The strategy of either killing or capturing al Qaeda cadres today stands as the dominant United States counter-terrorism strategy. This strategy, however, has failed to destroy al Qaeda, and has instead expanded the organization's political ideology into a major force being felt throughout the Middle East. Kill/Capture's appeal stems from assessments of al Qaeda as a vast network, articulated best by scholars such as Peter Bergan and Bruce Hoffman. The strategy also has appeal from several historical examples, and the early cost-effective successes found in Kill/Capture's implementation immediately after the September 11th attacks. Yet these advantages are outweighed by the strategy's strengthening of al Qaeda's brand among other groups, the indiscriminate nature of the strategy, and its inability to offer other political solutions versus al Qaeda's ideology within the context of violence and conflict. As a result, al Qaeda has endured, while expanding its ideology across the Middle East. Militant Takfirism today, is now largely defined by al Qaeda's ideology, and is best seen with the current situation in Iraq and Syria. Hence, while Kill/Capture offers some credible appeal, the strategy has failed overall to rid the world of al Qaeda.