This book examines, in the setting of Bangladesh, domestic, regional and international factors in the rise of militant politics by parties and organizations that use Islam. The author offers several explanations—a domestic political environment that is favourable; the weakness of some Bangladeshi state institutions in certain geographic areas; a popular glorification of militancy; and material support given to the militant institutions by kindred organizations outside Bangladesh. The author attributes the foreign interference to a sort of proxy war between India and Pakistan, insurgency through porous borders from India and Myanmar. Looking at future trajectories of militancy, the author wonders if Bangladesh, with its limited resources and fragile democratic institutions, can fight the militants on its own. The book's argument is premised on three claims: first, that these clandestine groups, despite having little support from the general public, are a threat to public life, national security and the future of the country; second, that the militant groups have access to arms and military training and are supported by a political network; and third, that a proper understanding of the political and ideological challenge posed by the Islamists will assist in the forging of an appropriate response. And it is presented with three methodological caveats: first, the nature of the militants’ operations makes it difficult to collect and verify information about these groups, to identify the sources and their veracity in published accounts, along with the ethical constraint of maintaining the anonymity of various interviewees belonging to government and political organizations. Secondly, there was the problem, intensified in a highly politicized and partisan media environment, of making sense of misinformation about the principal actors. Third, there was the problem of assessing the number of organizations and their cadres in militant activities.