Aftermarket Price Research Articles

Pre-IPO hype by affiliated analysts: Motives and consequences

We provide the first study of underwriter-affiliated analysts' pre-IPO research coverage and its impact on stock prices. Using proprietary data on a sample of Chinese IPOs, we document that affiliated analysts make highly overoptimistic forecasts about IPO clients. Analyst hype inflates both the offer price and the aftermarket price. Consistent with the sentiment theory, IPO investors inadequately adjust to analyst hype because the offer price is set sufficiently lower than the aftermarket price. The results hold when we instrument analyst hype with a variable that affects their hyping incentive. We also utilize a regulatory change as a quasi-experiment. Our analysis contributes to the debate about regulations on pre-IPO information provision.

A comparison of direct listings and IPOs

AbstractIPOs and direct listings (DLs) offer two different mechanisms for firms to go public. In contrast to IPOs, DLs do not employ an underwriter or raise new capital. Using a sample of IPOs and DLs on major stock markets in the European Union, we document that firms that choose to go public via DLs are larger, more profitable, and less levered, on average, than IPO firms. These pre‐listing differences suggest that DL firms should be less risky than IPO firms; however, controlling for this selection effect, we find that DLs have higher aftermarket price volatility than IPOs. This is consistent with some policy‐makers' concerns that, because they lack an underwriter, DLs expose investors to higher risk than IPOs in the immediate post‐listing period. We show that this heightened price volatility persists, on average, for the first 20 trading days after listings, and is larger in industries where listed peer firms provide relatively low‐quality disclosures. Our results provide new evidence regarding the types of firms that choose to list via DLs versus IPOs and the riskiness of IPOs versus DLs in the immediate post‐listing period; additionally, our results are consistent with underwriters improving the quality of information available to investors for IPO firms in the pre‐listing period.

Can Market-oriented Reform Improve Pricing Efficiency in China? Evidence from Registration-based IPO System

Registration-based IPO system has been regarded as the most important financial reform of China in recent years, and is expected to mitigate the severe IPO underpricing in Chinese market. Despite its importance, the impacts of the reform still remain unexplored. This paper examines the institutional investors, information disclosure, and IPO inquiry process as causes of the reduction in efficiency and makes recommendations. Our findings indicate that the reform improves price efficiency in the short and long term. After the implementation of registration-based system, the delisting of poorly performing companies is more efficient. The market-oriented reform shows its ability to improve the inclusiveness and opening-up of the A-share market, give full play to the power of the capital market in driving innovation, better serve the real economy, and contribute to state economic transformation and upgrade. At the same time, registration-based IPO system may amplify the aggressive speculation on the newly listed stocks, which blows up the aftermarket prices.

The Economics of IPO Stabilization, Syndicates and Naked Shorts

Stabilization is the bidding for and purchase of securities by an underwriter immediately after an offering for the purpose of preventing or retarding a fall in price. Stabilization is price manipulation, but regulators allow it within strict limits – notably that stabilization may not occur above the offer price. For legislators and market authorities, a false market is a price worth paying for an orderly market. This paper compares the rational for regulators’ allowing IPO stabilization with its effects. It finds that stabilization does have the intended effects, but that underwriters also seem to have other motives to stabilize, including favouring certain aftermarket sellers and enhancing their own reputation and profits. A puzzling aspect of stabilization is why underwriters create ‘naked short’ positions which are loss-making to cover when, as is usual, the aftermarket price rises to a premium. We set up a model to show that the lead underwriter may profit from a naked short at the expense of the rest of the syndicate given the way commissions are apportioned between them. We argue that a naked short mitigates the misalignment of interests which stabilization causes between issuer and lead underwriter, although it does so at the expense of the non-lead underwriters.

Optimism, divergence of investors’ opinions, and the long-run underperformance of IPOs

The long-run underperformance of initial public offerings (IPOs) suggests that aftermarket prices are overvalued. According to the theory of heterogeneous beliefs and short-sale constraints, the aftermarket price of IPOs is overvalued; in addition, their performance deteriorates when the mean level of optimism and degree of divergence of investors’ opinions increase. I examine this phenomenon by estimating the mean and divergence of investor opinion distribution by focusing on Japanese auction-method IPOs. According to the results, both optimism and divergence cause the overvaluation of IPO’s first-day market price; however, only the mean level of optimism is statistically significant in explaining post-IPO underperformance.

IPO policy and IPO underpricing: Evidence from the registration-based IPO reform in China

Based on difference-in-differences method, this document investigates the effects of IPO policies on price efficiency of the Chinese market IPOs. Different from the existing literatures, we document that market-oriented reform even significantly magnifies the initial returns, and no significant effects are detected in longer periods. We argue that registration-based IPO system may amplify the aggressive speculation on the newly listed stocks, which blows up the after-market prices.

The “7% solution” and IPO (under)pricing

We investigate the effect of the “7% solution”—the fact that underwriters in the U.S. charge a 7% spread to most IPOs between $20 million and $100 million in size—on the ensuing pricing of the offerings. Our identification exploits the variation in spreads that is due to distinct kinks in the relation between spread and offer size at these two thresholds. We find the spread positively influences underpricing but also the offer-price adjustment from the filing range's midpoint. Our evidence indicates the spread influences the aftermarket price, suggesting underwriters can shape, not merely discover, investor valuations.

The '7% Solution' and IPO (Under)Pricing

We investigate the effect of the “7% solution”—the fact that underwriters in the U.S. charge a 7% spread to most IPOs between $20 million and $100 million in size—on the ensuing pricing of the offerings. Our identification exploits the variation in spreads that is due to distinct kinks in the relation between spread and offer size at these two thresholds. We find that the spread positively influences underpricing but also the offer-price adjustment from the filing range’s midpoint. Our evidence indicates that the spread influences the aftermarket price, suggesting that underwriters can shape, not merely discover, investor valuations.

IPO Underpricing and Aftermarket Price Accuracy: Auctions vs. Bookbuilding in Japan

We analyse a regulatory change in the Japanese IPO market that created an abrupt shift from hybrid price-discriminatory auctions to bookbuilding. We find that bookbuilding leads to significantly higher underpricing than hybrid price-discriminatory auctions. Further, we find evidence that price accuracy tends to be higher for auctions than for bookbuilding. The results hold under a variety of OLS specifications and with regression discontinuity designs exploiting the abrupt change of the regulation. The results suggest that the interests of issuers and underwriters are not aligned. The popularity of bookbuilding seems puzzling from this perspective.

Green Shoe Option And Its Role In Post Issue Price Stabilization In Indian Capital Market

A green shoe option (GSO) provides the option of allotting equity shares in excess of the equity shares offered in the public issue as a post-listing price stabilizing mechanism. This research paper covers the process overview of green shoe option in India and compares it with the process prevailing in other countries. The paper also consists of rationale for including green shoe option in IPO programs. The paper further examines whether companies need to include GSOs in their initial public offerings (IPOs), and explores the reasons for the indifference on the part of issuer companies and merchant banks in India towards GSOs. The aftermarket price performance of companies that included GSOs in their IPOs is analysed; however, the results of this analysis do not lead to any generalization due to the small number of companies that opted for GSO.

Differences of opinion, institutional bids, and IPO underpricing

Miller (1977) hypothesizes that IPO underpricing arises because the issue price is based on the average opinion while the aftermarket price is set by a minority of optimistic investors. Using a unique data set of institutional bids for a large sample of Chinese IPOs, we show that the IPO issue price is positively related to the quantity-weighted average bid price and unrelated to the market-clearing bid price. In contrast, the first-day closing price is positively related to the market-clearing bid price and unrelated to the average bid price. Overall, our results provide strong support for Miller's explanation of IPO underpricing.

REVISITING BOOKBUILDING VERSUS AUCTION IPOS: A PERSPECTIVE OF INFORMATIONALLY EFFICIENT PRICES IN THE AFTERMARKET

AbstractWe compare price efficiency between auction and bookbuilding initial public offerings (IPOs). Our empirical results fail to support the prevailing conjecture that bookbuilding IPOs are more price efficient than auction IPOs. We find statistical insignificance between two IPO samples or weak evidence for the opposite hypothesis. We add to the evidence that auctions yield aftermarket price efficiency equal to that of bookbuilding or are statistically indifferent when measured by market microstructure and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data. We also examine whether underlying price efficiency forces reflect the relative presence of informed institutional and retail investors, aftermarket price support, and divergence of investor expectations.

Kondycja finansowa spółek dokonujących IPO: znaczenie wielkości i zyskowności

The study investigates the price behavior after initial public offerings (IPOs) listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange from 2004 to 2009. It focuses on possible explanations for the IPO phenomenon within the context of Poland and provides evidence on the relation between both the company size and profitability and the aftermarket price performance. The study aims to answer three questions. First, whether we could observe the short-term underpricing and the long­ term underperformance of Polish IPOs, including the financial crisis period. Second, if the IPO anomalies did exist, whether they were distinct for the size and profitability subsamples. Finally, the change of the profitability was investigated for size subsamples from before to after going public.A lower level of the underpricing and three-year underperformance was reported in comparison to the previous WSE studies. The pre‐issue company size influences the IPO underpricing with the higher level of returns for smaller companies. Concerning the long-term performance, the opposite relation between size and buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns was found. It was also found that the higher the pre‐issue profitability, the higher the underpricing. Large companies experience a better profitability improvement in the pre‐IPO period with the profitability ratios getting worse not so rapidly after the flotation.

The Influence of Market Activities and Underwriter Reputation Towards the Excess Returns in the IPO Underwriting Process in Indonesian Capital Market

This study provides a more comprehensive analysis of an IPO (Initial Public Offering) underwriting process. It considers the set of actions that an underwriter undertakes as an integrated process, explicitly recognizing the interdependencies among pre-market, issue-date, and aftermarket underwriter activities. It can be drawn only if these relationships are fully rather than partially considered. This analysis clarifies the relationships between the various underwriter activities and the returns that investors earn during different periods after the offerings. It also shows that an underwriter reputation has implications for both underwriter activities during the underwriting process and investor returns.Underwriter reputation is a positive but weakly determinant of pre-market underwriter activities, unrelated to aftermarket price stabilization activities, and unrelated to investor returns. Pre-market underwriter activities are a significant determinant of initial returns but unrelated to aftermarket activities and short-run returns. Initial returns are significantly related to aftermarket underwriter activities and longer-run returns. The results suggest for a simultaneous consideration of underwriter reputation and market activities, and for which path analysis can be drawn about the IPO as a set of process and investor returns.

Earnings management and IPO anomalies in China

This paper empirically examines the impact of earnings management and investor sentiment on IPO anomalies using a sample of 506 Chinese IPOs issued over the 1998–2003 period. We develop a parsimonious pricing model in which both the offer price and the short-term aftermarket price are influenced by the use of earnings management, and show that the offer price can be below the fair price while the short-term equilibrium price in the aftermarket can be overvalued due to investor sentiment. Consistent with the overreaction hypothesis, the empirical results reveal a positive relation between the initial return and managed accruals and a negative relation between the long-term stock performance and the initial return. Earnings management appears to generate a pattern where the initial price following an IPO tends to be inflated by overreaction in the secondary market but adjusts to its fundamental level in the long run. These findings are robust across a variety of test specifications.

Does Prohibiting 'Lock-In' Improve Aftermarket Outcomes? Evidence from the Fairness to Contact Lens Consumers Act

Because a patient must have a prescription to purchase contact lenses, prescribing eye care professional (ECPs) have incentives to take advantage of locked-in patients. I use the Fairness to Contact Lens Consumers Act (FCLCA) – which outlawed lock-in – as a natural experiment to perform (to my knowledge) the first empirical examination of the effect of lock-in on aftermarket prices. Examination of the pre- and post-FCLCA price gap between ECPs and online sellers indicates that pricing in the contact lens market has not systematically changed since FCLCA. One conjecture from these results is that search costs may be responsible for persistent ECP premiums in this market. To the extent that they are generalizable, these results also indicate that the current antitrust treatment of power derived from proprietary aftermarkets may be welfare reducing.

Stabilization and the aftermarket prices of initial public offerings

The paper examines the determinants of stabilization and its impact on the aftermarket prices. We use a unique dataset to relax several assumptions in the stabilization literature. We find that underwriters support IPO prices shortly after listing, particularly in cold markets and when demand is weak. We also show that stabilized IPOs are more common amongst reputable underwriters. This finding suggests that stabilization may be used as a mechanism to protect the underwriter’s reputation. It also implies that reputable underwriters may possess private information and price IPOs closer to their true values (i.e., higher than those indicated by the weak premarket demand). Consistent with the latter view, we show that stabilized IPOs are offered at higher prices and suffer less underpricing than those indicated by the premarket demand, firm characteristics and market-wide conditions. The post-IPO performance results indicate that stabilized IPOs are unlikely to be mispriced as their prices do not exhibit any significant reversal after the initial stabilization period. We conclude that stabilization may be superior to underpricing as it protects investors from purchasing overpriced IPOs, benefits issuers by reducing the total money “left on the table” and enhances the overall profitability of underwriters.

IPO pricing: a case of short-sale restrictions and divergent expectations

Prior research shows that short-sale restrictions during an IPO lead to higher aftermarket prices. Using this and heterogeneous expectations on the factor pricing coefficient, our model sheds additional light on the impact of the short-selling constraint. Like prior research, short-sale restrictions in the IPO market lead to higher aftermarket prices. Importantly, our model predicts that this constraint leads to a different factor pricing coefficient than the analog under complete markets. Our empirical tests over an extended period of time support the model's predictions.

Retail Trading and IPO Returns in the Aftermarket

Using trade size from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) data set as a proxy for individual versus institutional trading, this paper finds that the effects of trading of these two types of investors on initial public offering (IPO) returns on the first trading day depend on the hotness of the IPO. My regression results reveal that IPOs’ open‐to‐close returns are positively related to small trade participation, small trade purchases, and small trade order imbalance in the hot IPO sample, but not in the cold and neutral IPO samples. In addition, the aftermarket prices of cold and neutral IPOs are primarily driven by the trading of institutional investors, who are less likely to be driven by sentiment.

Two-Part Tariff and Aftermarket Duopoly: An Illustration

The authors shed light on the original equipment manufacturer's strategic behavior in the duopoly aftermarket. The original equipment manufacturer, firm 1, captures via its foremarket price some fraction of the aftermarket consumer surplus, where that surplus is generated by consumption of its own and its competitor's aftermarket products. The other firm, firm 2, only operates in the aftermarket and does not capture any of the aftermarket consumer surplus. Assuming a Cournot or Stackelberg duopoly aftermarket with firm 1 as the quantity leader, we find the conditions under which firm 1's aftermarket price is above or below its marginal cost; the conditions under which firm 1's profit falls or increases when firm 2 adds value to its aftermarket product or lowers its marginal cost; and the conditions under which firm 1 is less profitable or more profitable in sharing the aftermarket than it would be alone.