American Civil-military Relations Research Articles

Civil–Military Relations During the Trump Administration: Rejection of Military Professionalism and the Deterioration of Civil–Military Relations

The period of Donald Trump’s term in office was one of the most contentious periods of American civil–military relations. Both active-duty and retired officers rebuffed and castigated the president’s actions, policies, and character. Such public criticism of a sitting president has no real parallel in American history. This breakdown in civil–military relations was caused by the president’s lack of respect and in fact disdain for the contours of military professionalism. Those contours are expressed by the attributes of expertise, corporateness, and responsibility. The military’s notion of commitment to the Constitution, an apolitical ethos, as well as its willingness to sacrifice for the national good were all part of the military’s own sense of professional values. In this case, the sitting president shared none of those values and tried to politicize the military, ignored their expertise, and disparaged their selfless sacrifice.

American Civil–Military Relations and Presidential Power of Removal

Under what conditions are presidents more likely to remove senior defense officials from office? Using a novel data set of all senior U.S. defense officials, both civilian and uniformed military from 1947 to 2021, this article explores whether anticipated support in Congress, partisan factors, or institutional protections for the military affect observed patterns of removal for defense officials. The results suggest that presidents are more likely to remove their own appointees (or their co-partisans’ appointees), but provide little evidence that presidents premise removal on anticipated partisan support for a replacement nominee in Congress. Moreover, the results suggest that military officials may have some insulation from politicization by strong forms of removal, though that protection may weaken an important aspect of civilian control of the military, the threat of punishment by removal, raising profound questions for how civilian control endures.

“We Don’t Negotiate with Terrorists”—Afghanistan, Bargaining, and American Civil–Military Relations

The United States government’s inability to view the conflict with the Taliban through the lens of the bargaining model of war was a fundamental element of its failure in Afghanistan. This problem was reinforced by a dysfunctional civil–military relations shaped by Samuel Huntington’s theory of objective control, resulting in the military pursuing campaigns of attrition that fit its organizational preferences but did not advance civilian political goals. These issues are evident in three different moments during the War in Afghanistan where the U.S. failed to seize an opportunity that could have changed the result of the conflict.

American political divide under the dilemma of American civil-military relations

In recent years, a series of manifestations of American political divide have aroused widespread concern in the international community. Tracing the source and analyzing the extent of American political divide are important issues, closely related to the security and stability of the international community. As an important part of American political system, the performance of American civil-military relations shows the state of American political system in a concentrated manner. Based on historical reviews and current comments of American civil-military relations, it can be concluded that although American politics has shown divisions, American political system is relatively stable.

Tarnishing victory? Contested histories & civil–military discord in the U.S. Navy, 1919–24

ABSTRACTAs the First World War came to an end, the U.S. Navy's leadership engaged in a bitter fight over the “lessons” of the war. Admiral William S. Sims and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels fought against each other's irreconcilable positions. Sims argued that the Navy Department's inexpert civilian secretary had hamstrung mobilisation, impeded the anti-submarine campaign, and ostracised capable officers in favour of friends upon whom he bestowed medals. Daniels countered that his administration had masterfully responded to the crisis of war. The Navy's record, Daniels insisted, could best be summarised as “a great job greatly done.” Only disloyal nit-pickers could find fault in its accomplishments. The Sims-Daniels controversy raged in congressional hearings, the press, and in partisan histories written by the protagonists. The heart of the dispute and its uncertain resolution rested in radically different understandings of American civil–military relations, naval heroism, and the determinants of victory.

Cyber Operations, Legal Secrecy, and Civil-Military Relations (book chapter in Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations, Lionel Beehner, Risa Brooks & Daniel Maurer, eds. (2020))

Civil-military relations in cyberspace are under-studied. So too are the roles at their intersection played by law and secrecy. To illuminate the nexus of these matters and to spur additional thought and policy action, this chapter makes several observations and recommendations. First, salient aspects of cyberspace make civil-military relations in the realm of digital national security operations especially challenging, uncertain, and consequential. Second, the two most powerful masters of the military in the American constitutional system – the Congress and the President – have in recent years given the military expansive authority for operations in a realm where it is unusually difficult for civilians and elected officials to monitor and appraise their performance. A reported classified order by President Trump appears to be consistent with his administration’s broader effort to drive responsibility for national security decisions down the chain of command. That is, away from suits and toward uniforms, and away from the Executive Branch’s electorally accountable Commander in Chief and toward agencies. Third, the public record indicates that the military is gaining its greater authority in cyberspace in meaningful part through legal secrecy – via the use of unpublished legal authorities. Such “secret law” is both useful and inherently problematic in a republic, as I have explored in depth elsewhere in my scholarship. Fourth and finally, this chapter argues that Congress is right to be engaged on cyber operations. But Congress should be doing more than delegating authority. It should also exercise its constitutional prerogatives to write rules that govern and regulate cyber operations in ways that expressly account for the challenges in transparency, technical familiarity, and civil-military relationships these operations inevitably raise.

Civil-Military Relations and Military Missions in Contemporary Latin America: Argentina's Sinuous Path Towards a Democratic Defense Policy (2011-2016)

After three decades of democratic reforms, the literature on Latin American civil-military relations has shifted its focus from the military towards civilian elites. Following this trend, this article offers a contribution to the study of the 'civilian variable' by examining two controversial decisions taken by Argentina since 2011: the empowerment of an army official who gained influence over key areas of national defense; and the involvement of the armed forces in anti-drug operations. While the literature often relates setbacks in the deepening of democratic control to the autonomy of the armed forces and right-wing ideologies, and the assignment of public security missions based on practical necessity, we argue that the case of contemporary Argentina confounds such interpretations. First, we claim that both decisions are better understood as the products of instrumental political strategies. That is to say, these decisions are taken in pursuit of short-term goals with the objective of maintaining particular civilian elites in power, and are often unrelated to questions of the effectiveness or otherwise of democratic defense policy. Second, against widespread acceptance in the literature of the trend towards greater involvement of the armed forces in the fight against crime, we argue that shifts in military missions in the region have alarming implications for democracy.

Why “Best Military Advice” is Bad for the Military—and Worse for Civilians

This article contends that “best military advice” is a problematic construct for both the military and civilians alike. Yet, the increasing resonance of this construct across the Joint Force cannot—and should not—be summarily dismissed. Instead, it merits reflection about why the term has grown in popularity, how its continued use is influencing the development of defense strategy, and perhaps above all, how it will affect American civil-military relations. As best military advice infuses the U.S. military, it will increasingly become normalized and held up as desirable, particularly among the younger generation. Short of serious near-term steps to neutralize this construct, its deleterious influence will only increase.

Discovering the Fault Lines in American Civil–Military Relations

This essay is in response to Thomas Crosbie and Meredith Kleykamp’s article that investigates relationships between what they consider to be three fault lines in the American military profession: ethical lapses, expertise, and identity. As they explore the literature to contemplate how professionalism might help to prevent ethical lapses, they also seek to reveal relationships between lapses, military expertise, and identity. To enhance the relevance of their research, it is recommended that they examine ethical lapses more broadly. Their core subject is American civil–military relations, which is a complex, contentious, and often ambiguous topic. They can mitigate the ambiguity by developing a clear problem statement and a set of research assumptions. In addition, because not all lapses are treated the same, they can be categorized to identify more serious lapses, which will allow for a focused examination of institutional responses to the lapses. Also, integrating other academic approaches such as political science and history into their research will improve the theoretical and explanatory power of their investigation. Adopting these and other aspects of inquiry will support the testing of their six hypotheses and improve our understanding of the military profession.

美國小布希總統時期的文武關係（2001-2006）

This study discussed the civil-military relations in the United States during George W. Bush's presidency（2001-2006）and focused on civilian control, notions and fulfillment of military professionalism. The key points included American civil-military relations theories, wars and military transformations led by civilians, civilian leadership styles, conflicts between the civilian and military top rankings, criticisms on civilian leaderships by retired generals, and reviews of civil-military relations theories. Civilian and military conflicts originated primarily from disagreements and arguments regarding military operation planning and executions in the Afghan and Iraqi wars after 911, and from dissatisfactions with Donald Rumsfeld's（then Secretary of Defense）leadership style from the generals. The changes in civil-military relations has several implications:（1）The norm theory of civil-military relations and the notions of civilian control were challenged again;（2）The armed forces became ＂partisan＂ and subjected to increasing political influence;（3）Civilian control often overpowers the military during war time, resulting in increased pressure of transformation; and（4） Civilian control remains the central belief and tradition of American civil-military relations. Tension and conflicts may occur; however, American civil-military relations generally resemble a dynamic balance.

Principled Agents: The Role of Service Culture in American Civil-Military Relations

This article joins a robust literature in confronting an enduring dilemma of organized politics: who guards the guardians—and how? Building on an agency theory of civil-military relations, this article introduces a new way to think about the American military and its civil-military relationships. Traditional agency theory offered a strong and flexible approach for evaluating the relative strength of civilian control over the military. A principled agent framework takes the argument further by expanding the scope of when, what, and who. A temporal expansion reveals the subtle bargaining interactions between the advising and executing phases of a policy. A contextual expansion shows the importance of considering the broader policy ecosystem when evaluating the quality of military compliance. And a service-level expansion demonstrates the powerful impact of service culture on American civil-military outcomes. The four services tend to act as principled agents, making sense of policy ambiguity through their own cultural logic. After explaining the mechanics of the argument and summarizing the core cultural beliefs of the four services, the article uses two historical vignettes to illustrate elements of the framework in action. It concludes by highlighting implications for practitioners and citizens alike.

Dissent, Resignation, and the Moral Agency of Senior Military Professionals

This short article answers the question of whether, in the context of current American civil–military relations, senior military professionals may loyally dissent from a decision by civilian authorities, even including by resignation. Stated another way, can their constitutional duties to obedience to civilian authority ever clash so severely with their responsibilities to their profession and its fiduciary trust with the American people that dissent is obligated. The position offered here is that senior military professionals always retain the moral agency for such dissent. It inheres in their role as a steward of an American military profession exercising the discretionary judgments that are the moral core of their professional work.

Introduction to Symposium

This Armed Forces & Society symposium on the ethics of senior officer resignation in the United States includes a collection of four papers, each looking at principled resignation in different ways. Two authors, Dubik and Snider, believe principled resignation of senior military officers is sometimes justified, especially in wartime, where their inherent morals clash with their professional demands; these senior officer’s ability to resign in protest distinguishes their service to this nation between stewards and servants. Conversely, Feaver and Kohn believe principled resignation is almost never justified as this action weakens the military profession and ultimately threatens national security. Further, the disastrous effects increase the ever present friction and mistrust in the civil-military process. Each author answers the question in the context of current American civil military relations and it is their hope that this symposium will lead to further discussions, research, and policies regarding the ethics surrounding the issue.

Toward a Theory of Civil–Military Punishment

This article addresses a significant question in American civil–military relations: under what conditions will civilian principals punish military leaders for shirking? In order to inductively derive a theory of civil–military punishment, the authors examine two cases of military shirking where there is little doubt that insubordination occurred. The first case the authors analyze is Douglas MacArthur’s insubordination under Harry Truman during the Korean War, and the second is Colin Powell’s scuttling of Bill Clinton’s plan to allow homosexuals to serve openly in the military in late 1992 and early 1993. This analysis indicates that two factors are linked to civil–military punishment. First, the salience of the issue at stake determines whether he or she decides to punish shirking. The second factor linked to punishment is whether or not the civilian has the military’s support to pursue punishment.

General McClellan and the Politicians Revisited

Along with Newburgh Conspiracy of 1783 and Harry Truman's tangles with Douglas MacArthur during Korean War, George B. McClellan s problematic career as general during Civil War is frequently held up as one of great episodes of tension, if not crisis, in history of American civil-military relations. (1) In 1987, British scholar Brian Holden Reid published an essay in journal titled General McClellan and Politicians, in which he provided an insightful and compelling discussion of events and forces that shaped McClellan's dealings with Washington during his tenure in command. (2) In decades since appearance of Reid's essay, though, rich body of literature has appeared on both Civil War and subject of civil-military relations. It seems worthwhile to revisit subject of Reid's essay and consider what insight outpouring of recent theoretical literature on civil-military relations may offer on how we think about McClellan's dealings with Washington during his time in command. By far most famous and influential concept in field of civil-military relations is one Samuel Huntington advocated in his landmark work Soldier and State. This concept, which Huntington labeled civilian control, has become so ubiquitous that political scientist Eliot A. Cohen has labeled it normal theory of civil-military relations. The essence of objective civilian control is recognition of autonomous military professionalism, Huntington declared, professionalizing military, by rendering them politically sterile and neutral ... ready to carry out wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within state.... antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics, he added, notion fundamentally out of place in society in which division of labor has been carried to point where there emerges distinct class of specialists in management of violence. In conduct of war, Huntington advocated clear division of responsibility between political leader, whose job is to define broader policy ends for which wars are fought, and military man, whose job is to manage military means provided for achieving those ends. (3) In truth, Huntington simply gave label to concept that had informed attitudes toward civil-military relations for as long as militaries had been viewed as distinct from other governmental institutions. Huntington was correct, though, in his observation that appeal of idea received decided boost from increased specialization of labor that accompanied market and industrial revolutions of nineteenth century and gave rise to concept of professionalism in various fields. As historian John Shy noted, during nineteenth century, the modern military profession emerged in Western societies, with rationalized recruitment, education, promotion, retirement, staff systems--all features of separate, specialized of technicians, increasingly distinct from civilian world. Among forces that both drove and reflected development was prominence enjoyed by writings of Baron Antoine Henri Jomini. Jomini's effort to indentify and articulate principles to guide priesthood of technicians in conduct of war, writes Shy, fostered mindset that anticipated Huntington's concept of objective control by giving this emergent profession ... prestige of science as well as rationale for professional claim to autonomy.... lesson was clear: government should choose its ablest military commander, then leave him free to wage war according to scientific principles. (4) Yet, as Carl von Clausewitz noted, war is an activity whose inherent complexities make it exceedingly problematic to establish hard and fast principles for how it is to be conducted. This is especially case in relationship between military and political leaders, for war is, Clausewitz observed, never an isolated act separate from politics but rather a true political instrument, continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. …

Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil‐Military Relations – By Jason K. Dempsey

Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil‐Military Relations – By Jason K. Dempsey

American civil-military relations today: the continuing relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's The soldier and the state

Fifty-five years after it was first published, Samuel Huntington's The soldier and the state remains an essential starting point for serious discussions of American civil—military relations. In part this is due to the boldness and ambition of the author. Huntington brought theory to a research area that had suffered from too little theorizing and then went on to formulate concepts that scholars and practitioners of civil—military relations still find useful. These include: the conceptualization of the military as a profession; the articulation of the two central forces shaping the nature of military institutions as the functional and the societal imperatives; and the formulation of subjective and objective control as the two main patterns of civilian control. This review article briefly revisits these concepts and argues that they retain utility in illuminating important issues in American civil—military relations today. It also argues, however, that Huntington's contributions were productive but not perfect. Some of his specific definitions, such as the content of military expertise, are debatable. Some of his central concerns, such as whether the United States could sustain a strong military over an extended period of time, are no longer central today. Finally, in some places the literature has moved beyond what Huntington offered. The best example is the ongoing debate over how the country's political leaders and its most senior military officers should interact. It is precisely on this point that Huntington's objective control is the weakest. While The soldier and the state certainly does not deserve uncritical acceptance, it does continue to merit a fair hearing. Current discussions of American civil—military relations are likely to be more reasonable and productive if Huntington is given a voice.

Public Security Forces with Private Funding: Local Army Entrepreneurship in Peru and Ecuador

In Latin America's young democracies, actors in the private sector may infl u- ence military security work through resource transfers, with implications for state ac- countability and democracy in the region. This analysis fi nds that in Ecuador and Peru local army commanders—who frequently decide when and where army operations are conducted—make decisions not according to technical evaluations of security require- ments but rather on the basis of how much local clients pay. The article's local political economy perspective enables us to identify client infl uence, even in cases in which cli- ent and national security interests overlap. The study also helps bridge two literatures: research on Latin American civil-military relations, which has devoted a great amount of attention to military autonomy vis-a-vis the government without systematically ana- lyzing third-party infl uence on armed forces, and scholarship on security privatization, which has examined such third-party fi nancing but without underscoring the fact that clients can engage with the military directly, bypassing the national government. Following military rule in Latin America (1970s-1990s), the region's armed forces have largely returned to the barracks to focus on security work, and yet there is a dearth of analysis of what missions these militaries perform and who benefi ts from the missions. This article fi nds that by buying militaries' services, actors other than the national government can affect the behavior of Latin Amer- ican armed forces. Through an in-depth look at the Ecuadorian and Peruvian armies, the study shows that army unit commanders—who decide when and where army operations are conducted—make decisions not drawing on their technical evaluations of security requirements but rather in response to local cli- ent payments, mainly from private companies in extractive industries. The ar- ticle's local political economy perspective enables us to identify client infl uence, even in cases in which client and national security interests overlap. The study helps bridge two literatures: research on Latin American civil-military relations,

Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations

Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations

Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil–Military Relations. By Jason K. Dempsey. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. 288p. $70.00 cloth, $26.95 paper. - American Civil–Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era. Edited by Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009. 409p. $65.00 cloth, $34.95 paper.

Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil–Military Relations. By Jason K. Dempsey. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. 288p. $70.00 cloth, $26.95 paper. - American Civil–Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era. Edited by Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009. 409p. $65.00 cloth, $34.95 paper.