Address Resolution Protocol Spoofing Attacks Research Articles

Enhancing security in Software-Defined Networks: An approach to efficient ARP spoofing attacks detection and mitigation

The proliferation of Software-Defined Networks (SDNs) has introduced unparalleled flexibility and efficiency to network management, but at the same time, it has introduced new challenges in securing network infrastructures. Among these challenges, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing attacks remain a pervasive threat, compromising network integrity and data confidentiality. In this manuscript, we present an approach to ARP spoofing mitigation within SDNs, addressing the limitations of existing methodologies. Our proposed solution employs a multifaceted strategy that combines dynamic ARP cache management, real-time traffic analysis, and adaptive flow rule orchestration. Central to our approach is a dedicated device that continuously monitors the network topology and detects any deviations from established norms. Notably, our solution adapts seamlessly to networks of varying sizes, ensuring scalability and efficacy across diverse infrastructures. One of our key contributions is the integration of a deep learning-based Deep Neural Network (DNN) model to detect and mitigate ARP spoofing attacks. Leveraging a self-generated ARP spoofing dataset from SDN environments, our model demonstrates exceptional accuracy and adaptability, enhancing the network’s capability to identify and counter such threats effectively. Our approach showcases exceptional reliability, achieving 100% accuracy rate in detection of ARP spoofing, which is crucial for sustaining network responsiveness.

Countering ARP spoofing attacks in software-defined networks using a game-theoretic approach

The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing is a form of attack typically used by attackers to cause a denial of service or man-in-the-middle attacks. This attack comes from ARP weaknesses and aims to compromise victims' ARP caches by sending ARP packets containing fake IP-MAC pairs. To overcome ARP spoofing attacks, several approaches leverage the advantages of software-defined networking (SDN) to detect malicious users in the network. To achieve their goal, the SDN controller consecutively checks the characteristics of each ARP packet to ensure its correctness. However, this verification method can lead to latency and congestion at the controller level or render the system unusable for large-scale networks. To address this drawback, we propose a game-theoretic approach to provide an optimal verification method that considers the intelligent attackers' decision-making process during an ARP cache poisoning attempt. This approach is a zero-sum game between the attacker who wants to poison the victims' ARP caches and the defender who must avoid this poisoning. The game model results in mixed-strategy Nash equilibria that identify optimal verification methods to prevent control plane latency and congestion during attacker detection. The results show that an intelligent attacker will refrain from poisoning ARP caches with a high-impact strategy because the defender frequently checks such a strategy. In addition, the attacker's penalty value can deter both rational and irrational attackers from poisoning ARP caches. Simulations in the Mininet simulator have shown that the proposed approach can significantly mitigate control plane latency and congestion during the attacker's characteristic checking.

An Effective Approach to Detect and Prevent ARP Spoofing Attacks on WLAN

Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is used to resolve a host’s MAC address, given its IP address. ARP is stateless, as there is no authentication when exchanging a MAC address between the hosts. Hacking tactics using ARP spoofing are constantly being abused differently; many previous studies have prevented such attacks. However, prevention requires modification of the underlying network protocol or additional expensive equipment, so applying these methods to the existing network can be challenging. In this paper, we examine the limitations of previous research in preventing ARP spoofing. In addition, we propose a defense mechanism that does not require network protocol changes or expensive equipment. Before sending or receiving a packet to or from any device on the network, our method checks the MAC and IP addresses to ensure they are correct. It protects users from ARP spoofing. The findings demonstrate that the proposed method is secure, efficient, and very efficient against various threat scenarios. It also makes authentication safe and easy and ensures data and users’ privacy, integrity, and anonymity through strong encryption techniques.

Defending a wireless LAN against ARP spoofing attacks using a Raspberry Pi

The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is a protocol that converts Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to Media Access Control (MAC) addresses. Due to a security issue known as "Man in the Middle," identity theft is feasible using the ARP protocol. ARP spoofing is one of the weaknesses in wireless networks when an attacker effectively masquerades as a legitimate one. Spoofing attacks will reduce network performance and break several security measures. In networks that use MAC address-based filtering to verify clients, all a spoofer needs is an actual MAC address from an authorised client to gain an unfair advantage. The research recommends developing a security system recognising and preventing ARP spoofing attacks. This system detects ARP spoofing attempts by comparing the static MAC address of the original router to the router's MAC address in the ARP cache table. After detecting the attack using information collected from the router's MAC address in the ARP cache table, the system will conduct a de-authentication attack against the attacker's MAC address. If the attacker is disconnected from the WLAN, they cannot perform ARP spoofing attacks. This system is operated using a Raspberry Pi Model B. Most ARP spoofing attacks can be detected in 0.93 seconds, and responding takes 3.05 seconds.

Features of Address Resolution Protocol Operation in Computer Networks

The paper analyzes the network protocols of computer networks to identify potential vulnerabilities at the software level. The conditions for carrying out a man-in-the-middle attack in networks using the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) are investigated. Such attacks are of a rather dangerous type, since they are based on the shortcomings of the ARP protocol. A detailed analysis of the stages of the attack and the sequence of impact on the attacked node is given. The technology of ARP spoofing (poisoning) and methods that allow one to infiltrate an existing connection and communication process are examined in detail. An implementation of an ARP spoofing attack in the Python and C# programming languages using the Soapy and SharpPcap libraries is presented. Examples of implementation of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in a peer-to-peer network using the ARP protocol in C# are given. The article also describes examples of man-in-the-middle attacks associated with various protocols and infiltration into the address space of routers, such as DHCP (a protocol that dynamically assigns an IP address to a client computer) spoofing and ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) redirection. Methods for hacking a router and substituting a MAC address and examples of scripts that implement: sending a fake ARP packet; a function for performing a DoS attack; changing the Linux MAC address; router hacks, are presented in the article.

ASD: ARP Spoofing Detector Using OpenWrt

The address resolution protocol (ARP) is one of the most important communication protocols in a local area network (LAN). However, since there is no authentication procedure, the ARP is vulnerable to cyberattack such as ARP spoofing. Since ARP spoofing can be connected to critical attacks, including a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, detecting ARP spoofing initially without returning false-positive alarms is important. In general, however, existing works for ARP spoofing are unable to distinguish between ARP spoofing and connections from virtual machine (VM) guests, which results in false-positive alarms. In this article, we propose an access point-based ARP Spoofing Detector (ASD) that can detect ARP spoofing attacks without returning a false-positive rate. Our proposed system distinguishes between ARP spoofing and connections from VM guests using three information tables, AssocList, ARP cache table, and DHCP table, which are commonly managed by the access point based on a Linux system. We evaluated the performance of ASD on ARP spoofing attack experiments.

The problem of security address resolution protocol

This paper examines the conditions for conducting a Man in the middle (MITM) attack in networks using the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), as well as possible methods for detecting and preventing such attacks. Examples of implementation of denial of service (DoS) attacks in a peer-to-peer network using the ARP protocol are given. An implementation of an ARP spoofing attack in Python and C # using the sharppcap library is presented. Examples of Man-in-the-middle attacks such as DHCP spoofing and ICMP redirection are provided. Describes the techniques of hacking the router and spoofing the MAC address.

Implementing an intrusion detection and prevention system using Software-Defined Networking: Defending against ARP spoofing attacks and Blacklisted MAC Addresses

This work focuses on infiltration methods, such as Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing, where adversaries sends fabricated ARP messages, linking their Media Access Control (MAC) address to a genuine device’s Internet Protocol (IP) address. We developed a Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS), which defends against ARP spoofing and Blacklisted MAC Addresses. This is done by dynamically adjusting SDN’s operating parameters to detect malicious network traffic. Bespoke software was written to conduct the attack tests and customise the IDPS; this was coupled to a specifically developed library to validate user input. Improvements were made to SDN in the areas of attack detection, firewall, intrusion prevention, packet dropping, and shorter timeouts. Our extensive experimental results show that the developed solution is effective and quickly responds to intrusion attempts. In the considered test scenarios, our measured detection and mitigation times are sufficiently low (in the order of a few seconds).

E2BaSeP: Efficient Bayes Based Security Protocol Against ARP Spoofing Attacks in SDN Architectures

Virtual networks, just like classical IP networks, usually face many external threats such as ARP spoofing attacks. These attacks come from Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) vulnerabilities. Indeed, the ARP protocol can allow a virtual machine to be identified by one or more IP-MAC pairs, thus facilitating users’ impersonation and forged IP-MAC pair insertion into the victims’ ARP caches. This type of attack is the beginning of more dangerous attacks such as man-in-the-middle and denial-of-service. Several solutions based on SDN (Software-Defined Network) technology, known for their suitable adaptation to large-scale networks, have been proposed. These solutions use a global ARP cache built into the controller which contains the virtual machines’ IP-MAC pairs, as attacker detection knowledge. The main drawbacks of these methods are the collection and unsecured storage of IP-MAC pairs into the global ARP cache and failure to consider IP address reallocation cases, as well as users’ connection and reconnection scenarios in the attacker detection process. To remedy these shortcomings, we propose an Efficient Bayes Based Security Protocol (E2BaSeP) which detects attackers using a Bayes-based algorithm. This solution works in both dynamically and statically addressing networks. Simulation results show that the E2BaSeP protocol provides effective protection for ARP caches and performs better than those observed in the literature.

Analisis Bukti Serangan Address Resolution Protocol Spoofing menggunakan Metode National Institute of Standard Technology

This research intends to find information about evidence of Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Spoofing attacks that is the MAC address of the attacker and victim also the time of the attack. This research uses Wireshark tools to inspect network traffic, especially on the ARP protocol. It uses the National Institute of Technology Technology (NIST) method as a framework in the simulation process to produce evidence reports. ARP Spoofing attacks can lead to other attacks, such as Denial of Service and Man in the Middle Attack, this attack allows users not to be able to access the network and data theft. During the simulation stage, 2 ARP Spoofing attacks are carried out on 1 laptop and 1 router connected to the network. The results of the attack simulation found 2 attacks and obtained information about the MAC address of the attacker and victim and also the time of the attack. Based on the results of tests carried, successfully found all ARP Spoofing attacks that occur on the network with a success rate of 100%

SM ARP Stochastic Markovian Game Model for Packet Forwarding Based ARP Spoofing Attacks Detection

Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing attacks have become the most pivotal attacks in deteriorating the performance of computer networks. The objective of this paper is to develop SM-ARP, Stochastic Markovian game model based ARP spoofing attack detection scheme.Although many recent techniques have been developed to detect and protect against ARP spoofing attacks, the practical challenges has led to ineffective utilization. The major challenge is that the attackers employing ARP spoofing tend to alter the attack strategy at each point and increases the difficulty in detection and security implementations. The packet forwarding relaying is one suchattack strategy which is harder to detect using traditionally proven methodologies. This paper tackles the packet forwarding relay strategy based ARP spoofing attack strategy by using the proposed SM-ARPto eliminate the attack in a practically feasible manner. The proposed model utilizes a stationary Markov model for optimizing the packet forwarding behaviour of the networks. When an ARP spoofing attack is initiated, the SM-ARP model tracks the changes in the packet forwarding patterns through cache table and detects the misbehaviours. As a security measure, these misbehaved nodes are entitled to recovery and repair process to restore the network to stabilized state. Experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of SM-ARP in an application for student marks management system. The results prove that the proposed SM-ARP model improves the detection of ARP spoofing attacks with accuracy of 88.2% and also reduces the complexity and errors.

Address resolution protocol spoofing attacks and security approaches: A survey

Address resolution protocol (ARP) is a very popular communication protocol in the local area network (LAN), working under the network layer, as per the open systems interconnection (OSI) model. It is used to associate Internet protocol (IP) address to medium access control (MAC) address; hence, the IP‐MAC addresses are stored in ARP cache of any network host. ARP has weakness in authentication that an attacker can exploit to gain unauthorized access to one's sensitive data. There are some approaches that can be used against ARP spoofing attacks. These provide an efficient and secure way to mitigate ARP attacks and detect ARP poisoning that can reduce the attack. This paper will discuss: various effective approaches, security issues in ARP spoofing, and poisoning attacks.

RTNSS: a routing trace-based network security system for preventing ARP spoofing attacks

The motion of address resolution protocol (ARP) is done without any problem in a general environment, but it is not considered from the security aspect; therefore, it risks being threatened by an attack from the network called ARP spoofing or ARP poisoning. The attacker can approach the transmission data between hosts by disguising itself as a different host through an ARP spoofing attack and can isolate the host as the target of an attack from the network. In this paper, we propose a routing trace-based network security system for preventing ARP spoofing attacks. Our proposed system includes detection, protection, and recovery techniques to prevent an ARP spoofing attack in the internal network. Whether an ARP spoofing attack occurs is confirmed through the periodic monitoring of the ARP table and a routing trace. The system can prevent ARP spoofing attacks without modifications to the ARP or the addition of cryptographic measures. In addition, it provides security and efficiency by overcoming the weak points of the existing researches.

ARP Modification for Prevention of IP Spoofing

The address resolution protocol (ARP) provides dynamic mapping between two different forms of addresses: the 32-bit Internet protocol (IP) address of the network layer and the 48-bit medium access control (MAC) address of the data link layer. A host computer finds the MAC address of the default gateway or the other hosts on the same subnet by using ARP and can then send IP packets. However, ARP can be used for network attacks, which are one of the most prevalent types of network attacks today. In this study, a new ARP algorithm that can prevent IP spoofing attacks is proposed. The proposed ARP algorithm is a broadcast ARP reply and an ARP notification. The broadcast ARP reply was used for checking whether the ARP information was forged. The broadcast ARP notification was used for preventing a normal host's ARP table from being poisoned. The proposed algorithm is backward compatible with the current ARP protocol and dynamically prevents any ARP spoofing attacks. In this study, the proposed ARP algorithm was implemented on the Linux operating system; here, we present the test results with respect to the prevention of ARP spoofing attacks.

DS-ARP: a new detection scheme for ARP spoofing attacks based on routing trace for ubiquitous environments.

Despite the convenience, ubiquitous computing suffers from many threats and security risks. Security considerations in the ubiquitous network are required to create enriched and more secure ubiquitous environments. The address resolution protocol (ARP) is a protocol used to identify the IP address and the physical address of the associated network card. ARP is designed to work without problems in general environments. However, since it does not include security measures against malicious attacks, in its design, an attacker can impersonate another host using ARP spoofing or access important information. In this paper, we propose a new detection scheme for ARP spoofing attacks using a routing trace, which can be used to protect the internal network. Tracing routing can find the change of network movement path. The proposed scheme provides high constancy and compatibility because it does not alter the ARP protocol. In addition, it is simple and stable, as it does not use a complex algorithm or impose extra load on the computer system.

Design and implementation of an efficient defense mechanism against ARP spoofing attacks using AES and RSA

The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is used to resolve the MAC address of a host given its IP address. ARP is stateless, as there is no authentication when exchanging a MAC address between hosts. Hacking methods using ARP spoofing are being continuously abused in various ways, and there have been many prior studies of the prevention of such attacks. However, prevention requires the modification of the basic network protocol or expensive additional equipment, so it is hard to apply these methods to the current network. In this paper, we examine the limits of prior research into ARP spoofing prevention. In addition, we suggest a defense mechanism that does not require changes to the network protocol or expensive equipment. Our system automatically renews the reliable MAC address information to the ARP table as a static type to protect users from ARP spoofing.

The Role of Client Isolation in Protecting Wi-Fi Users from ARP Spoofing Attacks

This study investigates the role of the client isolation technology Public Secure Packet Forwarding (PSPF) in defending 802.11 wireless (Wi-Fi) clients, connected to a public wireless access point, from Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)cache poisoning attacks, or ARP spoofing. Exploitation of wireless attack vectors such as these have been on the rise and some have made national and international news. Although client isolation technologies are common place in most wireless access points, they are rarely enabled by default. Since an average user generally has a limited understanding of IP networking concepts, it is rarely enabled during access point configurations. Isolating wireless clients from one another on unencrypted wireless networks is a simple and potentially effective way of protection. The purpose of this research is to determine if a commonly available and easily implementable wireless client isolation security technology, such as PSPF, is an effective method for defending wireless clients against attacks.

On investigating ARP spoofing security solutions

The address resolution protocol (ARP) has proven to work well under regular circumstances, but it was not designed to cope with malicious hosts. By performing ARP spoofing attacks, a malicious host can either impersonate another host [man-in-the-middle attack (MiM) ] and gain access to sensitive information, or perform denial of service attack (DoS) on target hosts. Several security solutions, such as high-cost LAN switches and intrusion detection or prevention systems (IDS/IPS), are currently used to detect and prevent these attacks. In this paper, we evaluate, through extensive practical experiments, how effective these security solutions are in detecting ARP spoofing. We clearly show that ARP spoofing has not been given enough attention by most common security solutions which lack efficient detection and prevention mechanisms. We then propose an optimal algorithm that is capable of detecting all various ARP spoofing attacks; especially those not detected using the current mechanisms. The suggested algorithm can be easily integrated in any available security solution with very minimal overhead.