Analysts In Countries Research Articles

The Effect of Media Competition on Analyst Forecast Properties: Cross-Country Evidence

We examine the effect of media competition on analyst forecast properties in an international setting using 113,436 firm-year observations from 32 countries spanning 2000 through 2012. We find that firms in countries with stronger media competition enjoy more accurate, less optimistically biased, and less dispersed analyst forecasts. The effects of media competition on the properties of analyst forecasts are stronger for firms with lower institutional ownership, for firms followed by fewer analysts or by analysts from smaller brokerage houses, and for firms with weaker financial performance. This suggests that media competition plays a more pronounced role in shaping the information environment when information from nonmedia channels is likely to be limited or of lower quality. Finally, we find that analysts in countries with stronger media competition tend to follow more firms, suggesting that stronger media competition reduces analysts’ information acquisition costs, which in turn, improves the properties of their forecasts.

Investor Protection, Aggregate Accounting Earnings and Forecasts of Growth in GDP: International Evidence.

This study draws on the investor protection literature to examine differences in a country’s information environment that are likely to explain cross country variation in the extent to which macroeconomic forecasters take account of current earnings when forecasting future growth in GDP. Using a unique sample of analysts’ GDP forecasts from thirty countries, we find that economies with stronger levels of disclosure and enforcement regulation have a lower association between changes in aggregate earnings and errors in forecasts of GDP growth. The results are consistent with macroeconomic forecasters in countries with stronger investor protections taking greater account of changes in aggregate earnings when forecasting growth in GDP than analysts in countries with lower levels of investor protection.

Analysts’ Reputational Concerns, Self-Censoring, and the International Dispersion Effect

Stocks with higher forecast dispersion earn lower future returns and have a greater upward bias in the mean reported earnings forecast in international markets. Both phenomena are stronger in countries with more transparent information environments, more developed stock markets, stronger investor protection, greater capital openness, and more intense usage of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Using the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis as a natural experiment, we find that both phenomena become weaker postcrisis in Malaysia, which imposed capital controls, relative to Thailand and South Korea, which opened their financial markets to foreigners. These results suggest that analysts in countries with greater demand for their forecasts and hence greater concerns for reputations are more likely to self-censor their low forecasts, which leads to a stronger dispersion–bias relation and a stronger dispersion effect. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2642 . This paper was accepted by Wei Jiang, finance.

Bureaucracy and creativity: do they make companionable bedfellows?

This essay will look at the benefits and weaknesses of the increasingly bureaucratic nature of training structures and processes in the training of Jungian psychotherapists and analysts. The author will draw on her experiences during two different periods of time as Director of Training at the Society of Analytical Psychology in London with observations on and discussion about some of the changes that have evolved. By way of contrast, she will offer some comparisons with developments in the training of Jungian analysts in countries with little or no legacy of an analytic culture. Here, there is a need to professionalize training in Jungian analysis but the attendant growth of bureaucracy can easily come to echo the politics of non-democratic regimes.

Analysts’ reputational concerns, self-censoring, and the international dispersion effect

Stocks with higher forecast dispersion earn lower future returns and have a greater upward bias in the mean reported earnings forecast in international markets. Both phenomena are stronger in countries with more transparent information environments, more developed stock markets, stronger investor protection, greater capital openness, and more intense usage of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Using the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis as a natural experiment, we find that both phenomena become weaker postcrisis in Malaysia, which imposed capital controls, relative to Thailand and South Korea, which opened their financial markets to foreigners. These results suggest that analysts in countries with greater demand for their forecasts and hence greater concerns for reputations are more likely to self-censor their low forecasts, which leads to a stronger dispersion–bias relation and a stronger dispersion effect. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2642. This paper was accepted by ...

The Effect of Media Competition on Analyst Forecast Properties: Cross-Country Evidence

This study examines the effect of media competition on analyst forecast properties in an international setting. Using data from 113,436 firm-year observations from 32 countries spanning 2000 through 2012, we find that firms in countries with stronger media competition enjoy more accurate, less optimistically biased, and less dispersed analyst forecasts. In addition, we find that the effects of media competition on the properties of analyst forecasts are stronger for firms with lower institutional ownership, for firms followed by fewer analysts or by analysts from smaller brokerage houses, and for firms with weaker financial performance. This suggests that media competition plays a more pronounced role in shaping the information environment when information from non-media channels is likely to be limited or of lower quality. Finally, we find that analysts in countries with stronger media competition tend to follow more firms, suggesting that stronger media competition reduces analysts’ information acquisition costs, which in turn, improves the properties of their forecasts.