Campaign In Afghanistan Research Articles

ПОГЛЯДИ АМЕРИКАНСЬКОГО СУСПІЛЬСТВА НА ВИВЕДЕННЯ СПОЛУЧЕНИМИ ШТАТАМИ ВІЙСЬК ІЗ АФГАНІСТАНУ В 2021 Р.

The aim of the article is to analyze and compare the differences and similarities in the reactions of various groups of American society to the end of the military campaign in Afghanistan. The groups in question are the general public, whose opinion is measured through social surveys, various political experts and think tanks, as well as the American politicians of a wide spectrum of views. The scientific novelty of the article is that the authors research the phenomenon of American public opinion on the aforementioned issue from various angles. The article describes in detail the views of the American public in general and its ideologically differentiated groups; the views of political experts as well as the politicians themselves. The methodological basis of the article. The authors use the analysis method as a general scientific method to explore the opinions of various public groups, including American war veterans, political experts, and politicians. Another method (peculiar for historical analysis) is the comparative-historical method, which is used to compare different societal perspectives on this historical event to discern similarities and differences between those perspectives. The systematic approach is also used to describe the view of American society as a system. The principle of objectivity is also applied to promote the unbiased nature of the authors’ conclusions. Results. The article helps to understand the reaction of different societal groups, including politicians and experts, on the US Armed Forces withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. Conclusions of the authors of this article demonstrate that the majority of the ordinary citizens as well as of the politicians were dissatisfied with the realities of the process of the evacuation of troops and civilians from Afghanistan. The actions of the American government in this regard also received critical appraisal. On the other hand, the majority of the population generally supported the end of the war. The political experts and members of think tanks were divided among themselves on the question of what influence this withdrawal may have on the US popularity and image in the world.

French Military Neurosurgery: At Home and Abroad.

The origins of military neurosurgery are closely linked to those of neurosurgery in France and more particularly in Paris. The history of the field starts with its origins by 2 men, Thierry de Martel and Clovis Vincent. The first note about the creation of military neurosurgery was in 1942, when Marcel David was reassigned from the Sainte Anne Hospital to practice at the Val-de-Grâce Military Hospital. David trained the first military neurosurgeon. The field of military neurosurgery was subsequently developed at the Val-de-Grâce Military Hospital, at Sainte Anne Military Teaching Hospital in Toulon in 1990 and then at Percy Military Teaching Hospital in 1996. Over 29 military neurosurgeons were trained in these institutions. Since 2000, French military neurosurgeons have been deployed from France in the Mobile Neurosurgical Unit. This Mobile Neurosurgical Unit represents 12% of all medical evacuation of casualties categorized as the high dependency level. Neurosurgeons were able to adapt to asymmetrical wars, such as in the Afghanistan campaign where they were deployed in the Role 3 medical treatment facility, and more recently in sub-Saharan conflicts where they were deployed in forward surgical roles. To manage the increasing craniocerebral war casualties in the forward surgical team, the French Military Health Service Academy established a training course referred to as the "Advanced Course for Deployment Surgery" providing neurosurgical damage control skills to general surgeons. Finally, military neurosurgery is reinventing itself to adapt to future conflicts through the enhancement of surgical practices via the addition of head, face, and neck surgeons.

SRAD Director's Corner: Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow

In the fifth installment of the SRAD Director’s Corner, “Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow,” George Shatzer focuses on the failure of the US-led war and reconstruction campaign in Afghanistan. He reviews The Forty-year War in Afghanistan: A Chronicle Foretold by Tariq Ali and The Fifth Act: America’s End in Afghanistan by Elliot Ackerman. He brings personal experience to bear in his review, painting a picture of why the United States failed in Afghanistan and posing these failures as lessons that must be learned before the next war. The books also provide insights for strategists attempting to plan for security in the region.

ADVANCE-TBI study protocol: traumatic brain injury outcomes in UK military personnel serving in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014 – a longitudinal cohort study

IntroductionOutcomes of traumatic brain injury (TBI) are highly variable, with cognitive and psychiatric problems often present in survivors, including an increased dementia risk in the long term. Military personnel are...

SRAD Director's Corner: Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow

In the fifth installment of the SRAD Director’s Corner, “Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow,” George Shatzer focuses on the failure of the US-led war and reconstruction campaign in Afghanistan. He reviews The Forty-year War in Afghanistan: A Chronicle Foretold by Tariq Ali and The Fifth Act: America’s End in Afghanistan by Elliot Ackerman. He brings personal experience to bear in his review, painting a picture of why the United States failed in Afghanistan and posing these failures as lessons that must be learned before the next war. The books also provide insights for strategists attempting to plan for security in the region.

"Success or Failure? The Problem of Evaluating the Results of the US campaign in Afghanistan"

The end of the US campaign in Afghanistan in 2021 has led to mixed outcomes from the point of view of the American expert community. The article analyzes the problems and ways of evaluating the results of the US long-running campaign in Afghanistan. Special attention is paid to the key issues affecting the US withdrawal and to the main conclusions and lessons that American politicians and experts consider necessary to learn to increase the effectiveness of the US foreign policy mechanism.

Reflecting on America’s Withdrawal from Afghanistan: The View From Southeast Asia

This essay reflects on the broad contours of the war in Afghanistan from Southeast Asia’s perspective. While the United States’ withdrawal from Kabul was calamitous, the pessimism about America’s role in Southeast Asia has been overstated. The United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan was largely inconsequential for the region. Southeast Asian states deftly mixed their support for America’s campaign in Afghanistan and the broader war on terror without being seen as too sympathetic, including, in some instances, condemnation of America’s attacks on Islam. Regional governments balanced their domestic political interests with their foreign policy objectives. The abrupt Afghan withdrawal may instead have positive outcomes, as the United States boosted its courtship with countries of Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region through new security arrangements such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the Australian, U.K., and U.S. trilateral pact (AUKUS).

On the question of the secret actions of the United States to support the anti-Soviet campaign in the 1970s and 1980s.

Based on the revealed declassified documents, the paper examines previously unknown sources about the attempts of the American government to support various programs of dissent, freedom of speech and mass media in the USSR and countries where the pro-Soviet regime was supported. The subject of the study is the content of foreign intelligence published and declassified documents describing specific US measures to implement covert actions in Afghanistan in order to counteract the influence and strengthen the position of the USSR, as well as support centrifugal trends in the Soviet Union through the organization and financing of programs to support dissent, the development of radio broadcasting, increasing radio coverage areas, assistance in the publication of Samizdat literature, etc. The object of the work is the documentary correspondence of the US President and key figures of the American establishment on the use of resources for the implementation and promotion of anti-Soviet activities. The article reveals previously unknown details of the preparation of options and the implementation of approved programs of covert actions to discredit the Soviet regime as part of the military campaign in Afghanistan, as well as inside the USSR. The sources allow us to highlight the activities of the US Special Coordinating Committee for the preparation of this strategy. The authors draw attention to the complexity of solving financial issues in the American administration, as well as the size of US financial injections to support destructive forces in the Soviet Union. Such evidence from very authoritative sources significantly expands the source base in the scientific coverage of the facts of the implementation of subversive activities of the United States against the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s.

America’s longest war was founded on false pretences

The war in Afghanistan ended as it had started, with total ambiguity of its objectives as well as what it achieved. The official Western narrative in 2001 was that “everything changed” on the day four airliners were hijacked and nearly 5,000 people murdered. The US intervention in Afghanistan, by this account, was hastily improvised in less than a month. However, the decisions shaping the US military campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 show a remarkable continuity based on an ongoing pre-September 11 evolution in the US foreign policy. As a matter of fact, the US operations in Afghanistan did not begin 20 years ago. But in 1979, during the presidency of Jimmy Carter.

The Power of Putin in Russian Foreign Policy

The Power of Putin in Russian Foreign Policy

Coalition military personnel with stabilised facial fractures are less likely to require tracheostomy: a comparison of treatment in US and UK Medical Treatment Facilities during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts

Introduction: The United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) deployed Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF) in support of the military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The approach to treatment of patients with facial injuries differed between nations, reflecting management protocols and the capabilities of deployed surgeons.

Concepts of Legitimacy: Congruence and Divergence in the Afghan Conflict

ABSTRACTRevisiting the US-led counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, we examine to what extent the concepts of legitimacy of the Taliban and the US counterinsurgents showed congruence with pre-existing Afghan notions of legitimacy. We move beyond dominant approaches of social contract theory and materialist legitimacy by using a threefold model of legitimacy to assess the different concepts of legitimacy. Both the Taliban and the US, we argue, diverged markedly from historically developed notions of legitimate rule. The article demonstrates that counterinsurgents need to be aware of and adapt to local norms. Moreover, we point towards relevant norms in the case of Afghanistan.

Weapon of choice: small arms and the culture of military innovation

Over the past decade, the study of change and transformation in military organizations has become a major and very productive subfield of security and strategic studies. The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have led researchers to explore mechanisms of military change beyond the ‘major transformations’ studied in the 1990s, in particular bottom-up adaptation. One of the contemporary challenges for the field is to reconcile the study of top-down innovation, including the introduction of major weapon systems that have had a structuring effect on the armed forces, with the analysis of small-scale, incremental change. In particular, there is a need for more studies exploring how adaptation can become institutionalized as this subject is currently under-researched. Matthew Ford's book helps fill this gap in a creative and well-researched manner, which makes it an important point of reference for future work in the field. First, Ford correctly identifies that innovation studies are usually overly focused on major weapon systems at the expense of smaller innovations. Second, instead of seeing culture as a barrier to the institutionalization of bottom-up adaptation, he contends that an approach rooted in the social shaping of technology (SST) yields more explanatory power. Indeed, there is an ontological problem in treating culture as an independent or intervening variable. An approach weaving together technological practices and their cultural environment helps capture the struggles for power, status and authority between competing individuals and groups, which shape weapon design, production and adoption.

Anatomy of a village razing: Counterinsurgency, violence, and securing the intimate in Afghanistan

In autumn 2010, the United States military partially or completely razed several villages in Helmand and Kandahar provinces as part of its counterinsurgency campaign in southern Afghanistan. In the spring 2011, U.S.-led forces rebuilt one of the villages, Taroke Kalacha, to showcase the “humane” side of contemporary U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. This article analyses the logics and rationalities informing the reconstruction of Taroke Kalacha, and why the rebuilding effort ultimately failed. I examine a wide spectrum of biopolitical initiatives involved in the 2010–2011 “Hamkari” counterinsurgency operations, and show how violence became a protracted condition for displaced villagers as durable lines of force were inscribed into the communal relations and material arrangements of the built environment(s) in Kandahar. I focus on what I call “securing the intimate”; namely, the attempts by U.S. forces to harness Afghan households as sites of indirect rule. In this anatomy of a village razing, I analyse two specific problems with the reconstruction of Taroke Kalacha: (1) the bid to establish a new political order by bringing the villagers closer to local governance structures through the dubious process of U.S. military compensation schemes; and (2) how the rebuilt structures in Taroke Kalacha deviated from the “local style” with devastating effect, especially for women in the village.

Violence and the contemporary soldiering body

This article asks what is the significance of making the soldiering body (hyper)visible in war. In contrast to the techno-fetishistic portrayals of Western warfare in the 1990s, the recent counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan witnessed a re-centring of British soldiering bodies within the visual grammars of war. In the visibility of this body, violences once obscured were rendered viscerally visible on the bodies of British soldiers. Locating the analysis in the War Story exhibition at the Imperial War Museum, London, the article details two moments of wartime violence experienced and enacted by British soldiers, tracking how violence was mediated in, on and through these hypervisible soldiering bodies and the attending invisibility of ‘other’ bodies. The article argues that during the Afghanistan campaign, soldiers’ bodies became not just enactors of military power but crucial representational figures in the continuance of violent projects abroad and their acceptance back home.

Response to comments

In autumn 2010, the United States military partially or completely razed several villages in Helmand and Kandahar provinces as part of its counterinsurgency campaign in southern Afghanistan. In the spring 2011, U.S.-led forces rebuilt one of the villages, Taroke Kalacha, to showcase the “humane” side of contemporary U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. This article analyses the logics and rationalities informing the reconstruction of Taroke Kalacha, and why the rebuilding effort ultimately failed. I examine a wide spectrum of biopolitical initiatives involved in the 2010–2011 “Hamkari” counterinsurgency operations, and show how violence became a protracted condition for displaced villagers as durable lines of force were inscribed into the communal relations and material arrangements of the built environment(s) in Kandahar. I focus on what I call “securing the intimate”; namely, the attempts by U.S. forces to harness Afghan households as sites of indirect rule. In this anatomy of a village razing, I analyse two specific problems with the reconstruction of Taroke Kalacha: (1) the bid to establish a new political order by bringing the villagers closer to local governance structures through the dubious process of U.S. military compensation schemes; and (2) how the rebuilt structures in Taroke Kalacha deviated from the “local style” with devastating effect, especially for women in the village.

Vulnerability after “the end of famine”: Political ecology, development, and deconcentrated starvation

In autumn 2010, the United States military partially or completely razed several villages in Helmand and Kandahar provinces as part of its counterinsurgency campaign in southern Afghanistan. In the spring 2011, U.S.-led forces rebuilt one of the villages, Taroke Kalacha, to showcase the “humane” side of contemporary U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. This article analyses the logics and rationalities informing the reconstruction of Taroke Kalacha, and why the rebuilding effort ultimately failed. I examine a wide spectrum of biopolitical initiatives involved in the 2010–2011 “Hamkari” counterinsurgency operations, and show how violence became a protracted condition for displaced villagers as durable lines of force were inscribed into the communal relations and material arrangements of the built environment(s) in Kandahar. I focus on what I call “securing the intimate”; namely, the attempts by U.S. forces to harness Afghan households as sites of indirect rule. In this anatomy of a village razing, I analyse two specific problems with the reconstruction of Taroke Kalacha: (1) the bid to establish a new political order by bringing the villagers closer to local governance structures through the dubious process of U.S. military compensation schemes; and (2) how the rebuilt structures in Taroke Kalacha deviated from the “local style” with devastating effect, especially for women in the village.

Conditional commitments: Why states use caveats to reserve their efforts in military coalition operations

ABSTRACTWhy do states make substantial military contributions to coalition operations, while at the same time apply reservations, or caveats, to how the coalition can use the military contributions? Caveats rose to prominence in defense and policy circles with NATO’s campaign in Afghanistan. In the scholarly security literature, the term remains a buzzword for all types of reserved efforts by states in coalition warfare, but there are few theoretical accounts addressing caveats. This article contributes to the knowledge gap on caveats through a comparative case study of Denmark’s, the Netherlands’, and Norway’s contributions to NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011. It demonstrates that caveats can occur through three different causal pathways: compromises from domestic bargaining, handling of alliance commitments, and implementation and civil–military relations. Insights into the complexity that causes caveats are highly relevant for both political and military decision-makers that are trying to coordinate states’ effort in coalition operations.

International organization at war: NATO practices in the Afghan campaign

This article investigates the NATO campaign in Afghanistan through a practice-based approach. The structural distribution of power within NATO, which is obviously in favor of the US, does not automatically lead to Washington’s desired outcomes, and US delegates must competently perform a certain number of practices for their power advantage to take its full effect. The article also illustrates how looking at practices helps to explain policy decisions, such as NATO’s decision to engage in Afghanistan, the establishment of an International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) strategy and the wording of policy papers. By studying a case of military diplomacy, the article contributes to the emerging scholarship aimed at bridging the gap between diplomatic studies and practice-based approaches to International Relations.

The Afghan Theater: A Review of Military Medical Doctrine From 2008 to 2014.

This article forms part of a series that will explore the effect that Role 2 (R2) medical treatment facilities (MTFs) had on casualty care during the military campaign in Afghanistan and how we should interpret this to inform the capabilities in, and training for future R2 MTFs. Key aspects of doctrine which influence the effectiveness of R2 MTFs include timelines to care, patient movement capabilities, and MTF capabilities. The focus of this analysis was to review allied doctrine from the United States, United Kingdom, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to identify similarities and differences regarding employment of R2 related medical assets in the Afghan Theater, specifically for trauma care. Several discrepancies in medical doctrine persist among allied forces. Timelines to definitive care vary among nations. Allied nations should have clear taxonomy that clearly defines MTF capabilities within the combat casualty care system. The R2 surgical capability discrepancy between United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization doctrine should be reconciled. Medical evacuation capabilities on the battlefield would be improved with a taxonomy that reflected the level of capability. Such changes may improve interoperability in a dynamic military landscape.