Act Of Intellect Research Articles

Hervaeus Natalis and his polemics with the early scotists about formalities and formal distinction in God

The article is devoted to Hervaeus Natalis, also known as Hervaeus drom Nedellec, who was an outstanding theologian at the end of 13th — beginning of 14th centuries (c. 1260–1323). Brief biographical information about Hervaeus is provided and his importance for medieval thought is emphasized. The subject matter of the article is the consideration of a formal difference, or formal distinction in God. The introduction of this concept is usually associated with the name of Duns Scotus, and there is every reason for this: although Duns was not the inventor of formal distinction as such, it was he who put it at the heart of his trinitarian theology. The concept of formal difference is inextricably linked to the concept of formalities, which in this context mean those ontological subunits in a concrete single essence between which there is a formal difference. The basic impetus to the introduction of both concepts was the necessity for rational expression of distinction between common divine nature and those relations by which Persons are constituted (relations of fatherhood, sonship, etc.), and also between different divine attributes. The task was, on the one hand, not to destroy the absolute real unity in God, and, on the other hand to explain certain differences that exist in him before any act of intellect, even divine intellect. Therefore, the notion of formality as a correlate “from the nature of the thing”, which corresponds to any attribute or relation, is conceivable in a separate concept.

Ibn-Sina (Avicenna). Al-Isharat wa-t-tanbihat [on metaphysics]. Part three

Abstract: it is a continuation of the translation into Russian of Ibn-Sina’s treatise al-Isharat wa-t-Tanbihat (“Remarks and Admonitions”). The present chapter deals with the origination of the world from the One / Necessary Existent. Divine creation is described as an act of intellection. The cosmogonic scheme is constructed through the synthesis of Neoplatonian emanationism with the Aristotelian-Ptolemy model of the Universe.

Catecumenado del Ritual de la Iniciación Cristiana de Adultos (RICA): un ejemplo de inteligencia sentiente

La filosofia realista de Xavier Zubiri apuntó una via liberadora de la “inteligencia concipiente”, en la cual el concepto y el juicio constituían el acto primario de intelección y no la aprehensión de la “realidad”. Este modo de conocer, desde los griegos, separó el sentir y el inteligir como dos facultades independientes e incluso opuestas. Al contrario, en la “inteligencia sentiente” tanto el sentir como el inteligir son momentos del único acto de conocimiento, en el que el primario y radical es la aprehensión de la “realidad” más que los conceptos. La recuperación del catecumenado de iniciación cristiana de adultos por el Concilio Vaticano II es una excelente demostración de la “inteligencia sentiente” al servicio de la fe.

Exposición y crítica al análisis del acto de intelección primordial de Zubiri.

This article exposes and criticizes the conception of the primordial intellection act of Zubiri and the methodology used to address such act. Its aim is to show that despite of all the efforts of Zubiri to keep an analysis of the act of intellection, inevitably slives toward a theory of intellection, which obscures the intellection essence and the mutual congenericity that supposedly keeps the intellection whit the reality.

The ‘Intellected Thing’ (res intellecta) in Hervaeus Natalis

This paper analyses the ontological status of the ‘intellected thing’ (res intellecta) in Hervaeus Natalis. For Hervaeus an intellected thing is not a thing in the outer world, but something radically different, namely an internal, mind-dependent entity, something having a peculiar mode of being, ‘esse obiective’. While Hervaeus often says that the act of intellection is directed upon real things, this does not mean that the act is directed upon things existing actually outside the mind. Hervaeus argues that the act of intellection is directed upon things existing ‘aptitudinally’ outside the mind, not actually outside the mind. A thing existing aptitudinally outside the mind is a mind-dependent entity, something having esse obiective. In order to establish this point, I will explain how the property ‘being intellected’ (esse intellectum) should be interpreted in Hervaeus’ philosophy. This property is a peculiar type of relation, namely a relation of reason that gives a peculiar ontological status to its bearer. To neglect the distinction between actually outside and aptitudinally outside could falsely lead one to ascribe to Hervaeus a theory of intellection where the mental act is directed upon mind-independent entities.

Divine Nature and Divine Will

This paper examines the relationship between God and those universals that characterize his nature. It is argued that God has sovereignty over his nature, even though he is not self-creating, and does not give rise to the universals that characterize his nature by any act of intellection. Rather, God is himself an act of rational willing in which all that is has its existence. Because the act that is God is one of free will, he has sovereignty over the features it displays, which include all that characterizes his nature.

Der Begriff der inneren Erfahrung bei Petrus Johannis Olivi

The concept of inner experience in Peter John Olivi. This article discusses the notion of inner experience and self-knowledge in Peter John Olivi. According to Olivi, each act of cognition is accompanied by some sort of self-awareness or self-experience. Therefore, the problem of an infinite regress of acts of self-awareness arises. Olivi tries to solve this problem by drawing on a theory of reflection which bears a striking resemblance to modern self-representational or dispositional accounts of (self)consciousness. Thus, in order to be said to be »known« or »certain« it is not necessary for each single act of intellect to be followed by a higher-order act; Olivi argues that in many cases a simple first-order cognitive act suffices.

Plenty of Nothing: Ockham's Commitment to Real Possibles

����� As Marilyn Adams discovers in the course ofher valuable article on Nominalism and Unreal Entities, Ockham's mature theory of concepts carries with it an ontological commitment to unreduced unactualized possibles.1 What we are thinking about when we think about horses in general cannot be real universal horse outside the mind or fictive horse posited by the mind itselfin 'objective' being, but neither is our concept horse restricted to past or present actual horses. It applies as well to merely possible horses, and for Ockham, eventually, as Adams shows, this means that there must be possible horses for the concept to apply to, fully determinate individual merely possible horses which cannot be reduced to aspects of actual horses or aspects ofthe mind itself. I think I am only spelling out what is implicit here when I say that, on this view, the act of intellection in which we exercise our universal concept horse is sort of mental viewing of each and every one of an infinite number of wholly distinct, fully individuated possible horses, and that when we say that all horses are animals we are somehow identifying each ofthese possible horses with one ofan even larger infinite number ofpossible animals. With some reason, given our usual sense of Ockham's philosophical temperament and given his ridicule of theories of concepts positing a little world ofoccult objectively existent things, Adams concludes that Ockham should have found this commitment to real possibles embarrassing: he should have found such unreduced, unactualized possibles even stranger than the occult entities posited by an objective