Minds Of Actors Research Articles

Impacts of character morality on egocentric projection and identification

Studies in the social cognition literature indicate that several strategies play a role in how observers understand an observed actor, including by simulating the actor's perspective (identification), and/or an audience member projecting their own perspective onto the actor's mind (egocentric projection). In processing story characters, there is evidence that taking a character's perspective and projecting one's own perspective are distinct psychological mechanisms used to understand a character. Manipulating a common and much studied narrative feature—character morality—we examined how morality influences the way audience members process story characters. Three experiments consistently found that audience members tend to have higher levels of both egocentric projection and identification with the character when interpreting moral characters, compared to immoral characters. Confirmatory factor analysis shows that egocentric projection and identification are two distinct constructs.

Effects of Culture and Gender on Judgments of Intent and Responsibility.

Do different cultures hold different views of intentionality? In four studies, participants read scenarios in which the actor’s distal intent (a focus on a broader goal) and proximal intent (a focus on the mechanics of the act) were manipulated. In Studies 1–2, when distal intent was more prominent in the actor’s mind, North Americans rated the actor more responsible than did Chinese and South Asian participants. When proximal intent was more prominent, Chinese and South Asian participants, if anything, rated the actor more responsible. In Studies 3–4, when distal intent was more prominent, male Americans rated the actor more responsible than did female Americans. When proximal intent was more prominent, females rated the actor more responsible. The authors discuss these findings in relation to the literatures on moral reasoning and cultural psychology.

The Paper on the Chi Acting System to Control Actor's Mind and Body

원로배우 김동원은 한국에서의 연기교육은 구체적인 연기훈련법이나 체계적인 연기시스템은 없었다고 회고한다. 서구 연기술 훈련의 기본적인 두 방향의 원리는 배우의 파토스와 로고스 중 어느 방향을 강조하느냐에 따라 나눈다. 디데로(Denis Diderot)가 감성에 의한 파토스적 연기를 배척하고 이성에 의한 연기통제를 주장하면서 논란이 시작된 현대연기술론은 스타니슬라브스키(Constantin Stanislavski) 의 연기란 감각에 호소하기보다 영혼에 호소해야 한다는 새로운 연기술론을 등장시켰다.BR 폴란드의 그로토스키(Grotowski)는 절충적인 연기술론으로 내적으로 잘 조화가 된 혼연일체를 신체적으로 영적으로 이룰 수 있다고 생각하였으나 사회생활로부터 오염된 인간의 상태는 순수한 충동의 표현력을 방해한다고 판단하여 이를 극복하는 방법론을 모색하였다. 영적인 영감을 자연스럽게 불러낼 수 있는 해답을 찾고자 현대연기술 이론가들의 다양한 노력은 영적경험을 지향하고 있을 뿐 확고한 원리를 제시하지 못하였다.BR 본 연구는 우리들 창조기관의 중요한 중추를 지배하여 몸과 마음을 하나로 만들어 영적 경험의 세계로 인도하는 새로운 배우훈련을 제시하고자 조선기공을 바탕으로 체계화시킨‘기氣연기술시스템’을 제안한다.‘기氣연기술시스템’은 논자가 60여 년 동안의 수련경험과 30여 년 동안의 연기교육을 통해서 체험한 수련 논리를 바탕으로 효율적인 연기술시스템을 체계화하였다. 내용은 조선기공의 복식호흡 수련법과 명상 수련법을 토대로 정리하였다.

Construal level and free will beliefs shape perceptions of actors' proximal and distal intent.

Two components of lay observers' calculus of moral judgment are proximal intent (the actor's mind is focused on performing the action) and distal intent (the actor's mind is focused on the broader goal). What causes observers to prioritize one form of intent over the other? The authors observed whether construal level (Studies 1–2) and beliefs about free will (Studies 3–4) would influence participants' sensitivity to the actor's proximal vs. distal intent. In four studies, participants read scenarios in which the actor's proximal and distal intent were independently manipulated. In Study 1, when only distal intent was present in the actor's mind, participants rated the psychologically distant actor more responsible than the psychologically near actor. In Study 2, when only distal intent was in the actor's mind, participants with a chronic high level of action identification rated the actor more responsible than did those with a low level of action identification. In both studies, when only proximal intent was in the actor's mind, construal level did not predict judgments of responsibility. In Study 3, when only proximal intent was present in the actor's mind, the more participants believed in free will, the more they rated the actor responsible. When only distal intent was in the actor's mind, free will belief did not influence ratings of responsibility. In Study 4, the same pattern emerged when free will/determinism beliefs were manipulated and the actor performed a positive (life-saving) act. The authors discuss how these results shed new light on the literatures on moral reasoning and psycho-legal theory.

Paradigm man vs. the bricoleur: bricolage as an alternative vision of agency in ideational change

The status of ideational explanations in political science has been strengthened by the argument that institutionalized ideas structure actors’ identification of their interests as well as the interests of their political adversaries. Despite its utility, the focus on the institutionalization of ideas has had the unfortunate consequence that actors are often, implicitly or explicitly, believed to internalize ideas, making it difficult to understand how actors are able to change their ideas and institutions. Drawing on cultural sociology and ideational theory, the paper introduces the ‘bricoleur’ as an alternative vision of agency. It is argued, first, that actors cannot cognitively internalize highly structured symbolic systems, and ideas are thus ‘outside the minds of actors’. Second, using the cognitive schemas at their disposal, actors construct strategies of action based on pre-constructed ideational and political institutions. Third, actors must work actively and creatively with the ideas and institutions they use, because the structure within which actors work does not determine their response to new circumstances. Fourth, as a vast number of ideational studies have shown, actors face a complex array of challenges in getting their ideas to the top of the policy agenda, which makes it all the more important to act pragmatically, putting ideas together that may not be logically compatible but rather answer political and cultural logics. In sum, agency often takes the form of bricolage, where bits and pieces of the existing ideational and institutional legacy are put together in new forms leading to significant political transformation.

'What Matters Most is What's in Your Heart' vs. 'Evil Thought is Not a Crime': Level of Abstraction in Lay Reasoning on Moral Responsibility

When judging morally ambiguous action, how much weight do laypeople place on whether the actor's behavior was (a) driven by a prior goal versus (b) performed under intentional control? Based on a growing research literature in contemporary social-cognitive psychology, we hypothesized that perceivers' emphasis on the prior goal versus intentional control is predicted by how abstractly versus concretely they construe the action. In two experiments, we presented participants with scenarios in which a prior goal and intentional control were or were not present in the actor's mind at the moment of the critical act. In Study 1, participants who received an abstract construal prime rated the actor with a malevolent prior goal but no intentional control more blameworthy than an actor with intentional control but no malevolent prior goal. In contrast, those in the concrete prime condition rated the actor with intentional control but no prior goal more blameworthy than an actor with a prior goal but no intentional control. In Study 2, we replicated this pattern with measured, pre-existing individual differences in chronic construal level. In addition, we used an encoding paradigm to identify the condition in which the relationship between construal level and judgment is mediated by spontaneous extraction of ends-related concepts. Implications for understanding lay conceptions of intention, mens rea, and responsibility, as well as the literature on the interface between psychology and law are discussed.

Un cadre pour un système multirobot de service

This work aim at modelling a system which allows a user to give a mission to a robots team and to determine the whole process leading to its execution. This paper proposes a participative model to set up this system. We separate the actor: active element subjected to the stimulus (the user and its request), the objective form: object designed in the actor's mind, the product: element satisfying the stimulus. In agreement with this model, the system is based on a multi-levels diagram: the syntactic and semantic checker, which interactively corrects and completes the user's request, and the geometrical checker, which must create the robots path as well as validates passages of the formations. Results are presented to the user through an interface for validation. The mental model of the execution built by the user during his request formulation, can be confronted with the one deduced by the system.

What Does Love Mean? Exploring Network Culture in Two Network Settings

Meaning matters in the way people form social ties. Adopting an unconventional analytic technique - the Galois lattice analysis - I show how researchers can uncover relational meanings using conventional research techniques (i.e., closed-ended surveys). Galois lattice analysis also inspires new ways of conceptualizing relational meanings in terms of the duality ofpersons and relationships, that is, how actors' understandings of each other as persons define the understandings of their relationships with them, and vice versa. The co-constitution of these dualistic meanings thus defines a network culture. Comparing two communal settings in which the meaning of love is constructed, I demonstrate that different cultures produce different meaning structures that guide how actors relate to one another, resulting in different degrees of group stability. Social researchers often speak of networks in terms of their structures, as configurations of social relationships or ties constructed by social participants. Due to different methodological constraints (e.g., those of closed-ended survey questions), the meanings of social ties are often inadequately understood. Frequently, analysts assume that the meaning of a relationship (e.g., friendship) is self-evident. What people really mean by the word friend is thereby bracketed as a fixed meaning; meanwhile, analysis goes on to focus on networks as patterns of meaningfully unified ties. Although it is certainly plausible to think of all members sharing a common understanding of social relationships within groups, this assumption is more problematic when we try to address comparisons across different settings. In a different group context, friendship may mean one thing in one group and something else in another. It is therefore necessary for social researchers to examine not only the structural configuration of ties (i.e., properties) but also the meaning structures of different groups. We must ask how culture affects the ways in which people relate to one another and how these culturally configured relationships bring forth certain social outcomes (Fine and Kleinman 1983). Culture exists in many forms. Depending on researchers' theoretical orientations, they may concentrate on material productions, ideology, beliefs, typifications, practices, and so on (Sewell 1999). Focusing on what people really mean by having this or that relationship with some persons taps into the subjective aspect of culture (Wuthnow and Witten 1988:54). These meanings and their structures also link culture to cognition (DiMaggio 1997). Recently, researchers have shown increased interest in the cognitive aspects of social networks by examining the difference between the social networks in the minds of actors and the

Quero ser John Malkovich e o pacto com o diabo de Se eu fosse você: destinos da identificação projetiva excessiva

O autor discorre a respeito de dois possíveis destinos da identificação projetiva excessiva: aquele cujo desfecho é a perda do self original e o mergulho em um estado regressivo de fantasias psicóticas, e outro que culmina com a elaboração das posições esquizoparanóide e depressiva e a reintegração das partes projetadas do self. O autor ilustra o primeiro destino com o filme Quero ser John Malkovich, dirigido por Spike Jonze, no qual o protagonista Craig encontra um portal que dá acesso à mente do ator. O segundo destino da identificação projetiva excessiva é ilustrado com o romance Se eu fosse você, utilizado por Klein em Sobre a identificação, de 1955, e com a análise que a autora faz do pacto com o diabo que permite que o protagonista, Fabian, invada corpos e mentes de outras pessoas.

Competing Theories of Justification: Deeds Versus Reasons

In an article 20 years ago (A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite to Criminal Liability), Robinson argued that justification defenses are best conceptualized and formulated objectively, as focusing on the nature of the actor's deeds. (George Fletcher wrote a critical response, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson). In the two decades since, many if not most writers on the subject have disagreed with Robinson's position. And nearly all formulations of justification defenses in current American criminal codes use subjective formulations, which focus instead on the actor's reasons for acting. They give a justification defense if and only if, at the time of the conduct, the actor believes the conduct is justified. In this article, Robinson reaffirms his support for an objective formulation of justification and offers his first response to critics and defense of his original claim. His claim has two practical implications for liability. First, Robinson argues that a mistaken belief that one's conduct is justified ought to result in an excuse defense, not the justification defense that the subjective formulation would give. The article explains the important implications of that distinction. Second, Robinson argues that the unknowingly justified actor ought to retain a justification defense; the subjective formulation would take the defense away. (If the jurisdiction punishes impossible attempts--where an offense has occurred only in the actor's mind, only from the actor's mistaken view of the circumstances -- then the unknowingly justified actor would be liable for such an impossible attempt.) Robinson argues that the objective view is superior for several reasons: first, it generates liability results that are more just and that better match our collective intuitions of what is just. Second, even if the competing theories generated identical liability results, the objective deeds conceptualisation is superior because it lays bare the distinctions that are relevant to determining liability in these cases, while the subjective reasons theory obscures those distinctions. Finally, the deeds theory of justification improves the criminal law's rule-articulation function. That is, it allows the law to better communicate to the public the conduct rules that it commands they follow.