Evolutionary Game Analysis Research Articles

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Electric Vehicle Distribution Entities with Shared Charging Facilities

This study investigates the evolutionary game dynamics among electric vehicle distribution entities in the context of shared charging facilities, addressing the critical issue of inadequate charging resources. To understand the behavior of different stakeholders under government incentive policies, we develop an evolutionary game model involving a government department and two logistics enterprises (A and B). Through stability analysis, we explore equilibrium conditions of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) for the tripartite evolutionary game. To ensure the robustness of our findings, we conduct a MATLAB simulation analysis to validate the analytical results. Our findings highlight that government subsidies, the costs incurred by logistics enterprises to share charging facilities, and the additional distribution income derived from this sharing are critical in determining whether the evolutionary game can achieve a stable equilibrium state. This research enables logistics companies to optimize the use of charging resources, lower operating costs, and enhance delivery efficiency. Additionally, government subsidy policies play a crucial role in encouraging logistics enterprises to engage in charging facility sharing, thereby fostering the sustainable development of the entire logistics industry. Based on these insights, the paper offers practical recommendations to further promote the sharing of charging facilities in electric vehicle distribution.

Collaborative Governance of Stakeholders in the Payment for Forest Ecosystem Services: An SA-SNA-EGA Approach

Forests provide goods and services while maintaining ecological security. However, the market does not adequately reflect their economic benefits, posing a significant challenge to the Payments for Forest Ecosystem Services (PFES). The involvement of multiple stakeholders with varying responsibilities and interests complicates collaboration and hinders effective governance. This study proposes an integrated approach using stakeholder analysis, social network analysis, and evolutionary game analysis to explore the collaborative governance of stakeholders in PFES. Through field surveys, the study empirically investigates PFES in China, demonstrating the effectiveness of this integrated approach. The results indicate the following: (i) Stakeholders are classified into three categories; the key stakeholders include the central and local governments, forest managers, and paying users. (ii) Stakeholders still need to strengthen collaboration. Local governments, forest managers, their employees, and communities exert widespread influence; paying users and research institutions have high efficiency in resource sharing. (iii) Five evolutionarily stable strategies are observed at different stages. Government intervention is crucial for changing the stagnant state. Benefits and government incentives have a positive impact on stakeholder collaborative governance. The research findings offer theoretical insights to enhance stakeholder collaboration and promote the development of the PFES. Key strategies include addressing key stakeholders’ needs, diversifying incentives, and establishing an accessible information platform.

Four-party evolutionary game analysis of enterprise environmental behavior.

With the implementation of the "Rural Revitalization Strategy" in China, it is common for enterprises to go to the countryside to develop business. However, enterprises often neglect the local environmental protection in rural areas while developing the economy to pursue profits. As the end of the national administrative system and the villagers' autonomous organization, the village committee needs to participate in monitoring enterprises' environmental behavior. With this in mind, this paper builds a game model of enterprises, grass-roots governments, farmers, and village committees and analyzes the impact of village committees, grass-roots governments, and farmers on enterprise environmental behavior. The conclusions are as follows: (i) it is difficult for the village committee to promote the positive environmental behavior of enterprises, which needs the supervision of the grass-roots government; (ii) Improving the coordination ability of village committees is conducive to reducing the burden of government supervision; (iii) Farmers' awareness of environmental protection can affect the environmental behavior of enterprises through the rights protection mechanism and reputation mechanism.

Public participation in Governance of E-waste recycling: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

The surge in informal E-waste recycling has led to significant resource wastage and environmental hazards. The current government-centered governance system faces substantial obstacles to effective implementation due to information gaps and operational challenges. This study adopts the concept of social governance by incorporating public participation into the traditional government-led e-waste recycling system. Utilizing the bounded rationality of evolutionary game theory, this research constructs a tripartite game model involving the government, recyclers, and the public. It analyzes the behavioral strategy choices of each participant and the mechanisms of mutual influence under different scenarios. The main findings are: (1) Solely relying on public power is insufficient for effectively governing informal recyclers. (2) Reasonable and moderate incentives can promote public participation, serving as an effective supplementary tool for government regulation. (3) Increasing public exposure to the informal dismantling behaviors of recyclers is crucial for enhancing governance effectiveness. Specific measures can include establishing complaint departments for related incidents and creating media channels. These findings underscore the importance of integrating public participation into e-waste governance to address the limitations of a purely government-centered approach.

Evolutionary game analysis of multi-agent cooperation strategy analysis in agricultural water conservancy PPP project under digitization background

This study constructed a system dynamics (SD) evolutionary game model, from which we analyzed the conditions that need to be met by multi-agents to achieve cooperation in agricultural water conservancy (AWC) Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Simultaneously, this study used numerical simulation to depict the impact of initial participation willingness, reward, punishment, income, and other parameters of local governments, project enterprises, and farmers on the evolution strategy. The results firstly showed that the basic conditions for tripartite cooperation are to strengthen the rewards and punishments for project enterprises and improve the participation benefits of farmers. Secondly, it showed that increasing the rewards for farmers and improving the project dividend benefits can effectively motivate farmers to participate. Thirdly, it showed that enhancing the incentive subsidies and reputation benefits for project enterprise’s participation, as well as strengthening the supervision of local government, boosts the motivation of project enterprises significantly. However, it is vital to ensure that the reward amounts are not too high to allow local government to play its guiding role efficiently. Lastly, the results indicated that digital technology can help reduce the participation cost of local government, project enterprises and farmers, and improve the external reputation benefits of each participant, thus forming a win-win situation for all three participants. Analyzing the cooperation strategies of the three parties in AWC PPP projects provides theoretical support and a decision-making basis for the efficient operation of AWC PPP projects under the digital background, and also provides practical policy recommendations for the high-quality development of AWC.

Impact analysis of the four-party evolutionary game in renewable portfolio standard under dynamic parameters

Renewable portfolio standard has become the primary policy tool to improve the integration of renewable energy. The motivation of the parties involved and the formulation of the policy parameters are crucial for the rapid development of renewable energy industry. However, the role of large consumers has often been neglected as the main party for renewable energy consumption, and the policy parameters have been dominated by static parameters. This paper innovatively introduces large consumers into the evolutionary game, constructs a four-party revenue matrix and the replicated dynamic equations, analyzes the equilibrium conditions of the evolutionary game, and constructs the functions of the key dynamic parameters over time, then simulates the behavioral strategies of the game players under the dynamic parameters with a system dynamics model. The optimal strategy is regulators waive regulation, while power plants, large consumers and power sales companies fulfill their quotas. Dynamic fines, dynamic quotas, and dynamic consumption prices have a large impact on each player, while dynamic TGC prices have a limited impact on them. Reasonably high fines in the initial stage are effective in facilitating each player to its stable state more quickly than static fines. Even if the fine is reduced in the later stages, it will not affect their strategies. High quotas and low consumption prices will significantly accelerate the exit of regulators from regulation, while power sales companies and large consumers will quickly fulfill their quota tasks. Only power generators prefer low quotas and high consumption prices. These results provide some recommendations for the setting of policy parameters.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Knowledge Sharing among Supply Chain Enterprises Considering Incentive Strategy

This paper aims to explore and enhance the influencing factors which effect the evolution of supply chain knowledge sharing under different incentive strategies. Furthermore, it also helps supply chain managers determine whether incentives are needed and if needed to what extent they are needed to deal with the dynamic changes of factors in the evolution of supply chain knowledge sharing. The evolutionary game model of knowledge sharing without considering incentives is established respectively, and the influence of relevant influencing factors on the evolutionary results of knowledge sharing is analyzed. The results show that enterprises’strategy of selecting knowledge sharing can be attributed to the change by the degree of knowledge complementarity among enterprises when the incentive is not considered. The incentive of supply chain will stimulate knowledge sharing between enterprises but then the incentive coefficient needs to meet certain conditions; can the evolutionary system converge to the state of {knowledge sharing, knowledge sharing}, and the analysis shows that the relationship capital, knowledge’s unit value, knowledge sharing cost, knowledge sharing risk and other factors have significant effects on the evolution rate of knowledge sharing. Finally, based on the research conclusions, the countermeasures and suggestions for supply chain knowledge sharing are proposed.

An evolutionary game analysis of the prefabricated building supply side under dynamic government reward and punishment mechanisms

From the standpoint of the supply side of prefabricated buildings, an evolutionary game model between the government and developers is constructed under the static and dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms in order to promote the development of prefabricated buildings and realize the transformation and upgrading of the construction industry. The simulation study of the example is conducted, and the impact of policy cost, subsidy upper limit, and tax upper limit on the system’s evolutionary stability strategy is examined. The findings demonstrate that when the government chooses static subsidy and static tax policies, there is no evolutionary stable strategy in the game system. The flaws of the static reward and punishment system can be adequately compensated for by the dynamic subsidy and dynamic tax policy, leading to an evolutionary stable state. The likelihood of developers producing prefabricated structures is negatively connected with policy cost and subsidy upper limits and favorably correlated with tax upper limits, according to the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism. The findings of the study have significant implications for government policy that will encourage the widespread use of prefabricated structures in China.

Joint prevention and control, cross-regional governance: An evolutionary game analysis of fiscal environmental protection expenditure strategies

The ability to form a collaborative governance alliance is crucial to the in-depth promotion of pollution prevention and control. Starting from the perspective of regional development imbalance, this paper uses an evolutionary game model to explore how initial strategy choice, game order, financial and environmental protection expenditure efficiency, and total factor productivity affect the formation and stabilization of the cooperative alliance of “joint prevention and control, cross-regional governance”. The study shows that strategic interactions between governments can lead to “cooperative” or “collusive” outcomes and that game order and initial strategy play a key role in the formation of these outcomes. In addition, changes in parameters such as fiscal and environmental expenditure efficiency and total factor productivity can greatly affect the evolutionary path and the speed of convergence. Particularly in less developed regions, fiscal and environmental spending efficiency plays a crucial role in promoting government “cooperation”, which tends to be weakened by increases in total factor productivity. In contrast, economically developed regions tend to favor “cooperation” and “investment” strategies. This study provides valuable policy recommendations for enhancing interregional cooperation in environmental governance.

Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of government reward and punishment mechanisms and agricultural resilience under a dual carbon context

PurposeUnder the “dual carbon” framework, the article explores the equilibrium points among the government, agricultural enterprises and village committees, and uses sensitivity analysis to reveal the dynamic factors affecting these stakeholders, thereby proposing methods to enhance agricultural disaster resilience.Design/methodology/approachThe article uses MATLAB to construct a game model for the three parties with interests: agribusiness, government and village council. It examines the stability of strategies among these entities. Through graphical simulation, the paper analyzes the sensitivity of agricultural enterprises carbon emissions and village committees’ rent-seeking behaviors in the decision-making process, focusing on significant factors such as government carbon tax and regulatory policies.FindingsA single government reward and punishment mechanism is insufficient to influence the strategic choices of enterprises and village committees. The cost of rent-seeking does not affect the strategic choices of enterprises and village committees. A key factor influencing whether the village committee engages in rent-seeking is the level of labor income of the village committee as an “intermediary”.Originality/valueThis paper focuses on the dynamic game between three stakeholders (the government, agricultural enterprises and village committees), seeking dynamic equilibrium and conducting sensitivity analysis through visualization to provide the government with optimal policy recommendations.

Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of New-Energy Vehicle Promotion in China Based on Reward and Punishment Mechanisms

In China, new-energy vehicles are viewed as the ultimate goal for the automobile industry, given the current focus on the “dual-carbon” target. Therefore, it is important to promote the sustainable development of this new-energy market and ensure a smooth transition from fuel-driven vehicles to new-energy vehicles. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving vehicle enterprises, consumers, and the government. It improves the tripartite evolutionary game through the mechanisms of dynamic and static rewards and punishments, respectively, using real-world data. The results show the following. (1) A fluctuation is present in the sales of new-energy vehicles by enterprises and the active promotional behavior of the government. This fluctuation leads to instability, and the behavior is difficult to accurately predict, which is not conducive new-energy vehicles’ promotion and sales. (2) A static reward and punishment mechanism can change the fluctuation threshold or peak value. Nevertheless, the stability of the system’s strategy is not the main reason that the government has been actively promoting it for a long time. However, enterprises are still wavering between new-energy and fuel vehicles. (3) The linear dynamic reward and punishment mechanism also has its defects. Although they are considered the stability control strategy of the system, they are still not conducive to stability. (4) The nonlinear dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can help the system to achieve the ideal stabilization strategy.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Government and Enterprises in the Low-Carbon Utilization of Urban Industrial Land: Evidence from China

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Government and Enterprises in the Low-Carbon Utilization of Urban Industrial Land: Evidence from China

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Collaborative Prefabricated Buildings Development Behavior in China under Carbon Emissions Trading Schemes

Prefabricated buildings (PBs) are considered a green way to reduce energy consumption and carbon emissions in the construction industry due to their environmental and social benefits. However, PBs have obstacles such as high construction costs, immature technology, and insufficient policy incentives, and developers’ willingness to develop them needs to be higher. Therefore, it is necessary to explore how to motivate more developers to develop PBs. In this paper, we first discuss the impact of the carbon emissions trading scheme (ETS) on the construction industry and then consider the heterogeneity of construction developers, introduce a collaborative mechanism to establish a three-party evolutionary game model between the government and the heterogeneous developers, and explore the evolution of the three-party dynamic strategies through numerical simulation. The results show that developers’ initial development probability affects the system’s evolutionary trend, and the developer who obtains more low-carbon benefits plays a dominant role. Further analyses show that critical factors such as market profitability, synergistic benefits, and carbon tax price positively influence the development of PBs, and the influence of synergistic cooperation mechanisms should be especially emphasized. This study provides practical insights into the sustainable development of the construction industry and the government’s development of a suitable carbon portfolio policy for it. Including the construction industry in the ETS is recommended when carbon prices reach 110 RMB/t. At this point, the government can remove the subsidy for PBs, but the behaviors of the developers who participate in the ETS still need to be supervised.

Four-Party Evolutionary Game Analysis of Value Co-Creation Behavior of Bulk Logistics Enterprises in Digital Transformation

Four-Party Evolutionary Game Analysis of Value Co-Creation Behavior of Bulk Logistics Enterprises in Digital Transformation

Evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission reduction in transportation infrastructure construction under dual regulation

Under the dual regulation of government intervention and environmental constraints, user demand, low-carbon awareness, and the willingness of construction enterprise to reduce carbon emissions are crucial to the realization of low-carbon transportation infrastructure construction. Basing on prospect theory, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model for the government, construction enterprise, and user, explores the stabilization of the three-game players' strategy choices, and discusses the influence of key parameters on the behavior evolution of relevant players through simulation analysis. The results indicate that: the regulatory cost when the government adopts incentives or no incentives is an important factor affecting the strategy choice. The enhancement of incentives by the government can promote the construction of enterprise and the selection of low-carbon transportation infrastructure by user. However, when the benefit of government credibility outweighs the incremental cost of household subsidies, carbon subsidies, and regulation, the government changes its strategy and no longer adopts encouraging strategy. Improving benefits of build low-carbon transportation infrastructure reducing incremental costs, setting a ladder carbon tax rate, increasing carbon tax rate for traditional construction, and decreasing for low-carbon construction is an effective approach to stimulate enterprise to construct low-carbon transportation infrastructure. The user's choice of low-carbon transportation infrastructure strategy is positively correlated with the subsidy received and is less affected by environmental benefits. And the construction enterprise's strategy choice hasn’t been influenced by user, which is related to the public service characteristics of transportation infrastructure.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Regulation on Green Innovation Behavior Decision-Making of Energy Enterprises

Encouraging environmentally friendly innovation in energy companies is an essential way to stop global warming. Through ingenious integration of reputation and fairness preference, this research develops an evolutionary game model between the government and energy companies. This research investigates the dynamic evolution of green innovation strategy selection by energy firms operating under government supervision, using an evolutionary game model as a basis. This study examines how government regulations, including their subsidies and penalties, reputation, and fairness preference, affect the green innovation behavior of energy enterprises. The research shows that without considering the fairness preference, the subsidy and punishment of government regulation can improve the tendency of energy enterprises to choose green innovation behavior. At the same time, considering the reputation of energy enterprises to assume social responsibility can improve the tendency of energy enterprises to choose green innovation behavior. In the case of considering fairness preference, energy companies with strong fairness preference are more likely not to adopt green innovation and need more subsidies and penalties to choose green innovation; energy enterprises with weak fairness preference are more likely to adopt green innovation; green innovation will take place with fewer subsidies and penalties; reputation plays a stronger role in energy companies with weak fairness preferences. The study can give the government a theoretical foundation on which to build precise regulatory plans for various energy firms and encourage green innovation in those enterprises.

Evolutionary game and simulation analysis of construction waste recycling from the perspective of stakeholders.

In current construction waste resource management processes, the effect of government supervision is unclear, and illegal treatment and low-quality reproduction of recycling and reprocessing enterprises by construction units are common. To improve the degree of resource utilization of construction waste and deeply explore the role of its key influencing factors, a tripartite evolutionary game model of construction waste resource treatment in which the government, construction units, and recycling and reprocessing enterprises are the research objects that considers public participation factors to be established. MATLAB is used to simulate the sensitivity of relevant parameters. The results show that: (1) An increase in government fines can regulate the behavior of enterprises; (2) Low government subsidies are conducive to the development of a tripartite stability strategy; and (3) An increase in the cost difference between the two strategies of the enterprise will weaken its willingness to carry out green operations (and after the cost difference exceeds the threshold, the enterprise will refuse to carry out green operations); (4) The reputation value brought by the public and the additional value added by reputation under the contrast effect have an incentive effect on the enterprise and the government; and (5) The peak value of the inverted U-shaped curve of government strategy choice is affected by the degree of public participation. Therefore, the government should propose rectifications in terms of fines and subsidies, and both companies can use technological innovation to reduce costs. At the same time, it is necessary to raise stakeholders' awareness of resource utilization and encourage the public to actively participate in supervision. The research conclusions can provide a decision-making reference for improving the utilization of construction waste resources and the efficient treatment of construction waste resources.

An evolutionary game analysis of incentive of industrial parks, government support and enterprise innovation willingness in China

Industrial parks are the important carriers to promote regional innovation and economic development. The policy preferences of the government, the support orientation of the industrial park and the innovation willingness of the enterprises in the park play a significant role in promoting the high-quality development of the industrial parks. In order to clarify the decision-making process of each subject, this paper constructs a triple evolutionary game model between the government, industrial park and enterprises in the park, Matlab software is used to conduct simulation research, and the strategy selection of each subject in the process of promoting high-quality development of the park is analyzed, as well as the influence of variables on the evolutionary game. Through numerical simulation, this study finds that the strategy choice of the government and the industrial park is influenced by the cost of innovation management for enterprises. In addition, the innovation willingness of enterprises is affected by the policy preference of the government and the support orientation of the industrial park, the excessive tax preference of the government will lead to negative innovation behaviors of the enterprises, the “inward incentives” support orientation of the industrial park can stimulate the enterprises’ innovation willingness on “active innovation”, the enterprises behavior of “active innovation” will strengthen the “inward incentives” support orientation of the industrial park in turn. The difference of the benefits and the costs between the two support orientations by the industrial park will lead to the equilibrium points stabilized at different strategy combinations. Based on these findings, countermeasures and suggestions are proposed in this study.

How to Promote Traditional Automobile Companies’ Intelligent-Connected Transformation under the New Dual-Credit Policy? A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis Combined with Funding Time Delay

How to Promote Traditional Automobile Companies’ Intelligent-Connected Transformation under the New Dual-Credit Policy? A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis Combined with Funding Time Delay

Are Residents Willing to Pay for Electric Cars? An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Electric Vehicle Promotion in Macao

This study uses an evolutionary game model to analyze the interplay between Macao residents’ willingness to purchase electric vehicles (EVs) and the government’s promotion strategies. It assesses the effectiveness of incentives like tax exemptions and price reductions. Despite these initiatives, challenges such as high initial costs, limited vehicle range, and long charging times continue to hinder the widespread adoption of EVs in Macao. Government subsidies increase the appeal of EV purchases, but if not managed carefully, they risk creating dependency. Simulation analysis shows that an active purchasing strategy by Macao residents can stabilize the model’s development. However, to achieve wider market penetration and environmental goals, this study highlights the need for the government to align subsidies with market dynamics and for residents to increase their environmental awareness. This study outlines actionable strategies for policy-makers, emphasizing the importance of infrastructure improvements and financial incentives in promoting electric mobility. Policy-makers should focus on expanding the network of charging stations to enhance the convenience and viability of EV usage. Additionally, implementing targeted financial incentives, such as subsidies or tax breaks, can lower the cost barrier for potential EV buyers, thereby increasing the attractiveness and adoption of electric vehicles.