Agreed Framework Research Articles

North Korean nuclear program and Six Party Talks: A critical analysis

North Korea is an important figure in Northeast Asian politics due to its growing nuclear program which she claims to have initiated for defence. However, it has disturbed the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula at large. The tense relations over the years between U.S., its regional allies particularly South Korea and North Korea have affected world politics. Breakdown of the Agreed Framework Agreement of 1994, signed between U.S. and North Korea in 2002, caused a damage to their relationship. Six Party Talks were started to bring stability to region and political certainty among the relations of the stakeholders. However, SPT failed to achieve the desired objectives due to the ambitious interests of the member states. This research paper focuses those obstacles that led to breakdown of the six-party talks. Furthermore, the study addresses the question that how U.S., China and other regional states are handling and exploiting the North Korean nuclear issue for the vested interests. This qualitative study has used secondary sources for data collection and for the analysis it used descriptive-analytical and narrative analysis technique. The study shows that failure and suspension of the SPT have some serious implications on the security of Northeast Asia.

2000: North Korea: No bygones at Yongbyon

ABSTRACT A first-person account of a visit to North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor, and the role it would play following the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

Normalization by Other Means—Technological Infrastructure and Political Commitment in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

The 1994 Agreed Framework called for North Korea to dismantle its plutonium-production complex in exchange for civilian light water reactors (LWRs) and the promise of political normalization with the United States. The accord succeeded at rolling back North Korea's nuclear program, but the regime secretly began enriching uranium when the LWR project fell behind schedule. Today, scholars look back at the Agreed Framework as a U.S. offer of “carrots” to bribe the regime, but this framing overlooks the credibility challenges of normalization and the distinctive technical challenges of building LWRs in North Korea. A combiniation of political and technical analysis reveals how the LWR project helped build credibility for the political changes promised in the Agreed Framework. Under this interpretation, the LWR project created a platform for important breakthroughs in U.S.-North Korean engagement by signaling a U.S. commitment to normalization, but its signaling function was undercut when the United States displaced the costs of LWR construction to its allies. The real challenge of proliferation crisis diplomacy is not to bribe or coerce target states into giving up nuclear weapons, but to credibly signal a U.S. commitment to the long-term political changes needed to make denuclearization possible.

Leveraging towards restraint: Nuclear hedging and North Korea's shifting reference points during the agreed framework and the Six-Party Talks

AbstractThe emergence of new nuclear aspirants has posed a great threat to the post-Cold War global non-proliferation regime. These states have adopted a nuclear hedging strategy that has been deemed both strategically risky and politically difficult to maintain. Yet, hedging has not automatically resulted in nuclearisation. We analyse the conditions under which a nuclear hedger shifts its nuclear policy towards one of restraint. Drawing insights from prospect theory, we argue that a nuclear policy shift occurs when a nuclear hedger gains an asymmetric leveragevis-à-visits adversary. Specifically, a hedging strategy that is based on loss aversion will only be abandoned when a shift in the nuclear aspirant's reference point occurs during negotiations. To test our theoretical arguments, we conduct an in-depth case study of North Korea's nuclear policies throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The empirical study of the changes in North Korea's negotiating stance during the Agreed Framework negotiations and the Six-Party Talks supports our asymmetric leverage thesis. We conclude with broad policy implications for the non-proliferation regime.

The North Korean Nuclear Problem: Twenty Years of Crisis

The North Korean nuclear problem has gradually deteriorated in the past two decades and is becoming increasingly serious.1 Over the course of this worsening crisis, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has staged three nuclear tests and continues to develop its diverse medium- and long-range missile capabilities. North Korea now claims to be a nuclear weapons state and has formally announced its byungjin policy, which aims for the simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development.2 Pyongyang is clearly determined to develop advanced nuclear capabilities and time is running short for the international community to respond. Despite this, diplomatic initiatives aimed at denuclearizing North Korea have thus far been ineffective. Policymakers have bought the same horse three times by attempting, and ultimately failing, to resolve the problem through the Geneva Agreed Framework (October 1994), the September 19th agreement (September 2005), and the leap day agreement (February 2012). Likewise, the six-party talks aimed at peaceful denuclearization of North Korea-involving Russia, China, the DPRK, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, and the United States-have in essence stalled. Considering the rate at which North Korea's nuclear program is advancing, it is urgent that the international community adopt a more effective approach soon.This essay explores why efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis have been unsuccessful and attempts to outline a more effective approach. The first section examines Pyongyang's inconsistent justifications for the program, as well as its perspectives and motivations regarding denuclearization. Next, the essay assesses the obstacles hindering the international community's efforts toward the denuclearization of North Korea. Last, this essay argues that the nuclear problem is rooted in the nature of the North Korean regime and considers strategies necessary for resolving the crisis. The essay concludes by recommending a more enduring, holistic, and comprehensive approach focused on strengthening deterrence capabilities and gradually altering North Korea's current trajectory through increased engagement.North Korea's Claims for Nuclearization and Understanding of DenuclearizationNorth Korea's actions over time and inconsistent justifications for its nuclear program indicate an unwillingness to denuclearize. Commencing in the late 1950s, North Korea's nuclear program was ostensibly for research purposes and energy generation. Thus, the DPRK asked for compensation for terminating its program in the 1990s, and a coalition of countries agreed to the provision of light-water reactors and heav y-fuel oil under the 1994 Agreed Framework.3 When North Korea's uranium enrichment program was discovered in 2002, Pyongyang denied the program's existence. However, it later acknowledged the continuation of the program and withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003 to pursue its nuclear ambitions (the first and only signatory country to the NPT to do so). At the same time, North Korea has been developing its missile capabilities. Since the summer of 1998, outside observers have witnessed the country's development of medium- and long-range missiles such as the Musudan, Taepodong-1, and Taepodong-2 missiles.4 As North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities have evolved, Pyongyang has increasingly argued that its nuclear program is intended to be a deterrent against a potential preemptive attack by the United States.The key to understanding North Korea's changing stance on its nuclear program is comprehending how Pyongyang views the issue of denuclearization: when North Korea speaks of denuclearization, it means for the entire Korean Peninsula. In essence, its actions to this end would be conditional upon the United States no longer providing a nuclear umbrella over South Korea. Beyond this, North Korea has demanded a U.S. …

Economic Cooperation Between the Two Koreas

IntroductionFluctuating political relations between North and South Korea made it difficult to sustain, at least in past, any meaningful and lasting economic cooperation between two Koreas. This paper reviews history and scope of economic cooperation between two Koreas, leading to conclusion that economic cooperation between North and South Korea should remain unaffected by political turmoil between two Koreas.Historical Background of Economic CooperationThe first official joint statement between two Koreas was released on July 4, 1972, nearly nineteen years after Korean War ended on July 27, 1953. The SouthNorth Joint Communique states that reunification will take place without reliance on or intervention by foreign nations; it will be achieved by a peaceful means; that the two sides shall take measures to stop propaganda broadcasting against other side, stop military aggression and prevent any military clashes; and that the two sides shall institute various exchanges in economic, social and cultural areas; cooperate in holding inter-Korean Red Cross talks; open a Seoul-Pyongyang hotline; and set up a South-North mediation committee.Regardless of cooperative spirit expressed in 1972 communique, economic cooperation between two Koreas did not take place for many more years because of two related reasons: lack of progress on political front and several provocative actions carried out by North Korea. On October 9, 1983, for instance, four South Korean cabinet members were killed by North Korean agents in Burma. On November 29, 1987, Korean Air 858 was exploded by two North Korean agents forty-five minutes away from Bangkok, killing all 115 passengers and crew members aboard. As Soviet Union was dissolved in 1989, ending Soviet Union's economic support to North Korea, focus of North Korean issues shifted to development of nuclear weapons in North Korea. In fact, current nuclear crisis began during 1989 when Yongbyon's nuclear facility was identified through U.S. satellite photos.On October 21, 1994, United States and North Korea concluded four months of negotiations by adopting Framework in Geneva, which called for North Korea to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear facilities, a process that would require dismantling three nuclear reactors, two of which were still under construction. In exchange, North Korea was promised two light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs) and annual shipments of heavy fuel oil during construction of reactors. The LWRs were arranged for construction through Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). On March 9, 1995, KEDO was formed in New York with United States, South Korea, and Japan as organization's original members. On June 1, 2006, KEDO Executive Board announced that it had formally terminated its project to build two LWRs in North Korea due to continued and extended failure of North Korea to comply with its relevant obligations under 1994 Agreed Framework. KEDO was more a political arrangement than an act of economic cooperation. We thus turn our attention to economic cooperation.Dawn of Economic CooperationAlthough trade between two Koreas began in late 1980s, first meaningful event in inter-Korean economic cooperation occurred on January 13, 1998, when Chung Ju-young, founder of Hyundai chaebol, traveled to North Korea through China and signed an agreement with North Korea on what would later be known as Mt. Kumgang tourism project. Chung's visit to North Korea was made possible by election of Kim Dae-jung as President of South Korea in December 1997.During his inaugural speech on February 25, 1998, President Kim Dae-jung announced his Sunshine Policy for dramatic improvement of inter-Korean relations, which led to President Kim winning Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. …

Another Way to North Korea's Denuclearization: Multilateral Approach to Nuclear Fuel Cycle

IntroductionThe six-party talks have been suspended since North Korea's withdrawal in April 2009 to protest the UN Security Council's condemnation of l ong-range missile launches in presidential statement. To solve North Korea's nuclear problem, the deadlock in the negotiations with the North should first be broken in the near future. Once the six-party talks resume, the primary discussion could focus on how to denuclearize the North. In order to achieve such an objective, it will be essential to disDepartmentmantle its nuclear weapons program in complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. In addition to removing the nuclear material and infrastructure, irreversible dismantling of the North's nuclear weapons program would require redirection of the North's nuclear workers to other civilian occupations.While dealing with the North's nuclear problem, it will be important to assure the North of sustainable energy supply for supporting its economic growth. In the present context, nuclear energy is the single huge, economical, and reliable energy source. A constant supply of nuclear energy without proliferation risk would help to eradicate the necessity and false excuses of its indigenous nuclear development program. However, the international society will hesitate to do this because the North has previously attempted to mislead them into believing that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.Therefore, revisiting 1994's Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea could be considered. However, it has several weaknesses: First, it cannot resolve serious concern regarding the North's intention to divert the spent nuclear fuel discharged from the nuclear power plants, since they are located in the North; second, the North cannot effectively handle the central issue related to the irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear program, which is the diversion of its nuclear workers to other civilian occupations; third, such an approach will involve heavy financial burden on only three countries (Korea, the U.S., and Japan) that took part in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization; and fourth, it is not clear whether the approach would be acceptable to the North. The North Korean Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which Kang proposed as way to redirect the North's nuclear workers, could also be considered.1 However, Kang's proposal is not comprehensive approach to the North's nuclear problem, since it simply focused on the relocation of the nuclear workers.Hence, new comprehensive approach is needed that allows the North an opportunity to reap the benefits of its nuclear energy program according to Article IV of the Nonproliferation Treaty but prevents the North's nuclear workers from conducting clandestine nuclear activities. To achieve such an objective, an approach similar to the approach to the nuclear fuel could be solution. The multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle has been proposed and widely discussed since Mohamed El-Baradei, the former director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), called for the creation of a new mechanism that will assure supplies of nuclear fuel and reactors to countries which want them, while strengthening nonproliferation through better controls over the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. This paper reviews the previous proposals of the multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle which have been recommended since 2003 and proposes comprehensive multilateral approach to solve North Korea's nuclear problem.Multilateral Approach to the Nuclear Fuel CycleThe anticipated increase in global energy demand would result in the expansion of nuclear energy use worldwide, mainly due to the construction of nuclear power plants in countries that do not currently have established nuclear industries. This could result in the worldwide dissemination of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies because most countries would aim for local development of these sensitive technologies. …

Strategic Patience or Back to Engagement? Obama's Dilemma on North Korea

IntroductionAre the days of hope for North Korea's nuclear denuclearization over once and for all? North Korea's recent disclosure of its uranium enriched program (UEP), in addition to its plutonium-based nuclear arsenal, the possible instability of power succession from North Korea's top leader, Kim Jong Il, to his son Kim Jong Un, and the North Korean leadership's blind reliance on its nuclear program as the ultimate guarantor of its regime survival, all point to a pessimistic assessment that it would be impossible to persuade North Korea to negotiate away its nuclear program for whatever rewards might obtain from the United States and the international community.Admittedly many people hoped for some sort of breakthrough on the nuclear front as the Obama administration took office in January 2009, expressing its willingness to engage North Korea. Although he didn't mention North Korea by name, President Obama pledged in his inaugural address to reach out to isolated regimes. As Democratic presidential candidate, Obama also expressed an active interest in engaging North Korea in a presidential debate in September 2008 when he criticized the Bush administration's lack of diplomatic engagement with North Korea, and supported sustained, direct and aggressive diplomacy to resolve North Korean nuclear issues.2Obama's criticism was clearly directed against the Bush administration's non-engagement policy toward North Korea during its first term. In fact, such an approach was inevitable, given the Bush team's fundamental distrust of the Pyongyang regime that had failed to keep its promises despite a series of previous nuclear pacts with the United States, including the Agreed Framework in 1994. The Bush administration avoided any further nuclear deal with North Korea during its first term, determined not to accept any demands from Pyongyang because doing so might leave them open to comparison with the Clinton Its North Korea policy was even described as the ABC (Anything but Clinton) policy.3However, the Bush team's hawkish stance began to crumble when North Korea carried out its first nuclear test in October 2006. Tension was already rising since Washington made a big issue of Pyongyang's secret uranium enrichment program (UEP) in October 2005. North Korea initially acknowledged its presence, but has denied it ever since. Hard pressed by the urgent need to keep North Korea's unfettered nuclear pursuits at bay, chief U.S. negotiator Chris Hill hastened to pull off a series of nuclear deals with North Korea, with the full support of President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. North Korea froze its plutonium activities and finally submitted its nuclear declaration in 2009, for which it received political benefits from the United States, including being removed from the U.S. terrorism list. However, the previously uneventful nuclear talks stalled when both sides failed to iron out the differences on verification of North Korea's nuclear declaration.It was against this backdrop that many people expected some sort of breakthrough in the stalled nuclear talks when the new Obama administration came in. However, such expectations were shattered by North Korea's unexpected provocations right from the beginning of the Obama administration. On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a l ong-range ballistic missile that, it argued, was the satellite Kwangmyongsong-2, intended to be put into orbit through a space launch vehicle, Unha-2. The strong U.S. condemnation, followed by the unanimous UN Security Council Resolution 1874, prompted North Korea to embolden rather than change its behavior. In defiance of the UN resolution, the North conducted its second nuclear test in May 2009, which dealt a fatal blow to the Obama administration's efforts for engagement. The second nuclear test unequivocally demonstrated once again Pyongyang's intention of not giving up its nuclear program despite a series of nuclear pacts with the previous Bush administration. …

The Anatomy of North Korea's Foreign Policy Formulation

IntroductionNorth Korea itself is a puzzle. At the end of the Cold War, it was widely believed that North Korea would collapse, considering the loss of its economic patron and ideological backbone in the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, this logic seems to be fading out. Despite its economic setbacks, North Korea has successfully developed its missile and nuclear capability and thus increased the survivability of its regime without suffering military attacks. On the contrary, even though the United States has invented two negotiating frameworks, the Four-Party Talks in the 1990s (China, the two Koreas, and the United States) and the Six-Party Talks (Russia, China, the two Koreas, Japan, and the United States) in the 2000s, the U.S. diplomatic efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and to include North Korea into the international community have been unsuccessful.A certain question arises: Why are negotiations with North Korea, currently the Six-Party Talks, often ineffective? Indeed, neither the bilateral agreement, the 1994 Agreed Framework formed by the United States and North Korea, nor the multilateral declaration, the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks in September 2005, have been able to deter North Korea from developing and possessing its nuclear capability. In order to understand these phenomena, it is imperative to understand the nature of North Korean foreign policy.In this paper, I argue that North Korean foreign policy can be explained by neoclassical realism, which regards distribution of power in the international system as an independent variable, domestic perception of the system and domestic incentives as intervening variables, and foreign policy decision-making as a dependent variable.1 From the neoclassical realism perspective, foreign policy decision-makers can be constrained by both international and domestic politics, and their perceptions with regard to international anarchy, including whether they have assured its security, are influenced by such domestic factors as states' political structures and ideologies.2 In the case of North Korea, the international distribution of power is interpreted by its domestic political system, based on the national ideology (Juche) and the supreme leader (Suryong) political institution, and I argue that this perception has predominantly determined its foreign policy objectives and decision-making.The Distribution of Power in the International System and Northeast AsiaThe current distribution of power in the international system does not favor North Korea. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, North Korea has faced grave security threats from inside and outside the state. Domestically, as the surge of democratization in Eastern Europe from the early 1990s illustrates, North Korea faced a potential social uprising from inside at the end of the Cold War. It has also been facing the possibility of economic collapse due to decreasing economic assistance from the former Soviet Union, unexpected political events due to the death of Kim Ilsung, and social instability due to the catastrophic famine that struck during the mid- to late-1990s, all of which have contributed to decreasing the overall national strength. Internationally, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant the disappearance of the Soviet nuclear umbrella, and North Korea's security has become much more vulnerable vis-a-vis hostile states in the region, especially the United States, than during the Cold War.In fact, the United States and its allies have become capable of expanding their alliance functions since the 1990s. This is well illustrated by the modernization and realignments of the U.S.-ROK alliance3 and the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance role, which has developed its function and scope since the 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security,4 which now includes not only the defense of Japan but also regional and global contingencies. …

A New North Korean Policy under the Obama Administration

IntroductionFor over half a century, the Korean Peninsula has posed a foreign-policy dilemma for every American president. During this time, continuity, rather than change, has been the prevailing characteristic of U.S. foreign policy. Since President Reagan's Modest Initiative in 1988, the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) have attempted to normalize their relations through dialogue and negotiations.1 In 1994, North Korea and the United States signed an agreement by which Pyongyang pledged to freeze and eventually dismantle its weapons program. In return, the United States pledged to provide a package of nuclear, energy, economic, and diplomatic benefits. The U.S. support of the Agreed Framework has been inconsistent. Since then North Korea has launched several rockets and missiles, and has increased its weapon arsenal. In recent years six-party talks have been used as a vehicle for change in regard to the North Korean issue. The major players-China, South Korea, Japan, Russia and the United States-have worked to collectively implement their national initiative with regard to North Korea. The result has been that these negotiations have yet to result in a concrete solution and direction for forward progression and movement. These sessions of dialogue and negotiations have proceeded without altering the underlying configuration of the United States and North Korea's Cold War postures towards each other, such as armed deterrence. Nonetheless, the persistent duality of diplomacy exercised by U.S. leaders has largely contributed to the inability to resolve their differences. The recent Bush administration, in relation to its policy towards North Korea, has been characterized by its dualism -believing in the same goal, but divided over goal achievement actions. These divisions took place within the administration, which consisted of an influential coalition of Pentagon officials and advisers, among them Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, officials of Vice President Dick Cheney's office, and proliferation experts in the State Department and White House led by Undersecretary of State John Bolton.2Unfortunately, the internal division of policy at home has resulted in the North Korean issue being in a worse shape today than it was eight years ago after the Clinton-Bush regime change. After President Bush refused to follow Clinton's engagement path, North Korea significantly increased its plutonium stockpile, tested bombs and announced itself a nuclear weapons state. With his election as president, Barack Obama inherited not only difficult issues and initiatives on the home front but also internationally. The new Obama administration is inundated with a plethora of policy issues ranging from economics to foreign policy. President Obama has his hands full dealing with the current dismal economic situation at home and with equally important foreign policy issues, especially when it comes to North Korea.Without UN involvement, the North Korean communists held their own elections in September 1948, and under the tutelage of Russia, Kim Il Sung established the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea.3 Thus, the 38th parallel became Korea's Berlin Wall. Since then, the country has been a troubled issue for every American president. Since Obama took office, North Korea has attempted to make a statement to the new president through a series of missile tests. In the past few years, many experts in North Korean policy have juxtaposed various strategies that have been used and should be included with relation to North Korea. This paper will underline motives for North Korea's actions, updates of previously communicated policy options with real-time information and offer a unique twist, with truths that are often overlooked, on how they should be implemented in the new Obama era, moving forward.North Korean MotivationSince the early 1990s, North Korea has dealt with a harsh economic and food crisis that has left the country desperate to earn hard currency. …

The World vs. Kim Jong-il: The Legal Case Against a Nuclear-Armed North Korea

This paper focuses on the international legal issues surrounding the alleged nuclear-weapon program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or North Korea. The DPRK has withdrawn from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the first country to do so, and apparently is proceeding with the development of nuclear weapons. The regional Six-Party Talks, discussing North Korea's nuclear disarmament, have been unproductive. The international community, led by the United States, is verging on more coercive, even punitive, action. Before legally taking those actions, a case probably will be presented to a world forum that North Korea has violated international law. The relevant issues involve the right to withdraw from the NPT, the continued relevance of the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, legal structures established by the United Nations and United States to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the UN Security Council's general powers to preserve international peace. The case against North Korea has strengths, but so does North Korea's legal defense, including allegations that the nuclear non-proliferation regime is inconsistently applied and that the nuclear powers have failed to comply with their disarmament obligations. At issue is not merely the DPRK's nuclear-weapon program but the continued significance of the current non-proliferation system.

Why Has North Korea Responded Positively to the Nuclear Talks in 2007?

IntroductionI have repeatedly pointed out the adverse impact of numerous U.S. economic sanctions on North Korea's trade. I have written, for instance, that the large trade deficit, unless compensated somehow, is not sustainable.1 Further, since China and were the only two steady importers of North Korean products from 2000 to 2005, if one or both countries turned against North Korea by joining the economic sanctions, it would be difficult for North Korea not to feel the impact. And so it came to be. Japan rapidly tightened its economic relations with North Korea during the past year or two, I wrote in 2007, a total ban of imports from North Korea, over the issues of kidnapping and nuclear weapons, leaving China as the only country that has a key influence on North Korea's trade. Prospects are that North Korea's exports may decline, making North Korea's trade deficit issue even more difficult.2 Even with these premonitions, it was a pleasant surprise to see the way in which North Korea responded to the nuclear talks later in 2007.The objective of this paper is to explore the economic reasons behind North Korea's positive response to the nuclear talks in 2007, by hypothesizing that the North Korean leaders altered their approach partly because of the adverse impact of economic sanctions on North Korea's trade that had reached an unsustainable stage, and partly because of a greater calculation of benefits and costs by the North Korean leaders since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the process of which began in 1989.Key Economic Sanctions against North KoreaThe economic sanctions that have been imposed against North Korea since the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 are chronologically explained elsewhere by me.3 Among the many sanctions imposed on North Korea are three that currently have a direct impact on North Korea's trade. One is the U.S. denial of a most-favored nation (MFN) trade status on North Korea's exports, which was imposed on September 1, 1951. Because of the widespread use of the MFN tariffs, these are known as Normal Trade Relations (NTR) tariffs. Without MFN status, tariffs on North Korean exports to the United States can be so high that it would be impossible for North Korea to even consider exporting anything to the United States.Another important sanction was levied when North Korean agents blew up Korean Air 858 on November 29, 1987, when the plane was on its way from Baghdad to Bangkok. The explosion killed 115 passengers and crew members. On January 20, 1988, North Korea was placed on a list of countries that support international terrorism, on the basis of the U.S. Export Administration Act of 1979. The importance of this sanction is that placement on the list made it impossible for North Korea to borrow development funds from international financial institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.4The third key economic sanctions may be termed collectively the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, announced by President George W. Bush in May 2003, which is designed to interdict weapons of mass destruction shipments to and from countries of proliferation concern, such as North Korea.5 Ever since President Bush labeled North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as an axis of evil in his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, there had been a gradual tightening of sanctions until 2007. The October 2002 discovery of North Korea's nuclear program, and North Korea's subsequent announcement that it was renewing the program, broke the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework, and led to a rapid downturn in the relations between North Korea and the United States. The worsening relations were followed by a broad tightening of North Korea's illegal financial transactions. The broad tightening culminated in Banco Delta Asia's termination of business dealings with North Korea as of February 16, 2006. Banco Delta Asia had long been suspected of handling North Korea's illicit activities overseas, such as laundering of counterfeit U. …

The Beijing Deal Is Not the Agreed Framework

IntroductionThe latest round of the Six Party Talks resulted in a joint statement to implement a phase of Initial Actions including:* The DPRK will freeze plutonium production and processing at Yongbyon and will let IAEA inspectors back into the country to monitor and verify this freeze* Five working groups will be set up on U.S.-DPRK relations, U.S.-Japan relations, energy and economic aid, Armistice and security issues, and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula* Provision of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil equivalent of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK within 60 days.The six parties also agreed to undertake the phase, defined as: provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant-economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK.U.S. Cave-in?The Beijing Deal has been attacked already as a sell-out and reminiscent of the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework under which the DPRK froze its nuclear fuel cycle and got two light reactors and half a million tons of heavy fuel oil per year until the reactors were complete. The old Agreed Framework collapsed in 2002 when the United States accused the DPRK of pursuing uranium enrichment outside of the Agreed Framework. The ultra-hard line critics have got it wrong, again.The Agreed Framework provided two reactors at a cost of about $4 billion to the DPRK on a 2 percent per year confessional financing basis. In present value for the capital and operating costs, and assuming the power would have been exported to South Korea on a commercial basis (the North Korean grid being incapable of operating these reactors), the total annualized cost the reactors would have been about $300 million per year for the DPRK.The export earnings from the ROK would have been about $700 million per year from the two DPRK reactors exporting power to the ROK grid. The DPRK would thereby have earned about $368 million per year in profit. To this, we add an additional $150 million per year for ∂ a million tons of heavy fuel oil that would have gone to the DPRK each year until the reactors were complete under the old deal.The total net present value that the DPRK stood to gain in the Agreed Framework was about $4.6 billion (this would have been spread over 30 years from the time the reactors began operating). The economics were important in the Agreed Framework, although it foundered primarily on the failure of both parties to implement their commitments to normalize political and security relations.What do they get in the Beijing Deal? A measly 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil in the next 60 days, provided they freeze their plutonium facilities and the talks in the working groups go well over this time frame. When they have fully disabled their fuel cycle, they get another 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (or equivalent value from other energy assistance). At the earliest, this would be in two years. The present value of this fuel is about $257 million or about 6 percent of the $4.6 billion value of the old deal that they gave up when they opted for nuclear weapons. And, they get none of it until phase 2 is completed, and phase 3 of actual disarmament defined and presumably well underway.And the 50,000 tons to be sent in the first 60 days given by the United States and other parties as a good faith down-payment is worth? ... a tiny $15 million versus the $4.6 billion that they gave up when the opted for nuclear weapons. It is purely symbolic and is the price to be paid to get Pyongyang to continue to talk about phase 2 and 3; and if they don't talk turkey in the working groups, even that is likely to evaporate.What does all this tell us? …

Can the New Nuclear Deal with North Korea Succeed?

Can the New Nuclear Deal with North Korea Succeed?The new nuclear deal hammered out in Beijing in mid-February 2007 is a very tentative and limited first step toward ending North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Unfortunately, it creates numerous new problems without solving any fundamental issues. Prospects for its eventual success could prove worrisome.On the plus side, the accord is a step away from confrontation toward preserving peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. The Bush Administration, after four years of exchanging heated rhetoric with Pyongyang and reliance on ineffective coercive tactics like economic sanctions, has finally decided to negotiate with Pyongyang. Frankly, this has always been the only way to achieve a peaceful diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. Simply put, at long last negotiations have finally just begun.But the accord's negative aspects outweigh its positive points. It is not a new This is a tentative deal. If North Korea does not like the direction of future negotiations, it can pull out at any time and restart its nuclear reactor. The Agreed Framework was not a tentative deal. It was a package deal-all or nothing. The 1994 accord froze all nuclear activities and put all North Korean nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring. The new deal says that the DPRK will discuss with other parties the scope of nuclear activities to be covered. Also the details IAEA monitoring are to be agreed between IAEA and DPRK. The Agreed Framework resolved such issues prior to its finalization.In other words, the new agreement reverses the process that led to the Agreed Framework. Numerous working level discussions were held in New York and elsewhere to resolve the details of implementation prior to the agreement's conclusion. Under this new deal, North Korea can control the entire process because it can threaten to unfreeze its nuclear activities anytime that it is unhappy with one or more of the working group negotiations.Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill has incorrectly claimed that the new deal is better than the old one because it is He simply does not know his history. The Agreed Framework was multilateral. Prior to its finalization, the United States forged an international consensus supportive of the accord by consulting daily for eighteen months with Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing and Moscow, not to mention many other governments. Also, the Agreed Framework was designed to support the multilateral IAEA, an agency of the United Nations. The Bush Administration has openly and repeatedly belittled the effectiveness of the IAEA and its director, even calling for his replacement.The new accord's shortcomings suggest that the Bush Administration was desperate to continue the Six Party Talks at any price. Over-extended militarily in the Middle East, the Bush Administration cannot afford instability on the Korean Peninsula. …

The Denuclearization Agreement of February 13, 2007, and Its Implementation

Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint StatementThe six-nation to shut down North Korea's nuclear facility was reached on February 13, 2007, largely because President George W. Bush was willing to give U.S. negotiators more flexibility to reach an agreement. Ever since the North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in 2002 after the discovery of a secret nuclear program, the Bush administration has insisted that North Korea should not be rewarded for its bad behavior. Furthermore, many U.S. offers have required North Korea to destroy all its nuclear weapons in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible way before substantial rewards are delivered. Pyongyang has insisted that the United States should provide economic assistance and a security guarantee as preconditions before it gradually dismantles its nuclear weapons (Oh and Hassig, 2004, p. 279).This latest pact accepts North Korea's original position-a freeze of its Yongbyon nuclear facility-and requires the United States to move first by unfreezing North Korean bank accounts at Banco Delta Asia. As shown in Table 1, vexing issues such as the dismantlement of the facility and North Korea's stash of weapons-grade plutonium are subject to further negotiations for the next 60 days.Agreements for the next 60 days, from February 13 to mid-April 2007, included shutting down and sealing the Yongbyon nuclear facility, the provision of 50,000 tons of fuel oil, the provision by North Korea of a list of nuclear programs to be covered by the September 19, 2007, statement, and an agreement to hold North Korea-United States bilateral talks and North Korea-Japan bilateral talks on bilateral issues. Five working groups were to be formed to discuss denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; normalization of North Korea-United States relations; normalization of North Korea-Japan relations; economic and energy cooperation, and a Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism. A sixth round of talks were scheduled for March 19, 2007, at which time the working groups would report on their work and the next steps will be discussed (www.ncno.org, February 15, 2007).Under the agreement, South Korea, Russia, China, and the United States would provide the first part of the aid, 50,000 tons of fuel oil or an equivalent value of economic aid; for the United States, that would require congressional approval, which is likely to be difficult to get. If North Korea disables the reactor and abandons all nuclear programs, it will eventually receive another 950,000 tons of fuel oil or an equivalent value of economic aid. As a result, some conservative politicians have denounced the accord. For example, John R. Bolton, the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said, It is a bad deal for two reasons. First, it contradicts the fundamental premises of the policy that President Bush has followed since the beginning of his administration. Second, it makes the Bush administration look very weak at a time when U.S. troops are in Iraq and when the United States needs to look strong in dealing with Iran. According to critics, if there were no Banco Delta Asia, which holds $25 million in North Korean accounts, the new agreement would contain exactly the same things that North Korea sought in its negotiations with the United States during the first nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, which resulted in the now-scrapped Agreed Framework (Kessler, 2007).Reasons for the Denuclearization AgreementAccording to U.S. think tanks and policy analysts, the United States has four options in dealing with a nuclear North Korea (Bray, 2003):1. Give economic aid and security assurance if North Korea dismantles its nuclear program.2. Use a military strike against the North Korean nuclear facilities.3. Let North Korea develop nuclear weapons.4. Starve the North Korean regime of money.We will describe some details of these four options below. First, the United States could hand out economic aid and security assurance if North Korea dismantles its nuclear program. …

U.S. Policy toward North Korea in Strategic Context: Tempting Goliath's Fate

Since the collapse of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework in 2002, the Bush administration has failed to restrain North Korea's nuclear weapons ambitions, principally because of the constraints of highly idealized convictions. Resolution of the Korean nuclear crisis now depends on U.S. initiative beyond the boundaries of these predispositions and beyond the terms of the nuclear crisis itself.

Seminars on North Korea Organized by the Editor

The United States and the Two KoreasA Joint Seminar by the Korea Economic Institute of America and the University of Detroit Mercy12:30-17:00, March 23, 2005Commerce & Finance Building, the University of Detroit Mercy, Detroit, MichiganSix distinguished speakers provided an outstanding overview of the Korea problem and United States-Korea relations at The United States and the Two Koreas, a seminar held at the University of Detroit Mercy (UDM) on March 23, 2005. During the seminar, which was co-hosted by the UDM College of Business Administration Institute for Korean Studies and the Korea Economic Institute (KEI) of Washington, D.C., six distinguished speakers-three provided by UDM and three provided by KEI-presented a variety of information on these topics from both a political and an economic standpoint. Over 80 guests from the business community, the academic community, and the student population attended the seminar.James J. Przystup, Senior Fellow and Research Professor at the National Defense University began the first panel of the seminar, North Korea's Defining Moment, by reviewing the activities that led to the 1994 Agreed Framework, the Sunshine Policy, and today's six-party framework. Mr. Przystup stated that Korea's nuclear strategy is not just a U.S.-North Korea bilateral issue, due to the fact that nuclear proliferation involving the peninsula is a threat to the whole world. Since the six-party talks are currently stalled, in order to move forward there will need to be concessions or pressures. The goals of all of the six parties are the same: no war, no collapse of the current Korean regime, and a de-nuclearized peninsula. However, not all of the six parties prioritize these goals in the same manner. For instance, the threat of a collapse of the Korean regime is greater for South Korea, as they know from their studies of the collapse of East Germany and German reunification. In contrast, China may be more prepared to live with a nuclear Korea as long as the situation remains ambiguous, and for the U.S. the biggest priority is the removal of nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula.Mr. Przystup stated that he does not see any concessions coming from the Bush administration, since they appear to believe that concessions would legitimatize the Korean regime. He also does not believe that Korea will use nuclear weapons, because it is against their best interests to do so. Mr. Przystup went on to clarify that the world should not make the assumption that Korea desires to join the international community. For the Korean elite that makes up the regime, isolation is the best guarantee of their continued prominence.Next to speak was Scott Rembrandt, Director of Research and Academic Affairs of the KEI, who gave the South Korean perspective of the Korean problem. He believes that the current process of having six-party talks is necessary and correct. From South Korean viewpoint, the U.S. needs to be more flexible in its stance. South Koreans see Koreans as weak, in decline, and lacking the will and capacity to attack. Since they therefore see no direct threat from Korea, and due to the fact that they have a cultural alliance bound by blood, they believe that more concessions are necessary than pressures. South Korea would recommend that the U.S. offers more concessions, and avoids any type of roadmap such as that in use for the Middle East. Koreans are less linear and would prefer a buffet of concessions.Mr. Rembrandt went on to discuss the recent Korean Human Rights Act. He sees this as a good-faith effort on the part of the Bush administration, meant to help Korean refugees. However, this Act also masks the desire of the Bush administration to bring about regime change, and that desire will lead to reluctance on the part of Korea to return to negotiations within the framework of the six-party talks. …

Between a Rock and an Incomprehensible Place: The United States and the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Abstract This paper is concerned with the second North Korean nuclear crisis and the Six-Party Talks. It seeks to explain the collapse of the Agreed Framework resulting from the shift in U.S. policy under the Bush administration and the decision by North Korea to resume nuclear activities. It discusses the origins, the course and the failure of the Six-Party Talks prior to their resumption in July 2005. It shows how the political philosophy of the Bush administration led it to adopt tactics that were unsuitable for the achievement of the objective of disarmament. Likewise, Pyongyang proceeded from assumptions that were erroneous, and Washington proved to be impervious to its threats and brinkmanship. Thus, while North Korea strove to improve its bargaining power, it had no strategy of how to make use of it, having lost the gains achieved under the Agreed Framework. The article elucidates the structural impediments to a successful outcome, which consist in the divergent objectives among the parties to the talks, the problem of dealing with a nuclear program that is claimed not to exist (the HEU program), the disagreement with North Korea about the modalities of disarmament and the unwillingness of Pyongyang to finally renounce all nuclear activities. It is argued that the nuclear crisis is merely a symptom of the fundamental crisis of the lack of sustainability of the North Korean state and that the nuclear issue, while urgent in itself, cannot be dealt with apart from the future of the Korean peninsula as a whole.

The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by North Korea

When in October 2002 the US administration confronted the North Koreans with intelligence that the latter had a program to enrich uranium, another nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula was triggered. It quickly developed into a plutonium crisis because the DPRK then started to “defrost” the nuclear facilities that had been frozen by the Agreed Framework and to revive its nuclear weapons program. North Korea told the world that it was building up a nuclear deterrent force. Though the US administration toyed with the idea of working towards a collapse of the DPRK, it ultimately decided to pursue diplomacy. The two Koreas and the four great Pacific powers got involved in the negotiations. The administration insisted on a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of the North Korean nuclear programs. The DPRK was reluctant to proceed with the talks, since it felt that its basic security interests were being disregarded. Three rounds of six-party talks held in Beijing did not surpass the stage of prenegotiations. At the end of 2004, the prospects for the talks were gloomy.1

North Korea and Renewable Energy

In his News Focus article “Nukes for windmills: quixotic or serious proposition?” (17 Sept., p. [1698][1]) (and the broader article on North Korean science, “A wary pas de deux,” 17 Sept., p. [1696][2]), R. Stone quotes an unofficial envoy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as suggesting that the DPRK would be willing to abandon its nuclear program in exchange for clean energy technologies. The desire of North Koreans for renewable small-scale energy systems is consistent with what we have learned in our contacts with DPRK researchers and engineers in the context of our North Korean wind power project ([1][3]). The key energy elements of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the DPRK—the two large (1 GW) light-water reactors (LWRs) and the 500,000 tonnes/year of heavy fuel oil that were to have been provided to the DPRK until the reactors were completed—were political compromises with severe practical drawbacks. The LWRs could not be operated safely without an interconnection to South Korea's grid, and the bottom-of-the-barrel, high-sulfur heavy fuel oil has reportedly accelerated degradation of an already dilapidated thermal power plant fleet ([2][4]). Small and mini hydroelectric systems are a good match to the DPRK's terrain and climate, and parts of the DPRK seem to have at least a fair wind resource. Renewable options put the focus on economic redevelopment on the local level, rather than on the less tractable national level. Renewable energy systems are not going to be enough by themselves to makeover the DPRK's energy sector in the near term, but can certainly contribute to the redevelopment of the DPRK energy infrastructure. They are also relatively resistant to diversion to military use and would engage a broad group of North Korean citizens with visitors from the outside as technological skills are transferred. 1. 1.[↵][5] 1. J. Williams, 2. P. Hayes, 3. C. Greacen, 4. D. Von Hippel, 5. M. Sagrillo , Bull. Atom. Sci. 55(no. 03), 40 (May/June 1999). [OpenUrl][6][CrossRef][7] 2. 2.[↵][8] 1. D. Von Hippel, 2. P. Hayes, 3. T. Savage, 4. M. Nakata , Modernizing the US-DPRK Agreed Framework: The Energy Imperative (Nautilus Institute Report, Nautilus Institute, Berkeley, CA, 2001) Discussions of the Agreed Framework and an analysis of the DPRK energy sector can be found in (available at ), and D. Von Hippel, P. Hayes, and T. Savage, The DPRK Energy Sector: Estimated Year 2000 Energy Balance and Suggested Approaches to Sectoral Redevelopment (Nautilus Institute, Berkeley, CA, 2003) (Nautilus Institute Report prepared for the Korea Energy Economics Institute). [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.305.5691.1698 [2]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.305.5691.1696b [3]: #ref-1 [4]: #ref-2 [5]: #xref-ref-1-1 View reference 1. in text [6]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DBull.%2BAtom.%2BSci.%26rft.volume%253D55%26rft.issue%253Dno.%2B03%26rft.spage%253D40%26rft.atitle%253DBULL%2BATOM%2BSCI%26rft_id%253Dinfo%253Adoi%252F10.2968%252F055003014%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [7]: /lookup/external-ref?access_num=10.2968/055003014&link_type=DOI [8]: #xref-ref-2-1 View reference 2. in text