Afghan Police Research Articles

Counterintelligence in Afghanistan: Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System

The present article explores one of the most relevant counterintelligence (CI) programs in Afghanistan. The preliminary credibility assessment screening system (PCASS) assisted to provide initial screening of suspects for further follow up of intelligence and security forces. Thus, the objective of this article is to explore the dynamics of employing this technology in fragile states in support of the intelligence activities. To that purpose, we have used an exploratory case study research, which included several sources of data collection. We found that PCASS is used to empower the Afghan police forces to identify and neutralize insider threats, but also to keep NATO-coalition forces safer. Further research should focus, for instance, on the impact of the Afghan culture on PCASS operations.

Foreign policy decision-making in operational overlap: the UK’s policing assistance in Afghanistan through the EU and NATO

ABSTRACT Traditionally seen as an interlocutor between Europe and the US in transatlantic security relations, the UK’s engagement with the training of the Afghan National Police (ANP) through the concurrent EU and NATO missions presents an interesting case of foreign policy decision-making. Although a logic based on broader British orientations about the roles of the two organisations expect that the UK’s primary institution of choice would be NATO, London supported both missions in providing international policing assistance to Afghanistan. Adopting an operational overlap perspective, this article seeks to explain the UK’s strategic behaviour vis-a-vis the EU and NATO training missions that have been simultaneously involved in overlapping tasks, despite the initial intention that the two missions would undertake different and complementary roles. Analysing evidence from the UK Parliament and Government, US diplomatic missions, the EU and NATO, as well as interviews with former UK and NATO officials, this article argues that while providing training to the Afghan police, London focused on these missions’ practical outputs rather than preferring an organisation of choice as such. This strategy is mainly guided by the UK’s concern to uphold counter-narcotics enforcement in Afghanistan and to fulfil transition tasks during the incremental withdrawal of British troops.

From Guns to Roses: Understanding Community-Oriented Policing in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, police reform is an important focus of international efforts. After over a decade of assistance, however, there are still daunting challenges of public trust and police effectiveness. From a civilian perspective, the role of the police is a crucial one—and very different from that of the military. Communities, being at the very heart of security challenges, are well positioned to understand the intricacies of security and development. A police service able to work closely with communities plays an important role in managing conflict in the long run. Recognizing this, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoIA) has steadily increased its efforts in community-oriented policing (COP), despite a deteriorating security situation since the withdrawal of US troops in 2014. This paper explores how COP in Afghanistan links with local communities and institutions to ensure both peoples’ security and trust. It begins by considering police-community relations through a broad lens of human security, which comprises the social, economic, political, cultural and legal aspects of their everyday lives. We then examine international assistance to police reform, how the Afghan police have developed their COP philosophy, and how this has played out in re-defining police-community relations. Using field data from Nimruz Province, we then look at the role of local institutions of chowkidari and shura in addressing people’s insecurities, and opportunities for linking these with COP efforts of the police. We conclude that there is a real potential for COP in Afghanistan that his locally owned and sustainable, if enough attention is given to inclusive processes and developing creative and flexible trust-building relationships with local institutions and organizations.

Understanding corruption in the lower levels of the Afghan police force

Definitions of police corruption are usually associated with bribery and extortion. Police culture entails internalised and uncodified norms, rules and values that may enhance susceptibility of corruption within a police force. This article provides an empirical study on police corruption within the lower levels of the Afghan police due to the lack of studies conducted with them. Undertaking a social constructivist approach, the aim of the study is to provide the perceptions from Afghan police officers on the causes and practices of police corruption. The findings reveal that the main causes are heavily linked to unprofessionalism, low pay and the lack of controls. Police accountability is low and solidarity appears high. Moreover, patronage and the acceptance of corruption as a means to getting things done are part of social practices engrained in Afghan culture which leads to the practices of biased recruitment, bribery and extortion. In relation to noble cause corruption, there is no sense of mission and the idea of policing, as part of a mandate, has been lost in the Afghan police force. An understanding of police corruption and police culture from the perspective of street-level police officers is relevant to understand the main causes and practices of corruption and mitigate them to restore public faith in the police as a main port of security. This can prevent potential Taliban resurgence by deterring alternative security promoted by the insurgency.

A street intercept strategy to research police corruption in Afghanistan

ABSTRACT Conducting research in an armed-conflict setting can be a daunting task when faced with security, logistical and recruitment challenges. Moreover, when working with local agents for translation purposes there are additional problems with the veracity and accuracy of the research. However, there are various strategies to mitigate these problems that include a street-intercept strategy and training interpreters. This article provides a methodological insight into a study on police corruption in the Afghan police force. Recruitment of Afghan police officers was built on a street-intercept strategy and the interpreters utilized were trained and tested on language proficiency in English. The local company also specialized in logistics and security awareness that proved useful when relocating from Kabul to neighbouring provinces due to insecurity. This strategy can be considered by researchers when faced with security, access and logistical issues in volatile conflict settings.

Crime Scene Investigation Kabul: An Example of Failing to Understand Local Legal Structures and Traditions Before Attempting to Re-Establish the Rule of Law and Police Reform

Crime dramas can be found worldwide. There has been an exploding popularity of Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) programmes where the crimes are solved through scientific methods by forensics. They have broad international appeal and have been replicated in other countries. Reuters news reported that in “Afghan Confidential: Detectives Train at CSI Kabul” that US Police Advisory Arm of ISAF was attempting to create just such a capability within the Afghan National Police Force. The military fails to understand is that the legal structure in Afghanistan is completely different from that of the UK and the US and that the role of the Police was also not only different, but severely limited. In fact, not only was the programme they were implementing beyond not only the competency of the Afghan Police, but beyond their remit as a Force. This article highlights the problematic nature of the programme they are implementing. It seeks to challenge the tendency of post conflict planners to not fully understand the context of the cultural, societal, political and in this particular case, the legal structures of the nations in which they are operating but simply revert to systems and processes which they know and are comfortable with.

Anesthesiologic and Surgical Experiences of the Spanish Role 2 Enhanced in Herat, Afghanistan

Background: In 2001 the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Spain authorized the participation of Spanish military units in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in support of the Afghan government. Four years later, Spain assumed control of the Forward Support Base in Herat (Afghanistan). Because of its capabilities, personnel, and equipment NATO considered it as the medical reference installation for the four provinces that form the western region of Afghanistan. Objectives: The current report aimed to describe anesthesiology and surgical experiences of Role 2 Enhanced (Role 2E) in heart, Afghanistan, from March to May 2014. Patients and Methods: An observational, descriptive, retrospective study was conducted from March to May 2014. The civilians and military personnel wounded by firearm or explosive detonation in western Afghanistan, who were treated at the Role 2E in herat were included. There were no exclusion criteria. Results: Seven hundred and forty five patients including 181 Afghan civilians, 82 non-Afghan civilians, 24 Afghan police and military, and 458 military ISAF, were treated during the study period. There were 10 combat casualties among them. All patients were male and aged 2530 years; seven had been injured by an explosive and three by firearm; five with head-neck wounds, two with wounds in the upper limbs, two in the abdomen, one in the thorax, and one in the lower limbs. The New Injury Severity Score (NISS) was one mild, five moderate and four severe. There were 14 surgical patients (seven wounded in combat and seven non-combat casualties, and 12 patients were admitted to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). None of them died. A total of 12 general anesthesias, 11 regional anesthesias (three intradural anesthesias, three interscalene blocks, one axillary block and four femoral blocks) and six local anesthesias with sedation were performed. Conclusions: During the study period, 745 patients were treated, including 10 combat casualties. Twelve general anesthesias, 11 regional anesthesias (three intradural anaesthesias, three interscalene blocks, one axillary block, four femoral blocks), and six local anaesthesias with sedation were performed. Twelve patients were admitted to the ICU. These anesthesiological and surgical experiences can be helpful in future military deployments.

How security problem of Afghanistan threatens the global world: Afghan police reform case

It is a fact that both the political and the security problems in Afghanistan have directly affected the stability of the region since Afghanistan is in the strategic position of Asia. The article presents an in-depth examination into the current situations of Afghanistan, particularly in regards to the nation's security dynamics. The U.S., the CSTC-A, GPPT, UNAMA, EUPOL, NATO and a lot of individual countries are interested in the reorganizing of the Afghan National Police (ANP) force with the aim of providing stability in the nation. The main problem is that each country or international organizations want to implement their own strategies and political purpose to rebuild the ANP. Therefore, Afghanistan faces enormous challenge in terms of security reform. After examining the security training efforts by international communities along with Turkey’ contributions, recommendations are made to develop applicable, effective, and sustainable security reform that could be internalized by the Afghan officials.

Corruption and clientelism in the lower levels of the Afghan police

Some scholars argue that the Afghan police are regularly engaged in bribery and drug-related corruption. Prevalent corruption in the Afghan police has demonstrably resulted in greater support for the Taliban which is a threat to security. This suggests that a robust anti-corruption strategy is needed to restore legitimacy in the Afghan state and police and to counter the insurgency. This article initially provides a discussion of police corruption in Afghanistan that reveals four interrelated explanations: (1) structural causes of corruption, patronage and nepotism, (2) low pay, (3) state capture, and (4) ethnic favouritism. The research methodology included 70 semi-structured interviews with elites conducted by the author in Kabul during May–June 2010 and 100 surveys conducted with patrolmen and lieutenants in various Afghan provinces during January–March 2012. The article finds that it can prove counterproductive to post poorly paid policemen in distant provinces in order to challenge patronage relations as it tends to exacerbate survival-based corruption. Moreover, improved pay reform could help reduce survival-based corruption in the Afghan police but systemic corruption, clientelism and state capture will remain if it is not implemented alongside other wider structural initiatives.

Camp Bastion, Afghanistan

You may ask yourself what on Earth a physician does in a war zone. I certainly did as I donned my body armour and climbed aboard a TriStar , helmet...

Japanese Assistance in Afghanistan: Helping the United States, Acting Globally, and Making a Friend

Although Japan has rarely been mentioned in regular international or U.S. news coverage on Afghanistan, the Japanese government has been a major player in international assistance for Afghanistan over the past decade. In early 2002, just a few months after the fall of the Taliban, it hosted the first major international conference on the reconstruction of Afghanistan, effectively setting up the prototype of the so-called pledging conference for Afghan reconstruction that has been subsequently held in other major capitals at two-year intervals. Ten years later, Tokyo convened another major conference that critically coordinated international assistance for Afghanistan through the 2014 transition period and beyond until 2016.This essay provides a brief overview of Japan's major engagements in Afghanistan, identifies the key motivations behind them, and assesses their impact in terms of Tokyo's foreign policy objectives. Given that Japan has conducted its Afghan policymaking largely, though not exclusively, in the context of U.S.-Japan alliance management, the winding down of this signature decade-long foreign policy commitment is inevitable after 2014, when most of the U.S. and wider NATO forces withdraw from Afghanistan.Japanese Engagement in AfghanistanJapan assumed the lead country role for one of the five major security-sector reform programs-the so-called DDR program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former combatants into Afghan society-that were introduced as the main pillars of Afghan reconstruction and stabilization. The assumption of this role effectively positioned Japan as a principal player in international assistance in Afghanistan, alongside the United States (which assumed the lead-country role for re-establishing the Afghan military), Germany (for police reform), the United Kingdom (for counternarcotics), and Italy (for judicial reform). Although constitutional and other domestic political constraints prevented Japan from participating in the U.S.-led counterterrorism military operation (Operation Enduring Freedom) and the NATO-led security assistance mission (the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF), Tokyo came up with a creative way to enable its military to contribute. From late 2001 until the beginning of 2010, naval ships from the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) were deployed in the Indian Ocean to refuel U.S. and other international naval vessels engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom. The total operation cost amounted to $800 million, with around $250 million spent on supplying fuel and water to coalition forces.1Besides such diplomatic activism and unprecedented operations by the SDF, the most significant element of Japan's involvement in Afghanistan has been its substantial financial contribution to help stabilize and reconstruct this war-torn society. Since late 2001, Japan has spent almost $5 billion on various reconstruction and stabilization projects in Afghanistan. Overall, Japan ranks second, after only the United States, in financial assistance to the country, with its pledges totaling about $8 billion.2 Close to half of Japanese aid was disbursed for reconstruction assistance, such as infrastructure building, agriculture and rural development, and health and education improvement, while one-third was directed toward security-related programs, most notably supporting the salary of Afghan police and the aforementioned DDR projects. The rest-somewhere between 20% and 25%-was spent on projects to improve governance and on humanitarian assistance. A conspicuously large amount of Japanese financial assistance-more than 60%-was channeled through international organizations, such as the UN Development Programme, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Food Programme, while about one-third was disbursed as direct bilateral grants to the Afghan government or NGOs providing official development assistance. …

The rule of law at time of masculine honor: Afghan police attitudes and intimate partner violence

This paper examines how attitudes toward violence against women (VAW)—in terms of justification—influence the behavioral intentions of Afghan police officers when dealing with a case of intimate partner violence (IPV). An experimental study was carried out with 108 Afghan police officers who took part in a training course at the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) bases in Herat and Kandahar. Participants read an extract of a police intervention for an IPV case. They were faced with honor-related attitudes and possible actions to be taken to help victims and arrest perpetrators. In the experimental condition, in the questionnaire provided to police officers, there was reference to the victim admitting to an affair with another man. No such reference was present in the control condition. Results showed that admitting an infidelity produced more lenient attitudes toward the violence against the woman, which in turn reduced police officers’ intention to intervene by arresting the man and providing support to the victim. Results are discussed in terms of the role and function of the so-called culture of (masculine) honor and the rule of law and its implications.

Enlisting Islam for an Effective Afghan Police

Establishing an effective police force has eluded both the Afghan government and ISAF. Increasing the prominence of Islamic policing will complement current efforts to defeat the insurgency.

Escaping the ‘Graveyard of Empires’: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan

Given the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, a definitive, conventional victory is not a realistic option. Denying a sanctuary to terrorists who seek to attack the United States does not require Washington to pacify the entire country, eradicate its opium fields, or sustain a long-term military presence in Central Asia. From the sky, U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles can monitor villages, training camps, and insurgent compounds. On the ground, the United States can retain a small number of covert operatives for intelligence gathering and discrete operations against specific targets, as well as an additional small group of advisers to train Afghan police and military forces. The United States should withdraw most of its forces from Afghanistan within the next 12 to 18 months and treat al Qaeda's presence in the region as a chronic, but manageable, problem.Washington needs to narrow its objectives to three critical tasks:Security. Support, rather than supplant, indigenous security efforts by training and assisting the Afghan national army and police and, where appropriate, paying off or otherwise co-opting regional militias. Training should be tied to clear metrics. If those benchmarks are not achieved, Washington must cut its losses and cease further assistance. U.S. forces should not become Afghanistan's perpetual crutch.Intelligence and Regional Relations. Sustain intelligence operations in the region through aerial surveillance, covert operations, and ongoing intelligence-sharing with the Afghan and Pakistani governments. Seek cordial relations with all of Afghanistan's neighbors, particularly Russia and Iran, as each has the means to significantly undermine or facilitate progress in the country.Drugs. Dial back an opium eradication policy to one that solely targets drug cartels affiliated with insurgents rather than one that targets all traffickers, including poor local farmers. Harassing the latter alienates a significant portion of the rural population.Central Asia holds little intrinsic strategic value to the United States, and America's security will not be endangered even if an oppressive regime takes over a contiguous fraction of Afghan territory. America's objective has been to neutralize the parties responsible for the atrocities committed on 9/11. The United States should not go beyond that objective by combating a regional insurgency or drifting into an open-ended occupation and nation-building mission.Most important, Afghanistan serves as the crossroads of Central Asia. From its invasion by Genghis Khan and his two-million strong Mongol hordes to the superpower proxy war between the United States and the Soviet Union, Afghanistan's trade routes and land-locked position in the middle of the region have for centuries rendered it vulnerable to invasion by external powers. Although Afghanistan has endured successive waves of Persian, Greek, Arab, Turk, Mongol, British, and Soviet invaders, no occupying power has ever successfully conquered it. There's a reason why it has been described as the graveyard of empires, and unless America scales down its objectives, it risks meeting a similar fate.