Al Qaeda Movements Research Articles

Socialisation and Recruitment in Islamist Movements: A Comparison between the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda

To date, a little work has been undertaken to compare the socialisation process between the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda. According to critics, both are considered intermediate and extremist movements. While the Muslim Brotherhood utilises various methods of socialisation, Al-Qaeda utilises internet networks to recruit new members without looking at their prior history, leaving the Al-Qaeda movement extremely vulnerable. This article explores the main differences in the roles and impacts of the political movements the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda. It focuses on the most significant aspect of the socialisation process on shaping alfard al-muslim the individual Muslim.

Al-Qaeda’s New Orientation After the Death of Osama bin Laden

After the death of Osama Bin Laden and the declaration of the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Al-Qaeda movement changed from being aggressive to being passive. The aggressiveness of the Al-Qaeda movement, for instance, was seen during the spectacular terror of 9/11, which was then followed by various actions carried out by followers in various parts of the world. However, Bin Laden's death and the rise of the ISIS group made Al-Qaeda look passive. This paper seeks to see the history of the Al-Qaeda movement to the dynamics that influence the movement’s choices. The author found that changing Al-Qaeda's orientation from aggressive to passive did not deny the existence of a consolidated movement that deliberately distanced itself from the anti-terrorism campaign carried out by the United States.

Reviewing Al-Qaeda's Infiltration in Indonesia: A Historical Reflection

Al-Qaeda's infiltration into the Southeast Asian region is inseparable from the existence of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI). Some Jamaah Islamiyah cadres are veterans of the Afghanistan War. Historically Al-Qaeda under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden has trained the military skills of Jamaah Islamiyah cadres to help the Afghan jihadists fight Soviet communism until the Soviets defeated and left Afghanistan. Then Al-Qaeda succeeded in entering Indonesia through the Jamaah Islamiyah network and its cells in Southeast Asia by mobilizing key actors and radical actions. In Indonesia, Jamaah Islamiyah with the support of Al-Qaeda succeeded in carrying out a series of bomb attacks including Bali Bomb (2002), Kuningan Bomb (2004), JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton Bomb Jakarta (2009). The strategy of the Al-Qaeda movement in Indonesia does not appear openly by forming an underground organization (clandestine). Its existence exists but in the form of a Formless Organization (OTB) for the security of its organization. Their infiltration through these networks has succeeded in bringing in their radical ideology and movements in Indonesia in particular and in the Southeast Asian region in general.

Genealogi Gerakan Ikhwan Al Muslimin dan Al Qaeda di Timur Tengah

Secara historis, munculnya terorisme yang dilakukan kelompok-kelompok Islamradikal di Timur Tengah berakar pada semangat perlawanan terhadap kolonialismeBarat pada awal abad ke-19. Ada dua gerakan yang memiliki pengaruh besardan menginspirasi kemunculan gerakan-gerakan serupa di Timur Tengah, yaituIkhwan Al Muslimin (IM) dan Al Qaeda (AQ). Artikel ini bertujuan untuk mengkajiakar gerakan dari organisasi Ikhwan Al Muslimin dan Al Qaeda, serta bagaimanarelasi kuasa-pengetahuan yang terjadi. Teori yang digunakan dalam penelitianini adalah genealogi yang berupaya mengkaji aspek sejarah dan hubungannyadengan formulasi kuasa dan politik; serta teori Islamisme, yaitu menguraikanaspek ideologi Islam, gerakan politik Islam, serta aspek sosial-ekonominya. Temuanartikel ini menunjukkan bahwa IM dan AQ secara historis berakar pada gerakanperlawanan terhadap Barat. Pemikiran Sayyid Qutb menjadi inspirasi awal bagiradikalisasi aktivis IM, seperti Muhammad Faraj, Ayman Al Zawahiri, dan Osamabin Laden sehingga mereka membangun milisi yang lebih ekstrim, seperti Al Jihaddan Al Qaeda. IM pada awalnya adalah organisasi yang bergerak dalam bidangsosial dan akhirnya melibatkan diri dalam politik praktis. Metode gerakan Islamyang berbasis pendekatan budaya menjadikan IM diterima luas oleh masyarakatMesir, sehingga pernah berhasil menang dalam pemilu dan berada di lingkaranelit kekuasaan. Sebaliknya, AQ melakukan gerakan perlawanan terhadap Baratsekaligus pemerintah di negara-negara Muslim yang dinilai anti-Islam denganmetode teror, sehingga selalu marjinal dalam opini publik masyarakat Muslim.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, insurgency, or organized crime?

After incurring significant losses during France’s 2013 Operation Serval in Mali, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is back. Mokhtar Belmokhtar has rejoined the group, violent attacks are on the increase, and southern Libya offers elements of the group a new safe-haven. This article takes a long view on AQIM, looking at its objectives and ideology, organizational structure, relationship with the local population and revenue model to determine whether they should be labelled as terrorists, insurgents, or ordinary criminals. The article concludes that AQIM generally follows a strategy of terrorism, while some elements and modus operandi could also be indicative of a strategy of insurgency. AQIM’s primary commanders have a long-standing relationship with the global Al Qaeda movement, are unlikely to be seduced by the Islamic State, and enjoy significant autonomy in conducting their operations. There is, however, little evidence that supports the view that AQIM is a criminal organization behind a religious façade, and its Salafi–jihadist ideology remains a leading determinant.

A First Draft of the History of America's Ongoing Wars on Terrorism

This research note attempts to map the Al Qaeda movement's trajectory from the 11 September 2001 attacks to the stunning events of 2014—which saw the continued rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), its expulsion from the Al Qaeda movement, followed by ISIS's stunning thrust into Iraq, its declaration of a caliphate, and the re-engagement of American military forces in this region. It attempts to place in context the Al Qaeda movement's evolution to explain why the United States under President Barack Obama, despite hopes and expectations to the contrary, is still enmeshed in the war on terrorism proclaimed by George W. Bush over a decade ago.

Managing the Global and Local: The Dual Agendas of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

On 29 October 2010, authorities in the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates intercepted explosive packages that had been placed on U.S.-bound planes. Less than a year earlier, Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate explosives aboard Northwest Flight 253. These attacks originated and were organized in Yemen under the supervision of a local Al Qaeda affiliate known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. These attacks are a manifestation of the group's growing international ambitions, yet little scholarship on Al Qaeda explores how affiliates with robust ties to Al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan balance their dedication to global and local jihad(s). This article contends that despite its strong ties to Al Qaeda Central and international posture, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula still must maintain local relevance and support. Its ability to do so carries implications for counterterrorism policymakers and the broader Al Qaeda movement.

The United States and the Counterinsurgency: The Peace Process in Pakistan

Abstract The phenomenon of the Pakistani government's negotiated peace settlements with Taliban militants may seriously endanger stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas, simultaneously lending tremendous strength to the Taliban and Al Qaeda movements. The United States has raised serious reservations about this peace process, which it sees as a beacon for militants to regroup, resulting in renewed insurgency and terror attacks in Afghanistan and the Western Hemisphere in general. This article attempts to contextualize both the peace process negotiated by the Pakistani government with the militants and the policy of the United States regarding the process. Projections for a successful counterinsurgency policy are articulated at the empirical level.

September 11 and the UK Response

On 11 September 2001, four aircraft on internal flights within the United States were seized by passengers who crashed two of them into the World Trade Centre in New York and another into the Pentagon, Washington DC, the other falling into open land in Pennsylvania. The men who seized the planes were all non-US nationals. The total loss of life was over 3,000, including a number of UK citizens. The economic consequences were hardly calculable. Responsibility for the attacks was attributed to the Al Qaeda movement, a group regarded by the United States as being responsible for previous attacks against US targets, including the bombing of American embassies in East Africa in 1998 and on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000. Although Al Qaeda was thought to have members in many states, the principal base for its operations was in Afghanistan.1