed infinity of will, or its ultimate reduction to mere arbitrariness. This annihilates the very role assigned to will, i. e., that of founding and explaining the responsibility of the self. Therefore, it seems far more reasonable to hold a view of human soul that, in the same vein as the ancient Greek Ethics, refrains itself from introducing additional elements in the traditional dichotomy Reason-Desires, even if the detailed description of their mutual interactions can be greatly refined thanks to the modern cognitive science.

The fate of a warrior culture

Jonathan Lear in Radical Hope tackles the idea of cultural devastation, in the specific case of the Crow Indians. What do we mean by “annihilation” of a culture? The moral point of view that he imagines as he reconstructs the eve and aftermath of this annihilation is not second personal, of obligation, but first personal, in the collective and singular, as told by the Crows, with Lear as “analyst.” Radical Hope is a study of representative character of a people—of virtue, courage, resilience, and hope in the face of cultural collapse. The leading questions are shaped by ancient Greek ethics, but with a twist: On the brink of cultural death, what counts for us as good living and what is the nature of the virtues or excellences that constitute it? How might a leader, a phronimos, exemplify it? This puts it too narrowly. The questions, also, are Wittgensteinian: How does a nation go on, when the concepts and way of life it has lived by for centuries are no more? What does it mean to go on? What does it mean to stop when the marks of going on are no longer?

Can virtue be taught?

The teachability of virtue is an issue on which were crossed swords during the struggle for supremacy between two basic principles of ancient Greek spirit - sophistry and ancient Greek ethics. Two great representatives of these opposite principles, Plato and Protagoras, confronted their arguments in Plato's dialog named after the great sophist. Paradoxically, during this philosophical struggle, Protagoras, who at the beginning supposed that virtue is teachable, later, on the contrary, states that virtue is not knowledge and this would make it least likely to be teachable. On the other hand Plato, who is trying to preserve the ancient Greek principle that virtue is innate, claims that virtue is knowledge. The solution of this great dispute between two principles of antiquity Plato sees in philosophical theoretization of ancient Greek mythical worldview.

Who Is the Happy Warrior? Philosophy Poses Questions to Psychology

Psychology has recently focused attention on subjective states of pleasure, satisfaction, and what is called “happiness.” The suggestion has been made in some quarters that a study of these subjective states has important implications for public policy. Sometimes, as in the case of Martin Seligman’s “positive psychology” movement, attempts are made to link the empirical findings and the related normative judgments directly to the descriptive and normative insights of ancient Greek ethics and modern virtue ethics. At other times, as with Daniel Kahneman’s work, the connection to Aristotle and other ancient Greek thinkers is only indirect, and the connection to British Utilitarianism is paramount; nonetheless, judgments are made that could be illuminated by an examination of the rich philosophical tradition that runs from Aristotle through to John Stuart Mill’s criticisms of Bentham.

Facilitating the development of moral insight in practice: teaching ethics and teaching virtue

Abstract The teaching of ethics is discussed within the context of insights gleaned from ancient Greek ethics, particularly Aristotle and Plato and their conceptions of virtue (arete, meaning excellence). The virtues of excellence of character (moral virtue) and excellence of intelligence (intellectual virtue), particularly practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom, are considered. In Aristotelian ethics, a distinction is drawn between these intellectual virtues: experience and maturity is needed for practical wisdom, but not for theoretical wisdom. In addition to this, excellence of character is acquired through habitual practice, not instruction. This suggests that there is a need to teach more than theoretical ethics and that the ethics teacher must also facilitate the acquisition of practical wisdom and excellence of character. This distinction highlights a need for various educational approaches in cultivating these excellences which are required for a moral life. It also raises the question: is it possible to teach practical wisdom and excellence of character? It is suggested that virtue, conceived of as a type of knowledge, or skill, can be taught, and people can, with appropriate experience, habitual practice, and good role models, develop excellence of character and become moral experts. These students are the next generation of exemplars and they will educate others by example and sustain the practice of nursing. They need an education which includes theoretical ethics and the nurturing of practical wisdom and excellence of character. For this purpose, a humanities approach is suggested.

Developmental progress in ancient Greek ethics

Starting from a neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral reasoning, major moral-cognitive advancements are reconstructed from the historical development of ancient Greek ethical philosophy. Kohlberg's stage theory is basically retained and supplemented by a developmental logic which allows us to (re)construct moral stages from their respective predecessors. This logical or dynamical approach, however, yields a new stage taxonomy, which is significantly different from and more detailed than Kohlberg's. Applying the new approach to ancient Greek ethics nine distinct stages within the historical process can be made out and analysed. As far as the argument and the available historical evidence go, the real historical development appears to be well accommodated by the suggested theory.

Virtue and Knowledge: An Introduction to Ancient Greek Ethics

This book focuses on the concept of virtue, and in particular on the virtue of wisdom or knowledge, as it is found in the epic poems of Homer, some tragedies of Sophocles, selected writings of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoic and Epicurean philosophers. The key questions discussed are the nature of the virtues, their relation to each other, and the relation between the virtues and happiness or well-being. There has been renewed interest recently in the concept of virtue. The value of William Prior's book is that it provides the background and interpretive framework to make classical works on ethics, such as Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, accessible to readers with no training in the classics.

William J. Prior: Virtue and Knowledge: an Introduction to Ancient Greek Ethics. Pp. xi + 240. London and New York: Routledge, 1991. £35 (Paper, £9.99).

William J. Prior: Virtue and Knowledge: an Introduction to Ancient Greek Ethics. Pp. xi + 240. London and New York: Routledge, 1991. £35 (Paper, £9.99).

Virtue and Knowledge: An Introduction to Ancient Greek Ethics

<i>Virtue and Knowledge: An Introduction to Ancient Greek Ethics</i>

Virtue and knowledge: an introduction to ancient Greek ethics

Virtue and knowledge: an introduction to ancient Greek ethics