Reviewed by: Omaha Beach: D-Day June 6, 1944, and: Utah Beach: The Amphibious Landing and Airborne Operations of D-Day June 6, 1944 Adrian R. Lewis Omaha Beach: D-Day June 6, 1944. By Joseph Balkoski. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2004. ISBN 0-8117-0079-8. Maps. Photographs. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xxi, 410. $26.95. Utah Beach: The Amphibious Landing and Airborne Operations of D-Day June 6, 1944. By Joseph Balkoski. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2005. ISBN 0-8117-0144-0. Maps. Photographs. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xx, 380. $26.95. Utah Beach: The Amphibious Landing and Airborne Operations of D-Day June 6, 1944. By Joseph Balkoski. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2005. ISBN 0-8117-0144-0. Maps. Photographs. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xx, 380. $26.95. Historians have two primary tasks: first, to describe historical events as accurately and comprehensively as possible; and second, to explain change and identify the primary causes for the outcome of a given event. Balkoski succeeds brilliantly at the first task, but all but ignores the second task. In my book, Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory (2001), I took the exact opposite approach. My objective was to explain the outcome of the battle for Omaha Beach, to explain why the Allies attacked and fought the way they did. I all but ignored the first task. Balkoski has provided us with the most comprehensive historical narratives available on the Army's one day, tactical battles for Omaha and Utah Beaches. He has spent a quarter of a century studying the Normandy invasion, collecting oral histories, conducting interviews, examining and collecting primary documents, walking the terrain along the Normandy coast, and conducting battlefield tours. His first book, Beyond the Beaches: The 29th Infantry Division in Normandy, published in 1989, was an excellent study of the Maryland and Virginia National Guard Division that fought under the [End Page 870] operational command of the 1st Infantry Division (ID) at Omaha Beach. (Though disguised, Balkoski is partial towards the 29th ID, particularly the Virginia 116th Regiment, which drew its lineage from the Confederate Stonewall Jackson Brigade). Balkoski's methodology is that of the Army Staff Ride (cf. Jay Luvaas and Harold Nelson, Guide to the Battle of Gettysburg). Balkoski takes a unit that fought at Omaha Beach, describes the unit, its mission and equipment, and identifies key leaders. He then takes the reader to the terrain where a particular action took place and retraces the footsteps of the soldiers who fought there. Using maps he shows the disposition of enemy and friendly forces. He then narrates the action. Finally, he provides the reader with firsthand accounts of what took place. These oral histories are excellent, and Balkoski has one of the largest collections in existence. In many cases he also provides a picture to depict a particular action or piece of equipment. (Balkoski eliminated the first step of the Staff Ride, which was to provide an overview of the entire tactical plan of battle; and the final step, which was to identify alternative courses of action.) Balkoski's work is chronological and sequential, starting with the watery approach; moving to the assault at the water's edge; and tracking the advance of major units across the beaches, over the bluff, and into the towns directly behind the beaches—a period of less than twenty-four hours. He moves back and forth describing the actions of major units. The appendixes are excellent. Appendix one is a breakdown of casualties, the most comprehensive available. No other work provides a more accurate and comprehensive narrative of the battles for the American beaches at Normandy. General comments: Footnotes on works cited would have enhanced the value of these works to future researchers. Maps would have been more effective had friendly and enemy forces been shown in color. The bibliographies are incomplete. Significant works are not cited. Focusing on the Omaha Beach book, the most controversial assault, it is important to say what Balkoski's work is not. It is not a study of combined operations. The British who greatly influenced the overall invasion plan were left out. It is not a study of joint operations. The...
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