Albert Breton Research Articles

Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe (Eds.), Competition and Structure: The Political Economy of Collective Decisions: Essays in Honor of Albert Breton

Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe (Eds.), Competition and Structure: The Political Economy of Collective Decisions: Essays in Honor of Albert Breton

Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe (Eds.), Nationalism and rationality.

Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe (Eds.), Nationalism and rationality.

Albert Breton, Competitive governments: An economic theory of politics and public finance.

Albert Breton, Competitive governments: An economic theory of politics and public finance.

Are Discriminatory Procurement Policies Motivated by Protectionism?

KyklosVolume 49, Issue 1 p. 47-68 Are Discriminatory Procurement Policies Motivated by Protectionism? Albert Breton, Albert BretonSearch for more papers by this authorPierre Salmon, Pierre Salmon University of Toronto, Department of Economics, 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1, Canada, Universite de Bourgogne, Faculté de Science économique, 4 boulevard Gabriel, 21000 Dijon, France. For helpful comments and suggestions, we are grateful to Jean Magnan de Bornier, Michel Mougeot, Martin Paldam, participants at the European Public Choice Society Meetings, European Economic Association Congress and Séminaire Jean Bénard (Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), as well as to an anonymous referee. We are of course solely responsible for the shortcomings. We are also grateful to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for its support.Search for more papers by this author Albert Breton, Albert BretonSearch for more papers by this authorPierre Salmon, Pierre Salmon University of Toronto, Department of Economics, 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1, Canada, Universite de Bourgogne, Faculté de Science économique, 4 boulevard Gabriel, 21000 Dijon, France. For helpful comments and suggestions, we are grateful to Jean Magnan de Bornier, Michel Mougeot, Martin Paldam, participants at the European Public Choice Society Meetings, European Economic Association Congress and Séminaire Jean Bénard (Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), as well as to an anonymous referee. We are of course solely responsible for the shortcomings. We are also grateful to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for its support.Search for more papers by this author First published: February 1996 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1996.tb01384.xCitations: 23 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume49, Issue1February 1996Pages 47-68 RelatedInformation

Nationalism and Rationality

List of contributors and discussants Introduction 1. Rights, rationality, and nationality James S. Coleman 2. Self interest, group identity Russell Hardin 3. Some economics of ethnic capital formation and conflict Ronald Wintrobe 4. Ethnic clubs, ethnic conflict and the rise of ethnic nationalism Roger D. Congleton 5. The re-emergence of secessionism: lessons from Quebec Stephane Dion 6. Nationalism revisited Albert Breton and Margot Breton 7. Notes on the political economy of nationalism Ronald Findlay 8. Conservative nationalism and democratic institutions Jean-Dominique Lafay 9. Can economics explain nationalism? Ugo Pagano 10. The economics of socialist nationalism: evidence and theory Mario Ferrero 11. Regulating nations and ethnic communities Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry 12. Nations competing against themselves: an interpretation of European integration Pierre Salmon Index.

Equity and Efficiency in Economic Development: Essays in Honour of Benjamin Higgins

The ideological foundations of the contributors range from personalized neo-Marxism, through extreme centre neo-Keynesianism, to hard-line neoclassical mathematical economics. Despite this diversity there is a surprising degree of consensus. No contributor advocates centralized planning and none expects a free market to cure all economic ills. Opinions vary as to how well the market actually works, but all agree that equity and efficiency are essential goals which most consider to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. In the concluding chapter it is suggested that current economic problems are caused not so much by government intervention as by the nature of that intervention. The authors believe that the recent ideological convergence may lead to a new paradigm, a theory of the optimal blend of market and management that will be flexible enough to deal with the varying conditions of diverse societies, thus simplifying the task of creating a smooth-running global economy. The contributors are Irma Adelman, Mark Blaug, Kenneth Boulding, Irving Brecher, Albert Breton, John S. Chipman, Andre Gunder Frank, Martha Fuentes Frank, Niles Hansen, Murray C. Kemp, Robin Marris, Richard Musgrave, Walt Rostow, Donald J. Savoie, Nicholas Spulber, and Paul Streeten. Higgins himself contributes a chapter on basic concepts and collaborates with Donald Savoie on the final chapter.

An Economic Approach to Communist Regimes

KyklosVolume 45, Issue 3 p. 393-406 An Economic Approach to Communist Regimes He Yong, He Yong Researcher of CNRS and Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne. I am extremely grateful to JeaN Benard for his guidance during my doctorial research. I want to acknowledge Jean-Dominique Lafay, Albert Breton, Gerard Duchene, Louis levy-Garboua, Pierre Salmon, Barbara Krug, George Gallais-Hamonno, Ronald Wintrobe and Basudeb Chaudhuri for their inspiring suggestions and comments. I also thank the anonymous referees of this review for their useful suggestions to improve this paper.Search for more papers by this author He Yong, He Yong Researcher of CNRS and Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne. I am extremely grateful to JeaN Benard for his guidance during my doctorial research. I want to acknowledge Jean-Dominique Lafay, Albert Breton, Gerard Duchene, Louis levy-Garboua, Pierre Salmon, Barbara Krug, George Gallais-Hamonno, Ronald Wintrobe and Basudeb Chaudhuri for their inspiring suggestions and comments. I also thank the anonymous referees of this review for their useful suggestions to improve this paper.Search for more papers by this author First published: August 1992 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1992.tb02123.xCitations: 1 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume45, Issue3August 1992Pages 393-406 RelatedInformation

A comment on the papers by Thomas Courchene and Albert Breton

A comment on the papers by Thomas Courchene and Albert Breton

The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct: An Economic Analysis of Competition, Exchange, and Efficiency in Private and Public Organizations.

Journal Article The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct: An Economic Analysis of Competition, Exchange, and Efficiency in Private and Public Organizations Get access The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct: An Economic Analysis of Competition, Exchange, and Efficiency in Private and Public Organizations. By ALBERT BRETON and RONALD WINTROBE. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Pp. xi + 195. £15.00.) P. M. Jackson P. M. Jackson University of Leicester Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 93, Issue 372, 1 December 1983, Pages 936–937, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232769 Published: 01 December 1983

BOOK REVIEWS

Journal Article BOOK REVIEWS Get access The Economic Constitution of Federal States, by Albert Breton, and Anthony Scott. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978. Robert L. Bish Robert L. Bish University of Victoria Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Volume 11, Issue 1, Winter 1981, Pages 147–149, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a037342 Published: 01 January 1981

The Individual, Political Tension, and Canada's Quest for a New Constitution

Whatever else the move towards separatism in Canada has brought with it, the Canadian people have undoubtedly been given an unprecedented opportunity to go back to first principles concerning the nature of their constitution. In this vein we wish to consider two basic and related issues which threaten to be resolved at the expense of the individual's freedom from government, both federal and provincial. These are, first, what should be the meaning and rationale of 'federalism' in the new arrangements, and second, which institution or body should draw up the new constitution? Hitherto, the bulk of the limelight in the constitutional debate seems to have been taken by government and quasi-government bodies such as the federally sponsored Task Force on Canadian Unity that reported in January 1979. Our aim is to interject certain important points of view on federal structure that do not yet seem to have received adequate attention by these groups. In particular, we wish to refer to writings of authors whose interests straddle the disciplines of political science and political economy. These include the recent interpretations of the Federalist Papers by Vincent Ostrum, and the modern economic analysis of federalism by J. Roland Pennock, Gordon Tullock, Albert Breton and Anthony Scott.

Books reviewed: Comptes rendus

Book reviewed in this article: The Economic Constitution of Federal States By ALBERT BRETON and ANTHONY SCOTT100th Annual Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Fiscal Year Ended March 31,1978 Canada's Refugee Policy: Indifference or Opportunism? By GERALD E. DIRKS Improving total productivity: mbo strategies for business, government and not‐for‐profit organizations Par PAUL MALI. The Public Eye: Television and the Politics of Canadian Broadcasting, 1952–1968 By FRANK W. PEERS Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: Canadian and Australian Experiences By R.M. BURNS Small and Large Together: Governing the Metropolis By HOWARD w. HALLMAN Principles of Federal Policy Coordination in the Federal Republic of Germany: Basic Issues and Annotated Legislation Edited by P. BERND SPAHN Public Participation in Planning Edited by W.R. DERRICK SEWELL and J.T. COPPOCK For a Common Future: A Study of Canada's Relations with Developing Countries By ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA

Complexity as a characteristic of policies in Albert Breton's economic theory of representative government

Complexity of policies is shown to confer differential benefits on those people who have the time necessary to understand the policies. Understanding is defined to mean the ability to predict the consequences of implementation. Breton's economic theory of representative government postulates three groups in society: politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens, with the first two groups forming government bureaucracies that have policies as their sole output. This paper shows that complexity of policies is preferred by bureaucrats, politicians, and citizens in that order because, as one goes down the list, individuals have less time to understand policies and more policies that affect them. Bureaucrats, in order to achieve a level of incomprehension in the other two groups that mazimizes bureaucratic power, must sometimes design policies that they cannot fully understand themselves. This leads to policies with unintended and unanticipated consequences.

The Economic Theory of Representative Governments. Albert Breton

<i>The Economic Theory of Representative Governments</i>. Albert Breton

Book Reviews

Book review in this article British Cabinet Ministers: The Roles of Politicians in Executive Office Bruce Headey, Allen and Unwin, 1974. The Problem of Party Government Richard Rose. Democratic Theory and Local Government Dilys M.Hill. The Economic Theory of Representative Government Albert Breton. Independence and Deterrence Britain and Atomic Energy 1945–1952. The Management of Urban Change in Britain and Germany Richard Rose (ed.). Power and Authority in British Universities Graeme C.Moodie and Rowland Eustace. Power and Politics in the School System Michael Locke. The Government and Management of Schools George Baron and D.A.Howell.

Albert Breton, The Economic Theory of Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1974, pp. xvi, 228

Albert Breton, The Economic Theory of Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1974, pp. xvi, 228

The demand for local political autonomy: an individualistic theory

In recent years several social scientists interested in the sector have reaped considerable analytical returns from the theory of elites. For example, Albert Breton (1964, 1966) has put forward an interesting hypothesis which explains why even a power elite (of the sort described for Canada in Porter, 1965) might rationally expand expenditures even though they will have to pay for them, at least in part, and the expenditures will benefit most directly those groups which are not themselves included in the power structure. In a social system organized along elite lines one might in principle expect the preferences of the more powerful groups to be reflected in both revenue and expenditure patterns; for example, in the low-cost (even free!) provision of higher education for the scions of the upper-income groups. Breton suggests, however, that the controlling groups may also desire certain public such as industrialization or nationalism, perhaps because these goods carry with them a secure and expanding role-and hence substantial

The Income Velocity of Money in Canada, 1960-68: A Further Comment

In a recent issue of Economica Albert Breton reported the results of an experiment involving the prediction of the income velocity of money in Canada for the years 1960 to 1966 using a velocity function which he had estimated earlier for the period 1935 to 1959 but had never published.2 Breton reported good results from his exercise in prediction, and tentatively concluded that he had discovered a stable velocity function for Canada. In a subsequent issue, C. A. E. Goodhart reported on his attempt to extend Breton's predictions through 1968.3 Because of very large prediction errors in 1967 and 1968, Goodhart concluded that the velocity function must have shifted at that time-a conclusion accepted by Breton.4 This comment has two purposes. First, I report upon my own attempt to predict the income velocity of money in Canada for the years 1960 to 1968 using the Breton velocity function. My results cast doubt on the Breton-Goodhart argument that the velocity function was stable until 1966, and that it then shifted as a result of institutional changes in the Canadian banking system. Second, I undertake a diagonosis of the failing of the Breton function, partly along lines suggested by Goodhart and Breton. I argue that the prediction errors are not strong evidence of a shift in the underlying velocity function, but rather are a product of a mis-specification of the money supply variable.

Some institutional considerations in federal-state fiscal relations

Albert Breton [1] has contended that "from an economic point of view how it (the division of functions between governmental levels) changes when it changes is of no great interest." But if the welfare of the members of a society is affected by this division, as apparently it is when a federalism exists, then the forces behind such a change do have economic relevance. This paper interprets any existing division of functions as the result of rational collective decision-making. It seeks to determine how economic institutions can cause such a division to change without any change in the population's taste for decentralization. This is a question of considerable interest and it is amenable to economic analysis.

A Note on Demand for Public Goods

In a stimulating recent article' Professor Albert Breton refers to a dominant feature of the world of uncertainty and competition-the situation where there are externalities in output consumption. The exclusion principle is inapplicable and individuals have no reason to reveal their true preferences for public goods.2 Breton suggests (as have other major contributors) that, in this situation, a benefit taxation system is impossible and reliance on a non-benefit (ergo non-optimal) system results in the disequilibrium of some individuals in the community.3 The purpose of this note is to suggest a model of the world of competition, uncertainty, and externalities in output consumption, in which in(lividuals maximize their own self-interest while revealing their preference for public goods. First, it is useful to substitute the term conflict in place of Breton's competition. I do this for two reasons. One is that competition is usually associated with a price-taker's model. However, a consumer is a price-taker in a meaningful sense only if the exclusion principle applies, in which case this