This article defends Marjorie Suchocki’s position against two main objections raised by David E. Conner. Conner objects that God as a single actual entity (affirmed by Suchocki) must be temporal because there is succession in God’s experience ofthe world. The reply is that time involves at least two successive occasions separated by perishing, but in God nothing ever perishes. Conner also objects that Suchocki’s personalistic process theism is not experiential but is instead theoretical (based on what Whitehead says in Part VofPR) and not definitive. The reply is that his dismissal ofPart V ofPR is arbitrary, the interpretation ofall experience is theoretical, and no metaphysical interpretations are absolutely definitive, including PR as a whole. Also, Conner ignores religious experience. In “The Plight of a Theoretical Deity: A Response to Suchocki’s ‘The Dynamic God’ ,” David E. Conner perceptively called attention to a significant, but as yet unresolved, dispute in process theology. How can God, understood as a single everlasting actual entity, be in process or even be involved with process? As I explain in my What Caused the Big Bang? , process thinkers may need to go back to square one and totally rethink the very nature of time itself (What 242-74), but for present purposes I will answer this question within the framework of orthodox Whiteheadianism. “Suchocki employs the term ‘dynamic’ to disguise an unresolved incompatibility between temporal and non-temporal process in God,” Conner complains (Conner 11 2). This seeming “incompatibility” is indeed unresolved, and it dates back to Whitehead’s own distinction between two kinds of process, the succession of actual occasions, which he variously called “time,” “change,” or “transition,” and the internal processing or development of a single actual occasion or entity, which he variously called “becoming,” “genetic process,” or “concrescence” (PR 21 0-1 5). Just what these involve will be explained as we go along, but process PROCESS STUDIES 42.1 (201 3) 78 theologians have been sharply divided over whether to conceive of God’s own processing as analogous to “time” or to “concrescence.” According to the “time” view, God is an everlasting society of temporally successive actual occasions. According to the “concrescence” view, God is not a society at all but is a single actual entity whose processing must be understood atemporally. Both Suchocki and Conner take their stand with the “concrescence” crowd and against the “time” crowd, best represented by Hartshorne and Cobb (until recently). Suchocki identifies William Christian, Lewis S. Ford, Jorge Nobo, Palmyre M. F. Oomen, Denis Hurtubise, and herself as subscribing to the single actual entity view (Suchocki 39). Bowman Clarke and others should doubtless be added to this list. In several publications, I have also explained my preference for the single actual entity everlasting continuous concrescence view, but I acknowledge the apparent paradox of making sense of “process” or “becoming” without “time.” Conner finds Suchocki’s position to be problematic for basically two reasons that invite further analysis and clarification. A God Who is Not Temporal, and Yet is Temporal Suchocki’s first and primary difficulty is, says Conner (Conner 11 5), that her “dynamic” God seems to be both “not temporal, and yet. . . temporal.” Conner does not deny the validity of the distinction, but he argues that Suchocki wants to have it both ways when it comes to understanding what God is like. As Conner sees it, the main problem is that time involves succession, whereas concrescence does not, being instead an “all-at-onceness,” the subordinate phases of which do not involve succession or what Conner calls “actual serial order” (Conner 11 6). Suchocki apparently thinks that there is an actual serial order in God’s experience of and interaction with the created world, though this does not involve a succession of Divine temporal actual occasions, and God is only a single actual entity. Can we make good sense of this? I believe that we can. We must begin with the very nature of time itself, as understood by Whitehead. He defined “time” in Science and the Modern World as the “sheer succession of epochal durations,” (SMW 1 24, 1 26, also PR 68), “epochs” being “actual occasions,” which have “duration,” “temporal extensiveness,” or “temporal thickness” (PR 77, 1 58, 1 69). Single actual occasions or entities are in one sense not “in time” because by definition time requires at least two actual occasions in succession. Strangely, each
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