Act Utilitarianism Research Articles

Williams on the problem of moral integrity

In this paper, we have tried to point out the importance of the problem of moral integrity in ethical theory. The best way to make an introduction to ethical weighing when it comes to the problem of moral integrity is to analyze the dispute initiated by Bernard Williams. Namely, this is a critique of the act utilitarianism, whose essential weight is precisely on the topic of moral integrity. Williams conceived his objection as saying that there was no place for the value of moral integrity within the act utilitarianism. The treatment of moral integrity is the point of radical disagreement between utilitarianism and deontological ethics. In this way, deciding between utilitarianism and an alternative ethical position, we are actually deciding in favor or against the affirmation of the values of moral integrity. This is a very significant decision when it comes to ethical position. This paper is part of a broader topic on the place of moral integrity in ethical theory, where we have argued that utilitarianism is not the optimal ethical position, precisely because it does not affirm the value of the moral integrity of the individual. This paper is a preparation of such an attitude and has a more modest ambition - it deals with the re-examination of the perception of moral integrity within a utilitarian ethical position.

Whose morality? Which rationality? Challenging artificial intelligence as a remedy for the lack of moral enhancement

Moral implications of the decision-making process based on algorithms require special attention within the field of machine ethics. Specifically, research focuses on clarifying why even if one assumes the existence of well-working ethical intelligent agents in epistemic terms, it does not necessarily mean that they meet the requirements of autonomous moral agents, such as human beings. For the purposes of exemplifying some of the difficulties in arguing for implicit and explicit ethical agents in Moor’s sense, three first-order normative theories in the field of machine ethics are put to test. Those are Powers’ prospect for a Kantian machine, Anderson and Anderson’s reinterpretation of act utilitarianism and Howard and Muntean’s prospect for a moral machine based on a virtue ethical approach. By comparing and contrasting the three first-order normative theories, and by clarifying the gist of the differences between the processes of calculation and moral estimation, the possibility for building what—one might call strong “moral” AI scenarios—is questioned. The possibility of weak “moral” AI scenarios is likewise discussed critically.

Ethical business strategy between east and west: an analysis of minimum wage policy in the garment global supply chain industry of Bangladesh

There are two primary purposes of this manuscript: (i) to evaluate the western buyers’ ethical issue in the setting of eastern and western economies, and (ii) to assess the ethical values of the employers and the government in their business dealing in the background of Bangladesh. Analyzing the present minimum wage (MW) policy of the garment global supply chain industry in Bangladesh and the extent to which the policy functions are two of the other purposes of this study. This study is the mixed approached of exploratory, descriptive, and phenomenological qualitative research. Each of the exploratory, descriptive, and phenomenological qualitative research goals has identified and described in a systematic way to get the best outcome of the purposes set in this manuscript. This study shows that rule utilitarian ethics are being followed by the Western buyers in their business dealings in Western territories. The philosophy of rule utilitarianism holds moral principles, and this principle tends to place greater emphasis on ethical interests rather than economic gains. Unfortunately, Western buyers do not follow the rule utilitarianism in their business dealing in eastern countries. Thus, this study shows western business leaders/buyers are not ethically correct. The act utilitarian ethics, on the other hand, are being followed by the eastern buyers in their business dealing. The philosophy of act utilitarianism holds immoral principles, and this principle tends to place greater emphasis on economic gains rather than ethical interest. This philosophy permit firm’s unethical behavior such as an exploitation of MW on the ground that this practice increases its incomes and maximizes the owner’s interest. The employers and buyers unethically gain profit, keeping the workers in a disadvantaged situation, which contradicts John Rawls’ Theory of Justice. Furthermore, the government has become an accomplice in exploiting and depriving the garment works of their entitlement and labor rights to appease the so-called investors. This study helps buyers, employers, government, and stakeholders to correct their unethical business deals. It also helps the policymakers to implement the MW policy for the betterment of garment global supply chain workers.

Hutchesonian Inspired Agent‐Based Virtue Ethics

AbstractFrancis Hutcheson's moral sense theory is the inspiration for both act utilitarianism and a contemporary virtue ethics approach that Michael Slote calls agent‐based virtue ethics. In this essay, I look at other possibilities for ethical theory that spring from Hutcheson's writings and conclude that the landscape of sentimentalist inspired ethics is richer than many realize. I begin this article with a short explanation of Hutcheson's moral sense theory. I explain that Hutcheson proposes and embraces three distinct criteria of moral evaluation, one of which is concerned with the evaluation of motives and two of which are concerned with the evaluation of acts. Act utilitarianism adopts one of the criteria of act evaluation, and Slote's agent‐based virtue ethics adopts the remaining criterion of act evaluation and the criterion of motive evaluation. Then, after pointing out what I believe are shortcomings of Slote's agent‐based virtue ethics, I propose two Hutchesonian inspired theories, each of which is a compromise between act utilitarianism and agent‐based virtue ethics. The first, which I call hypothetical agent‐based virtue ethics, adopts two of Hutcheson's three criteria and is similar structurally to a virtue ethics theory articulated by Rosalind Hursthouse and Linda Zabzebski. The second, which, for lack of a better name, I call Hutchesonian hybridism, adopts all three of Hutcheson's criteria and is a hybrid combination of Slote's actualist agent‐based virtue ethics and hypothetical agent‐based virtue ethics. I argue that both hypothetical agent‐based virtue ethics and Hutchesonian hybridism overcome the shortcomings (pointed out earlier in this essay) of Slote's actualist agent‐based virtue ethics, and that both of these theories are, therefore, worthy of further consideration.

Consequentialism and Respect: Two Strategies for Justifying Act Utilitarianism

AbstractMost arguments in support of act utilitarianism are elaborations of one of two basic strategies. One is the consequentialist strategy. This strategy relies on the consequentialist premise that an act is right if and only if it produces the best possible consequences and the welfarist premise that the value of a state of affairs is entirely determined by its overall amount of well-being. The other strategy is based on the idea of treating individuals respectfully and resolving conflicts among individuals in whatever way best conforms to that idea. Although both of these strategies can be used to argue for the principle of act utilitarianism, they are significantly different from each other, and these differences cause them to have different strengths and weaknesses. It emerges that which argumentative strategy is chosen by a proponent of act utilitarianism has a large impact on which virtues her view has and which objections it is vulnerable to.

EFFECTIVE ALTRUISM

Abstract The effective altruism movement (EA) is one of the most influential philosophically savvy movements to emerge in recent years. Effective altruism has historically been dedicated to finding out what charitable giving is the most overall-effective, that is, the most effective at promoting or maximizing the impartial good. But some members of EA want the movement to be more inclusive, allowing its members to give in the way that most effectively promotes their values, even when doing so isn’t overall-effective. When we examine what it means to give according to one’s values, I argue, we will see that this is both inconsistent with what EA is like now and inconsistent with its central philosophical commitment to an objective standard that can be used to critically analyze one’s giving. While EA is not merely synonymous with act utilitarianism, it cannot be much more inclusive than it is right now.

Toward a Theory of Respect-Based Communication

Too often people from different walks of life, ideologies and cultures have a hard time working together. Examples include designing a building, playing together on an athletics team, architecting environmental policy or working to hammer out a diplomatic agreement. Communication is essential for people to engage and relate in order to accomplish any of these endeavors. It is humans’ unique ability to communicate that allowed us to work together to birth civilization (Bass, 1974). However, communication can stall and fall apart if people are not on the same page or willing to take into account differing perspectives. Related to this much work has been done on relationship management theory (Ferguson 1984, Ledingham and Brunig 1998, Ledingham 2003, Waters & Bortree 2012, Pratt & Omenugha 2014), but little on how to achieve fundamentally common ground to form relationships. To solve this issue, this paper asks what the basic element of effective communication is and suggests it is respect, and provides a framework from which a proposed respect-based communication theory operates. The approach integrates Kantian respect for persons and Millian utilitarianism while not violating the moral implications of the Greatest Happiness Principle – one can demonstrate compassion and consideration, while working to achieve their desired outcome. One can demonstrate compassion and consideration (Kant 1798-99), while working to achieve the desired outcome that benefits the greatest number (Mill 1864). Bringing these two divergent schools of thought together to form a new theory is an act of respect-based communication in itself. This is logical, as in reality we do not know for certain if decisions based off of morality (Kantian respect for persons) or consequences of the act (utilitarianism) will actually play out. They are simply best guesses. What respect-based communication theory offers is a framework based from the synthesis of the two discussed philosophical approaches to allow for dialogue, relationship formation, trust-building, and long-term beneficial action. A significant contribution of this paper is a framework that can help burst through communication barriers. This framework is firmly rooted in a foundation of respect from which empathic communication can occur. Understanding flows from empathy. As one understands their partner in communication, interest in that person occurs. Trust stems from these actions and from trust blossoms relationships, which makes possible honesty in wanting to help the other person achieve a desired outcome that could also benefit one in the short or long-term. Five basic building blocks form a respect-based communication theory. They are the ability to: (1) empathize, (2) cast away one’s own ideologies, (3) put aside preconceived notions of the other person, (4) get to know the other person, and (5) ask what you can do for the other person. Putting together these pieces results is an interdisciplinary communication theory that can be applied across a number of subjects and professions. One limitation of this paper is that it introduces a theory through empiricism. To advance this work, qualitative research through grounded theory or case studies – and eventually quantitative analysis informed from qualitative study – are necessary. This paper does not proclaim an absolute, but suggests much knowledge we accumulate can continue to inform this theory. Future research should delve into how a respect-based communication theory could be applied to various real-world settings so people can burst through the communication rut in order to achieve mutually beneficial goals for the good of our world. This paper offers the framework. Make no mistake, most desired outcomes will not be altruistic in nature, but if two-sides understand and trust each other, good things can come from the relationship.

Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Might’? How (not) to Resolve the Conflict between Act and Motive Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism has often been understood as a theory that concerns itself first and foremost with the rightness of actions; but many other things (e.g., moral rules, motives, laws, etc.) are also properly subject to moral evaluation, and utilitarians have long understood that the theory must be able to provide an account of these as well. In a landmark article from 1976, Robert Adams argues that traditional act utilitarianism faces a particular problem in this regard. He argues that a on a sensible utilitarian account of the rightness of an agent’s motives, right motives will sometimes conflict with right actions, leaving the theory internally incoherent. The puzzle Adams raises has received a good deal of attention but few proposed solutions. Fred Feldman, however, has offered a solution that seems to be gaining adherents. In this paper I argue that Feldman’s approach cannot succeed. At bottom, it relies on a version of the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’—and subsequently an account of an agent’s alternatives—that is far too restrictive to be plausible. Despite the failure of this solution, however, I argue that the conflict Adams develops is not as theoretically troubling as he suggests. While traditional act utilitarianism may fail for other reasons, it will not fail due to the conflict between acts and motives.

Rules and Right in Mill

Recent scholarship on John Stuart Mill’s moral theory has settled on the view that he is committed to a form of rule utilitarianism. I argue that this consensus is mistaken. Mill’s explicit account of practical rules is incompatible with rule utilitarianism but consistent with sophisticated act utilitarianism. I also examine the direct, textual evidence cited by rule utilitarian interpreters, arguing that it is consistent with the act utilitarian account of practical rules. Finally, I argue that two systematic considerations cited by rule utilitarian interpreters—Mill’s analysis of “wrong” in terms of the appropriateness of punishment, and his account of supererogation—also do not require a rule utilitarian reading.

What's Wrong with Tombstoning and What Does This Tell Us About Responsibility for Health?

Using tombstoning (jumping from a height into water) as an example, this article claims that public health policies and health promotion tend to assess the moral status of activities following a version of health maximizing rule utilitarianism, but this does not represent common moral experience, not least because it fails to take into account the enjoyment that various health effecting habits brings and the contribution that this makes to a good life, variously defined. It is proposed that the moral status of health threatening activities should instead be defined by a version of act utilitarianism where both maximizing value and method of calculation are decided by individuals. In this account personal responsibility for health is reduced to the obligation to undertake calculations effectively, comprising of two duties; epistemic and reflective. If there is an individual epistemic duty, it is plausible to suggest that health promotion should present information in a way which facilitates it, but despite the prevalent language of autonomous choice, discussion of health promotion messages, for example, related to drinking and smoking demonstrates that this currently does not happen. Health promotion strategies should seek to encourage reflection about the harm our health effecting behaviour causes others.

Succulent Sins, Personalized Politics, and Mainstream Media’s Tabloidization Temptation

This study uses an experiment to analyze how mainstream journalism’s use of tabloid writing techniques affects online credibility. Participants read four news stories and rated their credibility using McCroskey’s Source Credibility Scale. Participants found stories written with a tabloid style less credible than more traditional stories. Tabloidized soft news stories were more credible than tabloidized hard news stories. Results suggest that online news media may damage their credibility by using tabloidized writing techniques to increase readership. Furthermore, participants were less likely to enjoy stories written in a tabloidized style. An application of act utilitarianism suggests that tabloidization is an unethical method for increasing news readership.

Utilitarian epistemology

Standard epistemology takes it for granted that there is a special kind of value: epistemic value. This claim does not seem to sit well with act utilitarianism, however, since it holds that only welfare is of real value. I first develop a particularly utilitarian sense of “epistemic value”, according to which it is closely analogous to the nature of financial value. I then demonstrate the promise this approach has for two current puzzles in the intersection of epistemology and value theory: first, the problem of why knowledge is better than mere true belief, and second, the relation between epistemic justification and responsibility.

Utilitarian theories reconsidered: common misconceptions, more recent developments, and health policy implications.

Despite the prevalence of the terms utilitarianism and utilitarian in the health care and health policy literature, anecdotal evidence suggests that authors are often not fully aware of the diversity of utilitarian theories, their principles, and implications. Further, it seems that authors often categorically reject utilitarianism under the assumption that it violates individual rights. The tendency of act utilitarianism to neglect individual rights is attenuated, however, by the diminishing marginal utility of wealth and the disutility of a protest by those who are disadvantaged. In practice, act utilitarians tend to introduce moral rules and preserve traditional rules. At the same time, the tenability of rule utilitarianism is limited because it ultimately collapses into act utilitarianism or a deontological theory. Negative utilitarianism is a viable utilitarian variant only if we accept complete aversion to suffering, ie, if we disregard any forgone opportunities to increase pleasure. Finally, the adoption of preference utilitarianism requires us to accept the subjectivity of individual claims which may be perceived as unfair.

From Consequentialism to Utilitarianism

In this article, we show that total act utilitarianism can be derived from a set of axioms that are (or ought to be) acceptable for anyone subscribing to the basic ideals of consequentialism.

Expected Utility, Contributory Causation, and Vegetarianism

Several authors have argued that act–utilitarianism cannot provide an adequate critique of buying meat because a single meat purchase will not actually cause more farm animals to be raised or slaughtered. Thus, regardless of whether or not the production of meat is inhumane to animals, someone who buys meat is doing nothing wrong. This argument fails to show that meat purchases are morally permissible, however, because it assumes that act–utilitarians would use actual utility in their decision to buy or not to buy meat. I show that act–utilitarians cannot use actual utility as a decision procedure and must instead use expected utility to prescribe or proscribe actions. I then demonstrate how expected utility can be applied to cases of contributory causation, where many people seem morally responsible for causing something to happen. Buying meat is one case of contributory causation where the probability of any single individual's affecting meat production is slight, but the expected disutility of affecting that production is substantial. Thus, in its expected utility form, act–utilitarianism defeats the ‘causal inefficacy’ defence of buying meat [1].

The Moral Opacity of Utilitarianism

The guiding utilitarian idea (GUI) is that final ground of moral assessment ... must lie in effects on people's well-being (or welfare). The GUI calls (in some sense) for welfare to be promoted as much as possible. It is natural to suppose that act utilitarianism (AU) is the most faithful moral expression of the GUI, for AU requires one to promote welfare as much as possible. This paper first reviews the reasons we have to doubt that assumption--reasons to believe that conforming our behavior to AU does not guarantee that we shall maximize welfare. The question arises whether there is a better interpretation of utilitarianism--a better representative within moral theory of the GUI. This paper suggests that welfare would be better promoted by conformity to a multiple-influence principle, which refers directly to more than one factor (to, e.g., rules and behavioral dispositions as well as acts). As we have no clear idea of what such a principle would be like, it follows that utilitarianism is morally opaque. The paper concludes by suggesting that utilitarianism is not merely opaque but morally ambiguous, as there is no determinate criterion for identifying the moral principle that best represents the GUI.

Utilitarian alternatives to Act Utilitarianism

One problem for any utilitarian alternative to act utilitarianism, such as rule utilitarianism, is the feeling that act utilitarianism is the most natural form of utilitarianism. Other forms seen unmotivated, inconsistent, or irrational. This argument is found in Smart, Foot and Slote. It turns on the assumption that utilitarianism must be motivated by the “teleological motivation”, the idea that one must derive one's entire moral theory from the notion of the good. I respond that act utilitarianism itself has a problem from the point of view of the teleological motivation, a problem solved, surprisingly, by several utilitarian alternatives including rule utilitarianism.

Taking Justice Too Seriously

One of the standard objections to traditional act utilitarianism is that it is insensitive to issues of justice and desert. Traditional act utilitarianism holds, for example, that it is morally obligatory to torture or kill an innocent person, when doing so increases the happiness of others more than it decreases the happiness of the innocent person. Utilitarianism is, of course, sensitive to what people believe about justice (for example, people might riot, if they believe a gross injustice has been done), but it is not sensitive to justice itself.

Act utilitarianism and dynamic deliberation

Coordination problems, problems in which each agent's expected utility depends upon what other agents do, pose a problem for act utilitarianism. When the agents are act utilitarians and know of each other that they are so, they seem unable to achieve optimal outcomes in certain coordination problems. I examine various ways the act utilitarian might attempt to solve this problem, where act utilitarianism is interpreted within the framework of subjective expected utility theory. In particular, a new method for computing expected utility,dynamic deliberation, deserves examination as a possible act utilitarian solution to coordination problems. I argue that even dynamic deliberation fails to give the act utilitarian what he needs in coordination problems, and that the failure of act utilitarianism for such problems suggests the need for an alternative theory of moral choice along rule utilitarian lines.

Cooperation and doing the best one can

That one ought morally to do the best one can is a view that enjoys a rich history of support.1 Its most famous incarnation is act utilitarianism, according to which one ought to produce the most favorable balance of pleasure over pain that one can. Act utilitarianism is traditionally seen to be an amalgamation of hedonism (the view that the only thing that is intrinsically good [bad] is a state of pleasure [pain]) and consequentialism (the view that one ought to produce the most favorable balance of intrinsic goodness over intrinsic badness that one can). It is the consequentialist aspect of act utilitarianism that renders it a version of the thesis that one ought to do the best one can.