Allocation Of Decision-making Authority Research Articles

"When in Rome, do as the Romans do: Subsidiary Autonomy as a Response to Corruption Distance"

Research on the HQ-subsidiary relationship that has studied the allocation of decision-making authority within the HQ-subsidiary dyad (i.e. subsidiary autonomy) in relation to the local context has...

One Voice or Many? The Political Question Doctrine and Acoustic Dissonance in Foreign Affairs

A common theme in foreign affairs law is the importance of the US speaking with “one voice” to the international community. Speaking with one voice, so the story goes, ensures that the US is not embarrassed by multiple, inconsistent pronouncements from the several states or the different branches of the national government when it takes a position on a foreign affairs issue. Such acoustic dissonance from the US could potentially result in a loss of credibility, a reduced capacity to achieve foreign policy goals, and a greater chance of conflict with other countries. So, when the Constitution is unclear about the allocation of decision-making authority on an issue, but the President or the national government speaks first, the presumption in favor of speaking in one voice reduces the possibility of multiple governmental decision makers and permits the US to act clearly and decisively in foreign affairs. While it reduces acoustic dissonance, the presumption in favor of one voice has two other effects as well: the centralization of foreign affairs decision making in the federal government vis-a-vis the states and centralization of foreign affairs decision making in the President vis-a-vis Congress.

One Voice or Many? The Political Question Doctrine and Acoustic Dissonance in Foreign Affairs

A common theme in foreign affairs law is the importance of the US speaking with “one voice” to the international community. Speaking with one voice, so the story goes, ensures that the US is not embarrassed by multiple, inconsistent pronouncements from the several states or the different branches of the national government when it takes a position on a foreign affairs issue. Such acoustic dissonance from the US could potentially result in a loss of credibility, a reduced capacity to achieve foreign policy goals, and a greater chance of conflict with other countries. So, when the Constitution is unclear about the allocation of decision-making authority on an issue, but the President or the national government speaks first, the presumption in favor of speaking in one voice reduces the possibility of multiple governmental decision makers and permits the US to act clearly and decisively in foreign affairs. While it reduces acoustic dissonance, the presumption in favor of one voice has two other effects as well: the centralization of foreign affairs decision making in the federal government vis-a-vis the states and centralization of foreign affairs decision making in the President vis-a-vis Congress.

Delegation and Consultation with Contingent Information

We study strategic communication between a principal and an agent when both have private information that collectively determines the principal's optimal decision. The principal's possession of decision-relevant information makes the agent uncertain how her report influences the principal's decision. The agent's expectations regarding the principal's information and the relationship between the parties' information affect both the informativeness of communication from the agent and the allocation of decision-making authority when the principal has the option to consult the agent or delegate to her.

Minors and biomedical research in Singapore

This paper examines the challenges of enrolling minors in biomedical research that does not offer participants any prospect of direct benefit. It does so in the context of the current Singapore regime for the protection of research subjects, and seeks to evaluate if this is adequate for the task. In the process, it reviews appropriate Commonwealth and US precedents, regulatory instruments and guidelines that bear on three main issues raised by such research, and makes some recommendations on how they might be better addressed: first, the protective ceilings of risk prescribed beyond which minors may not be exposed to. Secondly, the allocation of decision-making authority and processes employed before a minor is permitted to enrol in such research. Finally, the particular regulatory oversight mechanisms that are needed to improve ethical and legal compliance.

Genetic testing in children.

In this article, the author focuses on the allocation of decision-making authority between parents and physicians. She argues that parents should have substantial room to decide whether genetic testing is good for their child and that they may appropriately consider interests in addition to those of their child in making such choices. A physician, however, may refuse to act pursuant to parental views about testing, when in the physician's view, the parents' choices would pose a risk of significant harm to the child. The balance of control between parents and physicians is illustrated by discussion of a series of case vignettes. Refusal to perform requested testing is most often warranted for testing for carrier status and for genetic predisposition to late onset disease. The author concludes her analysis by discussing why it is appropriate to give increasing deference to the views of the child as the child grows older.