Alyeska Pipeline Service Company Research Articles

Advance Fast Water Spill Response Tactics

ABSTRACT Alaska rivers and streams present many distinct challenges for spill response due to the remoteness of the environment of the 800 miles of Trans Alaska Pipeline traverses through Alaska. The Glacial and non Glacial streams and rivers seasonally produce current velocities that vary from 2 ft/s to 12 ft/s for operating conditions to respond to the event of a spill that may potentially enter them. Alyeska Pipeline Service Company has 5 different programs that the Emergency Preparedness Compliance Team actively employs. These Programs have contributed to developing innovative advanced fast water booming containment and recovery tactical responses to potential oil spill scenarios. These programs are the Pipeline C-Plan Equipment & PM Committee, Pipeline Training Academy, Exercise and Lessons Learned, Vessel Operating Committee, and LPS Safety Programs that affect Oil Spill Response. These programs have a strong focus on safety. The development of faster boom has increased the capability of booming extremely fast water that was not achievable in the past. The further development of midstream anchoring systems and shoreline anchor systems has advanced the capabilities of booming rivers that were previously not achievable. There are difficult challenges of fast water river systems that do not present slow or back water eddies for containment and recovery. They have now become achievable using partial deployment of portable light weight dams across a small segment of the river profile to produce these opportunities for recovery. Helicopter slinging operations using the Harbour Buster System to remote rivers of Alaska have also proven to be effective and tested for response capabilities. The techniques used are equally applicable to all regions of the world and have been presented to a network of OSRO's. The presentation will present the development of empirical data gathered from different river velocities and conditions. Using this research data will help predict and calculate boom requirements in each unique condition for Operations and Task Forces in tactical response. Profiling river hydrology is essential to the success of containment and recovery. The profiling assessment will identify key elements for operational and tactic decisions in choosing the optimal location for making diversion and containment boom sets for recover efforts for spill response.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF SAFETY SUCCESS

ABSTRACT Since 1995, through 2002 the Combined OSHA recordable rate for Alyeska Pipeline Service Company and its contractors working on the Trans Alaskan Pipeline System (TAPS) has ranged between 1.66 and 2.12 recordable accidents per 200,000 labor hours. (The eight year average is 1.95.) This recorded rate ranked the TAPS workforce near the bottom-third in safety performance of liquid pipeline carries in the nation. In 2002 Alyeska Pipeline Service Company developed a safety training course for managers and supervisors. As a part of their performance measure, Alyeska required all of its managers and supervisors to attend this training in 2003. The Fundamentals of Safety for Supervisors and Managers provides a base philosophy and concepts to the key fundamentals required to understand and manage Safety on TAPS. The course is comprised of 18 modules. Each module covers a particular aspect of safety management and provides supervisors and managers with the skills, knowledge, and desire to lead their workforce in achieving an injury-free environment. This is done through developing strong leadership, promoting Alyeska's core values and safety culture in all parts of the company and striving to continuously improve our safety performance. Fundamentals of Safety modules focus on making Safety Management practical for Supervisors and Managers; focusing more on the why than the how. In 2003, the combined OSHA recordable rate for TAPS was cut in half, resulting in 0.86 accidents per 200,000 labor hours. This paper will discuss how the principles taught in the Fundamentals of Safety training can help response organizations prepare their workforces—especially the managers and supervisors—in advance of an emergency response.

Near-Field Ground Motion of the 2002 Denali Fault, Alaska, Earthquake Recorded at Pump Station 10

A free-field recording of the Denali fault earthquake was obtained by the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company 3 km from the surface rupture of the Denali fault. The instrument, part of the monitoring and control system for the trans-Alaska pipeline, was located at Pump Station 10, approximately 85 km east of the epicenter. After correction for the measured instrument response, we recover a seismogram that includes a permanent displacement of 3.0 m. The recorded ground motion has relatively low peak acceleration (0.36 g) and very high peak velocity (180 cm/s). Nonlinear soil response may have reduced the peak acceleration to this 0.36 g value. Accelerations in excess of 0.1 g lasted for 10 s, with the most intense motion occurring during a 1.5-s interval when the rupture passed the site. The low acceleration and high velocity observed near the fault in this earthquake agree with observations from other recent large-magnitude earthquakes.

Ice Detection and Avoidance

ABSTRACT An extensive risk assessment of oil transportation in Prince William Sound, Alaska was finalized in 1996 that identified drifting icebergs, from Columbia Glacier, as one of the most significant oil spill risks remaining to be addressed. The Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council (PWS RCAC) was a major participant in this risk analysis. As part of the groundwork for the ice detection project, PWS RCAC has also sponsered extensive studies of Columbia Glacier calving and drift patterns, iceberg size and distribution. A collaborative project, called the ice detection project, was developed by a multi stakeholder working group and provides an opportunity for an immediate and long-term solution using existing technology. One objective of the project is to verify the efficiency, effectiveness and reliability of existing radar technologies to provide mariners and the United States Coast Guard with real time information regarding ice conditions. A secondary objective is to promote the research and development through field testing of new and emerging technologies to determine the possible enhancement of conventional radar. In addition to PWS RCAC, stakeholders responsible for spearheading this project are: Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, Oil Spill Recovery Institute, United States Coast Guard, Prince William Sound Community College and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Each of the seven participants brings expertise and backing from the stakeholder they represent. The site chosen for the ice detection radar project is Reef Island (illustration 1), located adjacent to Bligh Reef, Prince William Sound. This location is ideal because of its proximity to Columbia Glacier, the source of the icebergs, as well as providing an unobstructed view of the shipping lanes. A fifty foot tower was installed at the site during the fall of 2001 and a conventional radar system is currently being configured for installation. The expectation is that the system will be up and running by July of 2002, giving real time information on ice in the tanker lanes to mariners in Prince William Sound. A second field test of an UHF radar prototype is planned for the summer of 2002. Field testing and ground truthing of the radar system is scheduled for the next five years.

Alyeska Pipeline Service Company's Response Training Program

ABSTRACT In January 2000, the Alaska Statewide Oil and Hazardous Substance Incident Management System workgroup, convened under the auspices of the Alaska Regional Response Team (ARRT), submitted standardized spill response management guidelines to the ARRT These guidelines lay out minimum training needs of personnel in a variety of spill response positions including both those in the field and the Incident Management Team. These guidelines were established after extensive workgroup actions designed to comprehensively and accurately capture response information. This paper will examine these guidelines through a look at Alyeska Pipeline Service Company's Ship Escort Response Vessel System (SERVS) training standards and preparedness. It will show how SERVS and other Alyeska training requirements meet and/or exceed the recommendations of the ARRT-sponsored guidelines. The paper will explore the various avenues of training offered by Alyeska, including classroom instruction, on-the-job training opportunities available for employee development, and outside training classes/courses to which Alyeska has sent its employees. The paper will frame these discussions within a description of the minimum qualifications required for each position. As a key contributor to the guidelines, Alyeska Valdez Business Unit has used the guide to streamline its response training program. The training program set up by the Alyeska Business Unit compares very favorably to the statewide ARRT-recommended training levels by function and management level after an exhaustive review of our training processes. The paper will review how this training review process factors in prior work and training equivalencies into the Alyeska Valdez Business Unit program, promoting personnel assignment flexibility and efficiency. Through this discussion of the elements of the Alyeska Valdez Business Unit training program and a comparison of the program to the ARRT guidelines, the reader will have a better understanding of the tools required to develop a comprehensive spill prevention and response training program, while considering the inevitable pressures of resource and time constraints on that program.

THE GRAPHICAL RESOURCE DATABASE: FOUNDATION FOR GEOGRAPHIC RESPONSE PLANS

ABSTRACT Geographic Response Strategies (GRSs) proliferating in the Prince William Sound and Kodiak Island, Alaska area are relying increasingly on the Graphical Resource Database (GRD) sensitive resources maps. GRD allows response planners to select GRS sites from thousands of miles of remote, highly sensitive shoreline. GRD consists of a stand-alone Geographic Information System (GIS) containing maps, photos, and thousands of records contributed by 15 state and federal agencies and two citizens' regional councils. GRD addresses the Southcentral Alaska coastline centered on Prince William Sound and stretching 800 kilometers from the Copper River to Kodiak Island. Alyeska Pipeline Service Company in Valdez maintains the database as a GIS. Alyeska distributes annual updates on 500-megabyte CD-ROMs to more than 40 public and industry response-planning groups.

EVOLUTION OF A WORLD-CLASS TANKER ESCORT SYSTEM

ABSTRACT The Ship Escort Response Vessel System (SERVS) of Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska) in Valdez Alaska is responsible for overseeing the prevention, preparedness, and response activities for the safe transportation of oil through Prince William Sound. Since the inception of SERVS in 1989, escort vessels have accompanied laden tankers through Prince William Sound from the Valdez Marine Terminal to the Gulf of Alaska, a distance of approximately 70 miles. The tankers pass through the pristine Prince William Sound, which encompasses over 2,500 square miles, with fjord-like topography and a subarctic climate. The evolution of the tanker escort system began with the emergency order issued by the state of Alaska in 1989 immediately after the grounding of the Exxon Valdez. A fleet of 12 vessels, each singular in purpose, was quickly developed: three dedicated pairs of escorts (comprised of an escort response vessel and tug), response barge standby vessels, and four dedicated docking tugs. The emphasis was more on oil spill response than prevention, and there was little interchangeability between vessels and their missions. In subsequent years, a variety of factors has caused changes to the escort system and vessel mix. These included the Disabled Tanker Towing Study, Prince William Sound Risk Assessment Promulgation of Federal Escort Requirements, oil spill response responsibility in the Gulf of Alaska, tanker vapor recovery, reduction in pipeline throughput, and weather restrictions. Additionally, industry instituted voluntary measures such as ice scouts and sentinel standby escorts for inbound tankers in ballast have affected the escort system, in addition to the experience gained in the operation the system. As the escort system matured, there was a marked emphasis and focus on oil spill prevention, fleet modernization, and multipurpose vessels to increase capabilities while maximizing efficiencies. Alyeska/SERVS embarked on a dedicated strategy to upgrade the specialized vessel fleet of 12 vessels to a fleet composed of fewer multipurpose vessels. This strategy encompassed a technological and operational enhancement of the fleet, significantly improving the prevention posture while maintaining the necessary response capabilities. Today, the Alyeska/SERVS escort fleet consists of nine multipurpose vessels. The cornerstones of the escort fleet are the two 10,192 horsepower Voith Schneider enhanced tractor tugs and the three 10,192 horsepower ? drive Prevention and Response Tugs, all specifically designed, constructed, and outfitted for tanker escorting. The combination of these vessels for tanker escorting utilizes complimentary best available technology to ensure the safe transit of tankers through Prince William Sound.

Citizens and Industry Working Together To Make Oil Transportation Safer

ABSTRACT The Prince William Sound Regional Citizens Advisory Council (RCAC) is an independent non-profit corporation promoting the environmentally safe operation of the Alyeska Marine Terminal in Valdez, Alaska, and associated oil tankers. RCAC's work is mandated by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and guided by a contract with Alyeska Pipeline Service Company. Conflict is inherent in the relationship of citizens, industry, and government. The priorities of the citizens and those of the oil industry are fundamentally different and sometimes directly opposed. Such differences do not preclude citizens, industry and government from sharing environmental objectives. Joint projects have been especially successful in promoting effective working relationships between citizens, industry and government. Since 1990, RCAC has participated in several projects with the oil industry and government agencies on a wide range of issues including oil spill drills, disabled tanker towing, a tanker risk assessment, non-indigenous species invasions in waterways, and marine fire response capabilities. When stakeholders develop and manage a project together, disagreements can be identified and worked out early. This can minimize conflict and lead to common ground. Ten years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, citizens, industry, and government are working together in Alaska to make oil transportation safer.

Integrated Incident Management System

ABSTRACT The North Slope of Alaska Oil Operators—ARCO, (Alaska), Inc.; BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc.; and Alyeska Pipeline Service Company—and their governing agencies—Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)—currently use some form of the Incident Command System (ICS) to manage oil spill incidents and exercises. Although the ICS principles are similar, the structure, terminology and forms are diverse. The North Slope operators and regulatory agencies in Alaska are “thinking out-of-the-box” these days with the development of a new, all hazards, systems to maximize the use of resources on the North Slope. The new integrated Incident Management System (IMS) was designed to offer benefits such as standardized processes, forms and nomenclature, integrated organizational structures, common management/training, enhanced interactions, shared learning's, central coordination, standard Emergency Operation Center layouts, and access to equipment and personnel.

ICS-It's More Than a Two-Dimensional System

ABSTRACT Spill management is a critical component in successful response to any incident. Today's world of response utilizes variations of the Incident Command Systems (ICS) to successfully perform this piece. The success of spill management is based, in part, on detailed contingency planning and in size, responding time frames, and potential complexity of the incident command organization brought together for the event. There are specific requirements for the regulatory and response teams to accomplish, but what is not well described is how these team systems work together. ICS components are practiced in large drills and real responses by Alyeska Pipeline Service Company for its crisis management and implementation of the Prince William Sound Tanker Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan. This type of spill training plays an important role in validating the viability of ICS. The exercises showcase a multifaceted ICS organization that can best be described in three dimensions. Understanding the interrelationship of these dimensions to the overall ICS management team and response operations is critical for success. This paper describes the ICS system as used for the Prince William Sound crude oil TAPS trade and employed by Alyeska; the multi-dimension of a large working system and provides some examples of interactions that might occur.

LFL estimates for crude oil vapors from relief tank vents

AbstractIn 1970, the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company was formed to manage the design, costruction, operation and maintenance of the Trans‐Alaska Pipeline System. The 800 mile long pipeline carries crude oil from Prudhoe Bay on the North Slope to Port Valdez on Prince William Sound. There are 11 pump stations located along the pipeline, each of which is equipped with a crude oil relief tank. Because of the potential flammable nature of the crude oil vapors being vented from the tanks, Alyeska wanted to determine the region surrounding the tanks within which the lower flammable limit (LFL) could be exceeded. Because numerical models cannot accurately model the flow near structures, especially for dense gases (as is the case here), wind tunnel modeling was conducted to provide more accurate distance to LFL estimates. The wind tunnel model simulations were also used to judge the effect of various modeling parameters (i.e., site specific configurations, release scenarios and meteorological conditions), and to assist in possible future refinements to numerical models. Field observations were also obtained at one of the pump stations for the purpose of validating the wind tunnel modeling. The project, wind tunnel scaling methods, experimental methods, concentration measurement results, distance to LFL estimates and comparison between the field and wind tunnel observations are described in this paper.

WILDLIFE RESPONSE IN A REMOTE ALASKAN SPILL: TESTING A CENTRALIZED SYSTEM

ABSTRACT In 1991 the International Bird Rescue Research Center, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, and Alaska Clean Seas teamed up to design and implement a wildlife response system that could work successfully in a state with an area of nearly 600,000 square miles, more than 6000 miles of coastline, and hundreds of islands. In a state that is spread over more than 15 degrees of latitude and 45 degrees of longitude, the system would need to work in all sorts of weather and at all times of the year in three major climatic zones (marine coastal, subarctic, and arctic). It was decided that the best way to maximize resources and coverage was to design a system with a centralized oiled wildlife rehabilitation center in Anchorage: the Alaska Wildlife Response Center. This would allow one to use resources that would otherwise be unavailable in a timely fashion in many of the areas at greatest risk for an oil spill. It would also maximize cost effectiveness by minimizing the amount of equipment and personnel that would have to be moved and supported in remote areas of the state. A centralized system would, however, potentially require that the affected wildlife be transported long distances to be rehabilitated. In February 1996, a spill off the north coast of St. Paul Island in the Bering Sea provided the first real test of this system. It required the capture, stabilization, and transport of nearly 200 oiled birds under quite difficult and typical Alaska conditions. This paper will discuss the problems and solutions encountered in mounting a wildlife response to an oil spill in a remote area with inclement weather conditions and few local resources. It will focus on what makes responding in Alaska different from responding in most other parts of the United States, and on what was done differently in this response to make it a success. This paper will show how a system based on a centralized facility can work successfully, as was evidenced by the high percentage of released wildlife, when it involves teamwork among all organizations, agencies, and individuals involved.

The Alyeska Pipeline Service Company

The Alyeska Pipeline Service Company

DEPLOYMENT TEST FOR ALYESKA, GPS-POSITIONED DRIFTER BUOY

ABSTRACT The field test of a free-floating buoy system (the Oil Tracker) was conducted for the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company on November 15–17, 1994. During those three days, several buoy deployments were conducted in varying weather conditions. The Oil Tracker buoys transmitted their positions to both the response vessel and the command center in Valdez in real time.

The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Controversy: Technology, Conservation, and the Frontier by Peter A. Coates

TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 437 The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Controversy: Technology, Conservation, and the Frontier. By Peter A. Coates. Bethlehem, Pa.: Lehigh University Press; Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1991. Pp. 447; illustra­ tions, notes, bibliography, index. $57.50. There are pipes and then there are pipes. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAP) must rank as one of the most monumental pipes in the history of the world. From Prudhoe Bay to Valdez, the TAP measures 800 miles in length. About half the pipe is elevated, and half buried in the ground as it wends its way south, forging over the Brooks Range before descending across the Yukon River past Fairbanks and then climbing over the Alaska Range before disgorging itself at Valdez, the now infamous port on Prince William Sound. At one point there were more than 28,000 workers out there in the wilderness, making the 100,000 welds it took to connect the joints of this tubular monster that now cuts the nation’s largest state in half like a Mississippi River of steel. That pipe was built by the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, a consortium made up of this world’s largest and most powerful oil companies, including ARCO, Humble, and BP. It was finished in the summer of 1977, and since then we have heard little about it, that is, not until 1989, when a drunken ship captain grounded his tanker, the Exxon Valdez, on a reef, turning the Alaska coast black with oil. What is there to say about a pipe? A good deal indeed, judging from this thick volume written by Peter Coates. To be fair, Coates’s book is about more than just the TAP. In an effort to put the pipeline in historical perspective, Coates takes us back to the 19th century, to the time when the United States first acquired Alaska. Then the narrative moves forward in time to look at the role of technology and conserva­ tion in the history of the state. He covers the history of the Rampart Dam, which was never actually built, and of Project Chariot, a plan by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to use nuclear explosives to blow a hole at the mouth of Ogotoruk Creek (over 100 miles north of the Arctic Circle) in order to turn the area into a harbor. Edward Teller— that tireless promoter of the control of nature—told an audience in 1959 that, if the AEC wanted to, it could “dig a harbor in the shape of a polar bear” (p. 121). Although the harbor was never built, when it comes to Alaska, Americans have tended to think big and arrogantly. And it was precisely this philosophy—that we can indeed do what we want with the natural world—that seems to have informed the TAP project from the start. Coates aims to use the pipeline controversy to uncover the meaning of the frontier forAlaska and forAmerican history more generally. What he finds is that supporters and defenders of the pipeline project (and the other technological projects that were planned for the state) invoked the rhetoric of the frontier to advance their respective causes. So Spiro Agnew, in defending the pipeline, recalled how we had 438 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE conquered the American West and its frontier back in the 19th century. Alaska was simply the logical extension of that frontier, and it too needed to be conquered. That promoters of the pipeline and others used such frontier rhetoric is not by itself all that surprising. Frontier ideology has long occupied a place at the center of American culture. Thus the book left me feeling rather disappointed. One is hard-pressed to say exactly what Coates is trying to tell us. This is because the book lacks a coherent focus. Coates’s foray into Alaska conservation history leading up to the TAP is not sufficiently well connected with the story of the TAP controversy itself. What is the real meaning and historical lesson of the pipeline project? It is difficult to say what Coates’s answer would be, but his emphasis on the frontier is not entirely misguided. He just does not go far enough...

THE IMPACT OF REGULATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF OIL SPILL RECOVERY VESSELS

ABSTRACT Past, present, and future regulations have imposed and may continue to impose serious and unnecessary restraints on the design, construction, and operation of oil spill recovery vessels (OSRVs). OSRVs have been regulated as tankers under 46 CFR Subchapter D regulations. The application of these regulations to the design and construction of the Clean Sound Cooperative's Shearwater and the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company's Valdez Star and other vessels through the design approval and inspection processes of the American Bureau of Shipping and United States Coast Guard illustrate some of the problems. Present regulations do not encourage the development of new OSRVs. The regulations regarding OSRVs should be reevaluated. Committees of OSRV designers and users as well as regulators should evaluate comments and recommendations before incorporating them in the design of new OSRVs.

EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY: THE CITIZEN OVERSIGHT COUNCIL AS A MEANS OF MITIGATING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF TERMINAL AND TANKER OPERATIONS

ABSTRACT In 1987, a handful of people from the small fishing community of Cordova, Alaska, coalesced around concern over the risks of oil-related pollution and oil spills in Prince William Sound posed by the trans-Alaska pipeline terminal and tanker operations in neighboring Valdez. The Cordova group sent an emissary to Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, which operates the Valdez Marine Terminal on behalf of its seven oil company owners. The emissary asked Alyeska to consider forming a citizen group to advise Alyeska on environmental issues of local or regional concern. Alyeska listened but rejected the idea. In March 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef. Alyeska's owners, acting principally at the behest of majority owner, British Petroleum, soon effected sweeping change in Alyeska's management. The change in management, with Jim Hermiller as president, produced a change in Alyeska's attitude toward the citizen advisory group proposal, and not long afterward Alyeska formed the Alyeska Citizen Advisory Committee. Over the next year that group evolved into what is now called the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council, or RCAC. The Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council is a national experiment in providing citizens a voice in corporate decisions that affect them and their communities. This paper recounts the story of RCAC's formation and evolution, the group's mission under both federal law and its contract with Alyeska, and the hallmarks of its achievements and challenges to date.

Intra-industry environmental disclosures in response to the Alaskan oil spill: A note on legitimacy theory

According to the legitimacy theory arguments of Preston & Post ( Private Management and Public Policy, Prentice-Hall, 1975), social disclosures can be viewed as a method of responding to the changing perceptions of a corporation's relevant publics. Based on this theory, this paper examines the effect of the Exxon Valdez oil spill on the annual report environmental disclosures of petroleum firms other than Exxon. A significant increase in such disclosures is found. Furthermore, the amount of change is shown to be related to firm size and ownership in the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company. The results therefore support the legitimacy theory arguments.

The Alyeska Tactical Oil Spill Model

An innovative oil spill model system for the Prince William Sound region, a model developed for Alyeska Pipeline Service Company is described. The model system includes modules to simulate the surface and subsurface movement of oil, the tactics, operational constraints, and effectiveness of spill response (dispersant, mechanical cleanup, and burning), and the environmental impact of the spill on the biota of the Sound. The model system is impelmented in a personal computer workstation environment with a graphical interface including mouse-driven menus, color overlay mapping, and animations of model predictions. A commercial database system is employed to organize and present information on spill response resources, shoreline types, and biological resources. Water surface, water column, and shoreline biota are included in the biological database, as are critical habitats for these organisms. A mesoscale meteorological model, which explicitly includes orographic effects, is employed to predict wind fields. A three dimensional hydrodynamic model estimates the tide, wind and density induced circulation.

Homing of Transplanted Alaskan Brown Bears

Homing of Transplanted Alaskan Brown Bears