American Military Action Research Articles

Killing and Dying for Public Relations

My starting point is the first major American military action in World War II in Europe, “Operation Torch.” The action was controversial because the American military regarded it as militarily useless, if not counterproductive. But the military was overruled by President Roosevelt on the grounds that, while it was not militarily necessary, it was politically justified. This indifference to military necessity seems to violate standard rules about the legitimacy of military force. The larger question it raises is the relation between military concerns and political ones in warfare. Much of this essay explores the relation between these two dimensions in war: the military dimension and the political dimension. I argue that the second dimension is the most important one, as well as the most problematic one for the legitimacy of war. Yet it is ignored by standard just war theories. I then return at the end to consider again the problems raised by “Operation Torch,” and especially the question of the harms inflicted on a country’s own soldiers – in the name of killing and dying for public relations.

A Practice Round for the Inner City: Circum-Caribbean Occupation, Crack Cocaine, and Religious Duty in Louis Farrakhan’s Nation of Islam

Throughout the mid-1980s, the Nation of Islam—via its newspaper the Final Call—condemned American expansion of empire in the circum-Caribbean. Domestically, articles focused on President Ronald Reagan’s War on Drugs, characterizing it as a farce justifying the imprisonment and genocide of Black people. These were not separate thought experiments, however. For the Nation of Islam, the same racist, imperialist justifications served as the basis of both occupations, one foreign and one domestic. American military action abroad was simply a precursor to subjugation of Black America with tanks, guns, and bombs. This article explores this intellectual and internationalist discourse and the real solutions that emerged from it through the Nation of Islam’s Dopebusters program, which fought drugs and violence in Black communities. I argue that these tactics were a religio-political response, combining Islam, Black nationalism, internationalism, and anti-imperial discourses to translate theory and rhetoric into community action.

Student Speech and Social Media: The Supreme Court Finally Enters the Fray

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District was a watershed moment involving the First Amendment free speech rights of students in American public schools. In Tinker, the Supreme Court affirmed that absent a reasonable forecast of material and substantial disruption, educators could not discipline students who wore black arm bands to school protesting American military action in Viet Nam. Not surprisingly, litigation continues on the boundaries of student speech, coupled with the extent to which educators can limit expression on the internet, especially social media. As the Justices finally entered the fray over cyber speech, this three-part article begins by reviewing Tinker and other Supreme Court precedent on student expressive activity plus illustrative lower court cases before examining Levy v. Mahanoy Area School District. In Levy, the Court will consider whether educators could discipline a cheerleader, a student engaged in an extracurricular activity, who violated team rules by posting inappropriate off-campus messages on Snapchat. The article then offers policy suggestions for lawyers and educators when working with speech codes applicable to student use of the internet and social media by pupils involved in extracurricular activities.

The Notorious Ben Hecht: Iconoclastic Writer and Militant Zionist by Julien Gorbach

Reviewed by: The Notorious Ben Hecht: Iconoclastic Writer and Militant Zionist by Julien Gorbach Rafael Medoff (bio) The Notorious Ben Hecht: Iconoclastic Writer and Militant Zionist. By Julien Gorbach. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2019. xxiii + 453 pp. Interwar Hollywood had more than its share of Jewish actors who changed their names and Jewish producers who steered clear of content that might draw attention to their ethnicity. In the early stages of his public career, Ben Hecht, the columnist, novelist and playwright turned screenwriter, seemed to be cut from the same cloth, or worse. His 1931 novel A Jew in Love was awash in stereotypes so grotesque that one prominent critic called the main character "the caricature of the anti-Semite come to life." In reality, Julien Gorbach contends in The Notorious Ben Hecht, he was just "parodying the un-Jewish Jew" (8). Not many people seemed to get the joke. "Outrage cascaded like an avalanche from some quarters of the American Jewish community," Gorbach reports. Rabbis in Cleveland declared they would never allow Hecht to be buried in their city. Hecht replied that he was not troubled to miss out on "an honor nobody I know has ever yearned for" (97). In fact, he seemed to revel in the tumult that his writings often provoked. So how did the iconoclast known for writing the scripts for such blockbusters as Gone With the Wind and The Front Page become a notorious Zionist militant? Hecht's transformation evidently had nothing to do with Judaism or Jewish culture, not his immigrant parents nor his boisterously ethnic extended family. He changed because the world had changed. Hecht looked around in 1939 and was horrified to see Jews around the world under siege and most American Jews seemingly hesitant to respond. Many had "discarded their Jewishness out of the belief that as Jews they could line up only for a snubbing," Hecht wrote (118). His instincts—honed as a gritty crime reporter on the streets of early 1900s Chicago—told him that the Jews needed to answer their persecutors with "a battle cry, rather than moans" (164). In this thoroughly-researched and finely-written study—the first comprehensive scholarly biography of Hecht—Gorbach adeptly chronicles the stages of Hecht's political evolution. It began with his decision to join the Fight for Freedom committee, which on the eve of World War II urged preemptive American military action against Nazi Germany. Polls showed the public overwhelmingly opposed to US involvement in Europe's conflicts, but Hecht never minded being in the minority. Using his dramatist's skills to make his case, Hecht created Fun to Be Free, a three-hour "Mammoth Revue" of patriotic songs, skits and speeches by [End Page 462] stars of Broadway and Hollywood, which played to capacity crowds at Madison Square Garden in 1941. When reports of the mass murder of Europe's Jews were confirmed in late 1942, Hecht joined the Bergson Group, a political action committee that sought to pressure the Roosevelt administration to aid Jewish refugees. Toward that end, he authored another dramatic spectacle at Madison Square Garden, We Will Never Die. The defiant title summed up Hecht's credo. Gorbach recounts Hecht's unsuccessful effort to coax a sympathetic message from the White House to read aloud at the event. The president and his aides feared that calling attention to the slaughter would increase the pressure to open America's doors. For Hecht, that episode was a bitter reminder that before rescuing Jews, he and his comrades first had to "rescue the word 'Jew' from the garbage can" (181). In their public statements about Nazi oppression in 1942–1943, President Roosevelt and other US officials mentioned refugees of various nationalities—but not Jews. Even a White House statement marking the first anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto revolt failed to acknowledge that the fighters were Jews. Whether to focus on Jews or subsume their suffering among that of other oppressed peoples is a debate that did not end with World War II. Hecht addressed the problem the way he knew best—with his pen. In full-page advertisements with headlines such as "Time Races Death" and "They...

Casualties and Public Support for Military Conflict with North Korea

ABSTRACTWhat explains the American public’s support for military conflict with North Korea? Despite increased rhetoric, few analyses address American public opinion or whether priming the public to consider casualties influences their perceptions. The results of an experimental survey design suggest that mentioning the human cost—even without explicit references to American casualties—reduces support for American military action against North Korea but not broader perceptions of North Korea.

Turning Korea Around: An Analysis of Mission Command at Chipyong-Ni

The Korean war, famously euphemized by president Truman as a “police action,” was a near-miss military endeavor for America and the allied forces characterized by international threat, high body counts and unexpected reversals on the battlefield. Military strategy in Korea began with the failed task force smith at Suwon, a movement gen Douglas MacArthur later admitted being an “arrogant display of strength.” Indeed, although Americans had been conditioned by Wii to mount large-scale combat to complete victory, the Truman administration had made significant cuts to defense spending and it was clear early on that the situation in Korea required a new strategy. The U.S. lost 6,000 soldiers in the first few months of the war; south Korean casualties neared 70,000. By September 1950, the tide had changed and American military action, driven mainly by amphibious attack, had succeeded in the steady seizure of Suwon via inch ‘on, resulting in the recapture of Seoul. But not more than two months later an “entirely new war” had emerged with the influx of more than 300,000 Chinese combat troops to aid Kim ill sung and the soviet forces in north Korea. It was a bitter winter for the allies in Korea. Were it not for the exemplary leadership at the battle of chipyong-ni in mid-February 1951, the communist Chinese forces (CCF) would have continued their strong drive into south Korea and the war may well have been lost. Col Paul freeman, commander of the 23rd regimental combat team (RCT), clearly met gen George c. Marshall’s definition of strong leadership and put into action the mission command principles that lead to successful mission completion at chipyong-ni. This battle was truly a major turning point for the U.S. and changed the way we fought future battles.

Strategic Landpower and the Arabian Gulf

Abstract: recent years, a variety of threats have become more ominous for Gulf nations, and these countries have sought to strengthen ties to the United States in ways do not appear to compromise their sovereignty. The US Army has responded through a robust series of military exercises and through the development of regionally aligned forces. Consequently, the Army has played a vital role in meeting a variety of training challenges including preparation for conventional war, counterinsurgency, and missile defense. It has also asserted an important landpower presence in ways reassure local allies and deter potential regional aggressors. ********** The Middle Eastern strategic environment has been especially dynamic in the last decade due to factors such as the 2003-11 X US combat operations in Iraq, the Arab uprisings, and the continuing rise in sectarian tensions and violence throughout a number of regional countries. the midst of these developments, the stability of the region remains of central importance to the United States according to numerous presidents who have enumerated the American in the region. (1) Most recently, President Barack Obama stated US core interests in the Middle East include: (1) safeguarding energy supplies exported to the world, (2) counterterrorism, (3) countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and (4) the defense of Israel and advancement of the Arab-Israeli peace process. (2) Other US leaders have elaborated on the president's views by noting the Middle East will remain vital to the United States even if Washington moves closer to energy independence. (3) this regard, America garners tremendous global influence by using its military forces to guarantee freedom of navigation for the transportation of Persian/Arabian Gulf energy supplies. (4) If the United States relinquished this position, other powers, such as China, could become interested in this role and the global clout it provides. The next decade will be a particularly important era for defining how Washington can best protect its in the Middle East and especially the Gulf region. The legacy of the Iraq war will contribute to this debate since conflict generated significant US public and policymaker concerns about the future use of military force to fight major ground wars and then engage in long occupations, nation-building efforts, and counterinsurgencies. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates represented this view in a particularly straightforward way when he stated, In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the President to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined, as General MacArthur so delicately put it. (5) President Obama underscored Gates's comment by indicating he will seek to avoid using massive conventional military force except in cases involving US national survival interest. (6) This reluctance reflects the current political values of American society and is motivated by the administration's concern about developing open-ended military commitments to support secondary or peripheral in ways that we can no longer afford. (7) Additionally, according to a variety of polls, the general public is extremely wary of getting involved in new Middle Eastern wars in places such as Syria and Iran. (8) Likewise, Arab public opinion remains deeply concerned about future American military action in the region, although US favorability ratings improved beginning in 2011 as the United States implemented its withdrawal from Iraq. (9) Nevertheless, understanding the dangers of military interventions does not allow one to reach the conclusion conventional war and counterinsurgency actions will never again be required. Some challenges to US may not be viewed as immediate threats to national survival, but the long-term consequences such challenges could affect both US global leadership and economic future. …

Diversionary American Military Actions?: American Military Strikes on Grenada and Iraq

Research on potential diversionary uses of military force continues to generate widespread scholarly attention. New measures, novel databases, and an increasing internationalization of this research examine the kinds of targets an American president may strike. Yet in many respects, Levy's insight on research of diversionary military action(s), that quantitative research approaches fail to capture the decision-making dynamics involved in a military action, has generally held true. Current analysts still struggle to develop a consensus on the conditions that help explain a diversionary military action, or whether such military actions ever even occur. Using a diversionary-war model created from previous case-study analyses this research examines American military actions in Grenada in 1983 and Iraq in 1996 to determine whether or not these strikes appear to be diversionary in nature. Our model also employs previous research on diversionary military action to assist in the selection of American military actions, followed by a series of tests to assess various aspects of the decision-making process, international interaction prior to and after the strikes, and the strategic merits for conducting these strikes. Our research generally suggests that neither of these strikes was conducted for diversionary purposes.

On Condition of Contrition: French Reactions to American Films on the Vietnam War, 1978–1987

As the French have assessed American military actions over the past three decades, they have done so within a framework of memories about the Vietnam War. This article considers French memories of that war by examining reactions to American films on Vietnam released in France from 1978 to 1987, from Coming Home and The Deer Hunter to Rambo II and Platoon. Drawing upon reviews from 30 French newspapers and magazines as well as box-office figures and quotes from viewers, it identifies and analyzes patterns in French reactions. It observes a far larger current of French support for America’s war than normally acknowledged, while also noting disagreements among opponents of the war over whether the films expressed sufficient regret and evidence of lessons learned. Although still reluctant to debate their own colonial wars in those years, the French addressed the topic indirectly in discussing Hollywood’s retrospective view of the Vietnam War.

What really happened to the 1960s: how mass media culture failed American democracy

Wherever we turn these days, we encounter reminders of the sixties. They're invoked in presidential campaigns, American military actions, and outbursts of mass protest. We're bombarded with media-saturated anniversaries of iconic events, from JFK's inauguration (and assassination) to urban riots and Woodstock. But as Edward Morgan suggests, these references offer little more than an endless stream of distracting imagery that has more to do with today's politics and economics than with the reality of yesterday's social movements. In his provocative look at mass media's connection with those turbulent years, Morgan simultaneously seeks to explain what happened in the 1960s and what happened to how we remember it. His comprehensive overview and critical analysis reveal how the mass media have shaped the popular image of a raucous decade in ways that have curtailed its promise of democracy. Morgan's in-depth study of social movements and their depictions in corporate America's print media, film, and television helps to explain why the past still provokes deep emotions even antagonism half a century later. He blends history, sociology, political science, media and cultural studies, and critical theory to explain why the 1960s have been so virulently targeted, particularly by critics on the right who blame today's self-indulgent culture on baby boomers and sixties permissiveness instead of the real culprits: consumer-driven capitalism and neoliberal politics. Emphasizing the tensions between capitalism and democracy, Morgan investigates the fate of democracy in our media-driven culture, first by examining the ways that the 1960s were represented in the media at the time, then by exploring how popular versions of the have glossed over their more radically democratic qualities in favor of sensationalism and ideological constructions. He reminds us of what really happened then shows us how the media trivialized and satirized those events, co-opting and commercializing the decade's legacy and, in doing so, robbing it of its more radical, democratic potential. By revisiting this chapter of the past, Morgan shows that it has much to tell us about where we are today and how we got here. Whether you lived through the or only read about them or only saw Hollywood's version of them in Forrest Gump this book will put their lessons in clearer perspective.

American Football, Flags, and “Fun”: The Bell Helicopter Armed Forces Bowl and the Rhetorical Production of Militarism

The Armed Forces Bowl provides a troubling integration of commercial sport and the American culture of militarism. The game features patriotic displays and symbols that have become increasingly central to sporting events during the ‘war on terror,’ represents the first time a military manufacturer has been the official sponsor of a college bowl game, and depends on a ubiquitous rhetoric of ‘‘support the troops.’’ By expanding the familiar conflation of sport and war, the Armed Forces Bowl simultaneously trivializes the seriousness of war as it emphasizes the seriousness of supporting the American military. This rhetorical division offers a delimited conception of appropriate American identity, thereby normalizing war in general and endorsing the ‘war on terror’ specifically. doi:10.1111/j.1753-9137.2009.01046.x There can be little doubt that war is, in part, a rhetorical proposition. In the years since U.S. troops invaded Afghanistan in 2002, rhetorical critics have examined the various dimensions of America’s ‘‘war on terror,’’ largely concluding that it has been characterized by a series of false claims or argumentative failures. These analyses range from Bostdorff’s (2003) examination of the rhetoric of covenant renewal that justified public support of war, to West and Carey’s (2006) critique of the Bush administration’s enactment of frontier justice, to Jamieson’s (2007) account of the faulty evidence used by President Bush in the lead-up to the Iraq invasion in 2003. Most emphatically, Hartnett and Stengrim (2006) define the ‘‘war on terror’’ as an ‘‘operation of deception,’’ through which millions of lives have unjustly been altered. These scholars, and many others, have demonstrated persuasively that American military actions since 9/11 have been highly problematic.

In Search of the Art and Science of Strategic Communication

Abstract : Strategic communication in the Department of Defense clearly has moved forward under the tutelage of Secretary Robert Gates. In a far-ranging speech at the University of Kansas in November 2007, Dr. Gates bemoaned the inability of the United States to communicate to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture. Had the discussion ended there, a legitimate impression may have been conveyed that senior officials in the national security and foreign affairs sectors of the US government still were sorting out how to apply the principles of strategic communication. But on 17 September 2008, Dr. Gates announced a new policy of apologizing for Afghan civilian casualties and offering compensation to survivors even before all the facts were known. There were obvious downfalls to this decision, not the least of which is that the wrong people might be compensated. But perhaps Dr. Gates is demonstrating that he understands the value of a rapid, compassionate response. The policy aim had much less to do with compensation and everything to do with sending a message that the United States cares about the Afghan people. So the Secretary's action closed a proverbial say-do gap and made inroads in the elusive battle of ideas. It was a first but important step in this ongoing and generational ideological struggle. Secretary Gates then changed commanders and strategy in Afghanistan, recognizing the importance, in large part, of the perceptions of the Afghan people regarding American military actions and presence.

The Imperial Warrior in Hollywood: Rambo and Beyond

The Bush years have witnessed the elevated militarization of American society, marked by expansion of the war economy and security state, an aggressive foreign policy, increasing incidents of civic violence, and a media culture saturated more than ever with images and narratives of violence. The trends we identified in our book, The Hollywood War Machine, have only deepened and show no signs of receding. The most successful and widely-viewed films of 2007–2008, including several Oscar candidates, embrace dark images of savage, often relentless violence, graphic depictions of killing, and celebrations of social chaos. We argue that these trends, reflected in the ongoing interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, have dramatically influenced the national psyche. Here we devote special attention to two recent films that embellish strong patriotic and pro-military themes while reaching mass audiences with messages that champion US imperial power: Rambo IV, a particularly bloody recycling of the familiar 1980s Rambo episodes, and Charlie Wilson's War, a cinematic tale about well-intentioned US global designs in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Looking at the four Rambo films as an ensemble, it would be difficult to find a warrior hero better exemplifying the virtues of American military action than Sylvester Stallone, superseding even the legendary John Wayne. This motif converges with yet another—transforming Vietnam into another “good war”—that has shaped an entire cycle of Hollywood films, up to the present, dealing with the Vietnam War.

The Uncertain Future: Sino-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century

Two countries top almost everyone's list of nations that are most important to the United States. One has been a rapidly ascendant power for more than twenty years. The other has only recently begun to recover from the collapse of its empire. One is important because of its size and fast-growing economic and military power. The other's importance is based on its impressive nuclear arsenal, huge petroleum assets, and strategic location. These countries are China and Russia.The United States pursues its relationship with both countries in a bilateral fashion. However, the status of Russia and China's relationship with one another has the ability to dramatically impact the United States' relations with both countries. For example, the Nixon-era cooperation between China and the United States occurred in part because of China's fear of war with the much stronger Soviet Union. By the late 1990s, improved Sino-Russian relations led to a common diplomatic front against a variety of U.S. interests.An Uneasy AllianceA few years later, Russia's move toward the United States after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks was, to some degree, encouraged by Russia's interest in hedging its bets should relations with China sour. By 2007, however, the United States' preemptive war in Iraq and American support of the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine deeply alarmed Russia's national security establishment, which fears further American political or military action in the former Soviet republics-territories in which Russia wishes to be the dominant foreign power. Russia has sought to counteract this trend by drawing closer to China to offset U.S. unpredictability and meddling in former Soviet territory, which many Russians view as their backyard.1 Nevertheless, however bold the Sino-Russian pronouncements on the need for a multipolar world may be, the countries' interaction in other areas reflects caution, if not deep-seated distrust. This wariness will continue to mitigate the intensity of Russia's cooperation with China in opposition to U.S. interests.In formulating U.S. policy toward both countries, it is indispensable to know how the Sino-Russian relationship will evolve-and why.Over the last decade, cooperation between Russia and China has increased dramatically. It now includes military sales, joint military research and development, common diplomatic positions (e.g., Chechnya, Taiwan, U.S. missile defense), nonmilitary trade, and the settlement of border issues. To a large extent, this cooperation was formally codified in the July 16, 2001, Russia-China Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation.2As in previous treaties, (e.g., the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, the 1858 Treaty of Aigun, and the 1860 Treaty of Beijing), this agreement between China and Russia was driven primarily by a mutual need for:(1) Peace on the border. As long as a Sino-American conflict over Taiwan remains a possibility, China does not want to commit the resources necessary to protect its 3,645 km (2,264 mile) border with Russia. For Russia, after the Soviet Union's collapse, Moscow had neither the money nor the desire to station large numbers of troops along its border with China; and(2) Increased trade. In the 1990s, Russia was the only country willing and able to supply China with the sophisticated military equipment and technology it coveted. Additionally, China's shortages of lumber, various ores, and petroleum products were filled through Russian production. This was fully compatible with cash-starved Russia's need to keep key industries, such as aircrafts and lumber, viable through the sale of resources and arms to China.These reasons do not completely explain the rationale for the treaty, however. According to Alexander Yakovlev, a China expert from the Russian Academy of Sciences: Diplomats know any such treaty is always signed with a clear understanding about who is the real adversary. …

Baseball and Dissent: The Vietnam Experience

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Sporting News, speaking for the baseball establishment, editorialized that the sport would do its part the war effort, asserting that in all the history of baseball there never was a conscientious objector or a slacker the ranks. During the early 1950s, Commissioner of Baseball Ford Frick proclaimed that organized baseball would the ideological Cold War as well as the shooting war Korea. Frick insisted that the national pastime would indoctrinate youth on the virtues of democracy and a proud part of our ideal way of life. (1) Such patriotic rhetoric made the case for baseball's inclusion within the national consensus. In a similar fashion, professional baseball embraced the flag after the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Rallying to the refrain of support the the baseball establishment endorsed American military action Afghanistan and Iraq. Games often begin with salutes to the troops, and telecasts often include shots of soldiers the war zone watching their favorite teams. Baseball is portrayed as providing an essential morale function for the troops. Well-compensated professional baseball players are reluctant to challenge this nationalistic hegemony. First baseman Carlos Delgado, however, is a notable exception. During the 2004 season, sportswriters began to notice that Delgado, then playing for the Toronto Blue Jays, disappeared into the clubhouse when Irving Berlin's God Bless America was played. After 9/11, Berlin's tune replaced Take Me Out to the Ball Game many parks, especially Yankee Stadium. Delgado took exception to this practice, arguing that the song was being used to justify American military intervention Iraq rather than to honor the victims of 9/11. Terming the invasion of Iraq as the stupidest war ever, Delgado stuck to his principles, despite jeering and chants of U-S-A, U-S-A when he played Yankee Stadium. (2) Delgado's dissent, however, did not prevent him from signing a four-year, fifty-two million dollar contract with the Florida Marlins 2005. While some Florida complained about Delgado's politics, his new teammates welcomed the acquisition, which they hoped would lead to another World Series appearance for the franchise. The baseball establishment did not appear overly threatened by Delgado's lone dissent. The 1960s and the Vietnam War, however, were another time and place. With dissent permeating the culture, the sport was less tolerant of those who questioned authority or military policy. Baseball officials embraced the Vietnam War, but there was a considerable gap between their rhetoric and actions. Before addressing baseball and dissent during the Vietnam era, it is necessary to briefly examine how the sport responded to World Wars I and II, as well as the conflict Korea. The United States entered World War I the spring of 1917, but the conflict did not immediately impact the sport. Lacking the drama of a triggering event such as Pearl Harbor, ballplayers did not flock to the colors. It is often forgotten that there was considerable opposition to the war and conscription among working-class Americans. Baseball owners attempted to demonstrate their patriotism by raising funds to purchase athletic equipment for servicemen. But any expectation that the game might remain exempt from manpower needs was crushed May 1918 when the government issued a work or fight order. The order established July 1 as the deadline by which young men nonessential industries, such as baseball, would become eligible for the draft. To complete the season, baseball officials were able to get Secretary of War Newton Baker to extend the deadline until the first of September. Major League Baseball concluded its 1918 season on Labor Day, followed by the World Series between the Boston Red Sox and Chicago Cubs. After the season, players either obtained jobs factories producing war-related products or joined the military. …

The Precarious Lives of Animals

There never was human, there never was life, and no murder has, therefore, ever taken place. Judith Butler, Precarious Life, 147 In Precarious Life, Judith Butler explores Levinasian ethics, or what she calls Jewish ethics of non-violence.1 Arguing against Israeli violence to Palestinians, for instance, and against American military action in Middle East-violence often justified by evocations of sufferings of Jews, on one hand, and 9/11 on other-Butler writes of ethic which: wrought precisely from that experience of suffering, so that itself might stop, so that something we might reasonably call sanctity of life might be honored equitably and truly. fact of enormous does not warrant revenge or legitimate violence, but must be mobilized in service of politics that seeks to diminish universally, that seeks to recognize sanctity of life, of lives. (103-04) Following Levinas, Butler argues that moral authority derives from other's which, Butler stresses, is not exclusively human face. Rather, whatever says thou shall not kill. As Butler emphasizes, this thou shall not kill need not be spoken in human language: So strictly speaking, does not speak, but what means nevertheless conveyed by commandment, Thou shall nol kill.' It conveys this commandment withoul precisely speaking it. (132) Instead of speaking, may be cry, sob, scream. It an utterance, that not strictly speaking linguistic, a scene of agonized (133), the wordless vocalization of suffering ( 134). The face, Buller continues, we are to put words to its meaning, will be that for which no words really work; seems to be kind of sound, sound of language evacuating its sense, sonorous substratum of vocalization that precedes and limits delivery of any semantic sense. (134) As Butler also goes on to argue, this cry may also be silent, evoked simply by site of body, by back or shoulder blades, or by bent neck, as in example of Levinas's. Of this Butler writes: Indeed, this conception of what morally binding not one that I give myself; it does not proceed from my autonomy or my reflexivity. It comes to me from elsewhere, unbidden, unexpected, and unplanned. In fact, it tends to ruin my plans, and if my plans are ruined, that may well be sign that something morally binding upon me. (130) Although question of animals in philosophy of Levinas matter of ongoing debate, Butler seems to present Levinasian theory in light which most amenable for including non-human animals within sphere of our responsibility.2 Why else would Butler stress sanctity of all lives, or insist that need not be human that cry need not be made in human language, and that sheer site of body or cry of pain enough to address us? These qualifications are not necessary to argue against violence to Palestinians, Afghans, and Iraqis, given that these subjects have human faces and speak human languages. By arguing against exclusively human interpretation of face and ethical address, Butler seems to be setting stage to be able to claim-or to allow others to claimthat cries of animals in slaughterhouses, sight of their struggling bodies as they are dragged to their deaths, of their silent, corporeally-expressed grief as they live out their brief lives in factory farms, fur farms, and laboratory cages, address us with command: thou shalt not kill, and that we must respond to this command, even if it ruins our plans-our plans for dinner, for profit, for research, for fashion, for entertainment, for sport. In fact, however, such claim not among Butler's aims in Precarious Life. …

A weak pillar for American national security: The CIA's dismal performance against WMD threats

American preemptive or preventive military action against WMD-armed adversaries in the future will simply not be feasible without high-quality and timely intelligence. But is American intelligence up to this load-bearing task for the post-11 September national security? This article surveys the Central Intelligence Agency's record of gauging potential WMD threats for more than a decade and assesses its overall performance as dismal. The CIA's recent intelligence debacle against Iraq was one of the greatest in a long series of failures that has publicly exposed the Agency's profound weaknesses. These intelligence failures were due in large measure to the CIA's poor human intelligence collection and shoddy analysis, areas that cannot be remedied alone by the creation of the new Director of National Intelligence post. This article recommends steps needed to increase the quality of intelligence produced by CIA, or elsewhere in the new intelligence community, to move American intelligence in lockstep with military transformation to give the Commander-in-Chief realistic options for countering hostile nation-states or terrorist groups seeking or acquiring WMD.

Fahrenheit 9/11. Dir. by Michael Moore. Miramax Films, 2004. 122 mins.

Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11 deserves special attention. It is the highest-grossing and perhaps the most-watched documentary film on a political subject in American history. The production, which cost only $6 million to make, topped $100 million in earnings by early August 2004, and sales of videos and DVDs are expected to raise the gross to much higher levels. Fahrenheit 9/11 has become arguably the most controversial American-made documentary. In the weeks after its release, supporters and critics debated its merits and flaws vehemently. Some praised Michael Moore for delivering a hard-hitting, gutsy interpretation of recent events. Others lambasted him for juxtaposing evidence unfairly and delivering propaganda, not history. Fahrenheit 9/11 is especially provocative for three reasons. It raises serious questions about the rationale for American military action in Iraq. The documentary also presents President George W. Bush in a strongly unfavorable light. Finally, Fahrenheit 9/11 draws attention to the plight of Americans and Iraqis who have been physically and mentally harmed by the war.

"Infamy" and Other Legacies

Like many people who ought to have known better, chose to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of America's most famous military disaster by taking my family to see Jerry Bruckheimer's execrable movie Pearl Harbor (2001). It wasn't a complete waste of time. About halfway through, we got our money's worth. The audience, eyes glazed like a franchise doughnut after slogging through ninety minutes of possibly the least interesting love story in cinema history, was rewarded with a battle sequence that ranked among the wildest ever filmed. The fact that the navy permitted director Michael Bay to blow up ten actual warships while recreating Japan's surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet headquarters contributed immeasurably to the scene's visual impact, but Bay deserved some credit, too; his skill at orchestrating epic disaster spectacles, already demonstrated in Armageddon (1998) and Bad Boys (1995), was once more in evidence, and stood in customary contrast to his ineptitude with dialogue and character development. One image in the attack scene was genuinely haunting, as rescuers attempted to cut through the hull of the capsized battleship Oklahoma with an acetylene torch; several hands reached up through the narrow incision made by the torch, groped frantically, and then went limp as water levels rose within the ship and the trapped sailors drowned. For a moment, Pearl Harbor succeeded in making its title something more than a cliche. But then screenwriter Randall Wallace spoiled everything-at least the historians in attendance-by having the character of Danny (played by Josh Hartnett) bark into a telephone: I think World War II just started! That asinine line underscores a key point in Emily S. Rosenberg's book A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory: for most Americans, the historical narrative of World War II often begins with the Pearl Harbor attack, establishing American military action as reactive and defensive (p. 15). Obviously, the citizens of other belligerent nations do not share this historical narrative. As Rosenberg notes, [t]he attack on Pearl Harbor ... is

The Delphi method, impeachment and terrorism: Accuracies of short-range forecasts for volatile world events

Two experiments examined the effects of iterated polling and feedback on prediction accuracy for volatile world events using the Delphi paradigm. In both experiments, participants predicted rapidly changing geopolitical events. The first experiment occurred during the litigation surrounding the Clinton/Lewinsky affair in 1998. Results indicated that feedback improved individual and group accuracy for predictions of whether an event would occur. These types of predictions derived from group consensus were approximately 90% accurate, which was significantly higher than the average individual participant's accuracy. Neither polling nor feedback had much effect on time course predictions. The second experiment occurred during the American military action against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. In Experiment 2, participants were polled three times to determine if increasing the number of iterated polls would improve Delphi accuracy. The results showed that accuracy improved from the first to the second poll but not from the second to the third. The groups predicted whether these scenarios would occur with approximately 75% accuracy, which was significantly higher than the accuracy of any individual participant. Once again, the Delphi procedure did not enhance time course predictions in Experiment 2.