Adequate Theory Research Articles

Participatory backcasting towards desirable co-produced mobility futures: A case study of MaaS in Greater Manchester

Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) has emerged as a model supported by popular discourse on achieving greener, more efficient and equitable future mobility. While technological change is a primary driver for models of development, the policy pathways, implementation and implications of MaaS are complex and unclear. In this paper, we explore the implications and limitations of a participatory approach to co-produced MaaS futures in Greater Manchester (GM). We adapt a backcasting methodology involving two stakeholder workshops to develop shared future visions and action pathways. Our methodology includes a participatory approach to pluralistic vision development and the use of a Three Horizons method for backcasting. This approach provides the opportunity to explore multiple desirable futures and the formulation of action pathways without negating plausible future possibilities. The research identifies multiple policy and collaborative action areas while also revealing limitations in MaaS user agency and unaddressed sustainability concerns related to wider Smart City criticisms. Findings also suggest a lack of adequate theory within current MaaS frameworks to engage with uncertainty, change and adaptive capacity. Future areas of research include the expansion of current frameworks to incorporate alternative framings from planning and complexity theories already attempting to address these dimensions of futures.

Aetiological Naturalism in the Philosophy of Medicine: A Shaky Project

Griffiths and Matthewson (2018) employ the selected effects theory to contend that disease involves the impairment of the normal functioning of biological items. Since the selected effects theory focuses on the past effects of those items, I refer to their proposal as “aetiological naturalism”. In this paper, I argue that aetiological naturalism cannot constitute an adequate theory of disease. This is due to the fact that the selected effects theory, which lies at the heart of aetiological naturalism, is flawed. One promise of the selected effects theory is indeed that it is able to account for our normative intuitions about dysfunctional biological items by grounding them on the concept of natural selection incorporated in the selected effects theory itself, where this promise rests upon its claim that appealing to the fitness-enhancing effect of biological items can always explain why they persisted in a population. However, I contend that the naturalisation of normativity cannot be cashed out in terms of biological items’ past effects by discussing two biological phenomena: phenotypic plasticity and negative frequency-dependent selection. I illustrate that in both cases the selected effects theory cannot recognise adaptive items as having a selected effects function, therefore preventing the possibility to assign them any dysfunction. The normative force of the selected effects theory is consequently much diminished, leading in turn to a weakening of aetiological naturalism, given that such project actually relies on the assumed normative force of the selected effects theory itself.

Illumination Fading

Abstract Bertrand Russell abandoned the notion of acquaintance in July 1918. What changes does this force in his account of the mind? This paper focuses on one puzzle of interpretation about this. In 1913, Russell offered an account of ‘egocentric particulars’, his term for indexicals and demonstratives. He argued that the fundamental objection to neutral monism was that it could not provide an adequate theory of these terms. In 1918, Russell now embraces a form of neutral monism, but he does not return to the problem of indexicals until 1940 in his William James lectures. Is the account given in 1940 significantly different from the one given in 1913? What was the argument against neutral monism in 1913? Does Russell offer a new solution in 1940 or reject his earlier view as mistaken? The answers offered here are used to draw more general morals about the current debate concerning relational theories of sense perception.

Two concepts of directed obligation

AbstractThis paper argues that there are two importantly distinct normative relations that can be referred to using phrases like ‘X is obligated to Y,’ ‘Y has a right against X,’ or ‘X wronged Y.’ When we say that I am obligated to you not to read your diary, one thing we might mean is that I am subject to a deontological constraint against reading your diary that gives me a non‐instrumental, agent‐relative reason not to do so, and which you are typically in a unique position to waive with consent. I call this first relation the constraint relation. A second thing we might mean is that you are in a position to fittingly hold me personally accountable for reading your diary by demanding that I not read your diary, resenting me if I do so without excuse, and deciding whether to forgive me for this afterwards. I call this second relation the accountability relation. Though these two kinds of directed obligation often coincide, I argue that they are extensionally dissociable and play different normative roles. We cannot provide an adequate theory of ‘obligation to’ until we recognize that this phrase denotes not one relation, but two.

(In)admissibilidade do exame de gravidez na demissão: Análise a partir da normatividade concreta em Müller e da ponderação em Alexy

The purpose of this work is to compare the theories of Friedrich Müller and Robert Alexy on the interpretation and application of fundamental rights standards, in the light of a specific case judged by the Superior Labor Court (TST) on the possibility of requiring a pregnancy test when an employee is dismissed. The theoretical conceptions adopted by these scholars differ. Müller proposes a gradual construction of normativity based on textual elements and reality. Alexy develops a law of collision and balancing of principles in the specific case. As a research problem, there is the discussion about the TST’s decision in light of the theories of Müller and Alexy and the absence of a prohibition in the law. The aim is to verify which theoretical perspective is used by the decision examined. The methodology involves interdisciplinary research, bringing together theory and praxis in the articulation of philosophy, constitutional and labor law, with documentary and bibliographic analysis, in addition to scientific, dialectical and inductive approach methods. As expected results, we seek to present an epistemological awareness of the importance of adopting an adequate theory of legal norms and the performance of state functions, based on the examination of the concrete situation decided by the TST.

No hope for conciliationism

Conciliationism is the family of views that rationality requires agents to reduce confidence or suspend belief in p when acknowledged epistemic peers (i.e. agents who are (approximately) equally well-informed and intellectually capable) disagree about p. While Conciliationism is prima facie plausible, some have argued that Conciliationism is not an adequate theory of peer disagreement because it is self-undermining. Responses to this challenge can be put into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups: the Solution Responses which deny Conciliationism is self-undermining and attempt to provide arguments which demonstrate this; and the Skeptical Responses which accept that Conciliationism is self-undermining but attempt to mitigate this result by arguing this is either impermanent and/or not very worrisome. I argue that, by Conciliationism’s own lights, both kinds of responses (almost certainly) fail to save Conciliationism from being self-undermining. Thus, Conciliationism is (almost certainly) permanently self-undermining. This result is significant because it demonstrates that Conciliationism is likely hopeless: there is likely nothing that can save Conciliationism from this challenge. I further argue that Conciliationism, like any view, should be abandoned if it is (almost certainly) hopeless.

The Case Against Organoid Consciousness

Neural organoids are laboratory-generated entities that replicate certain structural and functional features of the human brain. Most neural organoids are disembodied—completely decoupled from sensory input and motor output. As such, questions about their potential capacity for consciousness are exceptionally difficult to answer. While not disputing the need for caution regarding certain neural organoid types, this paper appeals to two broad constraints on any adequate theory of consciousness—the first involving the dependence of consciousness on embodiment; the second involving the dependence of consciousness on representations—to argue that disembodied neural organoids are not plausible candidates for consciousness.

The Arm’s Length Principle – An Adequate Means for Taxing Multinational Corporate Groups?

Abstract International tax law is characterized by the arm’s length principle. However, the arm’s length principle is highly criticized since it is seen as a major driver of tax avoidance. Although the OECD’s Two-Pillar Solution and EU initiatives seem to indicate that international tax law is in a state of change, the arm’s length principle remains relevant. Therefore, we deal with the question whether it is possible to improve the arm’s length principle. While previous attempts ask, for example, whether it is possible to reduce its complexity, we focus on the aspect that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not refer to a theory of the formation of prices in transactions between independent parties. We advocate developing a theoretical substantiation and introduce a new interpretation of the arm’s length principle, based mainly on concepts of a general evolutionary theory and political-cultural market theory. This reference to an adequate market theory leads us to a new interpretation of the arm’s length principle that differs considerably from the current interpretation. Still, we doubt that this new interpretation of the arm’s length principle alone can reduce tax avoidance significantly. However, understood as one instrument in a mix of instruments, we estimate that this interpretation of the arm’s length principle constitutes a more adequate means for fighting tax avoidance of multinational corporate groups than its current interpretation.

The Path of the Prerogatives

Abstract The path of the prerogatives refers to the process by which the royal prerogative powers outlined in Blackstone’s Commentaries entered into American constitutional law. In 1953, Professor William Crosskey opened up a new window into the Constitution when he pointed out that many of Congress’s enumerated powers had been prerogatives of the British Crown. In The President Who Would Not Be King: Executive Power under the Constitution, Professor Michael McConnell takes Crosskey’s observation as a starting point of his own more systematic analysis of how the Committee of Detail divided these prerogative powers between Congress and the President. Yet neither Crosskey nor McConnell focuses much attention on the fact that many of these powers were already delegated to the United States by the Articles of Confederation. Nor do they ask whether the founders conceived of these powers primarily as legislative or executive powers, on the one hand, or government powers, on the other—a critical distinction reflected in the text of the Constitution by the Necessary and Proper Clause. This article investigates these topics by tracing the path of the prerogatives from 1774 to 1776 in the writings of James Wilson, Benjamin Franklin, John Dickinson, and Thomas Jefferson, highlighting the crucial role played by these powers in Wilson’s 1774 essay on the legislative authority of Parliament, the Articles of Confederation, and the Declaration of Independence. The article also discusses two further issues that any adequate theory of presidential powers must confront: the distinction between government powers and executive powers, and the status of the United States as a legal corporation, in which implied powers are vested without needing to be enumerated. Finally, the article points to new evidence indicating that Jefferson borrowed specific language and ideas from Wilson when drafting the Declaration of Independence.

Radical Cognitivism about Practical Reason

Cognitivism about practical reason is the doctrine that certain aspects of practical reason are really instances of theoretical reason. For example, that intentions are beliefs or that certain norms of practical rationality just are, or reduce to, certain norms of theoretical rationality. Radical cognitivism about practical reason, in contrast, is the more heady view that practical reason just is a species of theoretical reason. It entails that what it is to be a motivational state (of any kind) is to be a belief (of some particular kind), that all practical reasoning is just a variety of theoretical reasoning, and that all practical norms are really a kind of epistemic norm. In this paper, I introduce and motivate this view, before investigating the cognitivist theory of intention and means-end practical reasoning to which such a radical cognitivist is committed. Unlike other cognitivists about practical reason, the radical cognitivist reduces all practical reasoning to theoretical reasoning and all practical norms to epistemic norms. She therefore faces unique challenges in accounting for the basic desiderata on any adequate theory of intention and means-end practical reasoning: whereas other cognitivists can appeal to sui generis practical states (desires) and norms, the radical cognitivist is restricted to the sparse resources – cognitive states and the epistemic norms that govern them – to which she has restricted herself. Here I develop and critically examine the options the radical cognitivist has for satisfying these desiderata. My conclusions are optimistic: there is a defensible formulation of the radical cognitivist’s theory of intention and means-end practical reasoning.

Thermal stress analysis of variable angle tow composite plates through high-order structural models

This work focuses on thermo-elastic analysis of Variable Angle Tow (VAT) composite plates. Emphasis is given to the through-the-thickness 3D stress component distributions as a consequence of constant temperature profiles. High-order structural models are used, in order to take into account the volumetric and the distortion contributions. The last contribute arise from boundary conditions or asymmetric staking sequences. Governing equations of the uncoupled thermo-elastic problem are derived in the domain of the Carrera Unified Formulation (CUF), which in turn is coupled with a classical finite element method to obtain opportune numerical solutions. The advantage of using CUF lies in the fact that different theories of structures can be implemented automatically and a critical study on the use of standard to high-order plate finite elements can be performed with ease. In this manner we classify models based on their efficiency and depending on the degree of accuracy needed, both in terms of displacements and stresses. Different numerical problems are considered and it is demonstrated that layerwise approximations are needed whenever shear stresses trends are of interest. Boundary Conditions influence more the choice of the adequate expansion theory otherwise.

A Liberal Theory of Commodification

Abstract Judging on the basis of standard accounts of commodification, one might reasonably suggest that liberalism intrinsically lacks an adequate theory of commodification. Liberalism, with its commitment to individual choice and to neutrality as regards competing evaluation practices, seems conceptually incapable of identifying or abolishing many significant forms of commodification. This essay aims to refute this claim. It employs a strategy of appealing to the harm principle as grounds for a liberal anti-commodification theory. I claim that we are harmed when we are denied ways to meaningfully engage in certain evaluative practices, ways that depend on evaluations shared with others with whom we stand in meaningful social relationships. Markets can crowd out these shared evaluations, and to this extent cause us psychological harm; this in turn supplies grounds for restrictions on certain markets within a liberal state.

Belief: What is it Good for?

Abstract“Absolutely nothing,” say the radical Bayesians. “Simplifying decisions,” say the moderates. “Providing premises in practical reasoning,” say the epistemologists. “Coordinating with others,” say I. It is hard to see how to construct an adequate theory of rational behavior without using a graded notion of belief, such as credence. But once we have credence, what role is left for belief? After surveying some answers to this question, I will explore the idea that belief is in a different line of work altogether. Its job is not to rationalize and explain an agent’s behavior, but to track what the agent would accept as a reason. Although some philosophers have seen the connection between belief and reasons, they have tended to see reasons as part of a theory of rational action. This locates belief in the rationalizing and explaining business, where it must vie with credence. In contrast, I argue that reasons play no essential role in an account of individual rationality; they are important because we need to coordinate with others. Credence and belief thus answer to separate needs.

Human Sciences: Another Experience of Substantiating Socio-Humanitarian Knowledge

Introduction. The article raises the problem of methodological foundations of sociohumanitarian knowledge. The opinion that has been established since the constitution of the social and humanitarian sciences that there are fundamental differences in the methodology of natural science and socio-humanitarian knowledge has become perceived as an axiom. This situation did not contribute to the creation of an adequate theory capable of sufficiently implementing the explanatory and predictive functions of science in this area.Methodology and sources. Obstacles to the creation of an adequate methodology for the study of human existence are misunderstood thesis about the specifics of socio-humanitarian knowledge and inadequate understanding of the nature of the object of socio-humanitarian knowledge. The unity of criteria and standards of scientific research in the natural sciences and socio-humanitarian sciences is achieved on the basis of the post-non-classical model of science. The concept of scientific paradigms developed by V.S. Stepin can serve as a source of a new approach to the formation of the methodology of socio-humanitarian knowledge.Results and discussion. The classical model of scientific research posited the opposite of the method of natural and socio-humanitarian sciences on the basis of the opposite of the methods of mastering the objects of research: sensory means and intelligible. In this way, indeed, it is impossible to combine the criteria and standards of science in relation to natural science and socio-humanitarian research.Conclusion. The post-non-classical model of science is based on the understanding of the research object from the point of view of its structure, which allows us to consider the phenomena of human existence as having a single nature with the object of natural science, since in both cases, objects have a complex, systemic nature and belong to self-developing objects.

ZIF-derived non-bonding Co/Zn coordinated hollow carbon nitride for enhanced removal of antibiotic contaminants by peroxymonosulfate activation: Performance and mechanism

Co–Zn–N–C catalyst (MCZC) with neighboring Co and Zn pairs anchored on hollow carbon nitride was constructed by the direct etching of zeolitic imidazolate frameworks assembled with Co and Zn. Adequate characterizations and density functional theory (DFT) studies confirmed the successful construction of non-bonding Co and Zn pairs with enhanced electron transfer on Co sites by adjacent Zn sites. Based on the synergy of adjacent Co and Zn atom pairs, the MCZC/Perxymosulfate (PMS) system achieved 99.6% Tetracycline (TC) degradation in 24 min with a mineralization rate of 55.8% and PMS decomposition efficiency of 73.1%. DFT calculation based on the Fukui index identified the sites susceptible to attack by the active species. TC degradation pathways could be inferred, and reduced toxicity of intermediates was observed. This work provides new insights into the design of MOF-derived bimetallic catalysts and the importance of the interaction between adjacent metal active sites to catalytic performance.

Space War and Property Rights

Space warfare is warfare that takes place in outer space. It involves ground-to-space, space-to-ground, and space-to-space violence between nations or peoples. The violence can involve kinetic weapons, directed energy weapons, or electronic destruction. International law, specifically, the Outer Space Treaty and SALT I, currently bans weapons of mass destruction from being put into space, although one wonders if one country were to violate the ban whether others would follow suit. In this paper, I argue that that if there is a non-consequentialist morality of space war, then one country can unjustly attack a second country’s space vehicles. This in turn depends on property rights. But there is no adequate theory of property rights with regard to space war. Hence, there is no non-consequentialist morality of a space war.

Politički sistem Rusije - između demokratije i autoritarnosti

The main research objective of this article was to assess the nature of the democratization of Russia's political system in the period 1985-2000. The authors analyze the selected period of the transformation in Russia based on the concept of S. Huntington, considered the most adequate theory of democratization. The authors attempted to answer following questions: what changes occurred during the "Perestroika" process initiated by M. Gorbachev - unsuccessful liberalization for Soviet Russia and "started" the Third wave of democratization of the Russian Federation; secondly, what was the specificity of the democratization of the political system during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin; and lastly, when the retreat from democratization began in Russia. This analysis seems quite sensible due to the fact that it can explain the reasons for the retreat from democracy during the presidency of V. Putin and the construction of an authoritarian state in Russia in the 21st century. In order to verify the hypotheses and answer the research questions, the classic method for the social sciences was chosen (the decision-making, systemic, and case study methods).

Mental Filing Systems: A User's Guide

How seriously should we take the idea that the mind employs mental files? Goodman and Gray (2022) argue that mental filing—a thinker rationally treating her cognitive states as being about the same thing—can be explained without files. Instead, they argue that the standard commitments of mental file theory, as represented by Recanati’s indexical model, are better seen in terms of a relational representational feature of object representations, which in turn is based on the epistemic links a thinker bears to objects. This paper argues that this revision is misguided. Neither the representational property nor any basic role for epistemic links are needed for an adequate explanatory theory that makes use of the image of a mental filing system. A better alternative to the indexical model does posit files, albeit as causal-functional entities. This makes additional representational features redundant, and shows that epistemic links play a secondary role.

Theorising pedagogical dimensions of higher education leadership—a non-affirmative approach

Today, multilevel analytics on educational governance, management, and leadership are common in educational leadership research, drawing on a variety of approaches and academic disciplines. This article develops a threefold critique of the state of the art. First, this article argues that research on higher education leadership often represents an unreflected position regarding the societal role of higher education—decontextualising leadership from external practices and disregarding its internal object. Second, the approaches applied in leadership as a multilevel phenomenon can be problematic. On one end of the spectrum, we find particularist approaches focusing on individual levels representing disparate and often incompatible theoretical perspectives. As these positions rarely communicate, they have difficulties producing a coherent representation of higher education leadership. Universalist approaches, in turn, study leadership on several levels but offer identical conceptual tools for any societal practice, thereby losing the sensibility of the societal, cultural, and economic tasks of higher-education institutions, and for their specific character as institutions for research and teaching. Thirdly, research on educational leadership mostly fail to provide adequate theory of pedagogical interaction and influence. This is a twofold challenge. On the one hand, research lacks a theory of the object of educational leadership, namely teaching and studying. On the other, although research often defines leadership as a process of influence aimed at supporting learning, it lacks a theory able to explain what constitutes this influence. This article elaborates the possibilities for non-affirmative theory of education to provide a theory and language to overcome these challenges.

λεκτόν and Use Wittgenstein and the Incorporeal

Any theory of language – ancient or contemporary, philosophical or cognitive – faces the same problem, i.e. how to reconcile the unequivocally corporeal character of the speakers and the world they speak of with the somewhat ‘incorporeal’ character of the meanings of linguistic expressions. It is for this reason, for example, that direct-reference theories of language (Stroll 1999) seek to eliminate the Fregean notion of 'sense' (Sinn) from semantics. What is at stake is a completely corporeal account of language. However, such an attempt clashes with the fact that the vast majority of linguistic expressions do not refer either to any objects in the world or to the pre-scientific intuition that words have an autonomous 'meaning' (that is, that the 'sense' of a word does not coincide with the referent, Bedeutung). To solve such a problem, the Stoics introduced in their theory of language the notion of lekton, i.e. what is 'said' or is 'sayable'. Even if the lekton is, properly speaking, incorporeal, at the same time it is the corporeal product of what human speakers do when they utter a verbal utterance. In this paper I propose to compare the notion of lekton to the similar notion of 'use' (Gebrauch), much debated in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. The thesis of this paper is not that there exists a direct philological connection between the Stoic notion of lekton and the notion of linguistic 'use' in Wittgenstein (even if this cannot be excluded either). Instead, the idea is that when one wants to propose an adequate theory of language, one cannot but introduce a notion such as that of lekton or 'use'.