American Foreign Policy Decision Research Articles

Turning Apolitical To Stay Political: Billy Graham, Evangelical Religion, And The Vietnam War

This essay explores the intersection between Evangelicalism and foreign policy in the con text of the Vietnam War. As a handle into the topic, it focuses on examining how Billy Gra ham, a prominent religious actor, negotiated the public sphere and private halls of power in order to influence politics, and specifically the American foreign policy decision to inter vene in Vietnam. More than just a religious figure, Graham was a political actor who was able to adapt to a changing political climate by shrewdly turning to an apolitical message in the public sphere in order to sustain his political role in the private sphere. Within the White House, Graham practiced a unique and masterfully subtle style of ‘friendship politics.’ He cultivated a level of intimacy with President Johnson and Nixon unmatched by any other re ligious leader at that time and often leveraged this connection to influence foreign policy. By examining the political maneuvers of a man at the forefront of Evangelical Christianity, this paper aims to shed light on how a religious group sought to find, and found, its way into the White House, a platform that was used to nudge diplomatic decisions towards the Calvary. the peter tomassi essay

So much to lose: John F. Kennedy and American policy in Laos

Before U.S. combat units were deployed to Vietnam, presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy strove to defeat a communist-led insurgency in Laos. This impoverished, landlocked Southeast Asian kingdom was geopolitically significant because it bordered more powerful communist and anticommunist nations. The Ho Chi Minh Trail, which traversed the country, was also a critical route for North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam.In So Much to Lose: John F. Kennedy and American Policy in William J. Rust continues his definitive examination of U.S.-Lao relations during the Cold War, providing an extensive analysis of their impact on US policy decisions in Vietnam. He discusses the diplomacy, intelligence operations, and military actions that led to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, signed in Geneva in 1962, which met President John F. Kennedy's immediate goal of preventing a communist victory in the country without committing American combat troops. Rust also examines the rapid breakdown of these accords, the U.S. administration's response to their collapse, and the consequences of that response.At the time of Kennedy's assassination in 1963, U.S. policy in Laos was confused and contradictory, and Lyndon B. Johnson inherited not only an incoherent strategy, but also military plans for taking the war to North Vietnam. By assessing the complex political landscape of Laos within the larger context of the Cold War, this book offers fresh insights into American foreign policy decisions that still resonate today.

Hannah Arendt and the War in Iraq

Using Hannah Arendt's theory as a template, this essay analyzes American foreign policy decisions that led to the Iraq war. Obviously, Arendt would find the misinformation concerning links between Iraq and al-Qaeda to be problematic, as well as the unjustified allegation of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the Bush administration sought to justify the war in roughly two other ways: the liberation of the people of Iraq from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and the need to stabilize the region by providing a model for democracy in the Middle East. One may wonder whether Arendt would support the administration's actions for these other reasons, as Arendt was worried about the emergence of nuclear weapons and certainly was against dictatorships in favor of governments that support the public freedom of the people. However, I argue that Arendt's overall political theory would not support the war and may, in fact, give us reasons to believe that it will not produce a fully functioning democracy in Iraq. In conclusion, I will contrast the Bush administration's method to the Arab Spring, which Arendt would more fully support, if the outcome focuses on writing and adopting Constitutions that secure freedom for the people involved.

Climate Change Decisions: International Influences on Argentina's Foreign Policy Decision Making

This paper aims to contribute to both environmental and Latin American foreign policy decision making literatures, both of which are comparatively underrepresented areas of study. Specifically, it analyzes the factors affecting former Argentine President Carlos Saul Menem when he chose to join the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 and, thus, the international climate change regime. President Menem made a bold announcement that his country would voluntarily reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, a pledge well beyond what was required of the developing nation (as prescribed by the Protocol). This paper suggests that international factors, specifically Menem’s desire to align his nation with the United States, critically influenced the president’s decision, thereby advancing the argument that in this instance international (and individual), and not domestic factors, determined the president’s behavior. The paper concludes with a discussion of the boarder implications of the importance of international variables in the decision making processes of Latin American leaders and environmental foreign policy.

The Lessons of September 11, Iraq, and the American Pendulum

Political Science QuarterlyVolume 122, Issue 2 p. 207-238 The Lessons of September 11, Iraq, and the American Pendulum CHRISTOPHER HEMMER, CHRISTOPHER HEMMER CHRISTOPHER HEMMER is an associate professor of international security studies at the Air War College and is the author of Which Lessons Matter? American Foreign Policy Decision Making in the Middle East, 1979–1987.Search for more papers by this author CHRISTOPHER HEMMER, CHRISTOPHER HEMMER CHRISTOPHER HEMMER is an associate professor of international security studies at the Air War College and is the author of Which Lessons Matter? American Foreign Policy Decision Making in the Middle East, 1979–1987.Search for more papers by this author First published: 15 February 2013 https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2007.tb00597.xCitations: 1 AboutPDF ToolsExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume122, Issue2Summer 2007Pages 207-238 RelatedInformation

Resurrecting Empire

Written at a critical historical juncture of Arab-western relations, Khalidi’stext provides a refreshing and informed account of western intervention inthe Middle East. It stresses the catastrophic human and political consequencesof western colonial adventures in the region and the neglect of thishistorical experience by current American foreign policy decision makers.Although written primarily for a non-academic, American audience, it is auseful and important text on contemporary Middle East history.Accessible and highly readable, it provides insights into a series ofmajor issues currently relevant to the study of the Middle East: democracy, oil, Palestine, and Iraq. The first chapter provides an account of westerncolonialism’s social, political, economic, and cultural legacy wrought on theMiddle East. Beginning with a brief introduction to the American march towar with Iraq, the author establishes an approach employed throughout thetext: juxtaposing the historical western colonial experience with theAmerican invasion and occupation of Iraq. Locating western involvement inthe Middle East within the context of the Ottoman Empire’s decline, Khalidihighlights the differential systems of colonial rule imposed on the region.Throughout, he emphasizes the indigenous resistance to colonialism, thusarguing against Orientalist discourses of indigenous acquiescence and subservienceto the supposed benevolence of colonialist rule. Two importantpoints emerge: first, that the political structures imposed by the colonialregimes have persisted, and second, that the region’s political cultureremains deeply rooted in the anti-colonial experience. This experience –entirely conditioned through European involvement in the region – meantthat for many, the United States never experienced the same political andcultural hostility as Europe. Throughout the cold war, however, the UnitedStates’ image as a disinterested outside power began to give way to an imageof the United States as a significant power broker in the region with manyinterests, and, most importantly, few objectives compatible with the politicaldesires of the region’s peoples ...

Which Lessons Matter?: American Foreign Policy Decision Making in the Middle East, 1979–1987. By Christopher R. Hemmer. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000. 217p. $17.95 cloth, $55.50 paper.

At least since Ernest May's influential (1973) ‘Lessons’ of the Past, students of American foreign policy have been conscious of the powerful hold that some analogies seem to have on the minds of decision makers. All of us can think of “Munich” and “Vietnam” as shorthand for a whole series of judgments that we rely on to work through the maze of foreign policy calculus. In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attack in September 2001, we heard reference to “Pearl Harbor.” And we can now anticipate that “9-11” will take its place as a marker for a set of lessons concerning the struggle against terrorism.

Virtual Regime: A New Actor in the Geopolitical Arena

American foreign policy decision makers altered their understanding of the sovereign territorial state on September 11, 2001. The loss of lives and property in New York City, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania reversed America's general belief that the oceans and superpower status guaranteed “home security.” That dramatic act of violence against civilians and symbols of U.S. culture crystallized the distinction between the ideologies of democracy and terrorism, which in turn forced geopolitical horizons to expand beyond traditional thinking.

Which lessons matter?: American foreign policy decision making in the Middle East, 1979-1987

Which lessons matter?: American foreign policy decision making in the Middle East, 1979-1987

“Bureaucratic Bargaining”: An American Foreign Policy Simulation

The complexities of the governmental machinery and personal perceptions involved in the formulation of American foreign policy are difficult for students to comprehend from the confines of the classroom. Beginning students often enter the study of international relations/political science with a simplistic view of policy making. They tend to accept a priori what Graham Allison (1971) calls the “rational actor model” in which students “package the activities of various officials of a national government as action chosen by a unified actor, strongly analogous to an individual human being.” Students often believe that foreign policy is set by a cohesive group of individuals who share common goals and preferences. The additional tendency to anthropomorphize the state leads undergraduates to write papers in which nation-states are portrayed with such diverse human qualities as sympathy, cruelty, greed, and aggression.Modern scholarship on decision making has expanded beyond this traditional view to encompass differing variables. There is an ongoing debate in the discipline as to what is the most potent variable in American foreign policy. One group of scholars contends that the bureaucratic or role variable is more important. While agreeing that role is a powerful restriction, particularly at the lower levels of the bureaucracy, other scholars argue that the individual perceptions and beliefs of policy makers are more important in the decision-making process.Given the complicated nature of this debate, a creative way to expose beginning students to American foreign policy decision making is through a simulation. Simulations are useful for the study of the decision-making process because the standard lecture-discussion format, which provides a linear overview of the subject, does not adequately communicate the complex structure and multiplicity of factors in operation.

Congressional Voting On the Nuclear Freeze Resolutions

This study compares the relative utility of ideology, party, presidential support, and regionalism in understanding congressional voting on several nuclear freeze proposals in 1982 and 1983. Both ideology and presidential support provide good explanations for freeze voting over these years, whereas region and party prove to be relatively less important. Because both types of models are so closely related, and because both seem to be tapping an underlying ideological dimension, it is difficult to distinguish fully between them. Nevertheless, this analysis suggests that the ideological models (as measured by ADA scores) prove to be more parsimonious than the presidential support models (as measured by support for President Reagan). On balance, this research provides additional evidence for the importance of ideology in understanding critical American foreign policy decisions.

Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1898–1968: A Test of Interpersonal Generalization Theory

Whether personality characteristics of American leaders crucially determine major American foreign policy decisions has been a matter of considerable disagreement. A test of two hypotheses drawn from interpersonal generalization theory shows such influences have probably been crucial in a number of cases in American foreign policy between 1898 and 1968. In 49 cases of intraelite disagreement on force-related issues and 13 cases of intraelite disagreement on inclusionary issues the direction of disagreement could be predicted in over 75 percent of the cases by knowledge of individual differences in interpersonal relations. A four-fold speculative typology suggests fundamental personality-based differences in orientation towards America's preferred operating style and role in the international system (e.g., introverts are drawn toward impersonal principles and mechanisms like balance of power–or in an earlier period to international law).The evidence implies that one source of war and hard-line foreign policy is the structure of self-selection and recruitment to high office in the American political system. As well, the systematic tendency to self-expressive personalization in major foreign policy decisions probably increases the rate of error of American elites.