Action-oriented Representations Research Articles

Valent Representations, Bodily Feelings, and Social Norms

In this commentary, we discuss Tom Cochrane’s theory of emotions. Cochrane offers an appealingly unified account of valent representations, ranging from simple responses to complex representations within a mechanistic framework. This offers some guidance as to how we might conceive of emotions as simple action-guiding responses in infants and animals, as well as context-sensitive evaluative states. While Cochrane argues for the centrality of bodily feelings, he does not consider his approach to be embodied in the narrower sense. We question his reasons and suggest to think of emotions as embodied action-oriented representations. We, furthermore, suggest developing the approach with regard to the multiple roles that social norms play, and delve further into the nuanced relationship between bodily self-regulation and the formative influence of social norms on emotions.

Attentional prioritization reconfigures novel instructions into action-oriented task sets

An astonishing aspect of human cognitive flexibility concerns the ability to efficiently convert complex symbolic instructions into novel behaviors. In such ability, the rapid transformation of relevant content into action plans is particularly crucial as it allows for reflexive, automatic-like execution of merely instructed task sets. However, little is known about the mechanisms that give rise to this transformation. In the current study, we test the hypothesis that novel instructions held in working memory are reformatted into action-oriented representations when selective attention prioritizes their content. To do so, we devised a paradigm in which participants first encoded 4 S-R mappings and later, a retro-cue selected two of them. We first found that participants can benefit from retro-cues during the implementation of novel task-sets. Then, across two preregistered experiments, we observed that cued mappings (but not uncued ones) induced intention-based reflexivity, suggesting that only these entered an action-oriented state. Altogether, our results reveal that selective attention prioritizes relevant novel instructed content, playing an important role in its prospective reformatting into an action-bound task set.

Representational Organization of Novel Task Sets during Proactive Encoding.

Recent multivariate analyses of brain data have boosted our understanding of the organizational principles that shape neural coding. However, most of this progress has focused on perceptual visual regions (Connolly et al., 2012), whereas far less is known about the organization of more abstract, action-oriented representations. In this study, we focused on humans' remarkable ability to turn novel instructions into actions. While previous research shows that instruction encoding is tightly linked to proactive activations in frontoparietal brain regions, little is known about the structure that orchestrates such anticipatory representation. We collected fMRI data while participants (both males and females) followed novel complex verbal rules that varied across control-related variables (integrating within/across stimuli dimensions, response complexity, target category) and reward expectations. Using representational similarity analysis (Kriegeskorte et al., 2008), we explored where in the brain these variables explained the organization of novel task encoding, and whether motivation modulated these representational spaces. Instruction representations in the lateral PFC were structured by the three control-related variables, whereas intraparietal sulcus encoded response complexity and the fusiform gyrus and precuneus organized its activity according to the relevant stimulus category. Reward exerted a general effect, increasing the representational similarity among different instructions, which was robustly correlated with behavioral improvements. Overall, our results highlight the flexibility of proactive task encoding, governed by distinct representational organizations in specific brain regions. They also stress the variability of motivation-control interactions, which appear to be highly dependent on task attributes, such as complexity or novelty.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT In comparison with other primates, humans display a remarkable success in novel task contexts thanks to our ability to transform instructions into effective actions. This skill is associated with proactive task-set reconfigurations in frontoparietal cortices. It remains yet unknown, however, how the brain encodes in anticipation the flexible, rich repertoire of novel tasks that we can achieve. Here we explored cognitive control and motivation-related variables that might orchestrate the representational space for novel instructions. Our results showed that different dimensions become relevant for task prospective encoding, depending on the brain region, and that the lateral PFC simultaneously organized task representations following different control-related variables. Motivation exerted a general modulation upon this process, diminishing rather than increasing distances among instruction representations.

Individualism versus interactionism about social understanding

In the debate about the nature of social cognition we see a shift towards theories that explain social understanding through interaction. This paper discusses autopoietic enactivism and the we-mode approach in the light of such developments. We argue that a problem seems to arise for these theories: an interactionist account of social cognition makes the capacity of shared intentionality a presupposition of social understanding, while the capacity of engaging in scenes of shared intentionality in turn presupposes exactly the kind of social understanding that it is intended to explain. The social capacity in question that is presupposed by these accounts is then analyzed in the second section via a discussion and further development of Searle’s ‘sense of us’ and ‘sense of the other’ as a precondition for social cognition and joint action. After a critical discussion of Schmid’s recent proposal to analyze this in terms of plural pre-reflective selfawareness, we develop an alternative account. Starting from the idea that infants distinguish in perception between physical objects and other agents we distinguish between affordances and social affordances and cash out the notion of a social affordance in terms of “interaction-oriented representations”, parallel to the analysis of object affordances in terms of “action-oriented representations”. By characterizing their respective features we demonstrate how this approach can solve the problem formulated in the first part.

Grounding humanoid visually guided walking: From action-independent to action-oriented knowledge

In the context of humanoid and service robotics, it is essential that the agent can be positioned with respect to objects of interest in the environment. By relying mostly on the cognitivist conception in artificial intelligence, the research on visually guided walking has tended to overlook the characteristics of the context in which behavior occurs. Consequently, considerable efforts have been directed to define action-independent explicit models of the solution, often resulting in high computational requirements. In this study, inspired by the embodied cognition research, our interest has focused on the analysis of the sensory-motor coupling. Notably, on the relation between embodiment, information, and action-oriented representation. Hence, by mimicking human walking, a behavior scheme is proposed and endowed the agent with the skill of approaching stimuli. A significant contribution to object discrimination was obtained by proposing an efficient visual attention mechanism, that exploits the redundancies and the statistical regularities induced in the sensory-motor coordination, thus the information flow is anticipated from the fusion of visual and proprioceptive features in a Bayesian network. The solution was implemented on the humanoid platform Nao, where the task was accomplished in an unstructured scenario.

Representation Redux: Is there still a useful role for representation to play in the context of embodied, dynamicist and situated theories of mind?

Abstract The last fifteen years have seen a sea change in cognitive science where issues of embodiment, situatedness and dynamics have become central to the explanatory resources in use. This paper evaluates the suggestion that representation should be eliminated from the explanative vocabulary of cognitive science. We trace the history of the issue by examining the usefulness of action-oriented representation (AOR), and we reassess if there is still a good explanatory role for the notion of representation in contemporary cognitive science by looking at contexts of re-use, contexts of informational fusion and elaboration, contexts of virtualist perception, and contexts of representational extension, restructuring and substitution. We claim that in these contexts the notion of representation continues to fulfill a valuable function in linking the inner informational economy of cognitive systems to how they interact and couple with the world, and that the role of representation in explanation has not been superseded by enactive and radical embodied theories of cognition. The final section of the paper suggests that we might be better off adopting a more pluralist research perspective, accepting that certain branches of cognitive science seem to require the positing of representations in order to develop, whereas others (e.g. research into minimal cognitive systems), do not appear to require it. We conclude that trying to suppress the notion of representation in all areas of cognitive science is seriously misguided.

Exorcising action oriented representations: ridding cognitive science of its Nazgûl

This paper reviews two main strategies for dealing with the threat posed by radically enactive/embodied cognition to traditional cognitive science. Both strategies invoke action oriented representations (AORs). They differ in emphasizing different features of AORs in their attempt to answer the REC threat – focusing on their contents and vehicles, respectively. The first two sections review the central motivations and rationales driving the ‘content’ and ‘format’ strategies in turn and raise initial concerns about the tenability of each. With respect to the ‘content’ strategy, these worries ought to make us suspicious about the explanatory value of positing AORs. Although the ‘format’ strategy has a way of answering this concern, it raises a more fundamental worry about the motivation for even believing in AORs in the first place. Although these worries cast doubt on the feasibility of invoking AORs as a means of dealing with the REC threat, they do not constitute conclusive reasons for eliminating AORs altogether. There are other, stronger reasons for supposing that we should. The third section provides a sketch of a master argument, developed elsewhere, which makes that case in full dress fashion. The final section – ‘Resurrection?’ – considers and rejects the possibility that AORs might be resurrected, even if it is agreed that the master argument cited in the third section succeeds.

Learning of sequences of finger movements and timing: frontal lobe and action-oriented representation.

Motor sequence learning involves learning of a sequence of effectors with which to execute a series of movements and learning of a sequence of timings at which to execute the movements. In this study, we have segregated the neural correlates of the two learning mechanisms. Moreover, we have found an interaction between the two learning mechanisms in the frontal areas, which we claim as suggesting action-oriented coding in the frontal lobe. We used positron emission tomography and compared three learning conditions with a visuo-motor control condition. In two learning conditions, the subjects learned either a sequence of finger movements with random timing or a sequence of timing with random use of fingers. In the third condition the subjects learned to execute a sequence of specific finger movements at specific timing; we argue that it was only in this condition that the motor sequence was coded as an action-oriented representation. By looking for condition by session interactions (learning vs. control conditions over sessions), we have removed nonspecific time effects and identified areas that showed a learning-related increment of activation during learning. Learning of a finger sequence was associated with an increment of activation in the right intraparietal sulcus region and medial parietal cortex, whereas learning of a timing sequence was associated with an increment of activation in the lateral cerebellum, suggesting separate mechanisms for learning effector and temporal sequences. The left intraparietal sulcus region showed an increment of activation in learning of both finger and timing sequences, suggesting an overlap between the two learning mechanisms. We also found that the mid-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, together with the medial and lateral premotor areas, became increasingly active when subjects learned a sequence that specified both fingers and timing, that is, when subjects were able to prepare specific motor action. These areas were not active when subjects learned a sequence that specified fingers or timing alone, that is, when subjects were still dependent on external stimuli as to the timing or fingers with which to execute the movements. Frontal areas may integrate the effector and temporal information of a motor sequence and implement an action-oriented representation so as to perform a motor sequence accurately and quickly. We also found that the mid-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was distinguished from the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior fronto-polar cortex, which showed sustained activity throughout learning sessions and did not show either an increment or decrement of activation.

Analysing and training task analysis

Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) is used particularly in the context of instructional development. This paper involves two exploratory studies concerning the difficulties of those learning to perform HTA (Study 1) and how these might be overcome (Study 2). In Study 1 seventeen students were provided with declarative training in the major features of HTA and were then asked to analyse the task of making a cup of tea (task 1) or of painting a door (task 2). HTAs were analysed in terms of five HTA criteria (hierarchical representation, logical decomposition rule, logical equivalence, specification of plans and the P × C rule) and four other error categories (task boundaries incorrect, cognitive goals omitted, operations described as activities rather than goals, and lack of versatility of the analysis in terms of encompassing task variation). Errors occurred with respect to all HTA criteria and other error categories suggesting that carrying out HTA is itself a complex cognitive task. This together with an analysis of questionnaire responses concerning self-reported difficulties and strategies suggested that the tendency to use an action-oriented representation of the task being analysed might be one cause of poor performance. Study 2 investigated the effectiveness of three instructional conditions at improving analysts' performance at HTA: procedure training which specified eight main goals in carrying out HTA, criteria training which involved understanding and practice at using or recognising the five HTA criteria and types of error, and combined criteria/procedure training. Performance at HTA improved in both conditions that involved criteria training.

The neutral-weak-current experiments: A philosophical perspective

The last fifteen years have seen a sea change in cognitive science where issues of embodiment, situatedness and dynamics have become central to the explanatory resources in use. This paper evaluates the suggestion that representation should be eliminated from the explanative vocabulary of cognitive science. We trace the history of the issue by examining the usefulness of action-oriented representation (AOR), and we reassess if there is still a good explanatory role for the notion of representation in contemporary cognitive science by looking at contexts of re-use, contexts of informational fusion and elaboration, contexts of virtualist perception, and contexts of representational extension, restructuring and substitution. We claim that in these contexts the notion of representation continues to fulfill a valuable function in linking the inner informational economy of cognitive systems to how they interact and couple with the world, and that the role of representation in explanation has not been superseded by enactive and radical embodied theories of cognition. The final section of the paper suggests that we might be better off adopting a more pluralist research perspective, accepting that certain branches of cognitive science seem to require the positing of representations in order to develop, whereas others (e.g. research into minimal cognitive systems), do not appear to require it. We conclude that trying to suppress the notion of representation in all areas of cognitive science is seriously misguided.

Action-oriented representations of implicit personality theories.

Action-oriented representations of implicit personality theories.

Action-oriented representations of implicit personality theories.

Action-oriented representations of implicit personality theories.