Institution Of Agreement Research Articles

How US withdrawal might influence cooperation under the Paris climate agreement

Using a novel agent-based model, we study how US withdrawal might influence the political process established by the Paris Agreement, and hence the prospects for reaching the collective goal to limit warming below 2°C. Our model enables us to analyze to what extent reaching this goal despite US withdrawal would place more stringent requirements on other core elements of the Paris cooperation process. We find, first, that the effect of a US withdrawal depends critically on the extent to which member countries reciprocate others’ promises and contributions. Second, while the 2°C goal will likely be reached only under a very small set of conditions in any event, even temporary US withdrawal will further narrow this set significantly. Reaching this goal will then require other countries to step up their ambition at the first opportunity and to comply nearly 100% with their pledges, while maintaining high confidence in the Paris Agreement's institutions. Third, although a US withdrawal will first primarily affect the United States' own emissions, it will eventually prove even more detrimental to other countries' emissions.

Agreements with reciprocity: Co-financing and MOUs

Institutions for co-financing agreements often exist to encourage public good investment. Can such frameworks deliver maximal investment when agents are motivated by reciprocity? We demonstrate that indeed they can, but not how one might expect. If maximal investment is impossible in the absence of the institution and public good returns are high, then an agreement signed by all parties cannot lead to full investment. However, if all parties reject the agreement, then full investment is attainable via a gentlemen's agreement or memorandum of understanding (MOU). Agreement institutions may thus do more than just facilitate the signing of binding agreements; they may play a critical role in igniting informal cooperation underpinned by reciprocity.

Intergovernmental and Cross-Border Civil Service Cooperation: The Good Friday Agreement and Brexit

This article aims to examine the impact of the Good Friday Agreement on British–Irish intergovernmental cooperation and cross-border Irish/Northern Irish civil cooperation from 2001 to 2017. It also makes provisional observations about Brexit’s impact. British–Irish and cross-border cooperation were emphasised as integral to resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland by successive Irish governments and by the Social Democratic and Labour Party in Northern Ireland. Therefore, in assessing the Good Friday Agreement’s overall significance, it is essential to examine its impact on administrative and intergovernmental cooperation. It will be shown that Good Friday agreement's institutions for intergovernmental and East–West relations were under-utilised before Brexit and so were not equipped to deal with Brexit's challenges in 2016–2018. However, a legally enshrined institutionalised relationship, whether by empowering the Good Friday's institutions and/ or by creating a new legal agreement, will be needed in the years ahead if and when Brexit happens.

The legal character and operational relevance of the Paris Agreement's temperature goal.

This article assesses the legal character and operational relevance of the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C temperature goal. This article begins with a textual analysis of the 1.5°C goal. It considers whether the goal creates individual or collective obligations for Parties, and whether it is sufficiently specific to enable the tracking of individual or collective performance. Next, it assesses the operational relevance of the 1.5°C temperature goal, by considering the role it will play in the Paris Agreement's institutions and procedures. To the extent that the goal plays a role, and implies global limits on greenhouse gas emissions, this article observes that it could have implications for the sharing of the effort between Parties. Thus, this article considers the relevance of equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances, to understanding how the 1.5°C goal could be reached. In this context, this article explores whether the 1.5°C goal could play a role in the Paris Agreement's 'ambition cycle'. Finally, this article asks whether there are any legal or political implications, individually or collectively under the Paris Agreement, should the Parties fail to achieve the 1.5°C goal.This article is part of the theme issue 'The Paris Agreement: understanding the physical and social challenges for a warming world of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels'.

Co-Financing Agreements and Reciprocity: When 'No Deal' is a Good Deal

Institutions for co-financing agreements often exist to encourage public good investment. Can such frameworks deliver maximal investment when agents are motivated by reciprocity? We demonstrate that indeed they can, but not in the way one might expect. If maximal investment is impossible in the absence of the institution and public good returns are high, then an agreement signed by all parties cannot lead to full investment. However, if all parties reject the co-financing agreement, then an informal deal to invest can lead to full investment. Agreement institutions may thus do more than just facilitate the signing of formal agreements; they may play a critical role in igniting informal cooperation underpinned by reciprocity.

Outsourcing a partnership? Assessing ACP–EU cooperation under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement

Since 2000 the cooperation between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states has been governed through the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. This article complements existing research that focuses on Brussels-based stakeholders with an analysis drawing on the existing literature and on stakeholders' perceptions of ACP–EU cooperation and ACP institutions gathered via interviews in nine ACP countries. The findings presented observe a social disconnect between, on the one hand, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement's institutions and Brussels-based representatives, and, on the other hand, the broad-based and multistakeholder partnership they are tasked to promote. The article points to low levels of support in ACP countries, particularly in Africa, to continued ACP–EU cooperation in its present form, and stresses the need for an open and participatory process of reviewing and reshaping ACP–EU relations.