Agency Costs Of Debt Research Articles

Exploring the agency cost of debt: risk, information flow, and CEO social ties

Exploring the agency cost of debt: risk, information flow, and CEO social ties

Leverage ratio and corporate performance: Do marginal cost and marginal benefit of debt matter

This study examines leverage ratio and firm performance considering marginal benefits and marginal costs of debt to a firm. A total of 16 non-financial firms over a 15 year period (2001-2015) were randomly selected for the study. The panel data were subjected to Panel Least Square, Fixed Effects, and Random Effects regression estimations to test the formulated models in the study. Also the study employed Hausman Test to ascertain whether random effects model is the appropriate model or if fixed effects model is the appropriate model. The results shows that long term debt ratio (LTDR) have positive and significant influence on performance of Nigerian firms measured by Return on Asset (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). Short term debt ratio (STDR) on the other hand, established negative and significant effect on ROA, and negative and insignificant impact on ROE. STDR accounting for 75% mean value of the total debt ratio of the sampled firms, the researcher therefore, infer that financial structure has negative and significant influence on the performance of Nigerian firms. This outcome is attributed to mismatch of funds and high risk investment (asset substitution effect) resulting to marginal benefits of monitoring and bonding activities less than the marginal costs as noted by agency cost theory. The study therefore concludes that debt is valuable in reducing the agency costs of equity in professionally managed firm but at the same time debt is costly as it increase the agency cost of debt.

When shareholders cross-hold lenders’ equity: The effects on the costs of bank loans

We show that syndicated loan spreads are lower as borrowers’ shareholders cross-hold more lenders’ equity. Apart from controlling for borrower and lender fixed effects and various other ownership measures, we address endogeneity concerns by conducting a difference-in-differences analysis exploiting the mergers of institutional investors. Additional tests on cross-holding shareholders’ holding period, the impact of active cross-holders, subsamples of borrowers subject to different degrees of shareholder–creditor conflicts, changes in borrower risk around loan initiation, and the number of financial covenants provide support for the hypothesis that borrower shareholders’ equity holdings of lenders reduce agency costs of debt.

How does excess cash affect corporate financial performance?

PurposeThis article analyzes the moderating role of investment opportunities, business risk and agency costs in shaping the nexus between excess cash and corporate performance.Design/methodology/approachThis research uses dynamic regression models (two-step system generalized method of moments) to analyze the data related to 200 Turkish companies listed on Borsa Istanbul (BIST) for the years between 2009 and 2020.FindingsThe findings indicate that when excess cash increases, the financial performance deteriorates only for firms with lower investments compared to firms with more investments. In addition, investment contributes to better financial performance for firms that hold cash surplus, whereas the influence of investment is insignificant for firms that have insufficient cash. Agency costs of equity exacerbate the adverse impact of excess cash on financial performance while agency costs of debt mitigate this effect. Excess cash reduces the financial performance of highly leveraged firms. However, this impact becomes insignificant when debt ratio decreases. The findings also show that investment has more significant role than business risk in building the precautionary motive to hold cash.Research limitations/implicationsThe findings of this article are limited to the Turkish market. Future research is still needed in other emerging markets to compare the results and reveal more about the effect of excess cash on firm performance, and how other factors can change this effect.Practical implicationsThe findings verify the increased significance of excess cash in the presence of investment opportunities and difficulties in accessing external funds. Nevertheless, the role of the equity related agency problem in reducing the benefits of cash surplus confirms the necessity of policies that support corporate governance, especially in emerging markets.Originality/valueThis article, according to the knowledge of author, is the first to examine the role of agency costs associated with debt and equity, and the compound effect of investment opportunities and business risk on the nexus between excess internal funds and corporate financial performance in emerging markets.

CEO narcissism and the agency cost of debt

This study investigates the relationship between CEO narcissism and debt financing costs, highlighting a potential trade-off between leadership traits and firm financial well-being. While prior research has identified potential benefits associated with narcissistic CEOs, such as enhanced innovation, we demonstrate that such leadership incurs higher borrowing costs, as evidenced by elevated bond yields in firms led by narcissistic executives. This effect is amplified for grandiose narcissists, suggesting that investors are particularly wary of their risk-taking tendencies. Leveraging a natural experiment, we establish a robust causal link between narcissism and debt costs, revealing higher bond yield premiums demanded by investors in firms with narcissistic CEOs. These findings underscore the critical importance of considering CEO personality traits, particularly narcissism when evaluating corporate governance practices and ensuring optimal alignment with stakeholders' interests.

Do Better Managers Get Better Loan Contracts?

This paper examines the impact of managerial ability on bank loan contracting. We find that firms with higher‐ability managers obtain more favourable loan contract terms, including lower loan spreads, fewer covenants, and more short‐term maturities. Furthermore, the negative relation between managerial ability and loan spread is concentrated in firms with higher information asymmetry, higher default risk, or lower agency costs of debt. Finally, we find that firms with higher‐ability managers are more likely to choose public bonds over bank loans.

The Moderating Role of Corporate Governance in the Relationship between Leverage and Firm Value: Evidence from the Korean Market

This study examines the moderating function of corporate governance (CG) to the relationship between leverage and firm value (FV) using Korean market data. The study employs ordinary least-squares panel data regressions and two methods to manage endogeneity problems. The findings show a meaningful negative relationship between leverage and FV. This relationship, however, disappears, when the interaction variable of leverage × CG is included in the econometric model. These results indicate that an effective CG mechanism may lessen the probability of either the entrenched management-decision-making behavior or the agency costs of debt and, therefore, the negative effect of debt to FV diminishes. Moreover, our data show that the relationship between leverage and FV becomes positive, even though insignificant, for firms with a high level of CG, whereas it stays significantly negative for firms with a low level of CG. We also find that leverage for firms with a high level of CG is lower than those firms with a low level of CG. These additional findings support our conclusion of the moderating role of CG, which also influences the firms’ risk, leverage, and FV. The authors recommend the implementation of a robust CG plan to decrease the information asymmetry and the agency leverage problem.

Board reforms and the choice of debt: international evidence

PurposeThe authors examine how the major board reforms recently implemented by countries around the world affect firms' choice of debt.Design/methodology/approachUsing a quasi-experimental setting of major board reforms around the world that aim to improve board-related governance practices in various areas, this study investigates the impact of effective board monitoring on corporate debt choice. The authors employ difference-in-differences-type quasi-natural experiment method and path analysis for hypotheses testing.FindingsThe authors find that the implementation of board reforms is positively associated with firms' preference for public debt financing over bank debt. However, this effect tends to weaken after the fourth year following the implementation of board reforms. In additional analyses, the authors find that “rule-based” reforms have a more pronounced effect on firms' choice of debt than do “comply-or-explain” reforms. Both (1) strengthened firm-level internal governance practices that address concerns about the agency cost of debt and (2) reduced information asymmetries play important roles in facilitating firms' debt choice, but the evidence suggests that the former is the economic mechanism through which country-level reforms affect corporate debt choice.Research limitations/implicationsThe study extends the literature examining the heterogeneity of corporate debt choices in a global setting and the literature on the consequences of corporate governance reforms.Practical implicationsThe findings demonstrate the effectiveness of the corporate board reforms implemented in countries around the world, addressing concerns from critics about their potential harm or ineffectiveness.Originality/valueThe results indicate that country-level board reforms reduce the extent to which shareholder–creditor conflicts harm shareholders.

Agency cost of debt as incentive for executive inside debt: Evidence from empirical study

Agency cost of debt as incentive for executive inside debt: Evidence from empirical study

Large shareholders and agency costs of debt. Evidence from Spain

This paper analyses the influence of large controlling shareholders on the terms of bank loans for a sample of 984 loans to 261 non-financial Spanish public and private firms over the period 2001-2017. The results show that the presence of large controlling shareholders increases the interest rate spread of bank loans only in public firms, whereas the influence is insignificant for private firms. Similarly, a less evenly balanced distribution of ownership among large shareholders is associated with higher loan spreads for public firms. Our results reveal that large controlling shareholders expropriate wealth from other investors in public firms, in line with the existence of lower benefits for borrowers due to having large controlling shareholders when they have other internal and external mechanisms of control. El objetivo del presente trabajo consiste en analizar la influencia que los grandes accionistas tienen sobre las condiciones de los préstamos bancarios para una muestra compuesta por 984 préstamos realizados a 261 empresas cotizadas y no cotizadas españolas no financieras durante el periodo 2001-2017. Los resultados muestran que la presencia de grandes accionistas incrementa el tipo de interés pagado por los préstamos en el caso de las empresas cotizadas, mientras el efecto no es significativo para las empresas no cotizadas. De forma similar, una distribución de la propiedad menos equilibrada entre los grandes accionistas está asociada con un mayor tipo de interés pagado por las empresas cotizadas. Los resultados ponen de manifiesto que los grandes accionistas expropian riqueza de otros inversores en las empresas cotizadas, en línea con la existencia de menores beneficios para los prestatarios de la existencia de grandes accionistas cuando disponen de otros mecanismos, tanto internos como externos, de control.

Borrower-Lender Cross-Ownership and Borrower Audit Quality

SUMMARY We study the effect of borrower-lender cross-ownership on the demand for a borrower’s external audit quality in syndicated loan settings. Cross-owners, which are institutional investors who hold the equities of both the borrower and the lead lender of syndicated loans, have the ability and incentive to increase the economic benefits accruing to both contracting parties. We hypothesize that cross-owners demand high-quality audits of the borrower’s financial information as a delegated monitoring device to resolve the agency cost of debt and improve contract efficiency. Our evidence shows that cross-ownership is positively associated with higher borrower audit fees, our proxy for audit quality. We also find that the effect is more pronounced for larger loans. Overall, these results suggest that cross-owners view external audits to be a viable monitoring mechanism for improving overall debt contacting efficiency. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M42; M48.

Pre-LBO Credit Market Conditions and Post-LBO Target Behavior

In the context of leveraged buyouts (LBOs), this paper empirically studies the relation between pre-buyout credit market conditions and the post-buyout behavior of target companies, employing a supervisory dataset to overcome limited data availability for post-buyout target financial information. We propose an LBO-specific measure of (changes of) credit market conditions---the short-term (6-month) change of credit spreads leading up to buyout close. Using this proposed measure, we show that loosening pre-LBO credit market conditions, which are related to higher buyout leverage consistent with the literature, are associated with poor post-LBO (operating) performance of the target company. These results support the narrative of agency costs of debt such as risk shifting and debt overhang but are inconsistent with theories of disciplinary effects of debt. We provide further evidence supportive of the theories of agency costs of debt and some results favorable to the risk shifting story.

Sukūk development and income inequality

This paper investigates the link between sukūk development and income inequality by scrutinizing twenty-two countries’ data from 1995 to 2019. We employ the two-stage Fractional Regression Model to illustrate that sukūk issuance is associated with increased income disparity. This result is attributed to the sukūk design ignoring credit market frictions. This rationalizes the sukūk-inequality nexus in light of the ethical objectives of Islamic law. We argue that reinforcing property rights by mitigating the ill effects of excessive risk-taking (i.e., gharar) and endemic agency costs of debt (i.e., ribā) in our ethical framework can improve sukūk’s role in socio-economic development.

Contracting Costs, Covenant-Lite Lending, and Reputational Capital

Abstract Using a large sample of leveraged loans, we provide evidence that, despite having fewer creditor control rights, covenant-lite (Cov-Lite) loans have similar recovery rates and significantly lower spreads than loans with maintenance covenants. We find that the propensity to borrow Cov-Lite is related to various proxies for the reputational capital of a borrowing firm’s private equity sponsor. We construct a simple model to illustrate the relationship between reputational capital, covenants, and loan spreads in the leveraged loan market. Our model illustrates how reputational capital can substitute for covenants in mitigating agency costs of debt, leading to lower loan spreads for Cov-Lite loans.

Investment decisions and financial leverage under a potential entry threat

This study examines investment and financing decisions for a pioneering firm and agency costs of debt in the presence of a potential competitor’s entry threat. It demonstrates that the pioneer’s high leverage induces the competitor to enter the market in a downturn and creates exposure to the risk of forced bankruptcy, apart from expediting its market entry in an upturn. Therefore, the potential entry threat hinders the pioneer from debt financing, and thus mitigates agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders due to straining shareholders’ self-interest to expedite investment decisions at bondholders’ expense. As Mauer and Sarkar (2005) show that debt financing creates the overinvestment problem to expedite investment decisions in the absence of a potential entry threat, it remains in its presence. The results also provide empirical implications for the relationships among potential entry threats, debt financing, and investment decisions in uncertain nascent industries.

How does corporate ESG performance affect bond credit spreads: Empirical evidence from China

In recent years, as the concept of sustainable development has grown in popularity, ESG has attracted widespread interest from people of all backgrounds. This paper empirically investigates the impact of corporate ESG performance on bond credit spreads using a sample of 988 bonds issued by 443 A-share listed companies from the first quarter of 2009 to the fourth quarter of 2020. Results indicate that bond credit spreads are lower for listed companies with higher ESG performance. Good ESG performance decreases bond credit spreads by decreasing corporate financial risk, enhancing corporate transparency, and decreasing debt agency costs. The effect of ESG performance on bond credit spreads is more pronounced for non-state enterprises, enterprises in poor macroeconomic environments, and enterprises in regions with a higher degree of marketization. This study provides evidence for the positive economic consequences of ESG performance from the perspective of bond financing, with implications for firms to improve ESG performance and bond investors to optimize investment decisions.

Determinants of Debt Financing: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Financial Listed Companies in Sri Lanka

The purpose of this study is to identify the factors which determine the level of debt financing over the equity financing of the non-financial companies in Sri Lanka. The study is conducted on a sample of 30 companies from non-finance companies listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE). The sample consists of 20 companies that are selected based on the highest market capitalization and 10 companies which have issued debentures in the market. The data are obtained from the annual reports of sample companies for the years 2015 to 2018 for this purpose. A panel data regression analysis is conducted to analyze whether the firm performance, age, size, agency cost of debt, tangibility, sales growth, liquidity, and tax shield have an impact on the debt financing decisions of the firm. The pecking order theory, agency theory, and trade-off theory are used to explain the impact of determinants on debt financing. The findings of the analysis show that the firm performance, size, liquidity, tangibility, sales growth, and agency cost of debt have generated an inverse association with the firm leverage. Age and non-debt tax shield positively correlated with leverage according to the analysis. Findings are in line with the hypotheses developed except for firm size, tangibility, and non-debt tax shield. The size of the firm and tangibility deviate from the hypotheses developed while the non-debt tax shield is found to be insignificant in influencing its decision to apply for financing. This research has provided the basis to explore the determinants of debt financing in the overall capital structure of Sri Lankan firms. The results are useful for the managers and the policymakers to have knowledge about the firm-specific determinants of debt financing, and it should help corporate managers to make optimal capital structure decisions. This study contributes to enhancing the existing literature by analyzing the impact of determinants of debt financing in listed non-financial companies in Sri Lanka.

Proxy contests and debt contracting behavior: The interplay of managerial, shareholder and creditor incentives

AbstractWe evaluate how heterogeneity in the strategic interplay among shareholder, creditor and manager incentives influences debt contracting behavior around proxy contests. We find that, after proxy contests, new loan originations have significantly higher spreads and more stringent non‐pricing contracting terms. The effect, however, occurs largely in contest firms where Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are provided with risk‐taking incentives. Further, creditors’ simultaneous equity holdings and credit default swaps (CDS) trading attenuate the impact of proxy contests on debt contracting costs. Finally, proxy contests that culminate in voting and dissident victory experience the largest increase in loan pricing. Overall, our results suggest an increase in the agency cost of debt occurs after proxy contests, particularly when managerial risk‐taking incentives are high, and when creditors do not simultaneously hold target firms’ equity or CDS.

Tournament-based incentives and the lease-versus-buy decision

This paper investigates the effect of firms’ tournament-based incentives (TI) on leasing. Measuring TI as the pay gap between the chief executive officer (CEO) and non-CEO executives, we find that firms with higher TI have a higher propensity to lease than purchase assets. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that this positive association is stronger for firms with high information asymmetry, low creditworthiness, and high cash-flow uncertainty. Consistent with “financial contracting” motivations of the lease suggested by Smith and Wakeman (1985), our findings indicate that, when risky corporate activities induced by TI lead to an increased agency cost of debt, leasing could more likely be used to economize on the costly external finances.

Prosocial CEOs and the cost of debt: Evidence from syndicated loan contracts

This paper investigates whether banks value the presence of prosocial CEOs when designing loan contracts. Using personal charitable donation behavior to identify prosocial CEOs, we find robust evidence that the presence of prosocial CEOs is negatively related to firms' cost of debt. We address endogeneity concerns by employing a difference-in-differences setting that exploits exogenous CEO turnover events. Moreover, we show that the presence of prosocial CEOs mitigates the conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors, thereby reduces the agency cost of debt. In addition, we find that the effect of prosocial CEOs also extends to non-price loan contract terms. Finally, we show that the presence of prosocial CEOs has positive implications for firm value and is associated with lower default risk.